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Preface
This study was carried out in the Department of 
Political Science within the Research School of Social 
Sciences of the Australian National University between 
1965 and 1968. During this period I held a three-year 
scholarship awarded by the University.
The study is based primarily on the records of 
the Graziers’ Association of New South Wales, on 
interviews and discussions with its leaders, staff and 
members, and on observations of meetings of its central 
and local institutions. The detailed analysis of a 
pressure group is virtually impossible without the 
co-operation of the group and without access to its 
records. For this study I was particularly fortunate. 
Leaders, staff and members alike not only co-operated 
to make the project possible but went out of their way 
to assist in every way they could. Leaders and staff 
made time available for interviews and discussions, 
and arranged for me to attend, as an observer, the 
Association’s Annual Conferences and meetings of its 
General Council, committees, district councils and 
local branches. Free access was provided to all the 
Association’s records, and no limitations were imposed 
on their use. During 1966 I made a number of field 
trips to different country districts and talked to 
leaders and paid secretaries of branches and district 
councils, and to many individual members.
Apart from these sources, the study is also based 
on interviews and discussions with leaders, members and
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staff of other farm organisations, with Ministers and 
members of parliament, and with public servants and 
employees of other governmental authorities; on 
documentary material provided by other farm organisations, 
business groups and trade unions; on the records of 
the Wheat and Woolgrowers* Association of New South Wales, 
and the Farmers and Settlers* Association of New South 
Wales; on city, country and farm newspaper files; and 
on official publications of the N.S.W. and Commonwealth 
Governments. Early in 1968 I conducted a postal survey 
of leaders of the Graziers’ Association and two rival 
bodies in N.S.W. in order to secure data on their social, 
economic and educational backgrounds.
I would like to express my thanks to all those 
who assisted me in the collection and interpretation of 
the data, and in the final preparation of the thesis.
I am especially grateful to the two senior officers of 
the Graziers’ Association, Mr S.S. Ick-Hewins and Mr 
J.H. Fraser, and their colleagues who were most helpful 
in answering my questions and discussing numerous 
aspects of primary industry politics. I also owe 
them my thanks for providing me with such congenial 
working conditions. I must also thank my supervisors,
Dr D.A. Aitkin, Professor R.S. Parker and Dr D.W.
Rawson, for their encouragement and advice, and the 
Australian National University for making the project 
possible.
G.S.H.
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Prefatory Notes
Monetary Amounts
On l4 February 1966 a dollar and cents decimal 
currency system was introduced in Australia. One 
dollar is equal to 100 cents. One pound under the 
old currency equals two dollars, one shilling equals 
ten cents, and one penny equals five-sixths of one 
c ent.
All monetary amounts before l4 February 1966 are 
expressed in old currency, and after that date in new 
currency.
Footnotes and Bibliography
The system used generally follows that recommended 
by the Style Manual: For Authors and Printers of
Australian Government Publications, Canberra, 1966.
Maps
The map of sheep zones in N.S.W. (p.58) was drawn 
from data supplied by officers of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics in Canberra. The map of 
electoral districts for representation on the General 
Council of the Graziers’ Association was reproduced 
from The Graziers’ Annual 1965-1966 edition, Sydney, 
1966, P.372.
Postscript
Since the text was written, the Victorian division 
of the Australian Primary Producers’ Union has 
amalgamated with the Victorian Wheat and Woolgrowers’ 
Association; while in N.S.W. the State division of the 
Australian Primary Producers’ Union and the Apple and 
Pear Growers’ Association have united with the United 
Farmers and Woolgrowers’ Association.
XSUMMARY
I. Introduction
The aim of the study is to analyse and explain 
the pressure group behaviour of the Graziers’ Association 
of New South Wales.
The growing importance of pressure groups in 
Australia has raised many important questions, few 
of which have yet been answered, or at least adequately. 
To date there has been little intensive research on 
pressure groups in Australia. However, the student 
of pressure groups in this country has available to 
him many overseas studies and a large body of theoretical 
literature. The approach used here has been adapted 
from that developed by Eckstein. It relates behaviour 
to the environment with which the group interacts.
II. Environment
Environmental factors affect the way the Association 
behaves and its political effectiveness directly. They 
also affect the Association’s behaviour and effectiveness 
in politics through their influence on its internal 
characteristics.
Economic factors are of particular importance.
The Association operates in a modern, industrialised 
and regulated economy in which rural industries and 
rural dwellers are of decreasing importance, and in 
which all economic sections are becoming increasingly 
dependent on governments. Yet rural industries are 
still important as a source of food and raw materials,
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and of export earnings. The Association now claims to 
speak for the wheat industry as well as the wool and 
meat industries. In the wool industry, marked economic 
differences between producers have contributed to angry 
and long-lived disagreements over marketing and 
promotion. In the last decade these differences have 
been accentuated by declining wool prices and 
increasing production costs.
While Australian political culture provides no 
barrier to the free organisation of groups or pressure 
group activity, it places definite restrictions on 
methods that groups may legitimately use. As primary 
producers, graziers are accorded special advantages, 
though these are somewhat offset by prejudice and lack 
of sympathy arising from graziers’ wealth and high 
status. While they share many attitudes common to all 
primary producers, graziers have a distinctive sub­
culture of their own. This sub-culture differs from 
that of wheat-sheep farmers, and the cultural 
differences between graziers and wheat-sheep farmers 
have been a contributing factor to the conflict in the 
wool industry.
The Association operates in a political context 
where decisions affecting graziers are made at three 
different levels of government. At Commonwealth and 
State levels effective power now lies mainly in the 
hands of Ministers and public servants, and with 
statutory boards and commissions. Considerable 
opportunity exists for responsible and representative 
groups to participate in policy-making and
xii
administration. The Association’s behaviour and 
effectiveness are influenced to a large extent by 
the policies of official actors, and by competition 
from other groups. The most serious competition faced 
by all graziers’ associations is from the wheat-sheep 
farmers’ organisations, and the long-lived political 
rivalry between the two sets of organisations has 
contributed to the disagreements and unrest in the 
wool industry.
Ill. Group Characteristics
Unlike many groups, the Association was not formed 
to secure government assistance or veto government 
action, but in reaction to the industrial organisation 
of pastoral employees in the late nineteenth century.
At first the Association saw itself as an industrial 
rather than a political organisation. But through 
the influence of a variety of environmental factors, 
it was drawn increasingly and permanently into politics.
In its resources, goals and beliefs, the Graziers’ 
Association differs significantly from its main rivals. 
Its political resources include: a large constant
membership; members of high social status; skilful 
leaders; financial resources and a well-staffed 
secretariat; an effective organisation structure; and 
a serious and rational approach to decision-making. At 
the same time it has some serious disabilities: 
inability to speak for all producers of wool, wheat and 
meat in N.S.W.; a marked anti-Labor, anti-trade union 
bias; a conservative ideological position; and intense 
antipathy from many sections of the community. Its
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goals and beliefs clearly reflect the grazier sub­
culture. The Association still seeks to resist 
unfavourable government action and is opposed to 
socialism and communism, but at the same time it is 
concerned to achieve many forms of extended government 
activity and expenditure.
IV. Behaviour
The Association has its own distinctive political 
style or manner of performing political actions. Its 
style is refined and experienced, and reflects the 
cultural norms of graziers.
Today the Association is concerned with a wide 
range of issue-areas at three different levels of 
government. Of the three levels, State government 
is still the most important, though the importance 
of the Commonwealth is rapidly increasing. Since the 
1920s the volume of demands of governments made by 
the Association has increased by three or four times. 
Demands differ in many ways but especially in the tone 
in which they are made, and in the kind and degree 
of change sought (some, of course, seek retention of 
the status quo, rather than change). Today the 
Association seeks to achieve its goals primarily by 
political action.
Overall, the Association pursues its political 
objectives with fervour and persistence. Intensity 
however, varies from time to time, and between different 
issue-areas and types of demands.
In Australia most economic pressure groups co­
operate and form different kinds of alliances with 
other groups. The Graziers’ Association not only works 
with other graziers’ associations and other farm 
organisations, but also with different business pressure 
groups.
Demands are articulated by central and local organs 
within the Association, and by other groups with which 
it is affiliated. The Association prefers to communicate 
its demands directly to governments, but it also directs 
demands to secondary and intermediate targets; these 
targets include the electorate, political parties, 
members of Parliament, the judiciary, committees and 
Royal Commissions and other pressure groups.
V . Effectiveness
The Association’s effectiveness in politics is 
determined by environmental factors, its internal 
characteristics, and its political behaviour. On 
the basis of three criteria - political influence, 
impact on other actors and the political system, and 
success in achieving its goals - it must be regarded 
as an effective pressure group.
VI. Case-Studies
Three case-studies illustrate how the Association 
behaves in certain situations and in relation to 
specific objectives.
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The first, concerning the wool sales deduction 
acts of 1950» illustrates the kind of situation in which 
partisan political pressure groups sometimes find 
themselves when a favoured political party achieves 
office and introduces legislation opposed by members 
of the group. The study also illustrates the 
unsuccessful use of veto power, and some problems facing 
groups when they participate in confidential negotiations 
with governments.
The second study is of the Association’s role in 
the reserve price referendum campaign of 1965* It 
provides an example of the successful use of veto 
power by means of a public campaign directed to 
woolgrowers.
The third study relates to cattle compensation, 
a largely non-controversial matter at State level. It 
illustrates the Association’s role as an initiator of 
policy and as an ombudsman on behalf of its members, 
its competence on technical and less important 
administrative matters, and its relations with both 
Labor and non-Labor governments.
VII. Conclusions
The study shows the importance of environmental 
factors, and suggests that many criticisms of the 
Association and of economic pressure groups are 
unjustified. It also questions common generalisations 
about the methods employed by pressure groups, illustrates 
the important functions they perform, and points to the 
need for further research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
Introduction
In Australia graziers occupy a special place in 
society and in economic life. Not only do they constitute 
a social and economic elite, but in terms of their 
numbers they produce a disproportionate amount of the 
exportable wealth of the nation. Through founding and 
developing the wool industry they made an important 
contribution to the economic development of Australia.
As Sir Keith Hancock aptly put it, ’Wool made Australia 
a solvent nation, and, in the end, a free one’."*"
Since the early colonial period graziers have 
participated in politics in different ways. Their high 
social status, their education and their economic 
interests provide strong motivation for political 
participation. Many graziers seek office on shire and 
municipal councils or on Pastures Protection Boards.
Many write letters to newspapers; many join and contribute 
financial support to political parties. A few run for 
office in State and Commonwealth parliaments. But perhaps 
the most important means by which graziers today 
participate in politics is through organised associations 
and formal groups. In each State of Australia formally 
organised graziers’ associations play a significant role
1
W.K. Hancock, Australia, Brisbane, reprinted 1964, p.2.
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2in the political process and provide graziers with an 
important channel to communicate their demands to 
governments and public authorities.
This study is concerned with the largest and strongest 
of these graziers’ associations, the Graziers’ Association 
of New South Wales (hereafter referred to, for reasons 
of economy, as the GA although the Association’s own 
informal abbreviation is ’the Graziers’). The GA is a 
highly complex organisation which performs many different 
functions. The study however, is concerned with its 
political functions only or, more precisely, with its 
role and behaviour as a political pressure group.
The term ’pressure group’ is used in a technical 
sense; it does not imply any sort of value-judgment. A 
pressure group can be defined as a group of persons, or 
a formal association or institution, that communicates 
demands to public authorities and that seeks to influence 
the content of public policy and how policy is 
administered. A pressure group is a group seeking to 
achieve political change. Some students of politics have 
rejected the term ’pressure group’ on the grounds that it 
implies coercion, or at least the use of sanctions.
However, alternatives such as 'lobby' or 'interest group’ 
are also open to objections,"*- and the term ’pressure 
group’ is now more firmly established in the language of 
political science than any of the alternatives. Moreover, 
the term 'pressure group’ implies political action, even 
if such action is not pressure in its close metaphorical 
s ense,
1
For example, the term’lobby1 suggests political influence 
aimed solely at legislatures.
3In Australia there is a fairly clear distinction 
between parties and pressure groups. Pressure groups 
generally aim to achieve influence over certain policies, 
rather than to achieve control of government. Parties 
concentrate mainly on contesting elections, while most 
pressure groups use a wide variety of methods; since 
parties have to attract wide electoral support, their 
policies are usually broader in scope and more general 
than those of pressure groups.
The GA can be classed as an economic pressure group. 
Economic pressure groups can be defined as groups whose 
main political objective is to make claims upon 
governments to benefit the interests they represent in 
a material or economic sense. They are the groups that 
speak on behalf of labour (including the professions), 
businessmen, and primary producers in relation to their 
functions as employees and employers, and as economic 
producers. Except for the Returned Services League and 
one or two other groups, economic pressure groups are by 
far the most important pressure groups in the Australian 
political system. They are concerned with all the main 
policy areas of government. They exercise considerable 
power, and can disturb the balance of the economy. They 
are constantly involved in politics, and most of them 
have complex structures and machinery to develop their 
own policies and to articulate their demands,
Pressure Groups and the Australian Political System
The ’direct and ubiquitous influence of pressure 
groups upon the framing of national policy’, wrote the 
Australian journalist and author Craig McGregor in 1966,
4’is one of the outstanding characteristics of the 
Australian power scene’.“*" While there is nothing peculiar 
to Australia about this, it is true that pressure groups 
are of considerable and increasing importance in the 
Australian political system. There is also good reason to 
believe that pressure groups perform much more important 
political functions than most Australians (including 
many students of politics) seem to realise.
Pressure groups are not a new phenomenon in Australian 
politics. Before the federation of the Australian 
colonies in 1901, and even before the first colonies 
achieved responsible government in the 1850s, organised 
groups of pastoralists, merchants and workers, and 
organisations such as churches sought to influence public
-ypolicy. But in this century, particularly since the 
1930s) pressure groups have assumed distinctively new 
forms and have acquired much greater political importance. 
The leading pressure groups of today with their well- 
staffed secretariats, their public relations bureaus and 
their imposing office blocks located close to the 
government departments they wish to influence, differ 
greatly from the loosely organised and often short-lived 
groups charateristic of the nineteenth century or even 
of the early years of the present century.
The growing political importance of pressure groups 
is viewed with concern by some Australians who see the 
power of farmers to secure subsidies, or of manufacturers 
to gain tariff protection, or of the Returned Services
1
Craig McGregor, Profile of Australia, London, 1966, p.331
5League to secure pensions for its members, or of the 
Roman Catholic Church to get money for its schools, as a 
direct threat to the stability of the political system 
and to the public interest. Those who fear and oppose 
the growth of strong pressure groups argue that with the 
free organisation of groups wealthy and well-organised 
interests have an unfair advantage over other sections 
of the community. Small but wealthy groups of 
manufacturers, it is asserted, are clearly in a better 
position to influence government policy than numerous and 
scattered consumers of their products. Critics of 
pressure groups also argue that the product of the 
demands of many different sectional groups in society is 
not necessarily in the long-term interest of the majority 
of citizens. Even leaders of strong pressure groups 
sometimes doubt whether the influence of groups is 
always in the national interest. When serving as 
President of the United Graziers' Association of 
Queensland, the late Sir Richard Boyer (later Chairman 
of the ABC from 194.5 to 1961) described pressure groups 
as acting 'with less sense of moral and communal 
responsibility than would their component members as 
individual citizens'.  ^ Other critics of pressure groups 
see the danger of misrepresentation of interests through 
the manipulation of power inside groups. Since most 
pressure groups are voluntary associations, their 
internal affairs are largely outside government control 
and supervision.
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1941 (quoted by 
L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Croydon 
(Victoria), 1965, p.134).
6Some of the most vocal criticism of pressure groups 
comes from economists who object to the close relations 
between the leading business and farm organisations, and 
government departments. This, they claim, results in 
undue secrecy in decision-making and a lack of serious 
discussion on economic planning. According to Maxwell 
Newton,
a sort of subterranean political, system has 
developed where industry pressure groups 
maintain steady liaison with Commonwealth 
officials and ministers in furthering their 
own interests. The result is that great 
decisions are being taken, affecting the 
direction of the whole economy and the 
profitability of individual companies, 
spasmodically and to a large extent beyond 
the knowledge of the mass of the people  ^
and beyond the reach of public criticism.
Other economists complain that what little economic
planning there is in Australia is often frustrated by the
influence of powerful pressure groups. McFarlane
considers that there are ’obvious dangers in planners and
policy-makers producing economically calculated proposals
which are then modified out of recognition or deflected
2by group pressures’. Another economist has warned that
1
Maxwell Newton, ’The Economy’, in A.F. Davies and S. 
Encel (ed.), Australian Society; A Sociological 
Introduction, Melbourne, 1 9 6 5 ? p p .240-1.
2
Bruce McFarlane, ’Interest Groups and Economic Policy’, 
Dissent, Winter 1967? No.20, p.12. See also McFarlane’s 
Economic Policy in Australia; the case for reform, 
Melbourne, 1968.
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the concentration of power in Australia in the hands of 
business executives, and bureaucrats of the public service 
and the major pressure groups is 'the most serious threat 
to democracy in Australia*. ^
Criticism of the power of pressure groups in the 
last decade has probably been directed more against farm 
organisations than groups representing any other major 
interest. Journalists, labour spokesmen and economists 
(particularly agricultural economists) assert that farm 
interests, more than any other section of the community, 
have succeeded in manipulating political processes for 
their own advantage. In particular, they complain of 
the extraordinary influence of farm organisations in 
securing subsidies and other financial assistance for 
farmerso According to one journalist, the wheat 
stabilisation scheme ’has been used to put more and more 
money into the pockets of growers at the expense of the 
taxpayers* and ’because of the unceasing activity of the 
farm pressure groups,..the odds have increasingly favored 
the f a r m e r ' A  prominent trade union leader has 
referred to primary producers as ’the most pampered 
section of the Australian community’. In 1966 a 
professor of agricultural economics told a conference 
of accountants that no industry ’had been more successful
1
H.W. Arndt, ’The Danger of Big Business’, The Australian 
Quarterly , Vol. XXIX, No „ 4 (December 1957)» p.89.
2
The Bulletin, 2 April 1966, p .6l„
3
ibid„, 8 May 1965, p .84.
8in gouging large income transfers from other sections of 
the community than dairying’„* When another agricultural 
economist wrote a Current Affairs Bulletin attacking 
subsidies paid to the dairy industry, he gave it the apt 
title Milking the Australian Economy.' Agricultural 
economists in particular object to the way decisions are 
made on agricultural policy. They complain that farm 
organisations often have access to confidential reports 
and information not available to them or to members of 
the public. In I966 Professor K.O. Campbell attacked the 
practice whereby commodity policy proposals are 
thoroughly discussed with representative farm organisations 
before they go to Cabinet, and are kept confidential until 
the policy is crystallised and announced by the Minister 
for Primary Industry, ’Under this regime’, Campbell 
asserted,
the public is uninformed and ill-prepared to 
register any protests and there is no opportunity 
for informed and considered criticism by other 
affected parties. It is easy to see in these 
circumstances how the public interest may be 
sacrificed to the advantage of sectional 
interests, particularly in the matter of 
subsidies.... I would not deny the right of, 
and indeed necessity for the Government to 
consult with the directly-affected parties when 
administrative policies touching on their 
interests are being formulated. But I also 
feel that the broader public interest should be
1
Report in Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1966.
Vol. 39, No.13 (22 May 196?).
2
9protected, I would submit that this principle 
is in jeopardy when secrecy and special ^
privilege„.„are tolerated and even encouraged.
Others have attacked the practice whereby decisions on the 
marketing of' primary products are taken by the producers 
themselves 5 either through a vote or by the operation of 
marketing boards which consist almost entirely of producer 
representatives.
Leaders of all pressure groups react strongly to
criticism that pressure groups are both too powerful and
concerned only with the promotion of the selfish interests
of their members. They claim a legitimate right to make
demands and deny that they are acting selfishly. Leaders
of farm organisations add that their organisations are
not as politically powerful as the critics say. Other
interests command greater influence, they argue, and farmers
being at a political disadvantage is additional reason for
pressing their needs on governments. In 1 9 6 6  the President
of the National Farmers’ Union of Australia (NFU)
expressed this viewpoint when he stated:
Some people are inclined to criticize the man 
on the land for being over-vocal about his 
difficulties.... By their diffusive distribution 
across the continent, producers present nothing 
like the electoral might - in real size or actual 
appearance - of the vast concentrations of 
persons in the seaboard cities. The trend of 
our times is not in favour of country people.
As the cities continue to grow - and urbanization 
is a world-wide phenomenon - rural people
1
Keith 0. Campbell, ’Australian Farm Organizations and 
Agricultural Policy1, The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, V o 1.10, N o . 2 (December 1966).
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throughout Australia will need to look to their 
weapons and defences if they are to ensure that 
they are not relegated to the role of an impotent 
minority
Other interests are just as ready as farmers to justify
their pressure group activities as being in the national
interest«, To use the words of one business spokesman,
leaders of economic pressure groups see the ’readiness
of groups of responsible people to...speak out’ as ’the
life blood of a democratic society...the yeast that leavens 
2the dough’. They deny the charge of selfishness; by 
promoting their own interests, they argue, they are at 
the same time promoting the national interest. According 
to a President of a State Chamber of Manufactures, there 
is no contradiction in this assertion:
...we have always held, and I hope we will 
always continue to hold, that the continued 
economic growth of Australia can only be 
achieved, and the national interest furthered, 
against a program of healthy development of 
manufacturing industry.3
There are other arguments advanced by those who 
support the freedom of pressure groups to influence public 
policy. One Australian political scientist argues that if 
our complex society is to remain democratic we must allow
1
Speech by R.J. McAuley, National Farmers’ Union of 
Australia: Annual Conference Addresses 1966, mimeo,
PP*5-6.
2
Article by W.W. Pettingell, President of the Chamber 
of Manufactures of N.S.W., in Impetus: Australia’s
Magazine of Manufacturing, September 1966, p.27.
Ibid., p.28.
3
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the free organisation of interests to influence government; 
he sees pressure groups as
our spokesmen on the issues which concern us 
as Protestants or Catholics or cheese-makers.
They fill the gaps in a system which otherwise 
gives us only a crude choice between two sets 
of leaders. And to say ’Away with all this 
pressure group idea!’ is to say ’Away with 
democracy ! ' ^
Others have argued that strong pressure groups are 
necessary to counteract the danger of a secretive and 
unapproachable bureaucracy and to restrain further 
government encroachment on social and economic life.
This debate on the power and function of pressure 
groups in the Australian political system raises 
fundamental questions which citizens have a right to ask. 
Are pressure groups, or at least some pressure groups, 
too powerful and do they get their way contrary to public 
interest? Have farm organisations used their 
privileged relations with governments to secure unfair 
financial advantages for their members? Does the machinery 
of government for resolving the conflicting claims of 
interests work effectively when big and powerful groups 
are involved? Do minority groups get an adequate hearing 
or are they overlooked because they are small, inarticulate 
or politically insignificant? Are there some matters of 
fundamental importance which receive no consideration
1
P.B. Westerway, 'Pressure Groups', in John Wilkes (ed.), 
Forces in Australian Politics, Sydney, 19 6 3 , p.l46.
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because there are no pressure groups to state a case? Do 
we need legislative safeguards against the misrepresentation 
of interests through the manipulation of power inside 
groups? Are pressure groups responsible for undue secrecy 
in decision-making and the frustration of economic 
planning? Is the apparent increase in the importance of 
pressure groups undesirable and does it constitute a 
threat to the stability of the Australian political 
system?
For the student of politics there are even more 
fundamental questions that must be asked. What functions 
do pressure groups perform in the political system? In 
the terms of political scientists employing functional 
theories, are the consequences 'dysfunctional’ or 
'enfunctional’ for the larger systems in which they 
operate? Is the political role of pressure groups in 
the Australian political system changing? Are pressure 
groups, in fact, becoming more important and more 
powerful? What factors determine the power of groups at 
various stages of the governmental process? What 
features of the Australian political system tend to 
maximize the influence of organised groups and what 
features confine their activities within tolerable limits? 
Fhat factors determine how a group behaves in politics?
R.T. McKenzie has suggested that in Britain pressure 
groups ’are a far more important channel of communication 
than parties for the transmission of political ideas
13
from the mass of the citizenry to their rulers’. Is 
the same true of Australia? What effects have changes 
in the structure and functions of pressure groups had on 
the Australian party system? In what ways do groups 
representing the major economic interests - business, 
primary industry and labour - differ from one another? 
How do Australian pressure groups compare with those in 
the United States, Britain and other countries?
Most of these questions about the role and function
of pressure groups in the Australian political system
have not yet been answered, or at least answered
adequately. Research into Australian pressure groups
so far has been limited. There is still only one
published book in the field of contemporary pressure
group activity in Australia - a study written by a 
2Canadian. Apart from this, the published work is 
restricted almost entirely to two general sketches of
1
R.T. McKenzie, ’Parties, Pressure Groups and the British 
Political Process’, in Richard Rose (ed.), Studies in 
British Politics, London, 1966, p.259* This is an 
abridged and amended form of McKenzie’s paper which 
originally appeared in The Political Quarterly, Vol. 29,
No .1 (1958).
2
G.L. Kristians on, The Politics of Patriotisms The 
Pressure Group Activities of the Returned Servicemen * s 
League,Canberra, 1 966. T.Truman's Catholic Action and 
Politics, Melbourne, 1959, has some features of a pressure 
group study, but is basically a study of the relationship 
between the Catholic Church and politics, especially Labor 
politics.
l4
pressure groups in Australia, some brief studies of
2individual pressure groups and groups within different
3economic sectors, and a number of historical studies of
4pressure group activity and influence. There are
1
Trevor Matthews, ’Pressure Groups in Australia’, in 
Henry Mayer (ed.), Australian Politics; A Reader,
Melbourne, 1966; and W.A. Towns ley, ’Pressure Groups in 
Australia’, in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), Interest Groups on 
Four Continents, Pittsburgh, 1958.
2
For example, G.E. Caiden, ’The Commonwealth Public 
Service Associations as a Pressure Group’, The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol. X, N oT4(December 
1964) ; Trevor Matthews, ’The Political Activities of the 
Australian Employers’ Federation’, APSA conference paper, 
1964; and Westerway (who discusses groups which support 
and oppose the White Australia Policy and religious 
education in schools, and the Returned Services League).
3
The main studies of groups concerned with primary industry 
are: Campbell, ’Australian Farm Organizations and
Agricultural Policy' ; G. D’A. Chislett, 'Primary Producer 
Organizations', in D.B. Williams (ed.), Agriculture in 
the Australian Economy, Sydney, 1967; and G.S. Harman 
and R.F.I. Smith, ’’To Speak with One Voice”: Australian
Farm Organizations and the Quest for Unity', The Australian 
Quarterly, Vol.39. No.4 (December 1967)•4
For example, Ian Campbell, ’Groups, Parties and 
Federation’, in P. Loveday and I. Campbell, Groups in 
Theory and Practice, Melbourne, 1962; and R.S. Parker,
'Group Interests and the Non-Labor Parties since 1930’> 
ANZAAS paper, 1958 (now published in Colin A. Hughes (ed.), 
Readings in Australian Government, St. Lucia, 1968).
Aaron Wildavsky and Dagmar Carboch cover the role of 
pressure groups during the 1926 referendum and the 1929 
federal election in Studies in Australian Politics, 
Melbourne, 1958. The role of pressure groups in the 1911» 
1913 and 1919 referenda campaigns is discussed in Conrad 
Joyner, The Commonwealth and Monopolies, Melbourne, 1963*
The research of B.D. Graham and Don Aitkin on the Country 
Party has provided useful information on those farm groups
(continued on p.15).
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also some useful histories of trade unions and other 
organisations"^ which, while in many cases concentrating 
on internal structure and policies, are of value for the 
student of Australian pressure groups.
4 (continued from p.l4)
which supported or were affiliated with the Country Party. 
Graham’s published work includes The Formation of the 
Australian Country Parties, Canberra, 1966; and ’Graziers 
in Politics, 1917 "to 1929’, in Alan Barnard (ed.)
The Simple Fleece; Studies in the Australian Wool 
Industry, Melbourne, 1962. 'Pools and Politics: The Issue
of Co-operative Marketing in the Wheat and Wool Industries, 
1910-1922', APSA paper, August 1963, by Graham has some 
material on wheat and wool grower organisations. His 
Ph.D. thesis, 'The Political Strategies of the Australian 
Country Parties, From their Origins until 1929’ , contains 
details not included in publications. Aitkin’s Ph.D. 
thesis (ANU, 1964), ’The Organisation of the Australian 
Country Party (N.S.W.), 1946 to 1962' contains material
on relations between the GA and the Country Party. The 
two books by Ulrich Ellis on the Country Party (The 
Country Party: A Political and Social History of the
Party in New South Wales, Melbourne, 1958, and A History 
of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne, 1 9 6 3 ) cover 
somewhat the same ground as Graham and Aitkin.
1
The most useful studies of trade unions are R.A. Gollan, 
The Coalminers of New South Wales, Melbourne, 1963; J.
Hagan, Printers and Politics: A History of the Australian
Printing Unions 1850-1950» Canberra, 19o6; Gerald E. Caiden, 
The A.C.P.T.A.: A Study of White Collar Public Service
Unionism in the Commonwealth of Australia 1883-1922, 
Department of Political Science, Research School of Social 
Sciences, Australian National University, 1966; and R.M. 
Martin, Whitecollar Unions In Australia, Sydney, n.d. One 
of the few published histories of business groups is R.W.C. 
Anderson, A Brief History of the Associated Chamber of 
Manufactures, Canberra, i960. There are a number of 
histories of farm organisations including William A. Bayley, 
History of the Farmers and Settlers’ Association of N.S.W«, 
Sydney 19575 F.R. Mercer, On Farmers’ Service: A Short
History of Farmers’ Organisation in Western Australia,
(continued on p.l6 )
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Focus and Aims of the Study - the GA
This study is strictly limited in its scope and aims.
It is concerned with the behaviour of a single pressure 
group, and it does not pretend to answer or even to 
discuss adequately most of the questions raised about 
pressure groups and the Australian political system. The 
aim of the study is to analyse and explain the pressure 
group behaviour of the GA, with particular reference to 
the factors that influence the Association’s behaviour, 
the character of its behaviour, and its effectiveness in 
politics. But despite the study’s limited scope and aims, 
it is hoped that some light will be thrown on the role and 
functions of pressure groups, particularly economic pressure 
groups, in Australia, and also on the little researched 
field of the politics of Australian agriculture.
The GA is not only one of the oldest and most 
important farm organisations in Australia, but one of the 
oldest and most important economic pressure groups. It 
was formed in 1890, a decade before the formation of the 
Commonwealth, and immediately before the major industrial 
disturbances of I89O-I. Faced with the industrial 
organisation of shearers in the militant Amalgamated
I (continued from p.15)
Perth, 1955; Janet McRae, The Tasmanian Farmers, 
Stockowners & Orchardists Association 1908-1958, Hobart, 
1961; M.P. Dunlop, Looking Backward - What the P.P.U. 
has done, Sydney, 1925; and Frederick M. Ranson,
History of the United Grazier s ’ Association of Qu eensland 
from 1890, Brisbane, n.d. (processed). John Sandford, 
Walter Harper and the Farmers, Perth, 1955» is not only a 
biography but a study of a farmers’ co-operative movement.
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Shearers* Union, pastoralists in N.S.W. in the late 1880s 
quickly formed regional pastoralists’ associations to 
protect their interests and in July 1890 formed the 
Pastoralists’ Union which was renamed the Graziers’ 
Association in 1916. Almost immediately, the Pastoralists’ 
Union became involved in the major industrial struggle 
between employers and the trade unions known as the 
’great strikes’ or the ’great maritime strike’. In the 
end the employers won, but the victory was neither 
complete nor permanent, and the conflict had a lasting 
influence on the participants, and on future events.
The defeat of the unions accelerated the Labor 
movement’s entry into politics (in N.S.W. thirty-six 
Labor members in 1891 were elected to the Legislative 
Assembly where they held the balance of power) while the 
conflict increased tension between pastoralists and 
shearers, and developed within the Association an intense 
fear of trade unions and of the Labor Party the unions 
created.
For well over a decade from its formation, the 
leaders and staff of the Pastoralists’ Union considered 
their organisation to be an industrial rather than a 
political body. In one sense they were right; the Union 
was concerned primarily with resisting the claims of 
unionists and with negotiations over wages and working 
conditions, rather than with making claims on governments. 
But through the influence of a variety of factors the Union 
was drawn increasingly into politics. Today it is 
primarily a political body, and it seeks to achieve its 
aim of promoting and protecting the interests of its 
members both as rural producers and rural dwellers mainly
18
by political action. Consequently, it seeks to influence 
the policies and administrative practices of many different 
Commonwealth and N.S.W. government departments and 
statutory authorities, as well as numerous local 
government bodies.
With over 11,000 members, the GA is one of the largest 
State and regional farm commodity organisations in 
Australia. Its members are scattered widely throughout 
country districts of N.S.W., except for the Riverina and 
the fat' west where two sister graziers* associations 
operate within agreed territorial boundaries. The sizes 
of members’ holdings and enterprises vary greatly.
Originally the Union consisted almost exclusively of 
wealthy pastoralists, pastoral companies, wool firms and 
banks, but later many small landowners were recruited as 
members. Today smaller landowners comprise a large 
proportion of the Association’s membership (over 40 per 
cent of members have fewer than 2,000 sheep), yet the 
Association is still predominantly the voice of large 
graziers, and represents a very high proportion of owners 
of larger grazing holdings within the State.
Because it still has as members many wealthy graziers 
and pastoral companies who are willing to pay large annual 
contributions, and because it uses a sliding scale for 
membership contributions based on stock numbers, the GA 
enjoys an income far greater than any other farm 
organisation in Australia, and equal to that of many 
business pressure groups. Its wealth allows it to operate 
a well-staffed and well-equipped secretariat; in 19^7 the 
GA employed a staff of sixty-one (apart from its cleaning 
and building maintenance staff), five of whom were university
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graduates. The Association also owns an eight storey 
office building in the centre of the down-town business 
area of Sydney, .just two blocks away from Circular Quay 
and in close proximity to government offices.
Members can participate in the affairs of the 
Association through any of its 130 odd branches. Branches 
deal directly with local matters and submit resolutions 
to the Association’s central institutions. Branches also 
appoint delegates to district councils and to the Annual 
Conference, the Association’s main policy-making body.
The administration of the affairs of the Association and 
policy-making between Annual Conferences are in the hands 
of a General Council (mainly elected directly by members), 
an Executive Committee (elected by the Council), and a 
number of standing and specialist committees. The 
President of the Association is elected annually by the 
General Council, and cannot hold office for more than three 
consecutive terms.
As a pressure group, the GA is experienced and 
confident, and generally acts in a responsible manner.
It prides itself on its serious and rational approach to 
policy-making, and on the quality of the submissions it 
makes to governments. The GA uses a wide range of channels 
and tactics to communicate its demands to decision-makers. 
Most of its important demands to the Commonwealth 
Government are communicated through the national 
federation of graziers’ associations, the Australian 
Woolgrowers and Graziers’ Council (AWGC). The AWGC is 
the only farm commodity federation to have its own 
secretariat. In 1967 it had a staff of eight, four of 
whom were university graduates. Its offices are located 
in Sydney within the GA’s office building.
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While it was founded as a graziers’ association, the 
GA now claims to speak on behalf of wool, meat and wheat 
producers in N.S.W. But it is not the sole voice of these 
industries, and it does not enjoy exclusive clientele 
relationships with the government departments with which 
it transacts business. Apart from the two graziers’ 
associations already mentioned, two other organisations - 
the United Farmers and Woolgrowers’ Association (UFWA) and 
the N.S.W. division of the Australian Primary Producers’ 
Union (APPU) - also claim to speak on behalf of the wool, 
meat and wheat industries, and the GA and these two 
organisations (but especially the UFWA) compete not only 
for political influence but also for members.
Of the three rural industries with which the GA is 
concerned, the wool industry has had the most turbulent 
political history, and for over fifty years the GA has been 
in the forefront of a series of disputes. One of the most 
intriguing questions about the politics of rural industries 
in Australia is why the wool industry has been plagued for 
so long by controversy and political conflict. In every 
major rural industry there have often been serious 
differences of opinion. But in the wool industry, 
Australia’s major rural industry which contributes almost 
30 per cent of the country’s total export earnings, 
differences over a wide range of policies have been more 
pronounced and conflict more prolonged than in any other. 
Moreover, in the wool industry opinion on most policy 
matters has been divided on the same lines with the 
larger graziers on one side, and the mixed wheat-sheep 
farmers on the other. Both groups have their separate 
organisations in each State and at the national level.
21
This alone makes the wool industry unique; in each of the
other major rural industries there is one organisation in
each State and at the national level representing the
2interests of producers. The most serious differences 
between graziers and wheat-sheep farmers have been over 
wool marketing and wool promotion. For almost fifty years 
wheat-sheep farmers and other small woolgrowers have made 
repeated efforts to secure some form of stabilised marketing 
in place of the free auction system. But their efforts 
have been frustrated by the graziers and other interests 
including wool brokers and buyers. Of the graziers’ 
associations the GA has been the most consistent and vocal 
opponent of stabilised marketing, and one of the keenest 
advocates of wool promotion and research. One of the 
tasks of this study will be to explain the Association’s 
behaviour, as well as that of its opponents and allies, 
with respect to the disputes on wool marketing and 
promotion.
In a number of respects the GA is a deviant case among 
Australian farm organisations. It still pursues a free 
enterprise, anti-government intervention philosophy 
(though at the same time it demands increased public 
expenditure on many schemes to assist primary producers ) 
while most farm organisations now acknowledge that state
1
These organisations, of course, represent the same 
producers on matters relating to the meat industry, but 
they owe their formation to differences on wool policy. 
The GA, as we have noted, now also claims to speak for 
wheat producers in N.S.W.
2
That is, apart from the APPU which claims to represent 
the interests of producers of all farm commodities.
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intervention is not only inevitable, but desirable as a 
means of achieving economic security. Moreover, the GA 
makes no claim to be non-partisan in politics. It openly 
campaigns against the Labor Party, and gives extensive 
financial support to the Country Party, and more limited 
support to the Liberal Party. The GA is one of the few 
farm organisations (and the last) to have had formal links 
with the Country Party. With the Farmers and Settlers’ 
Association of New South Wales (FSA), the Association 
helped found the State branch of the Country Party in 1919» 
and from then until 19^5 was formally affiliated with the 
Party. Because of its anti-Labor orientation and close 
links with non-Labor parties, the GA finds it difficult 
to approach and establish close relations with Labor 
governments. Thus, the Association provides an 
interesting case-study of a partisan political pressure 
group, and of the problems of partisanship.
The main focus of the study is the contemporary 
scene. But while much of the material relates to the 
period from late 1965 to early 1968 (when the data was 
collected) extensive use has been made of material relating 
to the Association's activities in earlier years, 
particularly the decade and a half before 1965» to 
illustrate how the Association behaves in its contemporary 
setting. This approach can be justified on the grounds 
that it adds depth to the analysis. Moreover, for many 
years the Association has faced the same fundamental 
problems, and its behaviour has followed a consistent 
pattern. And while the study makes no pretence to provide 
a history of the Association or of its pressure group 
activities, an effort has been made to give the study
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some historical perspective, and to sketch briefly how the 
Association came to be formed and how it was drawn into 
different fields of political activity.
Pressure Groups in the Literature of Political Science
The study of pressure groups constitutes one of the 
major fields in the literature of political science. While 
the range of empirical studies of pressure groups in this 
country is limited, many studies of pressure groups in 
the United States, Britain and Europe, and a large body 
of theoretical literature are available to the student of 
Australian pressure groups.
The study of pressure groups is by no means a new
phenomenon. Long before this century, many students of
politics noted the importance of groups in politics and
thought about politics in terms of group interaction. But
in this century the study of the role of groups in
politics was given its first major emphasis in Bentley’s
book, The Process of Government, published in 1908.^
Bentley’s work was a reaction to the traditional approach
of American political science which emphasised the study
of legally constituted structures and paid little
attention to systematic theory. Bentley was far more
interested in political actors and processes, and considered
that the ’raw materials of government’ were the activities
2and actions of men. Bentley reduced all politics to
1
Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, 
Bloomington (ind.), republished 19^9.
2
Ibid., pp.175-99.
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group interaction. ’When the groups are stated’, he wrote, 
’everything is stated. When I say everything I mean 
everything1.^  But in Bentley’s terms, groups included 
the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and political 
parties as well as what we have defined as pressure groups 
(’semi-political groups’ Bentley called them).
Despite its value as a new approach to political 
science, Bentley’s book had little immediate influence.
One of his contemporaries dismissed The Process of 
Government in the following manner:
A hasty reading of some of these chapters
fails to impress the reviewer with their
value as a contribution to the literature
of political science, though the work as
a whole will doubtless interest students2of social institutions.
But in the early 1950s> when The Process of Government 
was resurrected by David Truman and others, it provoked 
the most prolonged and vigorous debate in the history 
of political science - the debate on the so-called 
’group theory’.
Meanwhile, American political scientists had become 
interested in the empirical study of pressure groups.
This interest was motivated partly by the new political 
science which sought to widen the field of the 
discipline to include the study of political actors and
1
Ibid., pp.208-9.
2
James W. Garner in The American Political Science Review, 
Vol.II (May 1908), p.457* (Quoted by Harmon Zeigler, 
Interest Groups in American Society, Englewood Cliffs 
(New Jersey), 1964, p.2).
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processes as well as institutions, and partly by the waves
of scandal associated with privileged evasions and
manipulations of the law by business interests. The
first scholarly study of a pressure group was Peter
Odegard’s Pressure Politics,^ published in 1928. This
was a descriptive study of the Anti-Saloon League with
little or no emphasis on theoretical problems. Other
studies with more emphasis on theorising soon followed,
and by the 19^0s a wide range of studies of American
2pressure groups had been published.
3The publication of Truman's The Governmental Process 
in 1951 stimulated further interest among American 
political scientists in the empirical study of pressure 
groups; it also provoked the prolonged methodological 
debate on ’group theory’. Few people quarrelled with the 
empirical parts of Truman’s book; it was the early 
theoretical section which caused the dispute. Truman 
saw himself as a disciple of Bentley. ’Bentley’s "attempt
1
Peter H. Odegard, Pressure Politics; The Story of the 
Anti-Saloon League, New York, 1928.
2
The most important of these were: E. Pendleton Herring,
Group Representation Before Congress, Baltimore, 1929» and 
Public Administration and Public Interest, New York, 1936; 
E.E. SchattSchneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1935» Belle Zeller, Pressure Politics 
in New York, New York, 1937 ; Dayton D. McKean, Pressures 
on the Legislature of New Jersey, New York, 1938; Oliver 
Garceau, The Political Life of the American Medical 
Association, Cambridge (Mas s . ), 19^1•
3
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political
Interests and Public Opinion, New York, 1951*
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to fashion a tool"', he wrote, ’has been the principal 
bench mark for my thinking'.^  Truman however, departed 
from Bentley’s theory on a number of points, Bentley 
recognised the individual only through his activity, 
never as an autonomous unit. Truman repudiated this 
notion. He also acknowledged the separate role of 
institutions (such as government departments) in politics 
and the influence of social factors in policy formation. 
Truman defined a pressure group ('interest group' is the 
term he used) as a group
that, on the basis of one or more shared 
attitudes, makes certain claims upon other 
groups in the society for the establishment, 
maintenance, or enhancement of forms of 
behavior that are implied by the shared 
attitudes'.^
There was however, some confusion over his concept of a
group. More than once he defined a group as a collection
of individuals with some characteristics in common and
interacting with some frequency, but he also stated that
the 'interactions, or relationships ... are the group, and3it is in this sense that the term will be used'.
Confusion also arose over Truman's general aim - whether 
he was attempting to develop a theory of pressure groups 
or a general theory of political explanation.
1
Ibid., p . ix
2
Ibid., P • 33
3
Ibid., p.24
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The group theory debate which followed centred around 
Truman’s and Bentley's books. It promoted dozens of journal 
articles and papers^ and for a decade remained the major 
area of controversy within the discipline. Truman’s approach 
appealed particularly to those political scientists who, 
influenced by behaviourism, sought the development of 
concepts, methods and general theories by which they hoped 
to promote a rigorous, systematic science of politics.
Group theory emphasised political actors rather than 
institutions; it promised to provide a general theory of 
politics; and it had a strong emotional appeal by promising 
to reveal the underlying factors of politics and the true 
sources of power, and so to uncover abuses and provide 
evidence for social criticism. On the other hand, group 
theory soon found opponents - traditionalists who opposed 
behaviourism, political theorists who saw inconsistencies 
in the use of terms such as ’group’ and ’interest’, and 
those who doubted the value of any single general theory 
of politics. The debate on group theory became more than 
a debate on the analysis of pressure groups and on the 
extent to which all political events can be explained in 
terms of the pressures and counter pressures of groups upon 
one another; it turned into a debate on the value of 
theories, and on the goals and methods of the discipline,
1
See bibliographies in the following for an indication of 
the main contributions to the debate: Stanley Rothman,
'Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group
Approach', The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, 
No , 1 (March I960) ; R.T. Golembiewski, '"The Group Basis of 
Politics": Notes on Analysis and Development', The
American Political Science Review, Vol. LIV, No.5 
(DecemberI960); Peter Loveday, 'Group Theory and Its 
Critics', in Loveday and Campbell.
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and into a confrontation between behaviourists and 
traditionalists.
As a general theory, group theory has obvious 
limitations. As expounded by many of its supporters, it 
ignores the importance of institutions and environmental 
conditions. Excessively concerned with conflict, it neglects 
elements of consensus and integration. The notion of public 
interest is abandoned, individuals are allowed no place 
in politics, and ideas become merely the rationalisation 
of group behaviour.
At the same time a modified version of group theory 
has merits. The group approach is a useful and natural 
way of talking about politics. As a theory about pressure 
groups (as distinct from a general theory), it is a useful 
tool of analysis, particularly for the study of a whole 
pressure group sub-class within a political system.^ 
Moreover, the debate on group theory had many desirable 
side-effects. It forced political scientists to 
reconsider the scope, the methods and the goals of their 
discipline; it exposed problems in the use of such basic 
terms as ’group’, ’interest’, ’pressure’, and ’public 
interest’; and it directed more attention to the use of 
theoretical frameworks in empirical studies. The 
exposure of the weaknesses of group theory also 
encouraged a healthy scepticism about the possibility of 
achieving a single general theory of politics.
1
Zeigler’s excellent study, Interest Groups in American 
Society, illustrates its value as a model for empirical 
s tudies.
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The group theory debate in North America encouraged 
the study of pressure groups in Britain, Europe and 
Australia. Until the 1950s there was little interest in 
the study of pressure groups outside North America. When 
The Political Quarterly ran a special issue on pressure 
groups in 1958 its editor commented:
The place of pressure groups in British 
public life has been almost entirely 
ignored except for the few scattered 
articles which have appeared during the 
past two or three years.^
The same year the first two books on British pressure
2groups appeared. In Australia, the American debate
3stimulated interest in theorising about pressure groups 
and some empirical studies. After some initial 
enthusiasm for group theory most Australian political 
scientists turned against it, and most of the contributions
4to the literature by Australians were destructive ones.
1
The Political Quarterly, Vol.29 (1958), p.l.
2
These were S.E. Finer, Anonymous Empire: A Study of the
Lobby in Great Britain, London, 1958; and J.D. Stewart, 
British Pressure Groups: Their Role in Relation to the
House of Commons, Oxford, 1958.
3
One of the first Australian political scientists to 
become interested in group theory was Henry Mayer. In his 
introduction to Wildavsky and Carboch's Studies in 
Australian Politics, he referred to ’the group
interpretation of politics to which they (and i) subscribe’. 
(p .xx ) .
4
The three most important contributions were R.E. Dowling, 
'Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range’,
The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, No.4 
(Decemberi960) ; R.S. Parker, ’Group Analysis and 
Scientism in Political Studies', Political Studies,
(continued on p.30)
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Empirical Studies
Empirical studies of pressure groups differ greatly
in their focus and their use of conceptual frameworks. On
the basis of their focus, studies fall into six groups.
First, there are the numerous studies of single groups.
Odegard’s pioneer work, Pressure Politics, falls into this
category. In it he traces the origins of the Anti-Saloon
League, its transformat ion from a social movement to a
national organisation, the character and role of its
leaders, and its complicated tactics. Perhaps the best
example of a study of a single group is Eckstein’s book
on the British Medical Association.^ Second, there are
the studies of pressure group activity relating to a
particular policy or to the passage of a particular bill.
2A good example is Stephen Bailey’s Congress Makes a Law 
4 ( continued from p.29)
Vol. IX, No.l (February 196l); and Loveday, ’Group Theory 
and its Critics’. Other contributions included: K.G.
Armstrong, ’Political Science and the Pressure Group 
Theory’, A .P . S .A . N ews, 1959; P.B. Westerway and P.
Loveday, ’Comments on Mr. Armstrong on Pressure Groups’, 
Ibid.; R.E. Dowling, T.C. Truman and H. Mayer, ’Three 
Notes on the Group Approach to Politics’, Ibid.; and 
L.G. Churchward, ’Group Theory - A Critique', Arena, 1963*
1
Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of
the British Medical Association, London, i960.
2
Stephen Kemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, New York, 
1950* Other examples are H.H. Wilson, Pressure Group:
The Campaign for Commercial Television in England, New 
Brunswick, 1961; and Aaron Wildavsky, Dixon - Yates: A 
Study in Power Politics, New Haven, 1962.
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which analyses group activity in the United States in
relation to the passage of the Employment Act of 1946.
Studies of groups operating in a single arena (e.g. within
an industry, or in relation to a single institution of
government) constitute the third category. Two examples
are Herring’s Group Representation Before Congress and
Stewart’s British Pressure Groups (which analyses pressure
group activity in relation to the House of Commons). The
fourth type are studies of such facets of pressure group
activity as lobbying or public relations. One good
example is Milbrath’s'*' study of the role of lobbyists in
relation to the United States Congress. In Influencing 
2Voters, Rose includes an analysis of the public relations
campaigns of some business interests in the 1964 British
general election. Studies of the whole pressure group
sub-class within a political system constitute a fifth
group. The best examples are Truman’s The Governmental
Process, Zeigler’s Interest Groups in American Society and
3Samuel H. Beer’s British Politics in the Collectivist Age 
(which includes an analysis of parties as well as pressure 
groups ). The sixth category - comparative studies of pressure
i '
groups in different political systems - contains few
1
Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, Chicago,
1963.
2
Richard Rose, Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign
Rationality, London, 1967»
3
Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist 
Age, New York, 1965"! (Also published in England in 1965 
under the title Modern British Politics ) .
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studies. The best is probably the brief study by Castles^ 
which surveys pressure groups in continental Europe, 
Scandinavia, the United States, Britain, the totalitarian 
countries and the emergent nations.
Many studies of pressure group activity have employed 
no elaborate conceptual framework, A number of students 
have followed Odegard’s pioneer work and used a straight 
historical method. Others have opted for a problem 
approach or an analysis in terms of structure or decision­
making. In some cases the elimination of a theoretical 
basis has been deliberate. In their admirable study of 
the partnership relation between the British Government 
and the National Farmers’ Union, Self and Storing 
explicitly state:
Throughout this book we have sought to approach 
agricultural politics as directly, as little 
burdened by fashionable ’conceptual schemes’, 
as possible. Of course we have employed concepts^ 
but they are the concepts found in political life.
Models that have been employed in the study of pressure 
groups fall into four groups. First, there is the group3theory approach as employed by Truman and Zeigler, which
1
Francis G. Castles, Pressure groups and political culture: 
A comparative study, London, 1967»
2
Peter Self and Herbert J. Storing, The State and the 
Farmer, London, 1962, p.212.
3
V.O. Key, Jr, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups,
New York, 1964 (fifth edition) also uses a group theory 
model for his section on pressure groups. ’At the bottom’, 
he states, ’group interests are the animating forces in 
the political process’, (p.17)*
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incorporates aspects of both conflict and equilibrium
models. Public policy is seen as the product of the
competing pressures of groups. Within a society pressure
groups usually find some sort of a balance or equilibrium.
When the equilibrium is disturbed, intense pressure group
activity results. This model is more useful for the study
of the pressure group activity within a polity or within
an industry, rather than for the study of a single group.
Second, some students have used an ideology or a goal
model. For instance Crampton^ analyses the American
National Farmers’ Union in terms of its ideology and how
its ideology affects its members, its structure and its
policy. The main difficulty with this approach is its
limited scope; often we want to know far more about a
group than its goals and ideology. Third, some scholars
have applied structural-functional analysis to the
study of pressure groups. The structural- functionalist
school of sociology, popularised by the students of
Talcott Parsons, places prime emphasis on society and the
means by which institutions (the structures) contribute
(the functions) to sustaining its operation. In i960
2functionalism was applied by Almond to the study of
1
John A. Crampton, The National Farmers* Union: Ideology 
of a Pressure Group, Lincoln(Nebraska) , 19 6 5 • See also 
R, Joseph Monsen, Jr. and Mark W. Cannon, The Makers of 
Public Policy: American Power Groups and their Ideologies,
New York, 19o5 •
2
Gabriel A. Almond, 'A Functional Approach to Comparative 
Politics’ in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), 
The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton, i960.
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comparative politics and more recently by Almond and
others^ to the comparative study of pressure groups in
different political systems. In an empirical study of
comparative pressure groups based on a functionalist 
2model, Castles formulates a typology of pressure groups 
based on the functions of ’interest articulation and 
aggregation’. From his study it is obvious that the 
functionalist approach has some value for comparative 
study, particularly when data from non-Wes tern nations are 
included. Functionalism fits pressure group activity 
neatly into a schema based on the functions performed by 
different structures in a political system and 
emphasises the contribution of pressure groups to the 
efficient operation of a political system. On the other 
hand, as one student of functionalism points out, 
functionalism
does not explain why groups come into 
existence in certain configurations, it 
makes little attempt to assess values 
as purposive drives in group politics..., and 
it can shed little explanatory light on the 
internal arrangements of gr o u p s .3
1
Gabriel A. Almond, ’Interest Groups and the Political 
Process’ in R. Macridis and B.F. Brown (ed.),
Comparative Politics, New York, 1964. As early as 1958 
(see Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents, p.287) 
Almond suggested use of a functionalist approach to the 
study of pressure groups.
2
Pressure groups and political culture.
3
Roy E. Jones, The Functional Analysis of Politics: An
introductory discussion,London, 1 9 6 7 ? p .75•
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There are even more fundamental objections which can be
raised against structural-functionalism as developed in
relation to political analysis by Almond^ or as a general
model for sociological investigation.^ Fourth, a more
effective and simpler approach for the study of pressure
3groups is that employed by Samuel H. Beer, Harry
4Eckstein and others. This approach is based on the
assumption, as stated by Beer in 1956, that we cannot
understand the behaviour of pressure groups ’unless we
also look at the changing context of culture and political
5structure with which they continually interact’. Not 
only do pressure groups influence public policy and the 
operation of the political system, but the political and
1
e.g., see R.S. Parker, ’Interest Articulation and 
Political Parties in Papua and New Guinea’, Work-in- 
Progress Seminar paper, Department of Political Science, 
IAS, Australian National University, 3 May 1967»
2
For a useful summary of these objections see Alex 
Inkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction to the 
Discipline and Profession, Englewood Cliffs(New Jersey)
pp•3^-7•3
Beer elaborated his ideas first in a number of 
significant articles in British and American journals 
and more recently in his British Politics in the 
Collectivist Age.
4
e.g., Graham Wootton, The Politics of Influence,
Cambridge (Mass.), 1963; James M. Clark, Teachers_and
Politics in France; A Pressure Group Study of the 
Federation de l ’Education Nationale, Syracuse(New York),
5
Samuel H. Beer, 'Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain', 
The American Political Science Review, Vol.L, No.l.
(March 1956).
3 6
cultural environment has a profound effect on pressure 
groups, their goals, their tactics and their effectiveness. 
Beer lays particular stress on political culture
(i.e. values, beliefs and emotional symbols) in explaining
:the political behaviour of groups and their members. His 
British Politics in the Collectivist Age probably gives 
too much emphasis to ideology and political culture, but 
at the same time it is one of the most significant studies 
of pressure group behaviour. The most elaborate framework 
based on this environmental approach is that set out by 
Eckstein in his Pressure Group Politics. Eckstein’s model 
has four variables which determine the political activity 
of a pressure group. They are the pattern of policy in 
a society, governmental structure, political culture, and 
the characteristics of the group. The first of these is 
a new determinant not included in previous designs.
Eckstein explains that policy is usually thought of as 
the result of interplay between pressure groups but 
suggests that it should also be thought of as a determinant 
of activity since a feedback mechanism operates."^
Eckstein’s model also includes four useful categories for 
analysing pressure group activity: form, scope, intensity
and effectiveness. In varying degrees each of the four 
determinants affects the form, scope, intensity and 
effectiveness of pressure group activity. This model
1
Eckstein, p.8.
37
was used by Eckstein in his study of the British Medical
1Association, and more recently by Castles, Willey and 
2others.
Theoretical Framework of this Study
The approach used in this study is based on the 
assumption that the behaviour of a pressure group is best 
understood by relating it to the environment with which 
the group interacts.
The framework is an adaptation of that developed by 
Eckstein. The accompanying diagram shows its main 
features. Environmental factors are of paramount 
importance; they influence group characteristics, how 
the group behaves, and its political effectiveness. 
Behaviour is also influenced by group characteristics; 
in turn group characteristics, the way the group behaves 
and environmental factors all affect political 
effectiveness. By means of feedback mechanisms, the 
environmental variables are affected by the way the group 
behaves and by its political effectiveness. Group 
characteristics too, are affected by effectiveness.
Of the three environmental factors, political 
culture and political setting are drawn from Eckstein’s
1
Castles uses the model for his analysis of the Anglo- 
American system of pressure groups.
2
Richard J. Willey, ’Pressure Group Politics: The Case
of Sohyo’, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, 
No.4 (December1964). Others who have used the model 
include Wootton and Clark.
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Figure 1. Explanatory Model of Pressure Group 
Behaviour
Group Characteristics 
(Membership, structure^N 
financial resources etc.)
Behaviour
(Styl scope,
PoliticalEnvironmental
EffectivenessFactors
(Economic context, 
political culture, 
political setting)
Feedback
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model. Political culture refers to the general pattern 
of attitudes, values and beliefs held by the whole society, 
and also to the sub-culture reflected by members of the 
group. Political setting refers to the whole institutional 
setting of government and to the operation of government 
decision-making machinery. Political setting includes 
two of Eckstein’s determinants, the pattern of government 
policy, and the structure of government, as well as other 
components. Eckstein did not include economic factors 
among his determinants. It seems to me that with most 
economic pressure groups, particularly groups speaking 
on behalf of business or farm interests, behaviour is 
closely related to economic factors, especially the 
relative profitability of the industry or industries 
represented. The GA invariably reacts quickly to falls 
in the prices members receive for their produce, and to 
increases in production costs.
’Group characteristics' is the term Eckstein uses to 
refer to the internal characteristics of a group; it 
includes such aspects as membership, structure and 
financial resources. Environmental factors affect these 
aspects and others.
How the group behaves can be conveniently analysed 
under five aspects: political style, scope, intensity,
co-operation, and form. Three of these are from 
Eckstein’s model, though in two cases their meanings have 
been modified; two aspects, political style and 
co-operation, are new. Political style refers to the 
distinctive way in which the group performs its political 
actions. Scope refers to the range of issues in which- the 
group is interested, the volume and kinds of demands it
4o
makes, and the degree to which the group employs political 
means to achieve its goals. Intensity refers to the 
fervour and persistence with which the group pursues its 
political objectives. Co-operation refers to the extent 
to which a group combines or co-operates with other groups 
to achieve its objectives. Co-operation is a most 
important dimension for an economic pressure group which 
competes against rival groups and is unable to speak for 
a whole section or to establish exclusive clientele 
relationships with government departments. It is a 
particularly important concept in the analysis of a State- 
based association operating in a federal political system 
where there is a multiplicity of groups representing the 
major economic sectors. The concept of form embraces 
the means employed by a pressure group to communicate its 
demands to the centres of official decision-making and to 
exert political influence. There are four components 
of form: the organs of demand articulation; the political
target structure; the channels of communication; and the 
character of the relations between the group and its 
individual organs of demand articulation on the one hand, 
and its political targets on the other.
Behaviour is influenced not only by the internal 
characteristics of the group or (to use different language) 
by its political resources, but also by environmental 
factors. To be effective, a pressure group has to come to 
terms with the official structure of government and with 
the processes by which decisions are made. Also 
environmental factors largely determine to what extent and 
in what ways a group will mobilise its resources for 
political purposes.
4l
Political effectiveness refers to the influence that 
a group has on the content of public policy and how it is 
administered, and also to its overall impact on the 
political system and on political actors. The political 
effectiveness of any group depends not only on its resources, 
and the extent to which it chooses to mobilise them and 
its skill in doing this, but also on environmental factors. 
Political factors are of crucial importance. For example, 
the GA ’ s effectiveness on any particular demand depends on 
whether a Labor or non-Labor government is in power, on 
whether the government and the departments concerned 
generally approve of the request sought, and on the amount 
of support and opposition forthcoming from other pressure 
groups.
The study generally follows the outline of this 
explanatory model. It also includes three case-studies 
which aim to illustrate how the GA behaves in certain 
situations and in relation to certain objectives, and how 
environmental factors actually operate to influence 
behaviour. The case-studies aim to complement the other 
sections of the study. They have been chosen to cover 
examples of successes and failures, crises and every-day 
hum-drum relations with government departments, 
representation at both the Federal and State levels, and 
partisan as well as non-partisan politics. Two cases relate 
to the use of veto power and the third to the GA*s influence 
in initiating a new form of government activity. Together 
these case-studies cover activity in four major issue- 
areas of concern to the GA: economic policy, taxation,
wool marketing and livestock.
II. ENVIRONMENT
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CHAPTER 2 
Economic Context
As with other economic pressure groups, the way that 
the GA behaves and its effectiveness in politics are 
influenced by the kind of economic situation in which it 
operates, and by factors relating to the particular 
industries that it claims to represent. Consequently, 
the GA’s pressure group behaviour cannot be properly 
understood or explained without reference to economic 
factors. In particular, the GA’s role in wool industry 
conflicts cannot be understood without reference to the 
economics of the wool industry.
Economic Situation
Since the GA was formed, the economic situation in 
which it operates has undergone fundamental changes.
These changes have affected it directly, and also 
indirectly through their influence on social and political 
factors.
In 1890 the economy of each Australian colony was 
based primarily on the pastoral and agricultural 
industries. Rural production accounted for almost 60 
per cent of the total value of production of the six 
colonies together.'*' Well over 25 per cent of the work-
1
A.G.L. Shaw, ’History and Development of Australian 
Agriculture', in Williams, Agriculture in the Australian 
Economy, p.23» Shaw's figure actually refers to 1892.
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force were still directly employed in rural industries, 
and among rural industries the pastoral industry was of 
far greater importance than any other. The total 
population of the six colonies was only slightly over 
three million, and one in every two Australians still 
lived in rural areas.^
In contrast, today Australia is a highly-developed, 
complex, industrialised, urban society. Manufacturing 
employs 30 per cent of the work force, or more than twice 
as many workers as the agricultural, pastoral and mining 
industries together. Rural industries, and in particular 
the pastoral industry, have lost their pre-eminent 
position. Rural production has fallen to 30 per cent 
of the total value of production and contributes little 
more than half the value of factory production. Rural 
industries now employ only 10 per cent of the work force, 
or one third of the number employed in manufacturing.
Within the rural sector, many new industries have developed, 
and consequently the pastoral industry no longer occupies 
such an important position. The population is now about 
twelve million. More than four out of five Australians 
live in urban areas, and over half the population in the 
large metropolitan areas. In N.S.W. almost 60 per cent 
live in Sydney. Of the six States, N.S.W. has the 
smallest proportion of rural dwellers (13*43 per cent 2in 1966) and its rural population is actually declining.
1
These figures are from various editions of Year Book 
Aus tralia.
2
Ibid.
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In addition, the Australian economy today is controlled 
and regulated to a much greater degree by governments.^
These changes have had many important effects on the 
GA. The decline in the proportion of the national income 
and the proportion of employment provided by rural 
industries has tended to reduce the political power of 
primary producers, while the drift of population to the 
cities, with the consequent reduction in the proportion 
of urban electorates, has eroded their voting power.1 2 As 
a result of industrialisation, all primary producers 
today face fierce competition in politics from business 
interests and from trade unions representing urban 
employees. Graziers also face political competition
1
Three useful indicators of the extent of government 
control of an economy are government expenditure as a 
proportion of GNP, government revenue as a proportion of 
GNP, and the proportion of the work-force in government 
employment. According to Russett's figures (Bruce M. 
Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, New Haven, 19^4, p p .63-64), on the first two 
Australia does not rank as high as many other advanced 
countries, but on the third it ranks extremely high. In 
1965/6, government expenditure was 32.1 per cent of GNP, 
while revenue was 30*2 per cent. The same year 27 per 
cent of the work-force was in government employment. 
Government regulation of the Australia economy takes 
many forms including control over: the inflow and outflow
of capital, migrants and imports; currency, credit and 
banking; the marketing of many primary products; wage 
regulation; transport; and trade negotiations with other 
countries. Moreover by grants, subsidies, bounties and 
the taxation and tariff systems the Commonwealth Government 
exercises indirect control over many industries.
2
This trend however, has been somewhat offset by rural 
dwellers securing greater representation per capita of 
population in legislatures.
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from farmers engaged in numerous newer rural industries, 
many of whom have different economic interests from 
those of graziers.
Industrial development and population growth have 
also stimulated the formation of economic pressure groups, 
and have encouraged groups increasingly to use political 
means to achieve their goals. The formation of pressure 
groups has been encouraged by the marked increase in the 
degree of specialisation and differentiation of economic 
function, which has divided the population into a host 
of different segments, each with its own specific economic 
interests and a sense of separateness from other 
interests. These changes, together with improved 
communications, increased government control, and 
increased opportunity for groups to work through politics, 
have encouraged each economic segment to form its own 
association or organisation to protect its interests and 
to make demands of governments. Moreover, as a result 
of industrialisation and economic development, the 
various segments of the Australian population have 
become increasingly less independent, and less able to 
overcome problems that confront them through their own 
resources. Consequently, they have turned increasingly 
to governments for assistance.^ Perhaps even more than 
others, primary producers have become highly dependent 
on governments. A notable phenomenon in all 
industrialised societies is that downswings in the
1
Truman (The Governmental Process, p,104), calls this 
the 'inevitable gravitation toward government’.
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business cycle strike primary producers more severely 
than manufacturers since they have less ability to 
regulate volume and type of production. In addition, 
in Australia many primary producers* costs are charges 
levied by governments or statutory authorities, or over 
which public authorities have direct control. Thus, as 
a result, all primary producers (including graziers, who 
still take pride in their own economic independence and 
oppose the principle of government intervention) have 
been forced to turn increasingly to governments for 
alleviation of their problems.
But while the relative importance of rural 
industries has declined, rural production is still 
important in the Australian economy as a source of food 
and raw materials for home consumption and a major 
source of export earnings. Farm products still account 
for 70 to 80 per cent of merchandise exports; wool 
alone in 1967 contributed over $800 m. or 27 per cent 
of these export earnings.^  Moreover, although the 
relative importance of rural industries has declined, 
the volume of rural production has increased greatly - 
and is still increasing. Between 1890 and 1967 the
1
Year Book Australia, 1967, p.1288. The actual
export earnings of the major rural industries in 1967 
were :
Wool
Wheat and Flour 
Meats
Hides and skins
Sugar
Fruit
Butt er
$809 m. 
$385 m. 
$279 m. 
$ 89 m.
$ 99 m. 
$ 94 m. 
$ 65 m.
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number of sheep in Australia increased from 97•8 m. to
164 m., cattle from 10.3 m * to 18.3 m. and wheat
acreage from 3*2 m. acres to 20.3 m."*~ Between 1902 and
1967 wheat production increased from 27 m. bushels to
462 m. bushels and wool production from 539 m. lbs. to 
21,759 m. lbs. Since rural industry is still so 
important in the economy, and since it offers reasonable 
prospects for expanded production, no Australian 
government can completely disregard the interests of 
farmers and graziers. Neither can it afford to take 
action which would jeopardise the future prosperity 
of any of the major rural industries, particularly the 
pastoral industry.
The Industries Represented
When the GA was formed most graziers in N.S.W. 
ran only sheep and cattle, and were seldom interested 
in agriculture. Similarly, few wheatfarmers at that 
time had any significant interests in grazing. But 
by the 1920s, to achieve greater economic security, 
many wheatgrowers had moved into mixed farming, and 
consequently wheatgrowers’ organisations began to involve 
themselves in wool and meat policy. More recently many 
graziers on the western slopes of N.S.W. have turned 
to wheat production, especially in times of low wool 
prices. As a result the GA has been forced to take an
1
Year Book Australia, 1917» PP-313» 317» 34l; and
1967, p.1287.
2
Year Book Australia, 1967» p.1287.
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active interest in wheat matters. Today in N.S.W. 
mixed farming is more common than ever. Over half the 
properties which carry sheep also carry cattle, and 
almost half of them grow wheat. At the same time 
almost all holdings which produce wheat also carry 
sheep, and often some cattle.’*" Consequently, today both 
the GA and the wheat-sheep farmers’ organisation in 
N.S.W., the UFWA (as well as the N.S.W. division of the 
APPU) both take an active interest in wool, meat and 
wheat policy. And because GA and UFWA members hold 
different views on many matters, these two major 
organisations have become strong rivals in each of 
their three main fields of interest.
The wool, wheat and meat industries have many 
features in common which differentiate them from other 
rural industries. They are Australia’s three main 
rural industries, not only in terms of the value of 
total production and export earnings, but also on the 
basis of the proportion of arable land and rural 
holdings devoted to them. They are based on the 
extensive use of land. Holdings are large, and often 
miles from the nearest town and hundreds of miles from 
the city. Transport costs of machinery and supplies 
from the city and of production from the farm to
1
This is based on figures from the Supplement to the 
Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool Industry 
June 1964, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra; 
and from Year Book Australia, 1967» and Year Book N.S.W, 
19 66.
2
The APPU however, is not regarded as an important 
organisation on wool, meat and wheat matters.
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selling or shipping point constitute an important item in 
total production costs. Farms are highly capitalised 
(in 1963/4 the average value of sheep properties with 
stock and plant in the pastoral zone of N.S.W. was 
$179,000), 1 2 complex business enterprises requiring 
skilled management and extensive credit for development. 
Costs often absorb almost half of gross income. Many 
costs are fixed costs (they occur irrespective of 
seasonal conditions, prices or returns) and a large 
proportion of total costs are charges levied by public 
authorities (land tax, shire rates, probate duty, rail 
freights) or result from government policy (such as 
tariffs on imported machinery, vehicles and chemicals). 
Production is greatly affected by varying seasonal 
conditions (particularly droughts) and attacks by pests. 
All three are major export industries and are thus 
dependent on world markets and prices, and affected by 
changes in shipping costs.
There are however, some important differences.
Over 95 per cent of wool production and 80 per cent of
wheat production are sold overseas, whereas less than
50 per cent of meat production depends on overseas 
2sales. Wheat and meat are food products for which 
demand is expanding, whereas wool is an industrial raw 
material in competition against synthetic fibres. Wheat
1
The Australian Sheep Industry Survey 1963-64, Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics, 1967, p.62.
2
D.H. McKay, ’Agriculture in the Economy’, in Williams, 
Agriculture in the Australian Economy, p .136 .
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and meat are subject to various international trade 
agreements, whereas wool is basically a freely-traded 
commodity. In Australia there is a compulsory stabilised 
marketing and government price-support scheme for wheat, 
while wool and meat are sold by auction and depend on 
the interaction of supply and demand."* In fact, the 
wool and meat industries are the only major rural export 
industries which are not assisted by means of marketing 
and price-support schemes or by a direct subsidy. But 
they share the same advantages as other rural industries 
with regard to taxation concessions, financial assistance 
in droughts and after floods, and subsidies on the 
purchase of fertilizer. In addition, the Commonwealth 
Government finances the control of the tick pest and 
now contributes up to $l4m. p.a. for wool promotion 
and research. The N.S.W. Government also assists all 
rural industries by means of reductions in rail freights 
for farm commodities, agricultural research and 
extension services, and the provision of transport 
facilities and irrigation schemes.
There are also important social differences 
associated with the three commodities. Because of the 
wealth of graziers and the historic role of the 
pastoral industry in Australia's development, woolgrowing 
(and to a lesser extent cattle grazing) carries far
1
About 95 per cent of the total wool clip is sold 
through the auction system in Australia and only a 
small quantity is sold privately to dealers and direct 
to Australian manufacturers, or exported for sale 
overseas. Sydney is the largest primary wool market 
in the world.
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higher social status than wheatgrowing. As a result, 
graziers who go into wheat production are sometimes 
uneasy about a possible loss of status. In 1966 when 
many graziers went into wheat production for the first 
time stories (probably apocryphal) went around many wheat 
towns about graziers who had wheat combines delivered 
to their properties at night, and others who explained 
to their neighbours that they were cultivating wheat 
solely for the purpose of pasture improvement!
The Wool Industry
Australia is by far the largest producer of wool 
in the world, and accounts for about 30 per cent of 
total production.^
Holdings producing wool vary greatly in size, in 
the quality of wool produced and in the importance of 
returns from wool in relation to other products. These 
disparities lie at the bottom of the often angry and 
long-lived disputes within the industry itself, disputes 
which have had no recent parallel in other rural 
industries. Woolgrowers have quarrelled especially 
about the promotion and marketing of their product, and 
their attitudes on these matters tend to reflect their 
own economic position in the industry.
The differences in size between wool producing 
holdings are considerable. In N.S.W. alone holdings
1
F.H. Gruen et al., Long Term Projections of 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Australia 19^3 to 1980, 
Clayton (Victoria), 1967, p.9-1 •
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carrying sheep vary from under 100 acres to over 50>000 
acres - and in i960 there were still 592 holdings with 
over 50,000 acres.^ The big production units owned by 
wealthy pastoral families, pastoral companies, wool 
firms and banks have much greater financial resources 
at their disposal. They are less seriously affected by 
short-term fluctuations in wool prices, and their owners 
can afford investment in better breeds of sheep which 
yield wool of higher value, and also in various 
improvements to increase productivity. The larger 
holdings however, are more dependent on hired labour, 
and labour costs constitute a bigger proportion of total 
costs. Consequently, owners of large production units 
have greater interest in wage regulation and are more 
concerned about trade union activity. On the other hand, 
smaller woolgrowers with limited resources are seriously 
affected by the considerable fluctuations in their
2incomes, and want security and stability above all else. 
Like other rural industries, the wool industry has a 
•tail’ of units with low earning potential. Apart from 
causing differences of economic interests, the differences 
in size of production units are the source of other 
political problems in the wool industry. Owners of the
1
Supplement to the Statistical Handbook of the Sheep 
and Wool Industry June 1964, p.31*
2
According to McKay (pp.139-l4l), farm incomes in 
Australia fluctuate from year to year much more than 
non-farm incomes, and more than farm incomes in other 
major agricultural countries. Year to year fluctuations 
of plus or minus 40 per cent are common. Fluctuations 
in incomes from wool have been greater than fluctuations 
in incomes from most other commodities.
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large holdings which produce most of Australia’s wool 
clip - Table 1 shows that holdings producing fifty bales 
and over account for only 22.3 per cent of the total 
number of holdings yet produce two-thirds of the wool 
clip - consider that their views should determine policy 
for the industry but in industry politics heads usually
Table 1 .
Australian Woolgrowing Holdings Classified according
Clip Size 
(bales )
to Size of Wool 
No. of holdings
clip1
Produc tion 
(bales)
Under 10 33,724 (28.4/o) 170,000 (3.356)
10 - 29 37,936 ( 3 2 . 0 % ) 760,000 (14.6/)
30 - 49 20,248 (17.1#) 810,000 (15.656)
50 - 99 16,327 (13-856) 1,220,000 (23.556)
100-199 6,508 ( 5.5$) 980,000 (18.8/)
200 and over 3,844 ( 3.2%) 1,260,000 (24.2/)
Totals 118,587 (100.0/) 5,200,000 (100.0/)
count for more than volume of production. In the 1965 
wool referendum all woolgrowers had equal voting rights, 
and on the Australian Wool Industry Conference (AWIC) 
the AWGC has equal representation with the federal body 
of wheat-sheep farmers, the Australian Wool and Meat 
Producers’ Federation (AWMPF), which represents more
1
Wool and Politics, Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 36,
N o .12 (25 October 1965, p.l8l.
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woolgrowers but a much smaller volume of production.
Many large graziers consider that equal voting rights 
for all woolgrowers is unjust. In late 1966 Mr G.G. 
Ashton, Treasurer of the GA and Vice-Chairman of the 
Committee for the Retention and Improvement of the Free 
Wool Market, told a meeting of woolgrowers at Scone:
What I believe is the over-riding consideration 
at the present time is that what I call bona- 
fide wool-growers should have the greatest say 
in matters affecting the wool industry. The 
situation is that less than 50% of flock owners 
run over 80% of the sheep. We have a body the 
Australian Wool Industry Conference recognised 
by legislation which purports to represent the 
wool growing industry. Surely a body which 
represents itself as representing an industry 
should pay regard to volume of production or 
volume of investment in that industry as well 
as to numbers of growers engaged in it. This 
principle is recognised in the United Kingdom 
and other democracies.^
The economic interests of woolgrowers also vary 
according to the type of wool produced, and whether wool 
production is the main enterprise. Fine merino wool 
used for wearing apparel and furnishing fabrics yields 
much higher returns than coarser wool (56’s and less), 
and in the last decade has been less affected by the 
general decline in wool prices. Consequently, producers 
of fine merino wool - who are mainly owners of larger 
holdings - are less inclined to seek radical solutions 
to the problems of the industry, and strongly oppose 
the idea of pooling where their wool might lose its
Address to Scone branch of the GA, 19 December 1966.
1
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separate identity. On more than half the holdings 
carrying sheep, wool production is not the main activity. 
Woolgrowers who depend for their income entirely or 
mainly on wool tend to differ in their interests from 
those whose income comes mainly from wheat or meat; 
the former are generally more concerned about the long­
term future of the industry and consequently are more 
enthusiastic about wool promotion and research, while 
the latter are concerned about their immediate returns 
from wool and are prepared to secure price stability 
by marketing schemes even if wool’s long-term future 
might be endangered. Owners of stud flocks of sheep 
(in 1964/5 there were over 2,000 sheep studs in N.S.W. 
alone) also have somewhat different interests from other 
woolgrowers. Stud merino breeders resent the ban on the 
export of stud merino sheep which deprives them of 
potentially attractive markets. This ban, introduced 
by the Scullin Government in 1929» has been retained 
partly by pressure of smaller non-stud owners who fear 
that the export of stud merinos might increase the
price of flock rams in Australia, or at least lead to
3a shortage.
Differences in size of holdings, in the importance 
of wool as a source of total income and in wool types 
are closely related to regional differences between wool
1
Supplement to Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and 
Wool Industry June 1964, p .34.
2
Year Book N.S.W., 1966, p.954.
3
On this, see Ronald Anderson, On the Sheep’s Back, 
Melbourne, 1966, pp.6l-2.
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producing areas resulting from widely different climatic 
environments. Woolgrowing areas in Australia are 
usually classified into three zones - pastoral, wheat- 
sheep, and high rainfall - according to a scheme 
developed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics."*- The 
distribution of sheep in each of these three zones 
throughout Australia is shown in Table 2 and the 
geographic boundaries of the zones in N.S.W. are shown
Table 2.
Distribution of Sheep in 1964^
(millions)
Pastoral
zone
Wheat-
sheep
zone
High Rain­
fall zone
Total
New South Wales 19.8 36.8 15.2 H 00
Victoria - cnOrH 18.2 28.5
Queensland 23-7 0.6 - 24.3
South Australia 2.5 7.8 6.1 16.4
Western
Australia 4.3 8.0 7.9 20.2
Tasmania - - 3-6 3.6
Total 50.3 63.5 51.0 164.8
1
This scheme was developed in connection with the 
Bureau’s series of surveys of the sheep industry commenced 
in 1954.
2
Compiled from data in The Australian Sheep Industry 
Survey 1963-64. It does not include the small numbers 
of sheep in the Northern Territory and the A.C.T.
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in the accompanying map. The different characteristics 
of each of the three zones are clearly reflected in 
different attitudes and in the different policies of 
the graziers’ associations as against those of the 
wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations.
In N.S.W. the membership of the UFWA is drawn 
mainly from the wheat-sheep zone where half the sheep 
and two-thirds of the holdings which carry sheep are 
located. In this zone holdings are comparatively small; 
the average is just over 2,000 acres. Over half have 
flocks of less than 1,000 sheep and on most wheat 
production is now more important, in terms of income, 
than wool growing. There is however, a minority of 
larger properties usually devoted mainly to wool and 
meat production. On most holdings in the wheat-sheep 
zone, sheep are grazed for both wool and meat. 
Consequently, wool quality has been sacrificed for 
carcass quality. Coarser wools from this zone yield 
lower prices and are subject to greater price 
fluctuations. Because most flocks are small, wool is 
often marketed in one, two and three bale lots which 
bring lower average returns than a similar type of wool 
classed and sold in larger lots It is1 not surprising 
then that wheat-sheep farmers generally favour alteration 
of the auction system to give greater price stability.
1
J.P. Fourlinnie and R.B. Whan, ’The Influence of the 
Size of Sale Lots of Wool on Wool-Buyers’ Costs, 
Quarterly Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. XX, 
No. 3 (July 1967).
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Being well satisfied with the wheat stabilisation scheme 
which gives them a guaranteed ’cost of production’’*" 
price for most of their crop, they want a similar scheme 
for wool. Since there is no necessity for wheat 
promotion they are inclined to doubt the value of wool 
promotion and have adopted the catch-cry of ’marketing 
first’.
In contrast, the GA is much stronger in the pastoral 
and high rainfall zones where the main income of
producers comes from wool (66 per cent in the pastoral
) \ 2  zone and 'Jk per cent in the high rainfall zone). In
the pastoral zone holdings are large (the average is
31,000 acres and the average flock is 3,800 sheep) and
owners need extensive financial resources since there
is a greater risk of loss through bad seasons. Because
holdings are large and isolated, a permanent labour
force is essential. In the high rainfall zone properties
are smaller, but carrying capacity is greater because
of better rainfall and pasture improvement. Fine merino
wool from this zone has been less affected by the general
decline in wool prices, and woolgrowers, like those in
the pastoral zone, have never experienced the operation
and security of a stabilised marketing system for any
commodity.
1
This includes an owner/operator allowance and liberal 
depreciation and interest allowances in addition to 
actual production costs.
2
This and other figures in this section come from 
The Australian Sheep Industry Survey 1963-64, p . 62 .
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Problems and Conflicts in the Wool Industry
The Australian wool industry today faces two major 
related problems: a ’cost price squeeze’, and intense
competition from synthetic fibres.
Since the second world war production costs have 
risen steadily. In the late 19^ +0s and early 1950s 
these rises were offset by record wool prices, but since 
the mid-1950s prices have fallen significantly. As 
Table 3 indicates, the returns from woolgrowing have 
declined appreciably in the last decade, while the 
profitability of wheatgrowing has remained fairly constant 
and the relative profitability of meat production has 
increased. Moreover, the actual decline in wool prices 
has had a marked psychological effect on woolgrowers 
and has made them seek remedies with a sense of urgency.
The decline in wool prices has been closely 
related to the increased use of synthetic fibres in 
textile manufacturing. Because wool is simply an 
industrial raw material it must compete against 
alternative fibres. In recent years textile manufacturers 
have turned increasingly to synthetic fibres produced 
by the big international chemical corporations which 
have the financial resources to undertake costly research 
and sales promotion campaigns. Strong competition 
between the leading chemical firms, together with large 
economies of scale, have brought significant price 
reductions in synthetic fibres,^" and this has tended to
1
For a comparison of wool and synthetic price trends 
since 195^ + > see table in Gruen, Long Term Projections, 
p.9-28.
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depress wool prices further. The threat to wool is now 
serious. Synthetic fibres can achieve many of the 
qualities once claimed exclusively for wool, and many 
textile manufacturers prefer to use synthetic fibres 
because their prices fluctuate less than wool prices.
By 1965 more than three times as much synthetic fibre as 
wool was used in textile production."*"
Australian woolgrowers recognise that the wool 
industry faces serious problems. But they have reacted 
differently to the fall in wool prices, and they have 
different ideas on what policies should be followed and 
on the help that governments should give.
Wheat-sheep farmers, who have been more seriously 
affected and who have a historic dislike for wool brokers 
and buyers, blame the marketing system for the present 
problems of the industry and want marketing reform. In 
doing this they are following a well-recognised trend 
over the world for farmers to become critical of 
marketing organisation and marketing costs in times of 
economic adversity. The wheat-sheep farmers1 desire for 
marketing reform is not new; neither is the opposition of 
graziers to the schemes they advocate. In every period 
of low or falling wool prices since the early 1920s, 
wheat-sheep farmers have pressed for a reserve price 
auction system or for something similar, while graziers 
have strenuously opposed any change to free auction 
selling. But the failure of wheat-sheep farmers to secure
1
G.S. Le Couteur, Wool! Modern Myths: New Horizons,
Melbourne, 1967, p . 13 +^ •
6 3
their goal cannot be a t t r i b u t e d  solely to the opposition 
of graziers. F or one thing, the wool industry offers less 
scope for o r g anised m a r k e t i n g  or stabil i s a t i o n  schemes 
than other rural industries. A price support scheme 
based on a h igh home c o n s u m p t i o n  price is out of the 
q u e s t i o n  since over 95 per cent of the clip is sold 
overseas and is dependent on world prices. A stabi l i s a t i o n 
scheme like that for wheat w o u l d  be almost unw o r k a b l e  since 
there are hundreds of different grades and types of wool. 
Moreover, w h e a t - s h e e p  farmers have been unable to convince 
their opponents that a reserve price scheme would succeed 
in s t a b i l i s i n g  wool prices, let alone p r o duce b e tter 
overall returns. In addition, a p art f rom graziers, many 
other interests i n v o l v e d  in the i n d u s t r y  have opposed 
changes in the wool m a r k e t i n g  system. Suc h  interests 
still oppose changes. For example, in the four months 
f o l l o w i n g  the release of an o t h e r  m a r k e t i n g  p l a n  by the 
A u s t r a l i a n  Wool B o a r d  on 31 O c t o b e r  1967» textile 
manuf a c t u r e r s  in Japan and in the C o mmon M a rket countries, 
wool buyers and the A u s t r a l i a n  B a n k e r s ’ A s s o c i a t i o n  as 
well as leading n e w s p a p e r s  all p u b l i c l y  expressed their 
opposition."*" W h e a t - s h e e p  farmers resent this outside 
influence. ’Brokers and buyers are a p p e ndages to the 
i n d u s t r y ’ , a V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  of the U F W A  stated in 
F e b r u a r y  1968:
1
S y dney M o r n i n g  H e r a l d , 12 and 16 F e b r u a r y  1968, and 
The L a n d , 13 F e b r u a r y  1968.
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The wool manufacturers are the only- 
partners with the grower....We don’t 
try to run manufacturers’ businesses 
for them, so why should they try to 
run our business?-^ -
Larger graziers, on the other hand, think the best 
way to overcome the problems of the wool industry is by 
investment to increase productivity (i.e. to run more 
sheep per acre, and to produce more wool per sheep), 
market promotion to increase demand for wool, research 
to increase productivity and make wool more attractive 
as a fibre to textile manufacturers, and government 
assistance to help growers reduce costs.
As a result of graziers’ efforts, an attempt is
being made through the Australian Wool Board and the
International Wool Secretariat to resist the
encroachment of synthetics in two directions. First, by
means of increased research it is hoped to make wool a
more versatile fibre. However, the discovery of new
processes to improve wool’s qualities tends to increase
the cost of manufacturing woollen yarn and cloth, and
therefore results in increases in the prices of finished
products. Gruen and his associates believe that in the
next ten to fifteen years textile research will probably
2give synthetics increased advantages over wool. Second, 
by promotion it is hoped to increase the demand for and 
the use of wool. The International Wool Secretariat, 
financed by the Australian, New Zealand and South African
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1968.
Gruen, Long Term Projections, pp.9~35 "to 9-39 •
2
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wool boards, has undertaken an ambitious programme aimed 
at building a 'quality image' for wool.^ This programme 
involves co-operative advertising with manufacturers 
and certification of fabrics with the 'woolmark' symbol. 
How effective the programme is or can hope to be is a 
controversial question.
'Estimates of the long-term future of the Australian 
wool industry vary greatly. Leaders within the industry 
tend to be optimistic. Le Couteur argues that the demand 
for wool, particularly apparel wool, is sound and that 
wool production in Australia could be greatly increased 
if governments helped the industry with the problem of 
costs. 'Despite the prognostications of the harbingers 
of doom', he states, 'the facts, the statistics, and the 
opinions of knowledgeable people in the industry, lead 
to the conclusion that through proper collaboration with 
Government, and through the initiative of woolgrowers, 
the wool industry will continue in a dominant role as a 
source of economic capacity for the Australian community'. 
Academic economists, on the other hand, tend to be 
somewhat pessimistic. Gruen and his associates in 1967 
suggested that declining prices for synthetics will 
probably result in downward pressure on wool prices to 
1975 and to a decline in wool consumption, although they 
did concede that: 'We cannot be very dogmatic about such
1
See annual reports of the Australian Wool Board.
2
Le Couteur, p.150.
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downward pressure on prices’. But whatever the case, 
the G A ’s future is linked to that of the wool industry, 
and the problems of the industry are its principal concern.
The Wheat Industry
Wheat is by far the most important crop grown in 
Australia both in terms of the cultivated area devoted 
to it and in terms of value of production. In N.S.W. 
over 60 per cent of the total area under crop is devoted 
to wheat, and in 1964/5 the State’s wheat crop was worth 
$172 m.1 2 3
The wheat belt coincides with the wheat-sheep zone 
for the sheep industry. Relatively few farms are devoted 
exclusively to wheat, and generally farmers vary their 
emphasis on wool and wheat according to the relative 
profitability of each enterprise. High wool prices in 
the early 1950s resulted in a marked trend to wool 
production and the area under wheat in Australia fell 
from 11.7 m. acres in 1950/1 1° 7-9 m. acres in 1956/7*'^ 
But since the mid-1950s, with falling wool prices (see 
Table 3) this trend has been reversed, and by 1966/7 the 
area under wheat exceeded 20 m. acres. In N.S.W. the 
increase in wheat acreage has been spectacular,
1
Gruen, Long Term Projections, p.9-6l. See also more 
recent statements by Gruen quoted in The Bulletin,
24 February 1968, p .57•
2
Year Book N.S.W., 1966, pp-905, 923-
3
The Wheat Situation, No.29 (June 1968), Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, Canberra.
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particularly since 1963/4. This increase is illustrated 
in Figure 2 which also shows the correlation between the 
increase in wheat acreage and the corresponding decline 
in profitability of wool compared with wheat. Because of 
increased yields resulting from improved varieties, better 
management, greater use of fertilizer and clover rotation, 
and increased mechanisation, the increase in production 
has been far greater than the increase in the area under 
cultivation. Between 1937/8 and 1966/7 the area under 
wheat cultivation increased from 8.8 m. acres to over 
20 m., while production increased from 81 m. bushels to
4 62 m .
The rapid expansion in wheat production has 
necessitated crash programmes to increase the capacity 
of storage facilities at railheads and ports, and has 
created some doubts about whether the Australian Wheat 
Board will continue to find profitable overseas markets 
for the greatly increased wheat crop.
Between the 1933/6 season and the 1964/5 season the 
Grain Elevators Board of N.S.W., which provides the bulk 
handling system for wheat in the State, increased its 
storage capacity from 68 m. to 96 m. bushels, but in 
the 1964/5 season N.S.W. growers produced 151 m. bushels. 
This meant that temporary storage facilities had to be 
provided by the Board, and some growers had to store 
wheat for short periods on their farms. In the record
1
Parliament of New South Wales: Report of the Grain
Elevators Board for the Year ended 31 October 1966, 
Government Printer, 1967> p.l4.
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FIGURE 2. N.S.W. — RELATIVE W O O L/W HEAT PRICES 
A N D  RESPONSES IN WHEAT ACREAGES
MILLION ACRES RATIO
Area Sown to Wheat/ 
for Grain f 'x /
Ratio Wool/wheat P rice s*
SOURCE :  QUARTERLY REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, JANUARY 1967; AND B. A.E.
^  AVERAGE PRICE FOR WOOL SOLD AT AUCTION IN  N.S.W. PER GREASY LB. - f -  AVERAGE NET
RETURN TO GROWERS ( FO R COUNTRY RAIL SIDING) PER BUSHEL.
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harvest of 1966/7 the storage problem was more acute 
than in 1964/5* Particularly in northern N.S.W., where 
the biggest expansion has taken place, traditional 
wheatgrowers are inclined to blame those larger graziers 
who have recently begun wheat cultivation on a large 
scale for the storage problems and bottlenecks at silos. 
This has accentuated the cleavage between graziers and 
wheat-sheep farmers on wool marketing. Nevertheless, 
large graziers and wheat-sheep farmers are both opposed 
to the principle of storing wheat on farms and demand 
that State and federal governments provide more finance 
for storage facilities.
Had not Mainland China entered the market as a major
buyer for Australian wheat at a time when production was
rapidly expanding, Australia might have had difficulty
in disposing of such large crops commercially.^ In the
five years from 196l/2 to 1965/6 China was Australia’s
leading customer for wheat, taking between 35 and 60 per
2cent of each crop. So far this market has remained firm, 
but there are obvious dangers for any industry to be 
dependent on the Chinese market in view of the political 
relations between the two countries. Except for seeking 
other markets for wheat, the Australian Government has 
taken no action other than to become a signatory to the 
new International Grains Arrangement in the expectation 
that this will lead to firmer wheat prices. Some pundits
1
The purchases by Mainland China have, of course, helped 
bring about the big expansion of production in Australia. 
2
Year Book Australia, 1967, p.9U.
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have suggested that in future production should be limited 
by acreage controls or by a reduction in the guaranteed 
price for wheat. Traditional wheat-farmers strongly 
oppose any suggestion of a drop in the guaranteed price, 
or any modification of the stabilisation scheme, but if 
necessary might agree to acreage controls. On the other 
hand, large graziers whose production costs are lower 
would probably favour a reduction in the guaranteed price 
rather than acreage controls. Thus, should the export 
market for wheat contract sharply,^- the Australian wheat 
industry might experience sharp disagreements similar to 
those which have split the wool industry.
Despite some animosity between traditional wheat
farmers and graziers who now grow wheat, there has been
little real conflict in the wheat industry in recent
years. All growers have been generally well satisfied
with the successive wheat stabilisation schemes which
2have operated since 19^ +8. Under these schemes Australian 
consumers have been charged a fixed home consumption price 
for wheat while the Government has guaranteed producers 
a minimum price based on 'cost of production' for a large 
proportion of the export crop (l50 m. bushels in 1963-8), 
The remainder of each crop is sold by the Wheat Board at 
ruling world export prices. The stabilisation schemes
1
In early 1966, Canada signed three year contracts to 
supply large quantities of wheat to China and Russia. 
Gruen (Long Term Projections, p.8-44) in 1967 suggested 
this could lead to Australia's displacement as the 
principal exporter to China.
2
For details of the stabilisation scheme see year books, 
or annual reports of the Australian Wheat Board.
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have required growers to contribute payments to a 
stabilisation fund when export prices have risen above 
the guaranteed export price. In the early years of the 
stabilisation system, growers contributed to the fund 
but with declining world wheat prices and increases in 
the assessed ’cost of production’ contributions from the 
fund were paid out to growers until the fund was exhausted 
in 1959/60. Since then the Commonwealth has paid 
wheatgrowers $112 m. out of consolidated revenue.^  In
2view of the generally low level of world wheat prices, 
and increases in costs of production, it seems unlikely 
that the Commonwealth will be willing to continue to 
subsidise wheatgrowers indefinitely. But should attempts 
be made to modify the stabilisation system to reduce 
the amount of the export crop subject to the guaranteed 
price, or to modify the ’cost of production’ formula, it 
is certain that wheatgrowers, traditionally the most 
politically conscious primary producers, will employ all 
their political resources and skill in defence of what to 
them is a sacred interest. The thinking of the older 
wheatfarmers is still largely coloured by their 
experiences of the bitter depression years and the long 
fight for stabilised marketing.
1
The Wheat Situation, No.29 (June 1968).
2
Gruen’s (Long Term Projections, p.10-14) projection 
for the world wheat trade suggests a downward trend in 
world wheat prices, though if necessary the major 
exporters may restrict the growth of output to minimise 
the decline in prices.
72
The Meat Industry
Members of the GA produce beef, veal, mutton and 
lamb. Mutton and lamb production is carried on in 
conjunction with wool production on many holdings in 
the high rainfall and wheat-sheep zones. Beef cattle are 
also produced on many woolgrowing holdings. On the upper 
reaches of the coastal valleys most grazing holdings are 
devoted solely to beef and veal production. Two thirds 
of the beef cattle in N.S.W. are in the high rainfall- 
sheep zone,^
Since the second world war meat prices have generally 
increased (see Table 3) and production has greatly 
expanded. Between 1948/9 and 1964/3 Australian production 
of beef and veal rose from 5^2 m. tons to 1,010 m., mutton
from 177 m • tons to 361 m ., and lamb from 130 m. tons to
2224 m. After steady expansion, meat exports fell sharply
in 1939/60 and I96O/I, mainly because of contraction of
the United Kingdom market. But since then, with the
development of a market for boneless beef in the United
States and increased demand in the United Kingdom, beef
exports have shown marked expansion. The United Kingdom
is still the principal buyer of Australian lamb, but
Japan is now a major customer for mutton. Of all the
three commodities produced by members of the Association,
the meat industry offers the best prospects for continued
3expansion and price stability. Population increases and
1
See figures in Year Book N.S.W., 1966, p.947*
2
Year Book Australia, 1967, pp.970, 973- 
3
Gruen, Long Term Projections, pp.10-4 and 10-5*
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higher incomes are expected to raise world demand 
substantially, particularly in the developing and 
centrally planned economies. Should wool prices 
continue to fall, graziers and wheat-sheep farmers are 
likely to turn increasingly to meat production.
Like the wool and wheat industries the meat industry 
looks to governments for assistance in research,"*" control 
of pests and diseases, and overseas market development. 
While the export trade in meat has some protection from 
price fluctuations through inter-government trade 
agreements, its future depends primarily on its ability 
to compete with producers in other countries. Thus, as 
with the wool industry, every effort must be made to 
contain production costs and to increase productivity.
As in the wool industry also, there is a great 
diversity in the size and type of meat producing holdings, 
and consequently the economic interests of producers vary 
greatly. But compared with the wool industry, diversity 
produces few serious conflicts. On specific policies 
relating to meat matters (that is, apart from matters like 
probate, taxation and land policy) both large and small 
producers, and both graziers and wheat-sheep farmers share 
a large area of common interest. Thus, meat matters tend 
to bring the GA and rival organisations together rather
1
Research is financed by a levy on all cattle, sheep and 
lambs slaughtered in Australia for human consumption and 
by a matching contribution on a $1 for $1 basis by the 
Commonwealth Government. Expenditure is controlled by 
the Australian Meat Research Committee which is composed 
of growers’ representatives, and representatives of the 
universities, the Agricultural Council, the CSIRO and 
the Department of Primary Industry.
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than to widen the rift resulting from differences on 
wool and wheat policies.
To sum up, the GA operates in a modern, 
industrialised and regulated economy in which rural 
industries and the rural population are of decreasing 
importance, and in which all economic sections are 
becoming increasingly dependent on governments. Yet 
rural industries are still important as a source of food 
and raw materials, and as a vital source of export 
earnings. The GA now claims to speak on behalf of the 
wool, wheat and meat industries. Of these three, the 
meat industry faces the best prospects for the future, 
and has experienced the least dispute over policy. The 
divergence of economic interest between producers is a 
basic cause of the conflict within the wool industry, 
and the differences between producers have been 
accentuated by the declining profitability of woolgrowing 
in the last decade.
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CHAPTER 3 
Political Culture
Political culture is commonly taken to refer to some 
of the values, beliefs and emotions held in common by a 
nation’s citizens, or by distinctive sections of the 
community. The term relates primarily to beliefs and 
attitudes towards basic features of the political system - 
’the community to be included within its boundaries, 
the nature of the regime, the definition of what government 
is expected to do and refrain from doing, and the role 
of individuals as participants and passive subjects of 
government’. ^ But it also can be used to refer to any 
attitudes or beliefs that affect political behaviour.
In this chapter we will consider those aspects 
of the Australian political culture that affect pressure 
group behaviour in general, and that of the GA in 
particular. We will also consider the distinctive sub­
culture of graziers, and how the values and attitudes 
of graziers differ from those of other primary producers, 
especially wheat-sheep farmers. The differences in 
political culture between graziers and wheat-sheep 
farmers are partly responsible for differences in 
behaviour between graziers’ associations and wheat-sheep 
farmers’ organisations, and for the conflict in the wool 
industry over marketing and promotion.
1
Rose, Studies in British Politics, p.l.
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Australian Political Culture and Pressure Group Behaviour
Political culture has an important influence on the 
role that pressure groups occupy in any political system, 
and on the way they operate.
In Australia, community attitudes and values have 
provided no barrier to the development of strong and 
active economic pressure groups. There is no real 
prejudice against the organisation of occupational and 
economic interests, nor against pressure group activity. 
Instead, it is recognised that workers, primary producers 
and business interests have a legitimate right to 
organise to further their interests. Pressure groups 
are viewed as legitimate elements in the formation and 
expression of public opinion, and as necessary and 
useful structures for conveying demands to governments. 
These attitudes and beliefs make possible the free and 
open organisation of pressure groups, and the 
establishment of intimate relations between public 
officials and lobbyists. Moreover, in Australia there is 
a strong belief that groups have the right to be 
consulted by governments whenever action is being 
considered which would affect the interests of their 
members. These ideas of group representation have been 
largely inherited from Britain."*' They are a modern 
manifestation of what Beer calls the ’Old Whig’ theory of
1
Alan D. Robinson, 'Class Voting in New Zealand: A
Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in the 
Anglo-American Political Systems', in Seymour M. Lipset 
and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 
New York, 1967, p.106, sees similar features in New 
Zealand political culture.
77
representation, according to which members of parliament 
represented interests or classes rather than individuals,'*' 
and a traditional belief that all with a material stake 
in society have a right to share in government.
Australian attitudes and beliefs however, place 
certain restraints on pressure groups and on the methods 
they may legitimately use. Groups are expected to be 
democratically organised, with written constitutions, 
the periodic elections of key officials, and opportunity 
for members to participate in policy-making. Without 
these elements an association cannot hope to gain 
respectability and legitimacy. Groups are also expected 
not to pursue goals that conflict with national interests, 
and not to use unfair or improper methods. For instance, 
it is thought improper for business interests to use open 
threats. Whenever a group violates the Australian concept 
of ’fair play’, it exposes itself to attack from other 
groups and from the press. Such action can endanger a 
group’s own cohesion, since individual members are often 
more committed to the idea of ’fair play’ than are group 
leaders.
An incident in 1953? when a business pressure group 
threatened to work to secure the defeat of the Government 
if its demands were not met, illustrates how these 
restraints sometimes operate. According to press reports, 
in September a deputation of the Australian Industries 
Development Association met the Acting Minister for Trade 
and Customs, Senator G. McLeay, to seek increased tariff
1
Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist A ge, pp.15-20.
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protection for secondary industries. The deputation 
included representatives of such important companies as 
Colonial Sugar, Felt and Textiles, REPCO, ICIANZ, 
Australian Glass, the Masonite Corporation, Olympic Tyres 
and Cables, and Australian Paper Manufacturers. The 
leader of the Association, Mr G.G. Foletta, told Senator 
McLeay that unless the Government increased certain 
tariffs many industrialists would do ’all in their power’ 
to see that a Government was elected which would do so.^ 
Immediately this was reported in the press, other leading 
pressure groups condemned the action. The N.S.W. and 
Victorian Chambers of Manufactures, which favoured the 
demands made, stated that they were not connected with 
the group, and pointed out that they were strictly ’non­
political’ bodies. ’We recognise our duty’, stated the 
Secretary of the Victorian Chamber, ’to co-operate fully
with whatever Government is in office to achieve the
2greatest good for the country’. The Secretary of the
Joint Committee for Tariff Revision called the Industries
Development Association a 'menacing political pressure
group', while the President of the GA said it was
deplorable that any organised group in the community
should openly threaten an elected government with
3reprisals if it refused to grant its demands. Most of 
these criticisms were to be expected. What was 
unexpected however, was the reaction within the Industries
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1953» p.2.
2
Ibid., 5 September 1953» p.2.
Ibid., 4 September 1953» p.2.
3
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Development Association. Colonial Sugar disassociated
itself from the threat explaining that although the Sales
Manager of its building materials division was present
at the meeting in Melbourne by invitation, it considered
that the case for increased protection should have been
put forward in the normal manner."*" Under pressure from
members, the President of the Industries Development
Association then denied that he had tried to blackmail
the Government. ’There has been no attempt at blackmail
2or anything like i t ’, he told the press. ’The 
association is non-party political and the deputation 
merely put the views of industry before the Minister’. 
Nothing further was heard of the threat. Experienced 
pressure groups are well aware of these cultural 
restraints. They consistently try to show that their 
demands are in harmony with the national interests and 
confine their tactics to those which are recognised as 
being legitimate.
Because the name ’pressure group’ carries the 
connotation of the selfish pursuit of interests and the 
use of unfair tactics, most organisations avoid the term.
A former Secretary of a State Chamber of Commerce 
reacted strongly when the press referred to the Chambers 
of Commerce as pressure groups. How could they be 
labelled as pressure groups, a term with ’a nasty flavor’, 
he wrote, when all their ’representations to authorities
1
Ibid., 5 September 1953» p.2.
Ibid., 6 September 1953» P*3*
2
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are based on the conception of national interest1?
Some people imagine that because the term ’pressure
group’ carries this undesirable connotation, Australians
object to pressure group activity. This is not the case.
The Australian attitude to pressure groups is well
illustrated in two separate speeches delivered in
November 1962 by R.G. (later Sir Robert) Menzies when
Prime Minister of Australia. At a Liberal Party meeting
he warned against pressure groups (meaning groups
promoting their selfish interests by unfair methods)
emphatically declaring, ’Therefore I say: Away with all
2this pressure group idea'. A fortnight later he again 
expressed another popular Australian view - this time 
about the legitimate representation of interests - when 
addressing a conference of the N F U . He told delegates 
never to let the Government forget about the needs of 
farm finterests, and advised:
the right way for you not to let us forget... 
is for you increasingly to concert among 
yourselves and with other organizations, 
united policies, because after all, though 
you will in a sense be pursuing your 
selfish interests, you will in a much 
truer sense be pursuing the best interests 
of the Australian nation... never be afraid 
to maintain pressure on the political mind.
I t ’s an age of pressure and I don't mind.
I am an expert at receiving it (laughter).
1
Matthews, ’Pressure Groups in Australia’, p.l8l.
2
Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 3 November 1962. (Quoted 
by Westerway, p.120).
3
National Farmers' Union of Australia: Selected 1962 &
1963 Addresses" p p .4-5.
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Although Australian political culture legitimatises
group representation by all sections of the community,
it gives to some sections special advantages. Australian
egalitarianism favours the under-dog and the battler.^
Consequently, farmers, trade-unionists and returned
servicemen generally can count on much greater public
2sympathy than business interests. Governments too, 
recognise this and often justify their policies by trying 
to show that they are in the interests of the under-dog. 
Many graziers believe that N.S.W. Labor Governments have 
often used the needs of returned soldiers as an excuse 
to confiscate large grazing properties for closer 
settlement. Farm organisations generally have been able 
to capitalise on the importance of agriculture in the 
minds of Australians. Most Australians still believe that 
Australia ’rides on the sheep’s back’ and, although the 
population is predominantly urban, Australians like to 
think of their country as a rural nation. The national 
mystique is essentially a product of the rural scene, in3particular of the pastoral industry. For this reason, 
graziers find it easy to argue and convince members of 
the public that the interests of the pastoral industry 
are in fact identical to national interests. But large
1
Donald Horne, The Lucky Country: Australia in the
sixties, Ringwood (Victoria), 1966 edit ion, pp.33- »^ 
writes: ’Australians love a "battler", an under-dog who
is fighting the top dog, although their veneration for him 
is likely to pass if he comes out from under’.
2
See a comment by the late Professor Leicester Webb in 
Ehrmann (pp.27^--5) on this point.
3
For example, see Russel Ward, The Australian Legend, 
London, 1958.
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graziers are often at a disadvantage because of their 
wealth and high social status. A journalist aptly summed 
up the popular conception of graziers when he wrote:
The city man never really believes that life 
can be hard for the woolgrower. His idea of 
a woolgrower is invariably a fellow with a 
big hat, a Harris tweed jacket, and a Mercedes 
that he ought not be permitted to own because 
he thrashes it so unmercifully.
Because of this historic prejudice against wealthy 
graziers, the GA has encouraged small woolgrowers to 
join the Association, and in its publicity it emphasises 
the needs of smaller woolgrowers who now constitute the 
bulk of its membership.
The Australian attitude to the state has also had
a marked influence on pressure group activity. The
state is seen as ’a vast public utility, whose duty it
is to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest 
2number’ and as ’a machine...avaltable for manipulation
by suffic lent ly powerful interested groups... to execute
the expressed demands of the community as formulated in
practice by organized bodies claiming to interpret the
3general interest correctly’. As Donald Horne puts it, 
the 'general Australian belief is that it is the 
government's job to see that everyone gets a fair go -
4from old age pensioners to manufacturers'. Even large
1
The Bulletin, 16 May 1964, p.76.
2
Hancock, p .55•
3
S. Encel, 'The Concept of the State in Australian 
Politics', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
V o l . VI, N o .1 (May 1 9 6 0 ^
4
Horne, p . 32.
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graziers who complain about government interference, look 
naturally to governments to provide assistance on a 
bewildering variety of matters. And when the GA or any 
other group demands government assistance of some kind, 
they are acting in harmony with a basic Australian belief 
about the role of government.
But while Australians have a natural tendency to 
look to the state for assistance, they are by no means 
agreed that they want greater state controls, or the 
elimination of private enterprise. In successive 
referenda electors have shown a marked reluctance to 
yield greater powers to the Commonwealth. In certain 
situations, it is still easy to get the public to react 
to charges that governments or parties favour socialism 
or nationalisation. In two successive referenda over 
wool marketing, the GA has successfully played on the 
natural fear of socialism among Australian primary 
producers.
The low regard for politicians and bureaucracies in 
Australia is somewhat surprising for a nation that 
depends so much on political solutions to economic and 
social problems. The low regard for politicians^ 
discourages recruitment of able political leaders and 
tends to encourage some potential politicians to aspire 
to leadership in the major pressure groups instead. In 
the case of farm organisations, the ultimate goal of 
many elected leaders is now a seat on a marketing board
1
See Henry Mayer, Peter Loveday and Peter Westerway, 
’Images of Politics’, in Mayer, Australian Politics.
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rather than a parliamentary career. Despite what Davies
calls a ’characteristic talent for bureaucracy’’*,
Australians show a marked dislike of bureaucracies and
a distrust of officialdom. When a group of 350 first-
year students in Government at the University of Sydney
in 1964 were asked to write the first thing they thought
of when they heard the terms ’the public service’ and
’bureaucracy’, only 1.4 per cent gave favourable
responses while 73 per cent indicated an unfavourable 
2image. This unfavourable image of the bureaucracy 
influences pressure group politics in many ways. 
According to one student of the Commonwealth bureaucracy,
The vested interests which oppose government 
intervention play on the popular dislike of 
authority and abuse of power and find ready 
support among political parties and pressure 
groups which blame the anonymous public 
bureaucracy for their own failings....In 
self-defence, the Commonwealth bureaucracy 
tends to be aloof, secretive and distant 
from its clientele.3
Australians also are said to have a strong dislike for 
long-term economic planning, an unwillingness to face 
chronic problems, and a distinct preference for ad hoc 
solutions. Many agricultural economists consider that 
nowhere have these attitudes been more marked than in 
agricultural policy.
1
A.F. Davies, Australian Democracy: An Introduction
to the Political System, Melbourne, second edition, 1964, 
p . 4 .
2
R.N. Spann, ’The Commonwealth Bureaucracy’, in Mayer, 
Australian Politics, p.436.
3
Gerald E. Calden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, Melbourne,
1967, p.15.
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The racial, cultural and relative economic homogeneity 
of the Australian population is reflected in the 
acceptance by the great majority of the fundamental aims 
of Australian politics and of the peaceful reconciliation 
of differences through democratic processes. Australians 
are agreed that governments should promote economic 
stability, development, and the peopling of Australia, 
as well as provide adequate protection for Australian 
industry from outside competition. It is folly for any 
group to make demands in opposition to these established 
goals. Because of the broad consensus of policy in many 
issue-areas, political conflicts have tended to move 
from the public arena and parliament to the administrative 
departments and institutions such as the Tariff Board 
and arbitration courts, specially created to resolve 
conflict between competing interests. The broad consensus 
about goals and the political process gives political 
stability, which in turn enables pressure groups to 
establish with comparative ease permanent and direct 
channels of communication to decision-makers.
But despite the overall homogeneity of the Australian 
population and a belief that Australian society is 
egalitarian, differences in status and class do exist."*"
The old grazing families, the leading commercial families, 
and members of the higher professions comprise the main 
economic and social elites. These elites are small and
1
For a criticism of the view that class stratification 
is unimportant in Australia, see Jean I. Martin, 
’Marriage, the Family and Class’ in A.P. Elkin (ed. ), 
Marriage and the Family in Australia, Sydney, 1957» 
pp.24-53.
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fragmented, and in no sense constitute Wright Mills’s 
idea of a power elite, In many respects, they are socially 
isolated from the rest of the community and so are often 
somewhat out of touch with popular sentiments. In some 
cases this isolation of leaders has placed the GA at a 
definite political disadvantage.
Attitudes and Values of Primary Producers
Before we turn to the distinctive grazier sub-culture 
and to note how it differs from the wheat-sheep farmer 
sub-culture, we will consider some of the main attitudes 
and values that graziers have in common with other 
primary producers.
To all Australian farmers and graziers the term
2’primary producer’ has special significance. It is 
thought of not merely as a name by which to differentiate 
those engaged in rural industry from those in 
manufacturing and tertiary industry, but as a form of 
recognition of the prime economic importance of rural 
production. Even though the importance of agriculture 
in the economy has declined, many farmers still believe 
that agriculture supports all other industries. While 
on a field trip, the writer was told by one woolgrower:
’80 per cent of Australia’s income still comes from the 
land; without us the cities would collapse’. Since they 
see agriculture as the ’backbone’ of the economy, primary 
producers consider that the rest of the community has an
1
C, Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, 1956.
2
Apart from the secondary sources indicated, the rest of 
this chapter is based on the writer’s observations and on 
discussions with individual graziers and farmers.
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obligation to assist them and so feel justified in asking 
governments for assistance.
Many primary producers see farming and grazing not 
just as ways of making money, but as a way of life. 
Consequently, they see any threat to their economic 
security as also a threat to their way of life - a way 
of life which they consider to be far superior to urban 
life and employment in secondary or tertiary industry. 
in addition, many farmers, particularly larger graziers, 
have a strong and almost mystic attachment to their land. 
This makes them react intensely to any threat of 
confiscation of land for closer settlement, or to 
suggestions of nationalisation of land.
One of the most important differences between urban
and rural modes of living is the isolation of the farm 
2resident. isolation reduces opportunities for a broader 
range of experience and for social intercourse, and 
promotes self-reliance and individualism. This 
individualism and the fact that they are employers and 
self-employed, according to farm organisation leaders, 
makes farmers difficult to organise and often leads to 
dissension in organisations. But while individualism is
1
F.H. Gruen, ’Rural Australia’, in Davies and Encel, 
Australian Society, pp.260-1, states that there is some 
limited evidence of a significantly higher degree of job 
satisfaction among farmers and farm labourers than among 
persons in urban occupations.
2
J.H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner, A Study of Rural 
Society: Its Organization and Changes, Boston, 19^0,
pp.270-77) noted similar features in the United States.
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strong, so is co-operation. Farmers are used to helping 
one another with major tasks and have a natural propensity 
to Form organisations. From observation it appears to me 
that farmers on the whole participate more readily and 
more actively in organisations than most urban dwellers. 
This facilitates the work of farm organisations.
Although rural attitudes to education and the 
universities are changing, many farmers still regard 
’experience’ more highly than ’learning’."*" They are 
suspicious of academic experts, particularly economists, 
and consider that a man without practical experience in 
farming is in no position to give sound advice to 
farmers. They resent what they consider as unfair and 
uninformed attacks by ’theorists’ in universities on the 
way farmers manage their properties, and on the various 
schemes of government assistance to rural industries. In 
1967» when a professor of farm management accused 
woolgrowers of being ’managerially illiterate’, farm 
organisation leaders quickly reacted. C.D. Renshaw, 
General President of the U F W A , told a farm convention 
that he found ’this sort of thing a bit hard to take’. 
’Many landholders’, he asserted,
ran properties of a face value of many 
thousands of dollars ...with a minimum 
work force...that in secondary industry 
would require half a dozen executives 
(with secretaries, typewriters and 
telephones) to administer. . ..Of .course, 
not all primary producers are efficient 
and no doubt some of them fail. But is 
the rate of failure any higher than in
1
Gruen, 'Rural Australia’, p.2 6 3 *
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secondary industry, or on the same scale?
I can’t recall a primary industry failure 
similar, say, to that of Reid Murray or 
Latec. The professor is reported to have 
called on graziers to make more use of 
farm consultants and modern accounting 
methods, even computers. This is bunkum.
In recruiting staff for their secretariats, most farm
organisations still place more emphasis on experience in
farming than on formal academic qualifications. Except
for the larger graziers’ associations, economists are
still rare. As a result, the staffs of many farm
organisations are at a disadvantage in dealing with
highly qualified bureaucrats in the State and
Commonwealth public service. They are also somewhat at a
disadvantage in competing with the leading business
groups who not only employ well-qualified university
graduates, but have successfully recruited senior members
2of the Commonwealth departments with which they deal. 
Because of their dislike of bureaucrats, farm organisations 
have recruited few public servants. Nevertheless, while 
the graziers’ associations share the suspicion of other 
farm organisations for bureaucrats and to some extent for 
economists, they have always recognised the need to employ 
specialists, and their secretariats have always been 
staffed by people with sound practical and formal 
qualifications.
1
The Land, 5 October 1967*
2
In the twelve months to May 1968 business groups 
recruited from the Department of Trade and Industry 
two Deputy-Secretaries and the head of the Office of 
Secondary Industry. (See report, The Australian Financial 
Review, 15 May 1968).
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For years Australian Farmers have Felt a sense oF 
being disadvantaged and oF social and political 
isolation. But in recent years, with the increasing 
rate oF industrialisation and urbanisation, this sense 
oF disadvantagement and isolation has become much more 
acute. Critics oF Farm policy oFten assert that Farmers 
constitute one oF the best organised and most powerFul 
lobbies in the country. Farmers however, rarely see 
themselves in this way. Instead, they consider that 
business interests, the trade unions and urban dwellers 
exert much more political inFluence than they do. In 
1961 one Farm leader told delegates at a conFerence:
This is the age oF combination - Trade 
Unions, Chambers oF ManuFactures, Chambers 
oF Commerce, many proFessional associations 
and similar organisations are evidence oF 
organised groups gaining in power and 
inFluence. They exercise an increasing 
amount oF political and economic pressure....
These groups wage a sort oF economic civil war 
among themselves and usually against primary 
producers. The situation now...is that 
primary producers are not holding their own 
in the dogFight. As they become more 
eFFicient, their numbers dwindle: Consequently
they exert less electoral inFluence than 
Formerly. The size oF the producers* dog is 
less. The remedy is to put more Fight into 
the dog.
The belieF that they are politically disadvantaged acts 
as a strong stimulus to political action by Farmers. It 
has also stimulated interest in the amalgamation oF Farm 
organisations.
1
National Farmers* Union oF Australia: 1961 Annual
ConFerence Collected Addresses, p .21.
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As a section, graziers are conservative and strongly
anti-Labor, while the political attitudes of other
Australian primary producers vary from radicalism through
to extreme conservatism. However, among primary producers
in recent years there has been a marked and increasing
prevalence of political conservatism. While support for
the Labor Party is strong in some areas, most Australian
farmers now vote consistently for non-Labor parties.
Public opinion surveys suggest that 70 to 80 per cent
of Australian farmers vote for the Liberal Party or the
Country Party. In a survey conducted immediately before
the 1 9 6 6 federal elections, 74.3 per cent of farm-owners
as opposed to 49.2 per cent in the whole sample indicated
that they intended to vote for the Liberal Party or
Country Party.^ In the same poll only 40.2 per cent of
skilled workers, 34.6 per cent of semi-skilled, and 2 1 . 6
per cent of unskilled indicated that they intended to
vote that way. The conservatism of Australian farmers
2springs from a number of factors. In recent years 
farmers have often been dissatisfied with their incomes, 
but not so dissatisfied as to demand radical solutions 
or to change their basic political attitudes. Radicalism 
is usually an expression of intense dissatisfaction, an 
indication that the need for economic security and social 
status is not being met. Conditions in the new wheat 
lands on the fringes of the main wheat belt in the 1 9 2 0 s
1
’Callup Poll I8 7 Conducted November 1 9 6 6 by The Roy 
Morgan Research Centre Pty. Ltd . ’, Mimeo.
2
On this see Gruen, ’Rural Australia’, p.260.
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and 1930s produced agrarian radicalism amongst Australian
wheat farmers^ similar to that observed by Lipset in 
2Saskatchewan. Sharply fluctuating incomes based on a 
single commercial crop, and the newness of the area 
developed in these farmers attitudes characteristic of 
an outcast group, and made them more receptive to radical 
remedies than mixed farmers in settled areas. But 
conditions in the wheat areas are now different. The 
conservatism of farmers today also springs from the fact 
that most farmers are employers or self-employed, owning
3their own land, and have grown up in farming and so have 
been socialised into conservative ways of thinking. 
Conservatism is also related to the character of the 
political parties. Many farmers are opposed to the Labor 
Party because of its association with trade unionism and 
its image as the party of wage-earners. Shearers, farm 
workers and even city wage-earners who become farmers 
under soldier-settler or closer settlement schemes, often
1
R.F.X. Smith, ’Organise or be Damned: The Development
of the Australian Wheatgrowers’ Associations, 1927-48*, 
work-in-progress seminar paper, Department of Political 
Science, IAS, Australian National University, 5 December
1967.
2
See S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan, Berkeley, 1950»
p.29.
3
J.S. Western, in a paper read to a conference in 1967 
(’The Yass Valley Survey', SAANZ conference paper January 
1967), reported that in answer to a question 'How did you 
come to get into farming?’, 76 per cent of the sample of
farmers interviewed in the Yass district said that their 
fathers or other relatives before them had been farmers 
and ’this seemed the natural thing to d o ' . Only 25 per 
cent had actually decided to go farming because of 
interest, and had purchased land and commenced farming.
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quickly cease to be consistent Labor voters. In addition, 
being a socialist party, Labor has often been portrayed 
by its opponents as standing for the confiscation of 
freehold land, increased government control of primary 
industry, and even dictatorship and international 
communism. The Country Party, on the other hand, has 
capitalised on farmers' anti-urban sentiment, and on 
their sense of numerical weakness and social and political 
isolation.
Grazier and Wheat-Sheep Farmer Sub-Cultures
Apart from differences in economic interests, 
producers of wool, meat and wheat are divided by social 
and cultural differences, and these differences are far 
greater than those that divide producers of any other 
farm commodity or related group of farm commodities.
At the top of the social scale are the old pastoral 
families descended directly from the squatters who 
originally occupied the pastoral land of eastern Australia 
and founded the wool industry. They constitute a small, 
exclusive, social elite with its own distinctive values 
and way of life. Despite the operation of the free 
selection acts of last century and the more recent closer 
settlement schemes, many of the old grazing families 
still own extremely large holdings. They generally live 
in spacious and imposing homesteads, usually surrounded 
by lawns and gardens and beyond that by outbuildings and 
houses for their employees. Members of the grazing elite 
often play a leading role in community affairs; sometimes
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they run for office in local government, or for election 
to State and Commonwealth p a r l i a m e n t s S o c i a l l y  they 
mix little with other landowners or with townspeople, 
but instead choose to mix with one another in their homes, 
at tennis parties, at picnic races and polo meetings, 
at city weddings, and at matrons and spinsters’ balls. 
Their children are sent away to the best private schools 
where they mix with the children of the business elite 
and where the social values taught in the home are 
reinforced. Intermarriage between leading grazing , 
families is common and, for economic as well as social 
reasons, is encouraged. The mode of life of the old 
grazing families resembles that of the landed classes of 
Britain. Great emphasis is placed on conformity to the 
rules of politeness and social etiquette; the accepted 
way of doing things is considered an indispensable mark 
of good breeding. The grazing elite provides a social 
link between the pastoral industry and the metropolitan 
business community. Many of its members maintain homes 
in the upper-middle class suburbs of Sydney as well as 
on their properties, and frequent the same clubs as the 
business elite. Many have interests in business, 
particularly wool firms and banks, and some occupy seats 
on boards of directors of leading companies. The old 
grazing families, according to Martin,
...have a strong sense of solidarity, 
sustained partly through the intensity of 
their social contacts with one another 
and partly through the kinship ties by 
which many of them are linked together
On this point, see Gruen, ’Rural Australia’, p.267*
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as a result of their tendency to marry 
within their own group. Traditions of 
high-born ancestry are preserved and 
sometimes fabricated. They are warmly 
interested in the history of their 
families....Unlike most Australians they 
are extremely conscious of belonging to 
a kinship group which extends back into 
the past for at least several generations 
and forward into the future.^
Relations with their employees are generally friendly 
and paternalistic - except, of course, for the itinerant 
shearers.
At the other end of the social scale are the very 
small woolgrowers, the share-farmers, and the shearers 
or farm labourers who run a couple of hundred sheep.
Their style of life is little different from that of 
unskilled workers in the poorest urban areas in Sydney 
or Newcastle, and in some cases their actual living 
conditions are inferior. Their homes are often old, 
dilapidated, poorly-furnished and lacking in essential 
amenities. Persons at the bottom of this social scale 
generally have had a minimum of education. They seldom 
travel far from home and rarely participate in community 
affairs. Observers have noted that the extent of the 
differences between these people and the old grazing 
families covers all aspects of social life - even the way 
they take their meals. According to one study made in 
the 1940s,small farmers invariably eat in the kitchen 
whereas graziers have separate dining rooms and their 
meals are usually
1
Martin, p .37•
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served by a maid, on a well-appointed table 
which may be set with the family silver and 
glass; they are attended by a ritual in which 
the correct precedence of serving and attention 
to the needs of others are carefully observed.
People of this class bath and change before the 
evening meal; they do not sit down to the table 
in their working-clothes as members of the 
other classes usually do. Meals are eaten 
slowly, and are a more potent means of 
continually re-expressing family unity than 
with other sections of the community.-^
Between the two extremes lie the majority of 
woolgrowers who are neither members of the old grazing 
families or struggling ’cocky* farmers. However, most 
woolgrowers, beef cattle producers and wheatgrowers 
tend to identify themselves with one or other of the two 
extremes on the social scale. They think of themselves 
either as graziers or farmers. While those who own 
larger holdings generally think of themselves as graziers, 
wealth is not the main or sole determinant of social 
status or perceived status. What is often more important 
is family background, education, attitudes, manners and 
way of life. There are many wealthy woolgrowers with 
large holdings who still identify themselves with the 
struggling ’cocky’. On the other hand, there are GPS- 
educated"^ descendants of old pastoral families or even 
sons of professional men battling to make ends meet on
1
Jean X. Craig, ’Some Aspects of Life in Selected Areas 
of Rural New South Wales’, M.A. thesis, University of 
Sydney, 19^4, p.73*
2
i.e. ’Great Public Schools’, a term used widely to 
refer to the leading and most expensive private and 
church schools in N.S.W.
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undersized farms who identifv themselves with the grazing 
elite. It is a woolgrower's conception of his own social 
status that primarily determines whether he identifies 
himself with (but not necessarily joins) a graziers’ 
association or a wheat-sheep farmers’ association.
This social polarisation means that among wool, 
meat and wheat producers in N.S.W. there are two distinct 
social groups with very different sets of attitudes, one 
reflected in the graziers’ associations and the other in 
the wheat-sheep farmers organisation.^ Moreover, these 
cultural differences accentuate and complement the 
economic differences between graziers and wheat-sheep 
farmers.
The graziers’ sub-culture is essentially one of 
conservatism. Graziers seek to maintain the existing 
social and economic order that accords them their 
privileged position. They see this privileged position 
being eroded by government action of various kinds - 
resumption of holdings for closer settlement, high income, 
taxation, land tax, and probate duty which makes the 
inheritance of property extremely difficult.
Consequently they believe strongly in free enterprise and 
a minimum of government intervention, and (for good 
reasons) have an intense fear of trade unions, the Labor
1
These two sub-cultures correspond, to some extent, to 
the ranch and to the family smallholding types of 
agricultural enterprises in a typology developed by 
Stinchcombe. See, Arthur M. Stinchcombe, ’Agricultural 
Enterprise and Rural Class Relations’, in Reinhard 
Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, Class, Status, and 
Power, second edition, New York, 1966.
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Party and socialism. With their city contacts and
business interests, they are much less strongly anti-city
in sentiment than most rural dwellers and share little
of the small farmers' fear of exploitation by merchants
and brokers. Many of them feel more at home in the
Liberal Party than the Country Party. With this outlook
it is not surprising that most graziers have always
opposed stabilised marketing schemes for the wool
industry on the grounds that it will involve increased
government intervention, as well as on purely economic
grounds. In the 1950-1 debate on wool marketing one
leading grazier warned in the press that, if a planned
reserve price scheme was implemented, it would be only
'a short time before any grazier who wishes to purchase
a few sheep will first have to obtain a permit to do so'.^
Another declared that once 'the socialistic octopus
effectively encircles the wool trade with its tentacles,
2the industry will be doomed to speedy strangulation'. 
Graziers look on the wool industry in a special way.
They see it as being different from other rural industries, 
as part of the Australian national heritage. They cling 
to the myth that the wool industry is free from 
government intervention and is economically independent. 
Many of them hold the same sentiments expressed by one 
leading grazier and former GA President nearly forty years 
ago :
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 1951> p.2.
Ibid., 9 August 1950» p.2.
2
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We as woolgrowers believe in working out our 
own salvation. We have always practised self- 
help. We refuse to lean on Governments, 
although some Governments have leaned heavily 
on us. What we ask of Governments is that 
they should constantly recognise the supreme 
economic importance of our industry, and that 
they refrain from placing obstacles in its way. 
Governments can best help by leaving us free 
to help ourselves.^-
But since these words were uttered the situation in the 
wool industry has changed. Like all other primary 
producers, graziers are now heavily dependent on the 
assistance of governments. While the wool industry is 
still free in the sense that the traditional auction 
system has survived, graziers depend on assistance in 
the way of fertilizer subsidies, freight concessions and 
taxation concessions, and the Commonwealth government 
subsidises both wool promotion and wool research 
programmes. Graziers constantly press for more government 
assistance, yet they cling to their myth about the 
freedom of the wool industry. The free auction system of 
wool marketing has a symbolic importance for them; they 
see it as a symbol of their economic and political 
independence. It is for this reason that many graziers 
resist so strongly attempts to change the marketing 
system.
The wheat-sheep sub-culture is different. Like the 
wheat farmers of Canada observed by Lipset, Australian 
wheat-sheep farmers have always had a marked dislike of
1
Ibid., 23 June 1931, P-7* (From a speech by Sir Graham 
Waddell to the Empire Wool Conference in Melbourne).
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merchants and brokers - middlemen who grow fat on the 
profits of farmers’ toil. Their enthusiasm for co­
operatives and orderly marketing schemes has often sprung 
from their desire to deal a blow at middlemen as well as 
to achieve economic security. Like graziers, they fear 
government intervention and socialism, but their fear 
is less intense and is offset by a realisation of the 
economic advantages of government assistance.
Consequently, they prefer to run the risk of increased 
government control of the wool industry in order to 
secure stable and worthwhile prices. While most of them 
prefer non-Labor governments, a proportion votes 
consistently for Labor candidates and in times of crises 
wheat-sheep farmers have been known to give strong 
electoral support to the Labor Party.
Wool, meat and wheat producers themselves think in 
terms of this dichotomy between graziers and wheat-sheep 
farmers, and identify the two main groups of organisations 
in the wool industry, the graziers’ associations and the 
wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations, with these two 
different sub-cultures. In N.S.W. wheat-sheep farmers 
often use the one term, ’the graziers’, to refer both 
to graziers as a social group and to the GA.
Moreover, the political rivalry between graziers’ 
associations and wheat-sheep farmers organisations is 
based on social and class differences as well as on 
other factors, and the repeated failure of wheat-sheep 
farmers to secure marketing reform has increased their 
sense of class animosity towards graziers as a social 
group. In a spirited account of the history of
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attempts by wheat-sheep farmers’ to secure marketing 
reform, Hitchins gives an insight into the way he and 
other wheat-sheep farmers’ leaders viewed the leaders 
of the graziers’ associations who repeatedly frustrated 
their efforts:
Always they looked backward, seeking to 
recapture the past that had vanished with 
the passing of McArthur [sic]. They saw 
themselves as a race apart from other men.
They designed a kingdom of their own that 
must forever remain splendidly isolated and 
always supremely self-sufficient. Although 
a minority group, within a community largely 
antagonistic to their aims, their attitude 
towards responsible government was always that 
it must remain aloof from their affairs, except 
when called upon to yield to their bidding.
And from the beginning of the 1930s, wheat-sheep farmers’ 
animosity towards graziers increased even more because 
of the belief that the graziers’ associations were 
working hand-in-glove with the hated wool brokers to 
deprive struggling farmers of a fair price for their wool.
Australian political culture places no barrier to 
the organisation of pressure groups or to pressure group 
activity, although it places restrictions on the methods 
that groups may legitimately employ. As primary producers, 
graziers are accorded special advantages, though these 
are somewhat offset by prejudice against them because 
of their wealth and high social status. Graziers share 
many of the same attitudes and values as other primary
1
F. Eric Hitchins, Tangled Skeins: A Historic Survey
of Australian Wool Marketing, Melbourne, [1956 ] , p .39•
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producers including belief in the importance of rural 
industries, and farming and grazing as a way of life; 
suspicion of experts (especially economists); a dislike 
for bureaucrats; and a sense of being socially and 
politically disadvantaged. But they differ in some 
important respects. Moreover, the differences between 
the grazier and wheat-sheep farmer sub-cultures have 
accentuated the economic differences between producers 
in the wool, wheat and meat industries, and have 
contributed to the political rivalry between graziers’ 
associations and wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations and 
to the conflict in the wool industry.
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CHAPTER 4 
Political Setting
The GA interacts with its political environment.
It seeks to achieve political change, but to do this 
it must come to terms with and operate within the 
bounds provided by its political environment. 
Consequently, its internal characteristics, its 
behaviour and its effectiveness are influenced by 
political factors.
In this chapter we will consider some of the 
important political factors that influence the GA under 
five headings: government structure, policy-making and
administration, official actors and their policies, 
rival economic interests, and political rivalry in 
the farm sector.
Government Structure
If a pressure group is to influence official 
decision-making, it must adjust its activities to the 
structure of government, to the processes by which 
decisions are made and to the points of access provided.
When the GA was formed there was only one level of 
government in N.S.W. But since the federation of the 
Australian colonies in 1901 and the establishment of a 
system of local government throughout country areas of 
N.S.W. in 1906,"^ official decisions affecting primary
Local Government Act, 1906.
1
io4
producers have been made at three separate levels of 
government - local, State and Commonwealth. The 
importance of decision-making at each level however, both 
overall and in relation to primary industry in particular, 
is not equal.
Local government enjoys much inferior status and the
activities of local councils are, in fact, under the
overall supervision of the State Government . Nevertheless,
decisions made by local government bodies are important
to primary producers. Municipal councils and shires
(which cover all rural areas except the sparsely populated
Western Division) are responsible for the construction and
maintenance of roads (apart from main roads ) and stock
sale-yards, the supervision of building construction and
public health and, through county councils (formed by
groups of municipalities and shires for specific purposes),
2the provision of electricity services and abattoirs. 3Shire rates constitute a major cost for rural producers. 
Where country towns are included within shires, a major 
grievance of primary producers is that rates from rural
1
This section is based on Year Book N.S.W., 1966, pp-559” 
603; and Frederick A. Larcombe, The Development of Local 
Government in New South Wales, Melbourne, 19ol.
2
At the end of 1963 electricity services in N.S.W. were 
provided by four municipalities, two shires and thirty- 
five county councils. Nine municipalities and six county 
councils conducted abattoirs.
3
Rates on property constitute(the main source of finance 
for local government bodies, büt the State Government 
makes capital grants for developmental projects.
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land are used to provide services (such as swimming pools 
and parks ) which are of greater benefit to the urban 
population than the rural population, rather than on road 
maintenance. At branch level all State farm organisations 
in N.S.W. take a keen interest in decision-making by 
shires, municipalities and county councils. But overall 
the effort expended at the local government level is only 
of minor importance in the total activity of any 
organisation.
The main decisions which affect primary producers 
today are made by the State and Commonwealth Governments. 
For many years the N.S.W. Government, which has control 
over agriculture, lands, water conservation and irrigation, 
railways, road transport, and education, was of far greater 
importance than the Commonwealth Government in the eyes 
of primary producers. But in recent years this has 
changed, and now the Commonwealth has a direct and growing 
influence on many aspects of life related to primary 
production. Of particular importance is the Commonwealth’s 
control over the inflow of capital; banking and credit; 
wage regulation; trade with other countries; research; 
tariffs, bounties and subsidies; and the marketing of 
primary products. The notable feature of the Australian 
federal system in recent years has been the increasing 
dominance of the Commonwealth over the States, achieved 
largely by the Commonwealth’s financial superiority.^
1
Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, pp.29-^3 ; and 
James A, Maxwell, Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 
in Australia, Melbourne, 1967.
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Having abandoned their independence in borrowing and also 
the fields of personal and company taxation, the States 
depend on Commonwealth grants for a large part of their 
income. Through its financial control the Commonwealth 
is able to influence the policies of State Governments; 
its financial superiority has also enabled the 
Commonwealth to enter fields already occupied by State 
Governments (such as drought relief, agricultural 
extension, education and transport) and also to develop new 
fields of governmental responsibility. The limitation of 
its powers to develop marketing schemes for farm products 
(as interpreted in the James case of 1936)^ has been 
largely overcome by persuading State Governments to pass 
complementary legislation. Because of the need for co­
ordination between State Agriculture departments, the 
Commonwealth established the Australian Agricultural 
Council which now consists of Commonwealth Ministers for 
Primary Industry and External Territories and State 
Ministers for Agriculture. Through its financial 
superiority the Commonwealth successfully dominates the 
Council.
1
In James V. Commonwealth, James (a dried fruit grower 
and packer) soughttoevade the requirement imposed by 
regulations that fruit could not be sold inter-state 
until prescribed export quotas had been filled. The Privy 
Council declared the Commonwealth Dried Fruits Act to be 
invalid because it restricted the volume of inter-state 
trade ( sec„ 92 ) .
2
See Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, p. 31 >’ and F.O. 
Grogan, ’The Australian Agricultural Council: A Successful
Experiment in Commonwealth-State Relations’, Public 
Administration (Sydney), Vol. XVII (1958).
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Since decisions affecting primary producers are taken
at these three levels of government, the GA finds it
necessary to operate at each level. To do this it has had
to develop suitable structures and machinery. Eckstein
notes that pressure groups often resemble the organisations
they seek to influence.'*' In Britain, with a highly
centralised form of government, pressure groups tend to
be monolithic with unitary structures. In Australia
however, State-based groups have formed federations and
confederations to channel their demands to the
Commonwealth Government, but have retained their existing
organisations to communicate demands to State governments
and, in the case of farm organisations, to local
government authorities. The pressure group federations
and confederations generally lack adequate powers and 
2finance. The farm federations and confederations are 
probably weaker than others, and the shift of power to the 
Commonwealth has only accentuated their weaknesses.
Pressure groups tend to adjust the form of their 
activities not only to the basic structure of government 
but also to the location of effective power within official 
institutions. Thus, as Eckstein suggests, the activities 
of pressure groups are reliable guides to the loci of
1
Eckstein, p.21.
2
See Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. 115-9» and 
Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying, New York, 
1966, p p .27-9, for a discussion of the general problems 
with federations and confederations.
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effective power in any political system. At both State
and Commonwealth levels, mainly as a result of the
increased scope and complexity of government activity, the
development of large professional bureaucracies, the
operation of strict party discipline, and the failure of
parliaments to evolve measures to ensure greater executive
accountability, power has moved from parliament to the
2Cabinet and public service. Thus pressure groups today
channel their communications mainly to Cabinet Ministers
and public servants, rather than to members of parliament;
most groups now appeal to members of parliament only when
their efforts to influence the executive or bureaucracy
have failed, or to ask that a matter be brought to the
notice of a Minister, either privately or at a party
meeting. Public servants make many of the decisions that
affect economic pressure groups. The increased volume of
3delegated legislation has placed considerable policy­
making power, not just administrative discretion, in their 
hands. They also have considerable say in drafting and
1
Eckstein, p.l6.
2
See G.S. Reid, 'Australia's Commonwealth Parliament and 
the "Westminster Model"', Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies, Vo1. II, No.2 (May 1964); Matthews, »Pressure 
Groups in Australia'; and Caiden, The Commonwealth 
Bureaucracy, p.23.
Davies, Australian Democracy, p.30»
3
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framing legislation and, because of the dependence of 
Ministers on their advice, they can have a marked influence 
on major policy decisions made by Ministers and Cabinet. 
Above all else, public servants are concerned with 
efficiency and with minimising public dispute; 
consequently, they show readiness to consult directly 
with interested groups and to make modifications which can 
be shown will probably reduce dispute, promote 
administrative efficiency, and not necessitate major 
changes in policy or increased expenditure. In addition, 
the privacy with which public servants work facilitates 
consultation and negotiation between public servants and 
pressure group leaders and staff.
The increased power of the executive and bureaucracy 
has also necessitated the development of bureaucratic 
structures by groups seeking to have an effective 
influence on decision-making. Pressure groups need 
secretariats, staffed by experts with the same ability 
and training as senior officers in government departments, 
and located in close proximity to the government 
departments whose decisions they wish to influence. 
Pressure group bureaucrats must know their way around 
government departments; they must be aware of the centres 
of power within departments; they must be able to prepare 
submissions similar in style to those prepared by
1
Ibid., p.27. Of the 80 bills passed in 1950 by the 
Commonwealth parliament, Davies classifies 24 as coming 
from Commonwealth departments and a further 16 from 
departments as a result of pressure group activity. In 
I960 of the 110 bills passed, 42 came directly from 
departments and an additional 40 came as a result of 
pressure group activity.
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departmental officers, and to negotiate and bargain over 
policy. Farm organisations, as we have already noted, 
have been slow to develop adequate secretariats, and 
even to use the experts they have effectively. The lack 
of adequate secretariats is particularly noticeable at 
the national level; in 1967 of the main commodity 
federations only the AWGC had its own secretariat, and 
none had an office in Canberra."^
The need for farm commodity federations today to have
their own expert bureaucracies is even greater because of
the dominance of the Department of the Treasury and the
Department of Trade and Industry over other Commonwealth
departments. Staffed by an able administrative elite, the
Treasury exercises effective control not only over the
whole economy but over expenditure by other Commonwealth
2departments as well as State governments. Although
some of its functions go back to 1901, the Department of
Trade and Industry is a relatively new department dating3from 1956. Its main concerns are trade policy, tariffs 
and industrial development. Under the dynamic leadership 
of John McEwen, the Department of Trade and Industry has 
become a major force and a rival to Treasury in
1
This statement is based on information supplied by farm 
organisations. For a list of the location of the offices 
of each commodity federation, see Australian Primary 
Industry Organisations, Department of Primary Industry, 
Canberra, 1967*
2
Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, pp.7^_5*
3
See R.P. Deane, The Establishment of the Department of 
Trade: A case-study in Administrative re-organisation,
Canberra, 1963»
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determining economic policy and goals. Trade is 
essentially positive, protectionist and willing to 
subsidise industries to achieve export goals. Treasury 
is more negative, and primarily concerned with efficiency 
and with controlling the extent of subsidies paid by the 
Government. Both departments are obvious targets for 
pressure groups that wish to have an influence on 
economic policy, though groups find that, depending on 
their outlook, one department is usually more sympathetic 
than the other. And to communicate demands effectively 
pressure groups need staff able to match those in these 
two top departments.
Farm organisations also need experts to present 
evidence to arbitration tribunals and the Tariff Board. 
The operation of economic pressure groups has been 
affected by what Parker has described as the
...long-established habit, carried further, 
perhaps, than in any other advanced society, 
of institutionalizing the resolution of 
conflicts over the allocation of values....
Its central feature is the attempt to remove 
important allocative decisions from a process 
of ad hoc bargaining or trials of strenth, 
based on the relative power of the competing 
interest groups, to a system of adjudication 
by committees, boards, tribunals, departmental 
agencies, autonomous corporations and similar 
institutional devices
1
See articles in Sydney Morning Herald, 5 and 6 January 
1968, and in The Australian, 10 January 1968; and Horne, 
P.190.
2
R.S. Parker, ’Power in Australia’, The Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. I, N o . 2 (October
1965), pp.88-9.
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The development of institutions such as arbitration 
tribunals and the Tariff Board, described by Miller as 
'organs of syndical satisfaction’,^ has also affected 
pressure group activity by removing important fields 
of public policy from the direct control of parliaments, 
Cabinets and bureaucracies, and beyond the reach of 
political parties. In the areas of policy controlled by 
these institutions, pressure groups rely on direct 
communication.
Although the structure of government encourages 
groups to communicate directly with the main decision­
makers - Cabinets, bureaucrats and institutions like the 
Tariff Board - it is still possible for groups to use 
alternative channels of communication such as political 
parties, individual members of parliament and the general 
public. Moreover, on a limited range of decisions, power 
rests with the general public.
Policy-making and Administration
In Australia there is considerable opportunity for 
groups to influence government policy-making and 
administration. One reason for this is that governments 
recognise their need of the advice, consent and co­
operation of economic pressure groups to manage the 
economy. 'It was primarily because government attempted 
to control or manage the economy', Samuel Beer believes, 
'that producer groups [in England] acquired power to
1
J.D.B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics: An
Introductory Survey, London, 1964 edition, p.132.
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influence policy’. The same is true in Australia. Not 
only are groups like the GA dependent on governments, but 
governments are dependent on groups; thus the 
relationship between them is one of interdependence.
Farm organisations such as the GA are in the position 
to supply governments with useful information: facts and
statistics which government departments lack; information 
on what is happening and likely to happen within an 
industry; and information on how proposed policies are 
likely to be regarded. Such information is important to 
both Ministers and public servants as it enables them to 
avoid unnecessary trouble and political fireworks. Farm 
organisation leaders and senior staff members can give 
expert advice to complement that available in government 
departments. Associations such as the GA which have well- 
staffed secretariats are able to provide administrative 
assistance to departments. Members of the GA often take 
their complaints first to the G A . The GA examines 
complaints, rejects those which are unsubstantiated by 
evidence, classifies the remainder, and sends to 
departments reports based on information received and 
analysed. This saves departments time and effort, and 
being inundated with numerous individual complaints. 
Moreover, all the major farm organisations have the 
ability to make things difficult by organising public 
campaigns, or merely by becoming less co-operative. The 
approval of a policy by a major commodity association 
produces confidence in the policy among producers, whereas
1
Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, p.319*
ll4
disapproval can easily cause public uneasiness. In 
addition, public servants and Ministers sometimes seek the 
help of groups to achieve policies which other public 
servants or Ministers, or other governments oppose."*"
Particularly at the federal level, Ministers and
departmental heads have encouraged farm groups to
establish close relations with departments and to
communicate their demands directly instead of campaigning
in public. The leading exponent of the need for the
closest relations between government and industry groups
has been John McEwen, leader of the Country Party. 'I
have established a philosophy’, he said to a graziers’
association conference in 1965, 'that as a man in
Government I want to work with the manufacturers or the
wheat growers or the graziers. I want to work in a
partnership relationship, not with each shouting at the 
2other'. Again and again McEwen has publicly told 
primary producers that the Commonwealth Government needs 
their advice, criticism and partnership.
1
Sometimes farm organisations can exert some influence 
over government departments, the CSIRO and universities 
through their members on boards and research committees 
which distribute levies raised from primary producrs 
for research. Amounts are allocated for specific projects 
to State departments of Agriculture, the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, the CSIRO and universities. One 
farm organisation leader told the writer of a case where 
a committee reduced the allocation to a State department 
of Agriculture in retaliation for a specific departmental 
policy.
2
Address to the annual conference of the Graziers' 
Association of Central and Northern Queensland, 12 April
1965.
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Because of their need of government assistance, and 
because of the encouragement of Ministers and public 
servants, farm groups in Australia have been particularly 
successful in establishing close and direct contact with 
decision-makers. There is an immense amount of day-to-day- 
contact between staff members of the leading farm 
organisations and their opposite numbers in government 
departments. Ministers and farm leaders are also in 
regular contact. Generally farm groups are consulted 
before major changes are made. In the federal, sphere, 
commodity policy proposals are thoroughly discussed with 
representative commodity associations before they go to 
Cabinet,^" and in these discussions the farm groups are 
able to ensure that the Government is fully aware of the 
problems and attitudes of the industry. Farm groups are 
also well represented on a wide range of advisory 
committees. Their leaders sometimes accompany official 
delegations to international trade negotiations. In 
1964 McEwen told a farm organisation conference:
What I did as Minister in charge of the 
negotiations was...to take to Brussels 
and to London with me representatives of 
the organized growers or producers. If 
they couldn’t sit at the table they were 
in the room outside where I or my officials 
could nick out and have a word with them.^
1
Campbell, ’Australian Farm Organizations and 
Agricultural Policy’.
2
Ibid.
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Farm organisations have also been drawn more and more into 
the administrative process. The compulsory marketing 
schemes for primary products are controlled by marketing 
boards on which in most cases farmers have majority 
representation/ Commodity organisations are represented 
on the various committees responsible for the 
distribution of research levies and the Secretary of the 
Australian Wheatgrowers' Federation sits on the Wheat 
Index Committee that reviews the guaranteed price of wheat 
before it is announced each year/
Increased participation in policy-making and 
administration has provided a strong stimulus to the 
integration and amalgamation of farm organisations. 
Governments prefer to deal with large representative 
pressure groups which can 'speak with one voice’ for all 
members of an economic section or industry rather than 
w'ith numerous, small, rival bodies offering conflicting
advice. Commonwealth Ministers have repeatedly urged farm
3organisations, as well as business groups and trade unions, 
to achieve a great er degree of organisational unity and 
amalgamation. At the least, the Commonwealth desires one 
spokesman organisation for each rural industry, but it 
would probably prefer to deal with one representative body 
able to speak for all primary producers. The most serious
1
On this point, see Marketing of Australian Primary 
Products, Department of Primary Industry, 1965, pp.20-3. 
2
Campbell, 'Australian Farm Organizations and 
Agricultural Policy’.
Matthews, ’Pressure Groups in Australia’, p.197*
3
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lack of unity is in the wool industry where two major 
commodity federations (the AWGC and the AWMPF) as well as 
the APPU claim to speak for the industry at the national 
level. To achieve a greater measure of unity in the wool 
industry, the Menzies Government encouraged the AWGC and 
the AWMPF to follow the suggestion of the Philp Committee 
and establish the AWIC as the ’parliament of woolgrowers’. 
Once established the Government gave this voluntary body 
statutory recognition and powers."'’ As originally formed 
the AWIC consisted of fifty members, twenty-five appointed 
by both the AWGC and the AWMPF. In 1965 under Government 
persuasion the AWIC agreed to increase its size by five 
seats and to allocate these to the APPU.
Official Actors and their Policies
Critics of pressure groups sometimes assume that 
government policy is simply the product of pressure group 
interaction, and that the strongest groups and those able 
to exert the most ’pressure' in fact decide what policies 
should be followed. This view is misleading in a number 
of respects, but especially because it fails to take into 
account the role of official actors in the political 
process.
1
Statutory recognition and functions were conferred by 
the Wool Industry Act of 1962 and the Wool Tax Acts of 
1964 which gave the AWIC the right to nominate the wool 
industry representatives on the Australian Wool Board 
and to prepare panels of names from which the three 
Board members with special qualifications are selected, 
and the power to recommend to the Government what rates 
of levy should be paid by woolgrowers to finance the 
activities of the Wool Board.
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Ministers and senior public servants, no less than 
governments and departments, are not just adjudicators 
between competing pressure groups. Instead, they are 
forces of initiative; they have their own ideas and views 
about policy which they want to implement. As a result, 
the amount of success that any pressure group can achieve 
in politics depends on the official actors and their 
policies, as well as the group’s resources and how it 
mobilises them, and on the pressure exerted by other 
groups.
From the G A ’s viewpoint, there is a marked difference 
between Labor and non-Labor administrations. The GA 
shares the same general outlook as the non-Labor parties. 
Moreover, it helped create the Country Party and it 
contributes financial support to both the Country Party 
and the Liberal Party. Consequently, it finds it 
comparatively easy to establish close relations with non- 
Labor governments. Non-Labor governments too, are more 
inclined to treat the Association’s requests 
sympathetically, and when possible to show preference to 
graziers. On the other hand, because of its antipathy 
towards and fear of trade unions and the Labor Party, 
the GA finds it difficult to establish close relations 
with Labor governments. Where possible Labor governments 
show preference to trade unions from which they still 
derive much of their support.^ Moreover, in the past
1
R.M. Martin, ’Trade Unions and Labour Governments in 
Australia: A Study of the Relation between supporting
Interests and Party Policy’, Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies, Vol. II, No.l (November 1963),
(continued on p.119)
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Labor administrations have often refused requests from 
the GA, and have frequently adopted measures such as land 
taxation and the confiscation of large estates for closer 
settlement which have brought forth immediate and hostile 
reaction from the Association.
However, the amount of preference that any government 
can show to its supporting interests is limited. To 
successfully manage the economy each party when in 
government needs to win the co-operation of each of the 
major economic sections. Thus, non-Labor governments 
cannot afford to alienate and antagonise the trade unions, 
while Labor governments need the co-operation of business 
and farm groups. As a result, the GA is able to win 
some concessions from Labor governments, while non-Labor 
governments are unable and unwilling to agree to all its 
requests, and sometimes legislate along lines which it 
opposes.
In addition, an individual pressure group has little 
hope of persuading any government to abandon what can be 
described as ’settled’ policies. While the GA considers 
that the policy of extensive tariff protection for 
secondary industry increases graziers’ costs of production
1 ( continued from p.118)
demonstrates that on policies which promise direct 
industrial benefits to all unionists there is a definite 
preferential relationship between Labor governments and 
trade unions.
1
Labor administrations were in power in the Commonwealth
1910-13, 1914-17, 1929-32, and 1941-9; and in N.S.W. 
1910-16, 1920-2, 1925-7, 1930-2, and 1941-65.
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appreciably, there is little it can do as protection is 
one of the major ’settled’ policies in Australia today.^
Rival Economic Interests
While official actors and their policies are of 
crucial importance, the GA ’ s behaviour and political 
effectiveness are also influenced by the amount of 
opposition and support received from other pressure groups. 
Unlike professional associations such as the N.S.W.
Teachers' Federation which face little serious competition 
from other groups and which are able to establish almost 
exclusive clientele relationships with the departments 
with which they deal, the GA faces competition from 
business groups, trade unions and other farm organisations 
on all the major policy-areas in which it is interested, 
and it does not enjoy exclusive clientele relations 
with any department.
Its main competition from business groups and trade 
unions is on general economic policy, taxation, tariffs, 
wage regulation, working conditions and social service 
benefits. On some matters such as tariffs the GA and
1
There is no doubt that tariff protection for Australian 
secondary industry increases graziers’ costs. Today a 
large proportion of secondary industry is protected by 
tariffs. In 1963 Corden (W.M. Corden, ’The Tariff’, in 
Alex Hunter (ed.), The Economics of Australian Industry, 
Melbourne, 1963, pp . 17 4, 193") estimated -That S"o per cent 
of employees in secondary industry work in industries 
whose viability depends on tariffs, and that in 1959-60 
the average tariff in protected industries was 30 per 
cent. Tariff protection increases production costs in 
all rural industrie’s* but hits hardest the wool and meat 
industries which sell their products on the open world 
market.
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other farm bodies are aligned against trade unions and 
powerful business groups such as the Associated Chambers 
of Manufactures. On others, such as the national wage 
case, taxation, and government controls, the GA is 
usually aligned with business interests against the trade 
unions. And because of the Association’s political 
views, it invariably finds its allies among business 
groups rather than the trade unions.
As we have already seen, Australian primary producers 
generally consider that trade unions and business interests 
command greater political influence. They attribute this 
political superiority not only to superior political 
resources but to better organisation. The President of 
the GA told a branch meeting in 1966:
I'm sure we don't get a hearing at Canberra 
anything like the manufacturing industries 
do, because we are not organised as they 
are. If we are to keep costs down to a 
reasonable level we have got to make an 
impact. ^
Do trade unions and business interests have much superior 
political resources, do they mobilise these resources 
more effectively for political purposes, and do they 
command appreciably greater political influence?
While business interests and trade unions may have 
superior political resources, there is no evidence to 
show that primary producers are seriously disadvantaged. 
Primary producers admittedly have some disabilities. 
Compared with trade unionists they are numerically weak;
Muster, 1 June 1966.
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they are also divided by their economic interests, 
geographically isolated from one another and, except for 
producers of perishable commodities, not in a strong 
position to use strikes as a weapon. On the other hand, 
primary producers have some valuable political resources: 
economic power as producers of food and major exporters, 
electoral systems weighted in their favour, and a 
political culture which places a high value on farming 
and rural production. In addition, there is the strong 
belief held by politicians and parties that the farm 
vote can topple governments, and that wheat-seats are 
swinging seats. Business interests and trade unions 
likewise have their political disabilities as well as 
resources. The business sector has the disabilities 
of little direct electoral power and an unfavourable 
public image, but the political resources of financial 
strength, economic expertise, and power to influence 
the economy and employment. Large manufacturers can 
often force governments to ease restrictions on public 
consumption by cutting their production more than is 
necessary and so creating unemployment. Like other 
sectors, the business community is divided on many 
policies but when the security and interests of 
business interests generally are threatened it can 
readily form a unified bloc. The political influence 
of trade unions is often limited by their lack of 
unity, their ability to antagonise other sections of 
the community by direct action, and their dependence 
on the capacity of the economy to afford higher wages 
and better conditions. Their three main political 
resources are electoral strength, ability to disrupt 
production and public services through strike action, 
and public sympathy for the worker.
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The political mobilisation of each section can be
compared under three aspects: density of representation,
1degree of amalgamation, and organisational resources. 
Density of representation refers to the proportion of 
eligible members enrolled in organisations. Difficulty 
in securing data on the membership of individual farm 
organisations and on the degree of cross membership between 
organisations makes it almost impossible to know exactly 
what proportion of Australia1s 280,000 farmers are 
organised. A useful estimate however, can be made by 
comparing available membership figures for commodity 
organisations with published figures of the number of 
producers for each commodity. Such calculations suggest 
that at least 50 per cent of farmers are organised and in 
the major rural industries (particularly wool, meat and 
wheat) the figure is much higher.^ The proportion of 3farmers organised compares favourably with the per cent 
of wage and salary earners belonging to trade unions and, 
as far as can be estimated from the limited data available, 
with the proportion of business firms belonging to trade 
associations.
The second aspect of mobilisation, degree of 
amalgamation, refers to the extent to which organisations
1
These two terms come from Samuel Beer (see British 
Politics in the Collectivist Age, p .332).
2
Harman and Smith, p.67.
3
Year Book Australia, 1967* p.366. This figure is for1966 .
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within a major section are integrated. Despite a high
degree of density, the political mobilisation of a section
may be ineffective if members are organised in numerous
separate bodies incapable of unified decision-making or
action. In each of the three major economic sections
there is a multiplicity of organisations. If State
branches of trade unions and labour councils are counted
as separate bodies, 1,257 existed in 1966.^ The business
sector is just as fragmented; in 1965 there were an
estimated 1,250 trade associations, of which approximately
2300 were local chambers of commerce. No one knows 
exactly how many farm organisations there are but the
3number clearly exceeds 500 and may well be over 1,000.
In each sector efforts have been made to integrate 
organisations by means of mergers, by the formation of 
federations and confederations, and sometimes merely by 
loose alliances. Integration has been achieved at two 
different levels: between closely similar organisations
at State and national levels, and between a wide range of 
organisations within the sector at State and national 
levels. While accurate comparisons of the degree of 
integration achieved by each major sector are extremely 
difficult, it is obvious that in each sector there is a 
striking lack of amalgamation. This situation contrasts 
sharply with the highly unified character of British trade
1
Ibid., p.367.
2
R.D. Freeman, ’Trade Associations in the Australian 
Economy', Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. 24, No.4 
(December 1965).
See Harman and Smith, p.68.
3
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associations, farm organisations and trade unions. The
degree of integration of farm organisations appears to be
comparable to that of trade unions and business groups.
For example, the proportion of farmers represented by the
NFU and the APPU, the two rival organisations which claim
to speak for all Australian farmers, is comparable with
the figure of less than 40 per cent of workers represented
by the peak organisation of trade unions, the Australian
2Council of Trade Unions. Most farmers are not aware 
that trade union and business leaders feel the same need 
for unity to enable them ’to speak with one voice’.
Except for its references to manufacturing and employers, 
the following statement reads like the utterance of a farm 
organisation leader. It is however, from the annual 
report of the President of a State Chamber of Manufactures.
Today it seems to me that there is a clear 
need for the unity of effort which has been 
achieved within the Chamber to be expanded 
to a wider field. Our first goal should be 
the attainment of a much wider unity between 
all organisations of manufacturer-employers, 
so that industry would speak with one voice 
on the big national issues....3
Nevertheless, within each section some groups are well 
organised and integrated. Among workers, pastoral
1
For example, in Britain the Trade Union Congress 
represents 85 per cent of unionists and the National 
Farmers’ Union 80 to 90 per cent of farmers.
2
See Harman and Smith, p.68.
3
Article by W.W. Pettingell, President of the Chamber of 
Manufactures of N.S.W., Impetus, September 1966.
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employees constitute such a group, with most of them 
belonging to the powerful Australian Workers’ Union (AWU) 
which has well over 150,000 members.
Although the three major economic sections of the 
community are comparable with regard to density of 
representation and degree of amalgamation, the business 
section has a distinct advantage with regard to 
organisational resources. Because their leaders have 
considerable managerial and professional skills and are 
used to corporate decision-making, business organisations 
tend to function more efficiently and their members delegate 
authority more readily to their leaders. With superior 
financial resources and an appreciation of the value of 
experts, business organisations have been able to develop 
strong secretariats staffed by university graduates 
(particularly economists) and public relations experts.
The superiority of their organisational resources is 
particularly evident at the national level. The main 
national business organisations are older^ and better 
developed than those of farmers and trade unionists.
They all have their own well-staffed secretariats in 
Canberra and in the State capitals, and are in the position 
to maintain close daily contact with government deparments.
1
Three of the leading national business organisations 
(the Associated Chambers of Manufactures, the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce, and the Australian Council of 
Employers* Federations) were all formed in the first 
decade of the Commonwealth, whereas the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions was not established until 19^7• 
Most of the leading farm commodity federations, as 
well as the NFU and the APPU, date from the 1930s and 
1940s.
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Probably the strongest and most active at the national 
level is the Associated Chambers of Manufactures which 
has had its own secretariat in Canberra since the 1930s.^ 
Today the Chambers of Manufactures and its rival, the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce, have their own imposing 
office buildings in Barton in Canberra, close to the 
Departments of Trade and Industry, and Customs and Excise, 
to the Tariff Board, and to Parliament House. And both 
of them are so well accepted as legitimate bodies in 
government that government departments rent their surplus 
office space! In some respects trade unions have 
organisational resources which are superior to those of 
most farm organisations. With the exception of the 
graziers’ associations, farm organisations charge lower 
membership contribution rates than most trade unions, and 
consequently work on smaller budgets. Many trade unions 
have secretariats which are larger and superior to those 
of most farm organisations.
Although primary producers often complain that other 
interests command far more political influence, it is 
doubtful whether their political influence is appreciably 
less than that of business interests or employees. If it 
were so, they would probably be much more alienated and 
much less willing to work through normal pressure group 
channels. Their willingness to participate in the 
political process at all suggests they have expectations 
of success.
’The Lobbying Bureaucracy', Nation, 12 January 1963-
1
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Political Rivalry in the Farm Sector
In many respects the competition from other farm 
organisations has a greater impact on the GA*s pressure 
group behaviour than the competition from business groups 
and trade unions. To appreciate the significance of this 
competition, it is necessary to understand something of 
the extremely complicated pattern of farm organisations in 
Aus tralia.
Australia’s numerous farm organisations can be 
divided into five categories: (l) State and regional
commodity associations; (2) commodity federations;
(3) State peak organisations; (4) a national peak 
organisation; and (5) one unitary organisation which 
claims to represent the producers of all farm commodities. 
Figure 3 attempts to show these categories and some of 
the relationships between organisations in different 
categories.
The State and regional commodity associations are the 
oldest and the most important. From them grew the 
commodity federations and the peak organisations and, 
except for the APPU, they constitute the basic units 
in all other farm organisations. They enrol individual 
farmers and collect their membership contributions, and 
provide the only means by which individual farmers can 
participate in national organisations. Graziers were
1
For further details on the character and types of farm 
organisations in Australia, see Harman and Smith; Campbell, 
’Australian Farm Organizations and Agricultural Policy’} 
and Chislett.
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the first to form permanent organisations. In N.S.W. 
they were followed by wheatfarmers, dairyfarmers and 
later by producers of many other commodities including 
sugar cane, bananas, apples and pears, canning fruit, 
citrus fruit, vegetables, potatoes, and poultry. Figure 
3 shows the main organisations in N.S.W. in 1967.
Generally State and regional commodity associations 
represent the interests of producers of a single 
commodity and have the status of spokesmen for an 
industry. However, in the wool, wheat and meat industries 
the organisations are interested in more than one 
commodity, and both graziers’ associations and wheat- 
sheep farmers’ organisations, as well as the APPU, claim 
to speak for producers. In addition, the position in 
N.S.W. is further complicated by the fact that as well as 
the GA there are two other smaller graziers’ associations, 
each with its own territorial base.
The commodity federations established by State 
commodity organisations are the main channels of 
communication for producers of each farm commodity to 
convey their demands to the Commonwealth Government.
Despite their important role, their development has been 
limited by the unwillingness of their member organisations 
to give them adequate powers and finance. The first
'ft
commodity federation, the Pastoralists' Federal Council, 
pre-dated federation and was formed as an industrial body 
to resist the demands of shearers. In 1919 graziers and 
other woolgrowers formed another federation, the Australian 
Woolgrowers’ Council (AWC),^ to negotiate with the newly
1
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 19^0» p.45.
131
formed National Council of Wool Selling Brokers and with 
the Government. Until 1931> when the new wheatgrowers1 
associations formed the Australian Wheatgrowers’ Federation, 
the AWC and the Graziers’ Federal Council (GFC), as the 
Pastoralists’ Federal Council was called from 1919>^ were 
the only two commodity federations. But after 1931 the 
situation soon changed. In 1939 small woolgrowers in the 
older wheatgrowers’ associations, dissatisfied with the 
failure of the AWC (to which some of their organisations 
were affiliated) to support a wool stabilisation plan, 
formed their own federal organisation, the Australian Wool 
Producers’ Federation which later became the AWMPF. Later 
dairyfarmers ,, canegrowers , citrus fruitgrowers and other 
producers formed their own federations in order to convey 
demands to the Commonwealth Government. Today, largely 
as a result of the increased impact of the Commonwealth 
on primary industries, producers of all important 
commodities have their own commodity federations. In 
I960 the GFC and the AWC amalgamated to form the AWGC.
The powers and financial resources of the State and 
national peak organisations are even more limited. The 
State peak organisations aim to promote the general 
interests of farmers at State level but, because of the 
differing interests of farmers, consensus on many issues 
is difficult to achieve. In N.S.W. since 1918 there has 
been a succession of different peak organisations. The 
present body, formed in 19^+8 as the Primary Producers’ 
Council, had fourteen member organisations including the 
GA in 1967.
Ibid., p .3 8 .
1
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The NFU, the national peak organisation, was formed
in 19^+3 as the Primary Producers Council of Australia.
It is a confederation of commodity federations and State
peak organisations. As Campbell has observed, it suffers
from all the political disadvantages of federations in
double measured Although its leaders tried to model
the NFU on the National Farmers ’ Union of England and
Wales, the commodity federations and their State affiliates
have ensured that it has remained a loose federation with
limited powers and a small budget. From the outset its
constitution allowed any member organisation to veto
discussion of any subject considered to be a matter of
domestic concern. Its small budget limits the size of
its secretariat. Until 1959 it did not have a full-time
Secretary and in 1967 its staff consisted of only three
2full-time members. The limited size of its secretariat, 
its difficulty in reaching consensus on policy, and the 
practice of its member organisations to take independent 
action have all greatly limited its political 
effectiveness. The GFC was one of the three commodity 
federations that founded the NFU and for many years 
supported the concept of a national peak organisation.
But in July 1965^ "the AWGC withdrew from the NFU and by
1
Campbell,’Australian Farm Organizations and 
Agricultural Policy’.
2
Information supplied by the Secretary of the NFU. 
3
The Land, 1 July 1965.
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doing so created a serious budgetary problem in the NFU 
since it had supplied 20 per cent of that body’s finance.
The one unitary organisation which claims to 
represent the producers of all commodities is the APPU.
From a small regional body established at Warrnambool 
(Victoria) in 19^3> the APPU expanded by aggressive 
organising and by amalgamation with smaller organisations. 
By the early 1950s it claimed to have a membership of 
70,000. Since then its membership has declined and now is 
in the vicinity of 40,000. The APPU’s expansion in the 
1940s was seen as a threat to their existence by the 
established State commodity organisations which preferred 
to seek unity through confederations rather than through 
a unitary organisation. They resented the proselytising 
of their members by large teams of APPU organisers and 
considered that the political efforts of APPU leaders 
often hindered rather than advanced the true interests of 
farmers. Because of the opposition of other organisations, 
the APPU has found it extremely difficult to secure 
representation on marketing boards and advisory committees. 
Only in late 1965 did it eventually secure representation 
(five seats out of fifty-five) on the AWIC. While the 
APPU is often quite effective in communicating demands 
to State and Commonwealth governments on fruit and poultry 
matters, it carries little weight on wool, meat and wheat 
policy. On wool matters it generally functions as an 
appendage of wheat-sheep farmers * organisations.
This pattern is not static but in a process of 
change. Many organisations have been exploring the 
possibility of amalgamation with others. The main interest 
however, has been focused on three related sets of
134
negotiations. These are the proposals to unite the NFU
and the APPU in a new peak organisation to be called the
Australian Farmers’ Federation, to unite the Australian
Wheatgrowers’ Federation and the AWMPF with the wool,
meat and wheat Federal commodity sections of the APPU,
and to unite the APPU State divisions with State commodity
associations.'*" But despite protracted negotiations, the
2achievements up to mid-1968 had been slight.
At both State and Commonwealth levels of government 
the GA and other graziers’ associations face some 
competition from organisations representing the producers 
of other commodities. For instance, in N.S.W. the GA’s 
views on general matters such as probate duty, income 
taxation, and closer settlement are sometimes opposed by 
associations representing dairyfarmers, fruitgrowers or 
market gardeners. Moreover, the Association’s policies 
with regard to the beef cattle industry have on occasions 
been opposed by dairyfarmers’ associations, while the GA 
has strenuously opposed the efforts of commerical rabbit 
breeders to gain greater freedom for their industry to 
expand.
But the most serious and sustained competition that 
the GA and other graziers’ associations face is from rivals 
who claim to speak for the same industries. Figure 4 shows
1
For details, see Harman and Smith, pp.78-80.
2
The only positive achievement was the amalgamation in 
September 1966 of the South Australian wheat-sheep farmers’ 
organisation, the Wheat and Woolgrowers' Association, 
with the State division of the APPU. However, it appears 
likely that mergers in N.S.W. and Victoria may soon take 
place.
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the graziers’ associations and their rivals at State and 
Commonwealth levels with regard to wool policy; it also 
shows the composition of the AWIC. Figure 5 shows the 
three graziers’ associations in N.S.W. and their rivals 
on wool, meat and wheat policy, and the main affiliations 
of each organisation.^
Numerically the graziers’ associations are not as 
strong as their rivals. At the national level, the AWGC 
claims to have 27,000 members while the AWMPF and the wool 
section of the APPU claim 45,000 and 22,000 respectively.
In N.S.W. the GA is similarly outnumbered; even the three 
graziers’ associations together have fewer members than 
the UFWA. Moreover, should the projected amalgamation of 
the UFWA with the APPU take place, the three graziers1 
associations will be in an even weaker position; likewise 
amalgamation of the AWMPF, the Australian Wheatgrowers’ 
Federation and the APPU would weaken the AWGC’s position.
The most pronounced political rivalry is between the 
graziers’ associations and the wheat-sheep farmers’ 
organisations. The two groups of organisations, as we 
have seen, reflect the values and beliefs of two different 
sub-cultures. They also hold different economic viewpoints, 
especially on wool policy. Their conflicting view on wool 
marketing and promotion were clearly set out in policy 
statements presented by the two rival federal woolgrowers’
1
With regard to Figure 5, it should be noted that the 
Pastoralists’ Association of West Darling takes no interest 
in wheat policy.
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associations to the Philp Committee in 1961. The AWMPF 
stated it held
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as a matter of firm policy that little if 
any material benefit in the way of better 
or more stable prices can be expected as 
a result of greatly increased wool promotion 
until such time as the auction system is 
improved. . . . ^
It argued for a reserve price scheme within the auction 
system whereby a wool marketing authority to be created 
would buy in wool which failed to reach a minimum reserve 
price. Later this wool would be again offered for sale 
by auction. The AWGC submission put its opposing view:
The policy of the A.W.G.C. is that intensified 
promotion and research, in conjunction with 
increasingly efficient production, are to 
be preferred as more positive ways of 
assisting the woolgrower than the restrictive 
policy implicit in proposals for the institution 
of a floor price for wool.^
The long-standing political rivalry between the 
graziers’ associations and the wheat-sheep farmers' 
organisations is just as much a cause of the disputes over 
wool policy as the economic and cultural differences. 
Historically this rivalry goes back to the squatter- 
selector battles of last century. But until wheatfarmers 
diversified into wool production there was no rivalry 
over wool policy, and the graziers’ associations remained 
the unchallenged voice of the wool industry. When the
1
Quoted in Wool and Politics, p.183.
Ibid., p .182.
2
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wheat-sheep farmers in 1939 formed their own federal wool 
body the graziers’ associations strongly resisted this 
attack on their previously unchallenged position, and it 
was not until 19^ +2 that the AWMPF gained representation 
on the Central Wool Committee and until 19^+5 that it 
secured representation on the Wool Board."*" Since 19^+5 
the graziers’ associations have become reconciled to the 
fact that the AWMPF is recognised by the Government as a 
legitimate voice of woolgrower opinion. Consequently, 
in 1962 when the AWIC was formed the AWGC agreed without 
question to both organisations having equal representation. 
But at the same time, it is resolved not to allow wheat- 
sheep farmers to determine policy for the wool industry.
From the G A ’s viewpoint the organisational rivalry 
between graziers and wheat-sheep farmers in many respects 
is more intense and serious at State level where the 
Association and the XJFWA compete not only for political 
influence but for members. While the UFWA is still 
recognised as the authoritative voice of wheatgrowers, 
the GA in recent years has made a deliberate effort to 
develop machinery to represent the interests of those 
graziers who have turned to wheat production to offset 
reduced incomes from wool. This intrusion has been 
resented by UFWA leaders who have opposed the attempts 
of the GA to gain representation on various boards and 
committees connected with the wheat industry and also on 
the Wheatgrowers’ Federation. In the 1967 Grain Elevators
1
Hitchins, pp.7^~7*
Board elections UFWA leaders tried to discredit the GA and 
its candidates. The UFWA Secretary told a public meeting 
in Lake Cargelligo that the GA ’had traditionally opposed 
orderly marketing in any form but was now trying to 
"hitch its waggon" to the achievements of others 1 In 
wool matters the situation is reversed, but somewhat 
different. While the GA resented the intrusion of UFWA’s 
predecessors (the FSA and the Wheat and Woolgrowers’ 
Association) into wool affairs, the UFWA is now well 
established as a legitimate voice of woolgrower opinion.
The GA and the UFWA hold different policies not only on 
wool, wheat and meat matters, but on a whole range of 
policy areas including closer settlement, land taxation 
and probate duty, and these differences tend to be 
exaggerated because of the competition for members. Both 
organisations employ organisers to recruit new members, 
and these organisers tend to give prospective members 
a highly exaggerated view of the rival body. Leaders of 
both organisations are extremely conscious of the political 
rivalry, and the competition for members and political 
influence. One of the over-riding considerations in any 
major policy decision by either body is how the other 
organisation will respond, and what effect the decision 
might have on the competition for members and power. Like 
competing retail firms, both organisations try to match 
or surpass the services and benefits offered by the other. 
Both also try to match one another in making claims on 
governments, and seek to take full credit for any 
concessions won.
1
Lake Cargelligo News, 8 September 1967-
l4l
In many respects this rivalry between the GA and the 
UFWA is not in the best interests of producers. It 
exaggerates differences over policy and leads to 
unnecessary dispute. On the other hand, rivalry prevents 
organisational inertia, and at times political pressure 
from two independent organisations is more effective 
than pressure from a single body. Because of the 
significant differences between the two organisations not 
only on policy but in political style and beliefs about 
the role of government, it is extremely difficult to see 
how these differences could ever have been effectively 
contained within one organisation.
In summary, the GA operates in a political context 
where decisions which affect its members are taken at 
three levels of government. At Commonwealth and State 
levels effective power now lies mainly in the hands of the 
Cabinets and bureaucracies, and with statutory boards and 
arbitration tribunals. Considerable opportunity exists 
for responsible and representative groups to influence 
policy-making and administration. The way the GA behaves 
and its effectiveness in politics are influenced also by 
the policies and actions of official actors, and by the 
amount of opposition and support the Association receives 
from other pressure groups. The GA faces competition from 
business groups and trade unions, and also from other farm 
organisations. The strongest and most sustained 
competition from other farm organisations at both 
Commonwealth and State levels comes from the wheat-sheep 
farmers’ organisations, and the traditional political 
rivalry between these organisations and the graziers * 
associations has been a contributing cause of the conflict 
in the wool industry.
III. GROUP CHARACTERISTICS
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CHAPTER 5
Foundation and Involvement in Politics
Pressure groups are products of their environments. 
Environmental factors - economic, social and political - 
are largely responsible for bringing groups into 
existence and into politics; they provide the motivation 
that sustains political activity; they also play an 
important part in shaping the internal characteristics 
of individual groups.
In this chapter we will consider how environmental 
factors operated to bring the GA into being and then 
into politics, and some of the ways in which 
environmental influences have affected the Association's 
internal characteristics.
Foundation
Pressure groups come into existence in different 
ways. Many are formed by people when their interests 
are affected by government action or the threat of it, 
or when they feel the need of government assistance 
to overcome some disability. Most of the State 
commodity farm organisations came into being in one 
of these ways. For instance, the FSA, the older of 
the UFWA' s two predecessors/ was established in 1893 
mainly to secure changes in land legislation and
1
The UFWA was formed in 1962 by an amalgamation of 
the FSA and the Wheat and Woolgrowers' Association.
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administration. Small farmers and selectors felt 
that government assistance was necessary to 
overcome a disability they suffered. The Wheat and 
Woolgrowers’ Association, the UFWA’s other 
predecessor, was formed by struggling wheatfarmers on
marginal wheatlands in south-western N.S.W. in
21930* Their aim was to secure extensive government
assistance for their industry. Or again, the APPU
emerged when farmers in one region of Victoria during
the second world war decided to form a new organisation
to press for specific economic and social changes to
benefit farmers and rural dwellers, and to work to
3unite all farmers in a single organisation. In 
constrast, the GA was formed not to press for 
government assistance, or to veto government action 
or proposed action, but in reaction to the industrial 
organisation of pastoral employees.
One of the most significant developments in 
Australia in the late nineteenth century was the 
formation of trade unions which sought to embrace all 
workers, including semi-skilled men and even unskilled
4labourers. By then Australia had developed
1
Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
p.85; and Bayley.
2
Smith, ’Organise or be Damned’, pp.10-11.
3
Harman and Smith, p.74-5*
4
For a good short account, see Russel Ward, Australia, 
Sydney, 1965, pp.84-8.
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economically to the stage where there were many 
specialised groups of industrial employees. However, 
the main impetus for the new unionism came from a 
few capable organisers, and from European and 
American radical ideas.^ One of the first groups to 
be organised was pastoral employees - shearers, 
station hands and carriers. Rural labourers are 
generally conservative and slow to join trade unions, 
but in Australia most of them worked on large 
pastoral holdings where the impersonal relationship 
between employer and employee was more like that in 
factories than on small farms. Shearers in particular 
constituted an ideal group for the formation of 
strong and militant trade unions. Unlike other 
pastoral employees, relatively large numbers of 
shearers lived and worked together, often in 
unpleasant climatic and living conditions. Being 
itinerant workers they did not share even the same 
relations that other pastoral employees had with their 
employers. Moreover, being mainly Irish, Roman 
Catholic, and working-class, shearers saw themselves 
as constituting a class entirely different from the 
pastoralists who were predominantly English and 
Protestant, and who constituted a social and economic 
elite. The Amalgamated Shearers1 Union, founded in 
1886, quickly organised bushworkers in New South 
Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, while in
1
The two tracts most influential at the period were 
both American works - Henry George*s Progress and 
Poverty, and Edward Bellamy* s Looking Backward.
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Queensland a separate Shearers’ Union worked in close 
co-operation. By 1890 most shearers in N.S.W. were 
members of the Amalgamated Shearers’ Union.^
Pastoralists in each colony reacted quickly to
the spread of unionism among their employees and
formed their own organisations and later the
Pastoralists’ Federal Council. In N.S.W. pastoralists
began forming regional associations soon after the
Amalgamated Shearers’ Union was formed, and on 9
July I89O the Pastoralists’ Union of N.S.W. (as the
GA was first called) was established. The circular
letter which called the public meeting at which the
Union was formed stated that because of the formation
of unions among shearers, carriers and station hands,
it was desirable for employers to unite ’so that
there may be a recognised authoritative body to
meet the Representatives of the Labour Unions, and
with them to discuss and settle disputes and
2differences which may arise’. At the meeting it
was agreed that the objects of the Union would be
'to secure to its members all the advantages of
unanimity of actions enjoyed by various Unions now
3in existence’.
1
R. Gollan, ’Industrial Relations in the Pastoral 
Industry’ in Barnard, The Simple Fleece, p.60 3*
2
Minutes of the General Meeting of Pastoralists 
held at Tattersalls’ Hall, Hunter Street Sydney 
on 9 July I89O (Council minute book).
3
Ibid.
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The various regional associations and the 
Pastoralists’ Union were formed with comparative ease. 
Pastoralists too, saw themselves as constituting a 
separate class. They were bound closely together by 
shared attitudes, common purposes and family 
connections. Moreover, as a result of attacks on their 
land rights and their position in the three previous 
decades, they had been forced to act together, and were 
experienced in operating voluntary organisations.^
Although they formed their organisations in
reaction to the organisation of shearers and other
pastoral workers, pastoralists in N.S.W. at first
tended to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the
2Shearers’ Union. But by the second half of July 1890 
the situation had changed, with the shearers’ demand 
that pastoralists negotiate an agreement incorporating 
the principle of employment of union labour only, 
and the threat of a general industrial disturbance.
In May I89O waterside workers in Queensland came out 
in support of striking shearers and successfully
1
For many years before the late 1880s pastoralists in 
N.S.W. had operated local and regional associations as 
well as more widely-based organisations such as the 
Wool and Pastoral Association of the 1870s, and the 
Commercial, Pastoral and Agricultural Association of 
the 1880s.
2
Stuart Piggin, ’An Inquiry into the Reasons for the 
Formation of the Pastoralists’ Union of New South 
Wales and its Policies and Actions in its First Year’, 
B.A. honours thesis, University of Sydney, 1965, 
PP.31-2 and 73.
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blocked the shipment of wool shorn by non-unionists.
The temporary victory for shearers in Queensland
caused the Amalgamated Shearers’ Union to threaten to
prevent the shipment of non-union wool from N.S.W.,
2Victoria and South Australia. Alarmed, pastoralists
in each of these colonies took action. Within a week
of its formation, the Pastoralists’ Union of N.S.W.
replied to a manifesto published by the Shearers’
Union, informing shearers that pastoralists refused
3their demand to use only union labour. A trial of 
strength began in the following month not only between 
the pastoralists and the shearers, but between combined 
employers and combined trade unions. The result was 
defeat for the unions. With its superior financial 
resources and effective organisation, the Pastoralists' 
Union recruited non-union labour and shearing proceeded. 
In August 1891 the Shearers’ Union was forced to 
capitulate in N.S.W. and to agree to the principle of
4’freedom of contract’.
The stimulus that brought the Pastoralists’ Union 
into existence and the events of the early months of 
its career were of great importance in shaping the
1
Official Statement of the Facts and History of the 
Shearing Difficulty in Australia, 1890-91? compiled by 
the Pastoralists' Federal Council for presentation to 
the British Royal Commission on Labour, September 1891» p.4. 
2
Ibid., pp.4-5.
3
Minutes of Council, l4 July I89O, and Official 
Statements of Facts, p.5*
4
Official Statement of Facts, p.10, and Go1lan, p.605.
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Association’s character and goals. For over a decade
the Pastoralists’ Union saw itself as an industrial
rather than a political organisation. It considered
that its aim was to resist the threat of organised
shearers rather than to make demands on government.
Indeed, in 1902 the Union refused to affiliate with
the Taxpayers’ Union on the grounds that its interests
were restricted entirely to labour matters/ and in
1904 it refused to support political action by the
Employers’ Federation of N.S.W., explaining that it
2’avoids taking part in political matters’. And as 
a result of the conflict, the Pastoralists’ Union 
developed an antipathy towards unionists and union 
organisers, an attitude reinforced by later clashes 
with trade unions and Labor governments.
After the Strikes
Once the shearers had been soundly defeated and 
comparative peace returned to the pastoral industry, 
the momentum of activity of the Pastoralists’ Union 
quickly declined. Council meetings became less 
frequent, the employment of paid district secretaries 
was discontinued, many local committees ceased to 
operate, and membership fell from almost 1,000 in the 
early 1890s to 275 in 1900. But at no time was the 
Union’s continued existence ever in real jeopardy.
1
Minutes of Council, 20 February 1902.
Ibid., 30 November 1904.
2
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Key has argued that most ’pressure groups...
originate in an effort to cope with some immediate
problem and then persist as an organization to deal
with new matters of concern to the membership’ Even
before the Pastoralists’ Union achieved its primary
goal of resisting the threat of organised shearers, it
developed functions which continued once the Shearers’
Union was defeated. One example was a labour
recruitment service for its members. Moreover, even
though the Shearers’ Union was defeated, pastoralists
recognised the need of a continuing body to safeguard
their interests against any future demands and action
by shearers, and to fix shearing rates for each season
in each district. And despite the belief of leaders
that the Union was an industrial and not a political
body, occasional demands in fact were made on the N.S.W.
Government. The earliest recorded formal deputation
2was taken to the Government in November 1890. Most of
the Union’s early demands on the Government were veto
demands, opposing legislation or proposed legislation,
but during the strikes it made positive demands for
3government action to maintain law and order. In 
addition, apart from these new functions and the 
continuing need for vigilance, the Union had considerable
1
V.O. Key Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 
New York, 1958, p .49.
2
Minutes of Council, 18 November I89O. The purpose 
of this deputation was to support ’Resolutions passed 
at meetings held at Hillston and Cobar re Rabbit Bill’. 
3
Ibid., 21 July 1891.
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financial reserves, a continuing income, and its own 
bureaucracy, and these assets made almost inevitable 
continued existence, at least for a generation or more. 
And once the Union became permanently and seriously 
involved in politics, its future was in no doubt 
whatsoever. But this did not happen until the first 
two decades or so of this century.
involvement in Politics
The GA was drawn into politics relatively quickly 
by a number of environmental factors. By the 1920s 
it was seriously and permanently involved in politics, 
and political activities were absorbing most of its 
energies and resources. Since then the process of 
politicisation has continued without interruption.
For the remainder of the chapter we will be 
concerned with the main environmental factors that drew 
the Association into politics and that have sustained 
its political activity up to the present.
Trade Unions
Trade unionism brought the Pastoralists’ Union 
first into existence, and then helped bring it into 
politics.
For almost a decade after the struggle of 1890-1 
pastoralists showed little real concern about the 
activities of the trade unions. But after the turn of 
the century the AWU, which had been formed in 1893 
by a merger of the Amalgamated Shearers’ Union with the 
General Labourers’ Union, began to prosper through
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effective organisation and the absorption of smaller
competitors.^ By 1911 it had 48,000 members and was
seen by pastoralists as a powerful and direct enemy.
Since the AWU had been linked to the Labor Party almost
2from its birth, pastoralists regarded the majority 
Labor governments, which came to power in N.S.W. and 
the Commonwealth in 1910, almost as creatures of the 
Union and expected them to pass discriminatory 
legislation. The A W U ’s links with the Labor Party 
gave GA members the idea of working to secure more 
direct and effective representation in parliament.
When the FSA in 1919 invited the Association to 
participate in founding a new political party, many 
members immediately called to mind the fact of the 
A W U ’s links with the Labor Party, and reasoned that a 
similar relationship with a new producers’ party could 
only be to the G A 1s advantage. Inspired by the’A WU’s 
amalgamation with smaller unions, and later by the 
’One Big Union’ movement, the GA during the first world 
war and immediately after also experimented with various 
schemes to unite primary producers for political 
purposes in a single organisation. The GA is a good 
illustration of the way that pressure groups often 
model themselves on their rivals and on institutions 
which they see as providing a threat to their security.
1
Gollan, p .609.
Ibid., p .6l0.
2
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But even before majority Labor governments came
to power, the trade unions drew the Pastoralists’ Union
further into politics and also into the field of
industrial arbitration. Demands of trade unions on
governments caused the Union to make counter-demands.
In particular it resisted trade union demands for
arbitration machinery, and then in 1903-4 opposed the
passage of an arbitration bill before the Commonwealth
parliament."^ Once this bill was passed and the
Commonwealth Arbitration Court was established, the
AWU appealed to the Court to settle a dispute over
shearing rates and conditions. This necessitated the
Union defending the interests of its members before 
2the Court. In 1907 the Court handed down the first 
Federal Pastoral Industry Award which granted shearers 
and other employees increased rates, but refused the
3A W U 1 2s demand for compulsory preference for unionists. 
Since 1907 repeated appeals by trade unions to 
arbitration tribunals have necessitated the GA being 
constantly involved in the field of industrial 
arbitration.
Government Action
Government action in the early years of this 
century provided the second major stimulus for the entry
1
Minutes of Council, 29 July 1903 and 27 January 1904.
2
Minutes of Council, 17 October 1906, 30 January 1907,
and 27 February 1907.
3
Gollan, pp.605-6 .
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of* the Association into politics. Within a short
space of time N.S.W. and Commonwealth governments
introduced and passed a great volume of legislation
which directly affected the interests of graziers.'*'
Industrial arbitration machinery was set up, fixed
minimum requirements were set for accommodation
provided by pastoralists for shearers, provision was
made for the resumption of large estates for closer
settlement, and land taxation was levied on owners of
larger holdings. New forms of taxation were introduced
and tariffs were applied to a wide range of imported
goods including farm machinery and pastoral supplies.
Then at the end of the first world war graziers reacted
strongly to the meat-price fixing regulations of 1918,
2and later to the Massy Greene tariff of 1920-1, to
higher taxation, and to the actions of Labor governments
in N.S.W., especially the Lang Government’s Workers’
Compensation Act, Rural Workers’ Accommodation Act,
amended land legislation and arbitration machinery,
increased rail charges, higher taxation, and the threat3to abolish Pastures Protection Boards. In March 1927 
the GA President told delegates at the Annual Conference:
1
Graham, ’Graziers in Politics’, p.592-4, and 
Formation of the Australian Country Parties, pp.118-120. 
2
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1923» p.22, and N.S.W. 
Graziers’ Annual 1924, p .16 .
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1927, pp.21-3, 26, , 3 8 .
3
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It used to be said that if the season was 
right the Government did not matter. The 
present Government has proved to us, however, 
that politics are almost as important as the 
weather. We can no longer ignore politics - 
politics will not return the compliment!
At every hand’s turn now we are handicapped 
by burdens politically imposed, and I think 
you will all agree with me when I say that 
the Lang Government has been the biggest 
political affliction that our industry 
has ever been called upon to bear,-*-
In reaction to unfavourable government policies,
the Association took action to veto specific policies
and to secure more favourable treatment for graziers.
It appealed to governments, members of parliament and
the public. In 1919* as we have noted, it combined
with the FSA to form a new political party. Its aim in
doing so was to keep the Labor Party out of office and
to secure the return of more sympathetic governments.
And even before this move, involvement in politics
necessitated changes in the organisation’s structure
and machinery. The local branch strueture, which
disappeared after the defeat of the Shearers’ Union,
was revived and a system of district committees was 
2established. The Council and Executive Committee 
were expanded in size, and in 1917 provision was made 
for Annual Conferences to which local branches could send
1
Ibid. , p p .2 0-1.
2
This is based on documentary material - minutes of 
Council, and Annual Reports - and on interviews with 
J.W. Allen (Secretary 1912-46) on 30 August and 
1 September 1966.
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delegates. Efforts were also made to increase the
membership size, and to recruit smaller woolgrowers
so as to soften the organisation’s image as an elite
group of wealthy pastoralists . From 191^+ paid
organisers were appointed to canvass country districts.
To make the Association more attractive to smaller
woolgrowers, and to improve its image with Governments,
its name was changed in 1916 from the Pastoralists’
2Union to the Graziers’ Association.
Graham has argued that most of these changes were 
the result of the influence of newly recruited smaller 
woolgrowers within the Association. ’During World 
War I ’, he states, the Association ’was joined by many 
small graziers and mixed (wheat and sheep) farmers 
from the New South Wales tablelands and slopes and,
in response to their attitudes, changed its procedures
3in certain important respects’. While it is true that 
efforts were made to make the organisation more 
attractive to smaller growers, the initiative for the 
changes came from larger graziers such as Colin Sinclair 
and James Walker whose main aim was to make the 
Association a more effective political organisation.
1
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1918, p.l4.
2
Annual Report, 1916, p.27; Annual Report, 1917» P*9; 
and minutes of Council, 30 August 1916. The decision 
to change the name was made after a ballot of all 
members.
3
G ra ha m , Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
p.120. See also ’Graziers in Politics’, p.596.
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Moreover, there is little evidence to show that the 
newly recruited smaller woolgrowers played any 
significant role in decision-making at this time.
Since the 1920s, government policies, especially 
those of Labor governments, have helped sustain and 
increase the political activity of the Association.
And as the scope of government activities has expanded, 
so the actions of governments have touched the lives 
of graziers in an increasing number of ways. 
Consequently, the scope of the G A *s pressure group 
activities has steadily expanded.
Other Factors
Many other factors also helped draw the GA into 
politics, and then helped sustain its political 
activities. One important factor was the political 
activity of other groups apart from trade unions, 
especially manufacturing interests demanding tariff 
protection and wheat-sheep farmers seeking stabilised 
marketing for the wool industry. Then too, increased 
government control over the economy made graziers, as 
well as other producers, more dependent on governments 
and less able to overcome disabilities by independent 
action. Thus the GA was forced to turn to governments 
for such assistance as concession freight rates for 
farm produce, taxation concessions, assistance to deal 
with rabbits and other pests, and later subsidies 
for research and promotion campaigns. Another factor 
which drew the GA further into politics was the 
increased opportunity for groups to participate in 
decision-making and administration. This factor also
157
encouraged the GA to expand its membership. At the 1919 
Annual Conference the GA President, John Mackay, 
explained to delegates that it was essential to recruit 
as many graziers as possible since there was a
growing tendency on the part of Governments 
everywhere to consult representative bodies 
of people with regard to matters that affect 
their interests, and if all graziers are 
members of the Association they would have 
a stronger voice in preferring their just 
claims.1
This account then indicates briefly how 
environmental factors operated to bring the Association 
into existence and then into politics, how they have 
provided the motivation for sustained political 
activity, and how they incidentally influenced the 
Association’s internal characteristics. Today a wide 
variety of environmental factors continue to supply 
the stimuli for political action, and in response to 
the influence of its environment the Association’s 
internal characteristics are being continually modified. 
For instance, the rising tendency of graziers in the 
wheat-sheep belt to grow wheat has necessitated the 
Association taking a greater interest in wheat matters 
and developing new machinery to do this. The 
Association’s Agricultural Committee has increased 
greatly in importance. Today it is perhaps the most 
important standing committee, and it is certainly the 
most active one.
1
Annual Conference records, 1919 (verbatim report).
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CHAPTER 6
Political Resources, Goals and Beliefs
Pressure groups vary greatly in their internal 
characteristics, and reflect the influence of different 
environmental factors. Consequently, the GA differs 
considerably in its resources, goals and beliefs from 
the UFWA and the APPU, and the differences between the 
three organisations contribute to their differing 
patterns of political behaviour. In considering the 
Association’s resources, goals and beliefs, we will 
note some of the differences between the Association 
and its rivals.
Membership
With over 11,000 members the GA is one of 
Australia’s larger State and regional commodity 
associations and the largest graziers’ association. 
Although it is unable to speak for all producers of 
wool, wheat and meat in N.S.W., its size ensures that 
governments take notice of its demands. Moreover, the 
GA claims that its members own almost half the cattle 
and sheep in N.S.W. and that they now grow at least 
half of the State’s wheat production.“*" Volume of 
production and stock numbers carry some weight,
1
Muster, 7 July 1965»
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especially with public servants and on matters that 
are not highly controversial.
The composition of the GA ’ s membership is decidedly 
different from that of its two main rivals. Members 
of the GA tend to have holdings that are considerably 
larger than average for the wool, wheat and meat 
industries. A large proportion employ labour 
throughout the whole year, as well as casual labour 
for short periods (such as at shearing time). Almost 
all GA members are wool and/or meat producers, though 
an increasing number now produce wheat in combination 
with grazing. Socially, most GA members think of 
themselves as graziers rather than farmers, and as a 
result the GA reflects the grazier rather than the 
farmer sub-culture. Most members are the sons of 
graziers, and many were educated in GPS schools. In 
addition, the GA ’ s membership includes pastoral 
companies and wool broking firms which own pastoral 
holdings, as well as individual graziers. While the 
UFWA includes some owners of larger holdings among its 
members, it is essentially an association of smaller 
producers,"*" and it seems that most of its members think 
of themselves as farmers rather than graziers. Unlike 
the GA, the UFWA does not include wool firms and 
overseas pastoral companies within its membership; in 
fact, at the insistence of the Wheat and Woolgrowers1
1
The average size of UFWA members’ holdings would 
probably be 1,500-1,600 acres, and the average flock 
size would probably be 1 ,200-1,700 sheep.
l6o
Association, the UFWA’s constitution was drawn up in 
such a way as to confine membership exclusively to 
bona-fide farmers and woolgrowers.^  Little is known 
about the composition of the APPU’s membership, but 
it seems that members who produce wool, wheat and 
meat resemble IJFWA members in many respects.
Over the years the GA ’ s membership has changed in 
a number of ways. In I8 9 O the Association was formed 
by wealthy pastoralists and for the first decade or so 
its membership was confined almost exclusively to 
owners of large pastoral holdings, pastoral companies, 
wool firms and banks. In 1891, when there were 1 3 , 1 8 7  
holdings in N.S.W. which ran sheep, the GA had only 
6 5 O members. These 6 5 O members however, as Table 4 
indicates, owned almost half the sheep in the colony 
and the average size of their flocks was over 38,000 
sheep. In the first three decades of this century, 
with the recruitment of many smaller woolgrowers into 
the Association, the average size of GA members’ flocks 
fell sharply from 22,254 in 1 9 0 1 to 3,496 in 1 9 2 9 .
1
Minutes of the Executive Council of the Wheat and 
Woolgrowers’ Association, 21 January, 7 April, 18 July 
I960; and minutes of the General Council of the FSA,
30 July I960.
l6l
TABLE 4
Sheep Numbers and Size of GA Members * Flocks
Year
Total N o . 
Sheep in
N.S.W.
No. of sheep (or 
equivalent 
cattle) owned by 
GA members
Average No. of 
sheep per GA 
member
1891 55,986,000 24,005,000 38,843
1901 40,020,500 7,699,000 22,254
1911 51,580,000 15,251,000 10,725
1921 37,571,500 20,985,000 4,116
1929 50,184,900 31,688,000 3,496
1937 53,166,000 30,137,000 3,808
1941 55,568,000 30,743,000 3,712
1950 53,298,000 23,391,000 2,38O
I960 71,000,000 24,559,000 2,355
1965 72,396,000 30,396,000 2,810
1
Compiled from figures in a report of the GA Unity 
Study Committee, 2 April 1968, p.30. Column four 
contains two sorts of errors which tend to compensate 
one another. In calculating membership contributions 
the GA equates cattle with a certain number of sheep. 
At least for some years, the figures in column three 
include cattle equivalents. However, the GA has 
always had a small number of members who own no stock 
and these members are usually included in calculating 
the average number of sheep per member. The figures 
in column four have been taken directly from the 
report.
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By 1929, as Table 5 indicates, over half the 
Association’s members had flocks of less than 2,000 
sheep. The recruitment of smaller woolgrowers and 
the rapid increase in the Association’s membership 
(from 2 7 5 in 1900 to 9,674 in 1 9 2 9 )were partly a 
result of an increase in the number of woolgrowers 
(from 1 9 0 1 to 1 9 2 9 the number or rural holdings 
carrying sheep in N.S.W. increased from 17,500 to 
3 1 ,7 0 0 ) brought about by the break-up of large estates 
and the trend to mixed farming. But, as we have seen, 
it was also the result of a deliberate attempt by the 
Association to increase its membership size and to 
recruit smaller woolgrowers. Today over 40 per cent 
of its members have fewer than 2,000 sheep, and the 
average size of members' flocks is just under 3,000 
sheep. But the average flock size of GA members is 
considerably larger (about 60 per cent) than the average 
flock size for the State. And despite the active 
recruitment programmes carried out by paid organisers 
and a membership contribution scale weighted in favour 
of small growers (for growers under 1,000 sheep the 
membership contribution does not cover even servicing 
costs), the GA has never succeeded in recruiting a 
majority of the total number of small woolgrowers.
As the figures in Table 5 indicate, in 1965 its 
membership included only 17 per cent of woolgrowers 
with less than 2,000 sheep, but 6 3 per cent of those 
with over 10,000 sheep.
The G A ’s leaders still consider the inclusion of 
smaller woolgrowers to be a definite political asset .
In its submissions and publicity the GA constantly
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emphasises that the bulk of its membership consists of
'men with small and middle-sized holdings'»^- Inclusion
of smaller growers has undoubtedly improved the
Association's public image and representativeness,
although it is still generally thought of as an elite
body of wealthy woolgrowers. On the other hand, the
high social status of many of its members is a useful
2political asset but one, as Dahl has suggested in 
another context, that can be exploited only to a 
limited extent. The high social status of its members 
gives the GA respectability and makes it comparatively 
easy for it to gain access to bureaucrats. Inclusion 
of a high proportion of owners of large holdings also 
gives added weight to its views on economic matters.
But on highly controversial issues social status counts 
for little.
The GA1 2s membership is widely scattered throughout 
the country districts of N.S.W. except for the Riverina 
and the far west, where the two other graziers’ 
associations (the Graziers’ Association of Riverina and 
the Pastoralists’ Association of West Darling) operate. 
The territorial boundaries recognised by the three 
graziers* associations are shown on the accompanying 
map. The scattered location of members and potential 
members makes organising and recruiting new members 
difficult. But for an economic pressure group there
1
The Graziers* Annual 1961-62 edition, p.23.
2
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in 
an American City, New Haven, 19^1, pp,229-38»
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are some advantages in having members widely scattered 
in many different electorates rather than concentrated 
in one area, provided that in each electorate there 
are sufficient members to have a significant influence 
on voting and on the behaviour of the local member of 
parliament.
The GA's strength and membership character varies 
between the three sheep zones. In the high rainfall 
and pastoral zones the GA is much stronger than the 
UFWA. Here probably 70 to 80 per cent of holdings are 
included in the GA ' s membership.^" In the wheat-sheep 
zone the position is reversed; the UFWA is appreciably 
stronger than the GA, and possibly only 30 per cent of 
rural property owners belong to the GA. However, 
almost half the GA*s membership is drawn from the 
wheat-sheep zone. In the pastoral zone GA members 
generally run sheep only, and in the high rainfall zone 
sheep and/or cattle. In the wheat-sheep zone most GA 
members run sheep and some cattle, and now grow wheat 
themselves or enter into share-farming agreements for 
wheat to be grown on their land.
Regional differences and differences between 
specialisation in different commodities provide 
potential sources of conflict within the GA. Other
1
The figures used in this section are based on 
interviews with staff and members of the GA and other 
organisations, and on the writer's calculations. 
Figures are available for the number of members in 
each of the GA's electoral districts (see accompanying 
map). By superimposing zone boundaries on the map of 
electoral districts, it is possible to compute 
approximately how many GA members are located in each 
sheep zone.
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potential sources of conflict are differences of 
interests and outlook between owners of smaller and 
larger holdings, between stud owners and non-stud 
owners, and between Liberal Party and Country Party 
supporters. In addition, a significant proportion 
(probably 20 or 30 per cent) of members also belongs 
to the UFWA, and a somewhat smaller proportion to the 
APPU."*~ But despite these differences, the GA has a 
high level of membership solidarity. Opinion on 
policies and tactics is often sharply divided, but 
such differences are seldom on basic issues and are 
usually resolved by constitutional means. What is 
significant is that no splinter group has ever broken 
away from the G A . Its solidarity springs basically 
from the general homogeneity of its membership. Despite 
their differences, GA members share basically the same 
general outlook, and are bound together by a sense of 
common purpose and of common experiences. The cross­
membership between the GA and other farm organisations 
does not seriously affect the G A ’s solidarity since 
few members with dual (or triple) membership feel an 
equal sense of loyalty and commitment to each 
organisation to which they belong. Those who belong to 
both the GA and the UFWA tend to identify themselves 
with one body, depending mainly on whether they think 
of themselves as graziers or farmers, or are inactive 
in both. Often primary producers join more than one
1
Except for the Dillon-Jarrett Survey of 1963 
commissioned by the APPU, no detailed survey has been 
made of cross-membership between farm organisations.
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organisation solely to get rid of a persistent 
organiser . ^
Since its formation the GA has enjoyed a high
degree of membership stability. As Table 6 shows,
since 1930 the membership size has remained fairly
constant. In addition, the turn-over in membership
has been comparatively low. To sustain its membership
level the GA employs permanent organisers to recruit
new members and to visit those whose membership
contributions fall into arrears. But 'even with these
recruitment methods, the GA ’ s membership level would
not be sustained unless members were well-satisfied
with the services provided and with the performance
of the Association in politics, particularly as its
membership contribution rates are higher than those
2of its competitors. The GA offers a large range of 
services to members apart from the promotion of their 
general interests by political activities. Its most 
valuable services are those related to the employment 
of labour. Both directly, and through the AWGC and 
the National Employers’ Policy Committee, the GA 
represents employers of pastoral labour in award and 
national wage case hearings. It supplies members with 
full details of awards and conditions of employm’ent, 
and with copies of agreement forms based on awards and 
on employment regulations for shearers and all of the
1
Aitkin, p.306, considers that many country people 
join the Country Party for the same reason.
2
That is apart from the rates for small producers.
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TABLE 6
GA Membership I89O-I965
(Source: Various issues of the Annual Report,
Report of Proceedings and The Graziers'
Annual, and information supplied by the 
GA Librarian).
1890 6O6 1930 9,269
I895 340 1933 7,537
1900 275 1940 8, 826
1905 429 1945 8,900 (approx)
1910 1,400 (approx) 1950 10,055
1915 2,386 1955 11,092
1920 5,098 I960 10,422
1925 5,067 1965 11,075
other numerous categories of labour (such as shed- 
hands, wool-pressers, cooks) employed in the pastoral 
and agricultural industries. Comparable services to 
employers of labour are unavailable from any other 
farm organisation or from any official institution. 
Legal and taxation advice is supplied and on occasions 
the GA undertakes legal action on behalf of individual 
members. Veterinary, superannuation, insurance and 
discount buying services are also provided, and the 
Association makes representations to government 
departments on behalf of individual members.
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Membership Participation
There can be few voluntary organisations whose 
leaders are not from time to time disturbed by apathy 
of rank and file. The GA is no exception, even though 
it is probably true that the level of membership 
participation in the Association is higher than in other 
farm organisations.
The level of membership participation varies with 
different activities. Fewer than 10 per cent of members 
attend branch meetings regularly, and less than 1 per 
cent attend the Annual General Meeting.'*’ Even fewer 
members hold office in local branches or higher organs 
since the number of such positions is limited. On the 
other hand, when ballots for the election of members 
of the General Council are required, up to 40 per cent 
of eligible members return voting papers.1 2 In 1950 
almost half the members (4,518 out of 9»364) returned 
their ballot papers in a GA referendum on the principle 3of grower finance for a proposed wool marketing scheme. 
In times of crisis, or when highly contentious issues 
are being debated, even higher proportions of members 
become mobilised and attend branch meetings, as they
1
Apart from the secondary sources indicated, this 
section is mainly based on the writer’s observations, 
and on discussions with members and staff of the 
Association.
2
From figures given in Annual Conference records. 
Often ballots are unnecessary as sitting members are 
usually returned unopposed.
Muster, 15 June 1950» P»51*
3
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did, for example, in 1950 > over the wool sales deduction 
legislation. The ability to mobilise a high proportion 
of members in a crisis is a particularly valuable 
political asset. While a higher rate of participation 
in branch activities would probably increase the overall 
efficiency of the organisation, as well as the political 
effectiveness of branches as independent centres of 
political action, the present rate is sufficient to 
enable the GA to function quite effectively. Moreover, 
the GA ’ s rate of membership participation is decidedly 
higher than that of the APPU, and probably slightly 
higher than that of the UFWA."*"
We have already observed that in the GA, membership 
recruitment is related to size of holdings and social 
status. Membership participation is likewise related; 
those with larger holdings and higher social status 
participate more actively from the branch level upwards. 
There are a number of reasons for this. More prosperous 
and wealthy land owners generally respond more readily 
to adverse changes in economic conditions, mainly 
because they have a higher level of income aspiration,
1
The APPU's rate of membership participation is lower 
mainly because the APPU operates active branches only 
in a few isolated areas. Many APPU members in grazing 
and wheat areas have never attended an APPU branch 
meeting; in many cases they don’t know where the 
nearest APPU branch is. If the GA’s rate of membership 
participation is higher than that of the UFWA, this 
could probably be best explained in terms of greater 
class cohesion among graziers and the use of differing 
membership contribution systems. GA members have 
their contributions re-assessed annually and receive 
an annual account, whereas most UFWA members sign bank- 
orders giving their banks authority to pay their annual 
contribution automatically each year.
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and often a better appreciation of the factors that 
cause adverse changes in profitability and more 
definite ideas about possible solutions.'*" Larger 
graziers also have a greater fear of trade unions, the 
Labor Party and government intervention, mainly because 
they have more at stake, and because they feel more 
vulnerable to attack. In a study of farm operators 
in Wisconsin, Warner and Heffernan2 found some evidence 
(though it was not conclusive) to support the hypothesis 
that the greater the number of benefits a member thinks 
he receives from a farm organisation, the greater will 
be his participation in the organisation. They found 
more substantial evidence to support a second hypothesis 
that the more a member thinks the benefit he is 
receiving from an organisation is contingent upon his 
participation, the greater his participation will be. 
There is evidence to substantiate both hypotheses in 
the case of the GA. Because they employ permanent 
labour forces and depend on itinerant shearing teams, 
larger graziers derive greater benefit from the G A *s 
industrial service. Most of them appreciate this fact; 
if they did not, they would not agree so readily to
1
On this point see Denton E. Morrison and Allan D.
Steeves, ’Deprivation, Discontent, and Social Movement 
Participation: Evidence on a Contemporary Farmers’
Movement, the N F O ’, Rural Sociology, V o l . 32, No.4 
(December 1967); and Frederick C. Fliegel, ’Aspirations 
of Low-Income Farmers and Their Performance and 
Potential for Change’, Rural Sociology, Vol. 24, No.3
(1959).2
W. Keith Warner and William D. Heffernan, ’The Benefit- 
Participation Contingency in Voluntary Farm Organizations’, 
Rural Sociology, Vol. 32, No.2 (June 1967)»
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retention of the sliding membership contribution scale 
based on stock numbers. They also value the GA ’ s 
political functions more highly since they feel more 
vulnerable to attack. In addition, they are aware that, 
if they do not participate in the affairs of the 
Association as a group, their special interests are 
unlikely to be safeguarded. Because they employ more 
labour and have greater economic security, larger 
graziers also are better able to afford the demands 
of time and expense that active participation involves. 
These demands can be particularly heavy, and in the 
GA there is little in the way of financial rewards. 
Unlike other farm organisations, the GA does not even 
pay an accommodation allowance to delegates to the 
Annual Conference. Larger graziers also participate 
more actively because they consider it is their duty 
to do so. Milbrath^ reports that several studies show 
that persons feeling a duty to participate in voluntary 
organisations are more likely to do so, and that persons 
with upper socio-economic status are more likely to 
develop a sense of citizen duty. The sense of duty 
among larger graziers is particularly strong. Graziers 
are brought up to believe that they belong to an elite 
group whose members have a responsibility to the 
community, and an even greater responsibility to their 
class and the grazing industry. Some grazing families 
have a strong family tradition of active participation 
in the Association, and over the years have been
1
Lester ¥. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and
Why Do People Get Involved in Politics, Chicago, 1965, 
pp.61-3»
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particularly well represented on the General Council 
and the Executive Committee. They include the Abbotts, 
the Dangars, the Katers, the Killens, the Wrights, 
and the Ashtons. Sometimes a number of members of the 
one family are active in the GA at the same time. For 
instance, in 1966 when B.A. Wright was the Association’s 
President, his father (a past-President) and one of his 
brothers were also members of the General Council, and 
another brother was Chairman of the New England 
District Council.
Some of the reasons why smaller landowners 
participate less actively in the GA have already been 
suggested but there are others. Smaller landowners 
are often extremely conscious of their lower social 
status. Generally they consider that it is the larger 
landowners’ ’place’ to participate more actively in 
the GA, and that their proper role is to give support 
when it is needed. Members with smaller holdings can 
easily feel out of place in GA branches where the 
main activists are owners of larger holdings and 
graziers of higher social status.
Leadership
Leadership is related to membership participation 
in that leaders are recruited from among activists and, 
for most of the same reasons that operate in the case 
of membership participation, tend to be drawn from 
among activists with higher socio-economic status.
Most GA leaders from branch level up own large holdings 
and employ a permanent labour force; generally they 
come from old grazing families, and have been educated
175
in the best private and church schools. Most of them 
produce wool and meat rather than wheat. Almost all 
think of themselves as graziers rather than farmers, 
and reflect the characteristic attitudes and beliefs 
of the distinctive grazier sub-culture.
But these are not the only criteria for securing 
office. Despite their natural concern about wealth 
and status, larger graziers have a high regard for 
ability, education, dependability and service. Over 
the years a tradition has built up in the GA that these 
qualities are important in leaders, and the method used 
for choosing leaders-tends to emphasise these qualities. 
This method differs markedly from that of the UFWA, 
as shown in Figure 6. With the UFWA’s method, where 
the Annual Conference chooses the General Council, the 
President, the Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer 
directly, there is a tendency to select competent and 
articulate conference performers or even demagogues.
In the GA there is a more careful, graduated, sifting 
process whereby leaders are selected by a much smaller 
body whose members are well aware of one another’s 
record of service, ability and reliability.
Many of the GA ’s Presidents have combined natural 
ability and education with wealth and high social 
status. One notable example was Sir Norman Kater, who 
was President of the Association from 1922 to 1925»^
1
The story of the Kater family is well set out in 
David S. Macmillan, The Kater Family 1750-1965; Sydney, 
1966. Valuable material is also available in the 
Association’s biographical file.
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Born in November 1874, Kater was the son of a well- 
known pastoralist, sheep breeder, company director and 
member of the Legislative Council. On his mother’s 
side he was a direct descendant from the famous 
explorer, Gregory Blaxland. Kater was educated at 
All Saints’ College Bathurst and Sydney Grammar 
School, and later at Sydney University where he 
qualified as a medical practitioner. However, except 
for brief periods after graduation and during the 
first world war, he did not practise, but instead 
devoted himself to pastoral and business interests, 
and to politics. In 1910 he entered into partnership 
with his father and managed the 'Egelabra' and 
’Yanganbil' properties. He was elected to the GA 
General Council in 1911 and to the Executive Committee 
in 1919» After his term as President of the 
Association, he continued to serve on the General 
Council until 1931 when he was appointed a Trustee of 
the Association, a position he retained until his 
death in 1965* Apart from the GA , Kater participated 
actively in many other organisations including the 
N.S.W. Sheepbreeders’ Association, the Country Party 
and the Institute of Public Affairs. From 1923 to 
1954 he was a member of the Legislative Council, and 
in the late 1920s chaired an official committee of 
inquiry appointed by the Bruce Government to examine 
problems facing the pastoral industry and to make 
recommendations. His business connections were 
extensive. By 1929 (when he received his knighthood), 
he was Chairman of the board of directors of the 
Commonwealth Wool and Produce Company, and a director
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of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, the Graziers’ 
Co-operative Shearing Company, the Globe Worsted Mills, 
and the London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance Company. 
Later he was appointed to the boards of other companies. 
For years Sir Norman directed his business affairs 
from his own office in O ’Connell Street in the heart of 
Sydney's banking and business area. He maintained 
homes in Sydney and Moss Vale, as well as on his main 
property, and was a member of the exclusive Union and 
Australian clubs in Sydney, the Queensland Club, and 
the Junior Carlton club in London. In many respects 
Kater was a unique figure. But many other GA 
Presidents have been well-educated, able and 
experienced, as well as being wealthy. J.P. Abbott 
and D.W. Bucknell were also university graduates, Sir 
Frederick Tout was a lawyer, and W.E. Abbott had read 
papers to the Royal Society and in 1884 was awarded 
the Society's bronze medal. B.A. Wright, elected 
President in 1965» is a brother of Judith Wright the 
poet. Sir Frederick Tout and Sir Graham Waddell both 
had extensive business connections and served on the 
boards of many prominent public companies.
The leaders of the GA have often differed
I
significantly in social and economic status from the 
Association’s membership as a whole. This has 
sometimes resulted in differences of outlook and 
interest, but the effects of such differences have 
been minimised by the high regard given to leaders 
within the organisation and by the genuine efforts of 
leaders to consider different points of view among 
members. The high regard in which leaders are held is
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based partly on tradition. Once a member is elected 
President, he is automatically accorded high status 
and respect and it is unknown for anyone to run for 
office against a President standing for his second or 
third term. The tradition of giving leaders high 
status is related to a general tendency among farmers 
and upper socio-economic status groups to place 
emphasis on respect and even deference to their 
elected leaders. But many GA Presidents, and other 
leaders also, have acquired status and legitimacy by 
their charismatic qualities and their performance. 
Perhaps the most forceful President was J.P. Abbott 
who immediately after his term of office entered the 
Commonwealth parliament and served in 19^0 and 19^1 
in the Menzies Ministry.
The leaders of the GA also have always differed 
significantly in wealth, social status and education 
from leaders of other farm bodies, an important factor 
underlying the differences in political behaviour 
between the GA and its two main rivals. A survey 
conducted by the writer^ showed that leaders of the 
three organisations differ markedly in education, 
social background and in the sizes and types of their 
enterprises. Ninety-six per cent of GA respondents
1
To secure data on the extent of the differences 
between leaders of the G A , the UFWA and the APPU, the 
writer conducted a survey early in 1968 of members 
of the general councils of the GA and the UFWA and 
members of the Finance and Administration Committee 
of the N.S.W. division of the APPU. A detailed 
explanation of the survey method and response rate 
secured is included in an appendix.
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had some form of post-primary education while this was 
true of only 79 per cent of UFWA respondents and only
65 per cent of those from the APPU. Almost 20 per 
cent of GA respondents held university degrees or 
agricultural diplomas, against less than 5 per cent
of APPU respondents and none at all for the UFWA. The 
differences in social background were even more marked. 
No APPU or UFWA respondents belonged to any of the 
three exclusive clubs in Sydney (Australian, Union 
and University clubs) whereas almost 30 per cent of GA 
respondents reported belonging to one or more of these 
clubs. Almost 80 per cent of GA respondents had 
attended a church or private secondary school, whereas 
the figures for UFWA and APPU respondents were 38 per 
cent and 12 per cent respectively. Family traditions 
of organisation participation were somewhat higher 
in the GA than in the UFWA, and appreciably higher 
than in the APPU. Respondents were asked whether 
their father was, or is, a member of the same 
organisation (in the case of UFWA, one of its 
predecessors). Replies in the affirmative were: GA
66 per cent, UFWA 56 per cent and APPU 21 per cent. 
Differences in size and type of enterprise were 
considerable, as Table 7 shows. The average size of 
APPU respondents’ holdings was 1,100 acres; for UFWA 
respondents it was 3»886 acres and for GA respondents 
14,121 acres.1 Table 8 indicates that GA
1
The average for GA respondents does not include one 
respondent who, through family companies, partly owned 
a greater amount of property than all other GA 
respondents together.
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TABLE 7
Size of Properties of Leaders 
(Percentages)
Acres GA UFWA APPU
Under 2,000 11.5 60.7 76.2
2,000 - 4,999 21.3 24.2 23.8
5,000 and over 67.2 15.1 --
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 8
Size of Flocks of Leaders who Ran Sheep 
(Percentages)
Size of Flock GA UFWA
Under 2,000 12.7 37.5
2,000 - 4,999 32.5 41.7
Over 3 > 000 54.8 20.8
Total 100.0 100.0
respondents who ran sheep had considerably larger 
flocks than UFWA respondents. The average for GA 
respondents was approximately 7>000 sheep and for 
UFWA respondents 3>000. Most GA respondents were 
interested in wool production, while the interest of 
UFWA respondents was mainly in wheat. Of GA respondents 
81 per cent reported that they produced wool and only
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64 per cent that they produced wheat; for UF¥A 
respondents the figures were 70 per cent and 91 per 
cent respectively."*" GA respondents also tended to 
employ more permanent labour, as indicated in Table 9*
TABLE 9
Permanent Labour Employed by Leaders
Employees
(Percentages) 
GA UFWA
Nil 11.1 31.3
1 15.9 37.5
2 - 5 52.3 25.0
6 or more 20.7 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0
The composition of the leadership of a pressure 
group has a marked effect on the organisation’s 
character and behaviour. Strong, able and skilful 
leaders constitute a valuable politicä.1 resource. 
Clearly the Association’s leaders in the past have 
left their mark on the organisation and have 
contributed to its success in politics. Without 
doubt its leaders today constitute a valuable 
political resource.
1
GA respondents mostly listed wool first among the 
commodities produced while most UFWA respondents 
wrote wheat first.
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Goals
The goals of a pressure group are largely 
determined by the character of its membership, 
particularly rank and file activists and leaders, and 
by the motivation that brought the group into 
existence and/or into politics and that provides the 
stimulus for sustaining its political activity.
The GA’s goals clearly reflect the attitudes, 
values and emotions of larger graziers - in other 
words the main characteristics of the grazier sub­
culture. Thus the GA seeks to maintain the existing 
social and economic order which accords graziers 
their privileged position. It stands in theory for a 
minimum of government intervention and for free 
enterprise; it is opposed to socialism and communism, 
and to many of the goals of trade unions and the 
Labor Party. In the case of the wool industry, the 
GA reflects the belief of larger graziers that the 
problems of the industry can best be overcome by 
increased productivity, wool promotion and research, 
and government assistance to reduce costs, rather than 
by marketing reform. Because leaders and activists 
share a similar general outlook, there is a strong 
degree of consensus on basic goals.
The various political motivations that have 
operated on the GA have tended to reinforce these 
goals derived from its membership character. Because 
of its experiences with trade unions and Labor 
governments, the GA as an institution has good reason 
to see unions and Labor administrations as
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constituting a definite threat to its existence, as 
well as often constituting a threat to the well-being 
of its members.
Changes in goals are a common phenomenon in the 
career of any pressure group."*" When the Association 
was founded its goals were extremely limited and 
negative in orientation. Its first aim was to 
counteract the industrial organisation of shearers, 
then to resist their demands for better conditions 
and a ’closed shop’. But later, in response to new 
political motivations, the GA’s goals gradually 
broadened and included positive as well as negative 
goals. Today the Association aims to promote and 
protect the interests of its members, not only as 
employers of labour, but as producers of wool, wheat 
and meat, as rural dwellers, and as citizens. It 
still aims to resist the actions of trade unions and 
Labor governments, and the encroachment of socialism 
and communism. In consequence, it wants to preserve 
the status quo and. if possible regain lost ground.
But at the same time, despite its opposition in theory 
to government intervention, the GA is concerned to 
achieve many forms of extended government activity and 
expenditure. Moreover, its positive goals are becoming 
increasingly important as a result of graziers' 
increasing need of government assistance.
1
See Zeigler, pp.75-6, on this point.
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The GA’s aims naturally vary with changing 
circumstances. During periods of industrial 
disturbances and Labor rule, the G A 's fear of trade 
unions and the Labor Party inevitably increases. For 
example, in 19^8 when Labor governments were in power 
in N.S.W. and the Commonwealth and after attempts by 
the Chifley Government to nationalise airlines and 
banks, the President of the GA (P.A. Wright) told 
delegates at the Association’s Annual Conference:
In a battle to maintain our rights and 
privileges as free citizens...we are 
fighting on four fronts.
We have to resist the efforts of Governments 
to hold and enlarge the extraordinary 
powers ceded to them temporarily during the 
war and, by means of those powers, to 
transform themselves from the servants to 
the masters of the people.
We have to wage an implacable campaign 
against a treasonable, subversive communist 
minority, sometimes supporting, sometimes 
defying our Governments, aiming at enslaving 
us under a totalitarian dictatorship.
We must combat those pressure groups, used 
so adroitly by the communists and by 
opportunistic union leaders, which are 
endeavouring to exploit the post-war 
situation for the sectional advantage.
And we must strive to awaken in people, 
blind to the threat to their liberties 
and prone to be taken in by specious 
romises, a realisation of the thralldom 
sic] into which they will be drawn unless 
they shed their apathy.“*"
1
Presidential address to 19^-8 Annual Conference 
(Annual Conference records, 19^8).
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But at other times the GA is more concerned about purely 
economic goals. In the last decade, with less to fear 
from trade unions and the Labor Party, and with sharply 
declining wool prices, the GA has been concerned 
primarily with the ’cost-price squeeze’.
Identity and Operational Norms
These terms refer to beliefs held by leaders, 
activists and staff and also, to some extent, by 
members. Identity refers to beliefs about what kind 
of organisation the GA is or should be. Operational 
norms are beliefs about how the Association should 
operate and behave, and about the nature of the outside 
political world. These beliefs constitute an important 
part of the Association’s internal characteristics.
While all leaders and activists recognise that the 
GA is an organisation which represents the interests 
of graziers, and that it differs from other farm 
organisations, there are some differences of opinion 
about how wide the GA’s interests should be, and about 
the extent to which the Association actually differs 
from other farm organisations. The most contentious 
of these questions is that relating to the width of 
the Association’s interests. Some members favour 
restricting the GA’s interests to wool and meat matters, 
while others consider that the Association should take 
a definite and increasing interest in wheat policy. 
Members in the northern part of the wheat-sheep zone 
have been pressing for the name of the Association to 
be changed to 'The Graziers and Graingrowers’
Association of New South Wales’, and for provision to
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be made for the automatic representation of the 
Agricultural Committee on the Executive Committee 
To date these pressures have been resisted, but in 
the future they could be a source of serious dispute.
On the question of the extent to which the GA differs 
from other organisations, the main division of opinion 
is between leaders and members. Leaders generally see 
the differences between the GA and other farm 
organisations as significant, and as a barrier to 
unity; many members on the other hand, tend to minimise 
the differences, and show much greater enthusiasm for 
amalgamation with other oganisations.
On most other matters concerning identity and 
operational norms there is a high degree of consensus. 
Leaders, activists and members alike see the GA as an 
association of graziers rather than farmers, and 
consider that it should uphold the traditional values 
of graziers. There is a tremendous pride in the 
Association which is seen as an important and 
responsbile policy-former in the Australian political 
system. It is considered that the Association’s 
policies are soundly based and in accord with the 
national interest. On the occasion of its seventy-fifth 
anniversary in July 1965, T.B.C. Walker, then the 
Association’s President, wrote of the GA:
Its past is a great one and its policies 
have been distinguished by two outstanding 
characteristics: integrity and soundness.
This, I think, is due to the practice of
1
General Council minutes, 15-17 November 1967? and 
Annual Conference minutes, 1967.
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studying a new problem fully before it 
takes a decision.... It has always sought 
to present the truth to the industry and 
conclusions which may be drawn logically 
from the facts.... A characteristic of 
graziers is their strong sense of 
independence. The association has this 
characteristic, too. If it is right, 
it does not like compromise.1
There is also a strong belief that the Association’s 
role in the formation of agricultural policy is 
crucial.
Because the Association is seen as responsible, 
its leaders and staff have clear ideas about how the 
Association should behave, and what methods are 
legitimate and proper for it to use. In an address 
to a regional conference of GA delegates in i960,
S.S. Ick-Hewins, then General Secretary, expressed 
the settled view on how the methods of the GA differ 
from those employed by other groups. He told delegates
An organisation is knit together very largely 
because its members possess something in 
common in their philosophic outlook. One 
organisation may be convinced that strength 
lies in a large number of angry members 
capable of marching on Canberra or Macquarie 
Street, armed with cudgels and pole-axes 
and of heaping the desk of some Arbitration 
Court judge with a pile of intimidatory 
telegrams. Another may take the view that 
it is better to win both government and the 
public by unassailable reason. The latter 
class must have considerable knowledge and 
appreciation of the National problems with 
which government has to deal.
1
Must er, 7 July 1965 (anniversary supplement), p.10.
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After thirty-two years’ observation of the 
Graziers’ Associations throughout the 
Australian States, I have no hesitation^in 
saying they belong to the latter class.
Once or twice some inexperienced delegate to the 
Annual Conference has suggested the possibility of 
strike action, only to be told that such action is 
considered improper. Even at the branch level, there 
is a strong belief that the GA’s methods and political 
style differ from those of other farm organisations, 
particularly the UWEA and the APPU. The GA prides 
itself on its rational and business-like approach to 
policy-making, and on its reliance on argument and 
direct approaches to governments rather than on 
irresponsible, public campaigning. The secretary 
of a local branch of the GA complained to the writer 
about this difference in political style: on a local
matter, he related, the GA branch had enlisted the 
support of the UFWA branch, which instead of pursuing 
the matter ’quietly and sensibly’, went at it ’like 
a bull at a gate’; the project failed.
The GA has always been conscious of criticisms 
levelled against it - that it is undemocratic and ruled 
by a close coterie of wealthy pastoralists, that it is 
(as one Labor Minister once described it) ’an exclusive 
society’, that it is reactionary and ultra-conservative,
1
Notes on an address delivered at Bathurst, 30 July 
I960 (held by GA Library).
2
This criticism came from the Hon. Clive Evatt in 
the 19^0s.
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and that it vetoes the proposals put forward by other 
farm organisations without making any positive 
contributions. Such criticisms are considered to be 
unfounded and unfair. In 19^ +8 P.A. Wright, then the 
Association’s President, replied to some of these 
criticisms. He told delegates at the Annual Conference
It is sometimes said of us - simply because, 
in the past, as now, we have refused to be 
stampeded by the glib catchcries of the day - 
that we are conservative. If to be 
conservative is to insist on keeping the 
best of the old while accepting only after 
test what the new may have to offer us - 
if to be conservative is to maintain the 
dignity of human beings and basic principles 
of decency in the conduct of daily life ... no 
matter what technical and scientific changes the 
world may see - then we are conservatives, and 
profess that faith proudly.
The graziers of New South Wales - of Australia - 
have never set their face against change.
Indeed, the most superficial survey of the 
industry shows that the opposite is the case.
Far from being content to ride unthinkingly 
on the sheep’s back, we have spent vast sums 
in developing our land and pastures, in 
improving our flocks and herds, stimulating 
research to keep wool in its pre-eminent 
position as a textile, ^nd exploring and 
developing new markets.
Some practices and beliefs in the GA result partly 
from reaction to criticism. One of these is the 
strong emphasis on democratic procedures.
1
Annual Conference records, 19^8.
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The GA’s view of the economic and political 
systems in which it operates is essentially rational 
and well-informed. The GA ’ s leaders and staff, in 
particular, have a good appreciation of how the 
political system works, of government policy-making 
and administrative processes, and of the relative 
amounts of power (and kinds of power) wielded by 
different institutions of government and by different 
official actors in the system. However, their view 
of their competitors and more particularly their fear 
of trade unions, the Labor Party, socialism and 
communism are perhaps less rational.
Financial Resources and Secretariat
The GA enjoys an income far greater than its 
rivals and probably greater than any other farm 
organisation in Australia. For instance, in 1964 
when the GA had a membership of 10,990 and the UFWA 
had a membership of 19,600, the GA ’ s general income 
was almost double that of the UFWA.  ^ The size of a 
pressure group’s income depends on its membership, 
on the ability and willingness of its members to 
contribute, and on the actual membership contribution 
scheme used. Being the largest of the graziers’ 
associations, the GA is naturally the most wealthy. 
However, the GA’s financial superiority over the UFWA 
springs mainly from the fact that members of the GA
1
This statement is based on examination of both 
organisations’ financial statements for 1964.
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are better able and more willing to pay larger amounts
to the Association, and contributions are based on a
sliding scale related to stock numbers,"*" In 1967 the
minimum membership contribution was $10, with an
additional charge of 60 cents per 100 sheep over a
2minimum of 1,000 sheep. Thus, while some members 
paid only $10, others with large holdings and flocks 
paid sums ranging up to approximately $2,000. In 
contrast, the UFWA has a fixed membership fee which3was $10 in 1967» In addition to its annual ordinary 
income from membership contributions, the GA has 
considerable assets (including an office building in
4the heart of the commercial area of Sydney, as well 
as invested funds), a Special Purposes Fund which is 
used for ’political purposes’, and the constitutional 
power to raise additional funds by special levies or 
’calls’ from its members up to $2 per 1,000 sheep and
1
In 1967 an assessment based on wheat production was 
also used, but this proved impracticable and was 
abandoned.
2
For the purpose of this calculation one head of 
cattle was deemed to equal four sheep.
3
This statement is based on information supplied in 
1967 by the Acting General Secretary. Not all members 
however, paid $10. At the 1967 UFWA conference the 
Treasurer explained that many members had not changed 
their bank-orders as requested to $10, and consequently 
were paying at old rates. One branch secretary told 
the writer that some members of his branch were paying 
as little as $1 p.a.
4
The UFWA too has its own office building which is 
somewhat smaller than the G A ’s building.
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1$1 per 100 head of cattle p.a. The Special Purposes 
Fund, which is supported by voluntary contributions 
from members is used mainly for special campaigns and 
for the support of political parties.
In Australia there is little scope of bribery 
and corruption at the official level. Financial 
resources do constitute an important political asset 
for pressure groups, however, and they can be used 
for five main purposes: maintenance of a secretariat
and the hire of experts, organisation maintenance and 
membership recruitment, regular publicity and 
propaganda, contributions to political parties, and 
the fighting of special political campaigns. The GA 
uses its financial resources in each of these ways. 
Table 10 shows an analysis of the GA's expenditure for 
1963 against that of the UFWA. What is significant 
is that the GA spends a larger proportion of its 
ordinary income on maintaining its secretariat (and 
consequently it is able to employ a larger staff), 
public relations, and affiliation fees to commodity 
federations (most of which go to the AWGC). The 
table also shows that the GA spends less than the 
UFWA at branch level, mainly because the GA's branches 
have no separate funds (their operating expenses are 
paid from head office), whereas the UFWA's rules
1
Rules of the Graziers' Association of New South Wales 
(incorporating amendments up to 26th March 1966) , 
rule 22.
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TABLE 10
Comparison of GA and UFWA General Expenditure in 1964^
(Percentages)
GA UFWA
Publications and public relations i—1 cr\0i—1
Affiliation fees and commitments 
to commodity federations 14.1 6.2
Membership recruitment 12.9 18.0
Expenses of Executive Committee 
committees, Conferences
(T
'i
Oi—
1 13.2
Remittances to or expenditure of 
branches and district councils 4.0 21.7
Head office expenses 39.6 27.2
Others 00rH 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0
provide for branches to receive 12^ per cent of 
membership subscriptions
On the basis of the number and quality of its 
staff and its office facilities, the GA'*s secretariat 
is much superior to those of other farm organisations. 
It is also superior to the secretariats of most trade
1
This table has been compiled from the 'Treasurer’s 
Report and Balance Sheet and Accounts, year ended 
31st December 1964' for the G A , and the statement of 
the 'Revenue and Expenditure Account, year ended 
31st May 1964' for the UFWA.
2
Memorandum and Articles of Association of United 
Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association of New South 
Wales, r u l e 4 4 , p .16.
195
unions and comparable to the secretariats of many 
business pressure groups. The GA in 1967 had a staff 
of sixty-one, apart from cleaning and building maintenance 
employees. Except for the UFWA and the Victorian Wheat 
and Woolgrowers1 Association which had staffs of thirty- 
three and twenty-two respectively, all other farm 
organisations had staffs of less than twenty-one.^
Table 11 shows an analysis of the staff of the GA and 
four other farm organisations according to function 
and the number of university graduates. What is 
significant is how the GA utilised its larger staff.
The number employed in organising and the conduct of 
the buying-service and the insurance scheme was roughly 
comparable to staffing in other large farm organisations, 
but a much larger number were employed in public 
relations, in research, and in providing clerical and 
secretarial assistance to senior staff. Five members 
of the GA staff held university degrees; others held 
professional qualifications in accountancy, business 
administration and public relations. In recruiting 
staff, the GA has always placed more emphasis than other 
farm organisations on academic qualifications and on 
experience in business or journalism, rather than on 
experience in farming. Its salaries, particularly 
at senior levels, have always been higher than those 
offered by other farm organisations. In addition, the
1
At the writer's request, all the leading organisations 
supplied details on their staff size in 1967.
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GA offers attractive fringe benefits and has its own 
superannuation scheme. The turnover in staff, 
especially at senior levels, is very low. In 1965 
there were eleven members of staff who had been with 
the Association for more than twenty years, and four 
for almost forty years.“* " Since 1912 the GA secretariat 
has only had two ’permanent heads’; J.W. Allen from 
1912 to 19^6, and S.S. Ick-Hewins since 19^+6.^ Ick- 
Hewins holds a law degree. For a short period after 
graduation he taught at Sydney Church of England 
Grammar School, and then joined the staff of the GA 
in 1928, becoming Assistant General Secretary in 1935» 
The GA's office facilities are clearly superior to 
those of all other farm organisations. Particularly 
important is its library which has extensive holdings 
of government and academic publications, press clipping 
files, and periodicals relating to economics, politics 
and agriculture. The library, which in 1967 had a 
staff of five, also holds and organises all the 
Association’s files.
The GA’s secretariat in many respects is like a 
public bureaucracy or a government department in 
miniature. It is hierarchically organised, it has 
a high degree of specialisation of function and well 
established procedures, and there is a strong emphasis 
on efficiency, economy and staff neutrality regarding
1
Muster, 7 July 1965*
2
From 19^ +6 to 1966 Ick-Hewins was General Secretary 
and in 1961 was appointed to the newly created post
* of Chief Executive Officer.
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policy-making. Except for the Association’s organisers, 
the G A ’s staff are concerned with much the same functions 
and tasks as are their counterparts in the public 
service: the preparation of reports and submissions;
correspondence; searching for files and material in 
files ; servicing of committees; and organisational 
maintenance.
The quality of its secretariat gives the GA 
political advantages over its rivals. The main functions 
performed by its secretariat are: securing advance
intelligence and scrutiny of legislation and regulations; 
preparation of submissions to governments; conduct of 
direct negotiations with public servants; briefing of 
GA committees, deputations and representatives on 
other bodies; public relations; organisation maintenance 
and membership recruitment. But unfortunately for the 
Association, its senior staff are severely limited in 
the time they can spend on research, scrutiny of 
legislation and regulations, and preparation of 
submissions. The heavy demands of organisation 
maintenance and the provision of services to members 
consume perhaps 70 per cent of the time of senior staff,"*" 
and in the last decade demands on the staff have 
increased faster than the rate of staff expansion.
In addition to the facilities provided by its 
secretariat, the GA often secures the advice and 
assistance of outside experts, particularly academic
1
Ick-Hewins’s estimate, (interview 1 September 1966).
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economists and legal authorities. For example, the GA 
and the AWGC employed leading economists to assist in 
the preparation of submissions to the Philp and Vernon 
committees, and the GA often seeks opinion of counsel 
if it doubts the validity of legislation and 
regulations.
Structure, Decision-making and Power
Australian farm organisations are similar in 
structure, partly because they have similar clientele 
and functions, and partly because their founders 
tended to borrow constitutions and structures from the 
same sources, and from each other. Gradually, however, 
each association has developed its own institutional 
peculiarities. The GA is a more complex organisation 
than its rivals and colleagues, and it conforms 
neither to the common pyramidal model nor to the simple 
hierarchical model. It is a curious mixture of 
centralisation and decentralisation, of oligarchy and 
democracy;nonetheless, it generally operates 
effectively and fulfils the basic needs of members. 
Figure 7 shows this structure in diagrammatic form.
The main lines of communications between organs in 
the structure are shown by broken lines while the 
unbroken lines show relationships of responsibility.
Branches of the GA differ from those in most other 
farm organisations in three main respects: they have
no independent source of income, head office pays the 
secretaries a fee for each meeting held as well as an
Figure 7 * Organisation Structure (1967)
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annual retainer, and most branch secretaries are stock
and station agents or accountants who usually accept
the position not so much for the fee but for business
contacts. Not being members of the Association, such
secretaries sometimes lack the real enthusiasm of
activists, but this is offset by secretarial efficiency
and by the provision of what is virtually a permanent
office for the branch, conveniently located in a larger 
2town. Branches are able to submit motions directly
not only to the Annual Conference but to the General
Council, the Executive Committee, and standing and
3ad hoc committees.- As well as participating in 
policy formation, branches perform a useful function 
for the head office and central organs by providing 
information and opinion. Copies of branch minutes 
are sent to the head office; secretaries perform this 
duty reliably since they are paid for each meeting 
only after the minutes are received. Branches also 
have the power to deal directly with local government 
matters, and even with local matters relating to State 
and Commonwealth governments. They provide services 
(such as the organisation of field days) and social 
functions, assist in membership recruitment, and attend
1
In 1966 the fees were: $6.30 per ordinary meeting,
$10.50 for the annual meeting, plus a retainer of 
$10.50 as long as the annual meeting was held.
2
Based on the writer’s observations and on interviews 
with branch secretaries and chairmen.
Rules of the Graziers’ Association, rule 80.
3
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to local publicity for the Association, Branches of 
the GA, like those of any pressure group, vary greatly 
in the regularity of their meetings and their 
effectiveness. Some hold regular monthly meetings and 
engage in a wide range of political activities. Others 
are dormant except for an annual meeting.
The main role of district councils'*' is to co­
ordinate the activities and, as far as possible, to 
reconcile the views of branches as they relate to 
regional matters. Their functions are severely 
limited since branches are not compelled to channel 
their motions through them and since councils have no 
representation on higher organs. However, district 
councils perform useful political activities at 
regional level and provide an easy and effective means 
for the President and senior staff to confer with 
representatives of a number of local branches at the 
one time.
Unlike those of most other farm organisations,
the GA1 2s General Council is elected directly by the
membership, or at least fifty-six out of its seventy-
2two members are. These fifty-six members represent 
electoral districts (see map earlier in this chapter) 
and in their election all members of the Association 
have equal voting rights. Nominations for election 
to the General Council can be made by branches, or by
1
Ibid., rules 88-93.
2
Ibid., rule 30
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any five members. Of the other sixteen members of the
General Council, ten are co-opted by the Council, three
are elected by the Cattle Council and two by the North
Coast District Council, and the Treasurer is a member
ex-officio. The practice of co-opting ten members is
a useful means of recruiting new leaders with special
qualifications and experience. But since in the past
staff and directors of wool broking firms were
sometimes co-opted in this way (one senior staff member
of a wool firm was Chairman of the Executive Committee
from 1916 to 1928),"*" this practice is not popular with
many members of the GA. The GA ’ s opponents also cite
this provision as evidence to show that the Association
is undemocratic and that it is dominated by the wool 
2firms. In opposition to this practice, and to the
fact that members of wool firms were often on the
Executive Committee, between 1920 and 1941 motions
were introduced at thirteen different Annual Conferences
seeking to make members of wool firms ineligible for
appointment to the General Council or to the Executive3Committee. These attempts however, failed. 
Constitutionally, the General Council has control over 
property and finance, and power to determine policy
1
This was B.B. Allen, Wool Manager of the Australian, 
Mercantile Land and Finance Company.
2
For criticisms from wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations, 
see Hitchins, p.40.
3
See Annual Conference minutes, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923)
1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1940, 1941.
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between Annual Conferences. It also elects the 
President, the Vice-Presidents, and members of the 
standing and ad hoc committees. Apart from a short 
meeting immediately after the Annual Conference for 
the purpose of electing officers, the General Council 
meets twice a year.
The Annual Conference is looked on as the supreme 
policy-making body and is made up of a representative 
from each branch together with the members of the 
General Council. At various times unsuccessful efforts 
have been made to secure separate representation for 
district councils, and to enable the Conference to 
elect the President and members of the Executive 
Committee.
The main functions of the Annual General Meeting^ 
are to receive the annual financial report, to elect 
a Treasurer (who must be a resident of Sydney), and 
to alter the rules of the Association. All members 
are eligible to attend the Annual General Meeting, or 
to participate in decision-making by means of proxy 
votes.
The constitution of the GA provides for three
standing committees: the Cattle Council, the
Agricultural Committee and the Western Division 
2Committee. The Cattle Council was established in 
193 +^ to promote the special interests of members
1
Rules of the Graziers* Association, rules 96-107»
2
Ibid., rules 38-66c
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producing beef cattle. It is made up of thirteen 
members elected by the General Council, two members 
elected by the North Coast District Council, and co­
opted members, many from recognised stud beef cattle 
societies. The Agricultural Committee was formed in 
1946 and is elected annually by the General Council.
It is concerned mainly with wheat policy. The Western 
Division Committee was formed in 1955 to promote the 
special interests of members in the Western Division.^ 
In addition to the standing committees recognised by 
the constitution, the GA has in operation approximately 
ten ad hoc committees and sub-committees, many of 
which in practice operate as standing committees 
With marked increase in the volume of transactions 
between the GA and governments, these committees are 
playing an increasingly important role in the 
Association.
The President and two Vice-Presidents are elected 
annually by the General Council. By the constitution
3they are limited to three successive years in office. 
This safeguards the establishment of an entrenched 
oligarchy of three members.
1
For administrative purposes, N.S.W, is divided into 
three land districts - the Eastern, Central and Western 
Divisions. In the Western Division most land is held 
on a leasehold basis.
2
Apart from the three standing committees, the following 
committees operated in 1967: Wool, Meat Marketing,
Mutton and Lamb, Agricultural Education, Land, Shipping, 
Local Government and Land Tax, Economic, Public 
Relations, and Unity Study.
Rules of the Graziers* Association, rule 46.
3
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The Executive Committee is the Association's 
'inner cabinet'. It consists of the President, Vice- 
Presidents, Treasurer and six other members elected 
by the General Council.^ Theoretically, its function 
is to implement policy, but in practice it has wide 
policy-making power and it also makes most of the 
tactical decisions. It meets monthly and its meetings 
generally extend over two or three days.
In any voluntary organisation with a mass
membership it is inevitable that all members cannot
share equally in decision-making, but Michels's 'iron
law of oligarchy'^ operates less in the GA than in
many other pressure groups. Constitutionally, there
is an opportunity for all members to participate in
decision-making about policy. Members can make their
views known at the Annual General Meeting, at branch
meetings, or directly to members of the General
Council, committees, or the Executive Committee.
Unlike that of many organisations, the GA's structure
allows for direct communication between any of its
3major organs. Thus branches can communicate their 
views directly to the Annual Conference, the General 
Council, the Executive Committee, and standing and 
ad hoc committees. Branches, district councils, the
1
Ibid., rule 49•
2
Robert Michels, Political Parties, New York, 1966 
edition (translated by Eden and Cedar Paul with an 
introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset).
3
See Figure 7»
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Standing and ad hoc committees enjoy a fair degree of 
autonomy and within limits have freedom in decision­
making about both policy and tactics, In practice, 
as well as in theory, the Annual Conference is the 
chief policy-making body. Questions of high policy 
such as about the GA’s attitude to wool marketing 
schemes are always determined by the Conference. The 
General Council and the Executive Committee often 
refer high policy questions to the Conference for 
determination, and in special circumstances they call 
special conferences to determine policy on particular 
mattersBefore the Annual Conference or special 
conferences a preliminary agenda is circulated in 
advance to give branches an opportunity to discuss 
motions on the agenda paper. At the Annual Conference 
there is ample opportunity for all delegates to express 
their points of view on major questions. In addition 
to these methods, the GA has also experimented with 
plebiscites and ballots to enable the whole membership 
to determine policy on particular issues.1 2 Such 
methods however, are clumsy and costly. From all this 
it is clear that the GA is much more democratic than 
most farm organisations. It also is much more 
democratic than its critics allege - and it is 
definitely not the 'tool’ of the wool firms.
1
Special conferences were held in 1925, 1950, 1956,
1962, 1963, 1965.
2
For example, ballots were held in 1916 on the change 
of the Association’s name and in 1950 on a proposed 
wool marketing scheme.
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Yet as in any organisation with a mass membership, 
there is an inevitable tendency towards oligarchy. 
Effective participation in policy-formation is limited 
to activists, and inevitably leaders have even greater 
influence on policy than rank and file activists. 
Oligarchy arises also because, as in any organisation, 
small groups or individuals, through their position 
or expertise, tend to dominate decision-making. For 
instance, at the Annual Conference members of the 
General Council and the Executive Committee tend to 
dominate debates because of their skills in meeting 
procedure and their greater knowledge. With the 
increased range of the GA’s goals and the increased 
volume of business being transacted between the 
Association and governments, the tendency towards 
oligarchy is increasing. The Annual Conference and 
the General Council meet infrequently, and often 
have insufficient time to deal with all items on their 
agenda papers. Thus, many decisions are left to the 
staff and the Executive Committee. In the same way,
1
Sometimes decisions on important matters have to be 
made very quickly. In i960 Ick-Hewins told a regional 
conference at Dubbo:
I had to determine policy myself in 
relation to the evidence which was given 
by this Association before the Committee 
of Inquiry into Land Valuation, for no 
other reason than that we were summoned 
to appear at short notice immediately 
the committee was established and over 
the Christmas holiday period when there 
were no conventions, conferences, councils 
or executives to consult. Something had to 
be done and it was done.
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because of the increasing volume of business the 
Executive Committee must depend increasingly on staff 
advice and often leave decisions about tactics to them.
Because of the social background of its leaders, 
its operational norms, and the important role of the 
staff in providing background information, the GA’s 
approach to decision-making is serious, realistic and 
rational. The role of the staff is particularly 
important. Even for the Annual Conference, the staff 
prepare detailed explanatory notes for all important 
items on the agenda paper. After reading these notes 
branch delegates often realise that their branch has 
been misinformed and ask leave to withdraw or amend 
their motion.
Political Image
The GA has many different public images, rather 
than a single image. Trade unionists and members of 
the Labor Party generally have a highly unfavourable 
image of the GA. They see it as an organisation of 
wealthy pastoralists and wool firms, with the 
determined aim of defending the selfish interests of 
its members and exploiting the working-class. Their 
reaction to the word ’grazier1 is usually highly 
emotional and hostile. Other farm organisations have 
a love-hate attitude towards the GA. They often try 
to court the GA’s friendship, but at the same time they 
are intensely jealous of the GA’s power and status. 
Members of other farm organisations (particularly 
wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations) are inclined to 
hold highly exaggerated views about the GA’s goals and
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how it operates. The view that bureaucrats have of 
the GA varies according to their individual political 
biases and according to their experiences of contact 
with the GA. Those who deal with GA on economic or 
technical matters are often tremendously impressed 
with the quality of the GA’s leaders and staff, with 
how well informed they are, and with their reasonable 
and rational outlook. Those who have been involved 
in public controversy in which the GA has participated 
are often less favourably impressed, and see the GA 
as being reactionary and even irrational, and its 
leaders as being stubborn and uncompromising.
Governments, too, hold differing views of the GA. But 
no matter what party is in power, the GA is recognised 
as a group whose members perform important economic 
functions as producers in the economy. But while the 
general public accord the GA high status, they often 
have little sympathy with the GA’s demands for increased 
government assistance on the grounds of the economic 
disabilities of graziers.
To sum up, the GA*s political resources include 
its constant, large membership; members with high social 
status; a satisfactory level of membership participation; 
skilful and dedicated leaders ; strong financial resources 
and a well-staffed secretariat; an effective 
organisation structure; a serious and rational approach
1
One well-experienced leader of a rival organisation 
confided to the writer that the GA has dossiers on 
leaders of all competing organisations.
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to decision-making; and a good image with those who 
share the Association’s belief's or have come in 
contact with it on technical and non-controversial 
matters. On the other hand, it has some serious 
disabilities: inability to speak for all producers
of wool, wheat and meat in N.S.W.; numerical weakness 
in comparison with the UFWA; a marked anti-Labor, 
anti-trade union political orientation; a conservative 
ideological position; and a poor image with an intense 
antipathy from certain sections and groups. The 
Association’s goals and beliefs reflect the grazier 
sub-culture. While it still seeks to resist 
unfavourable government action and is opposed to 
socialism and communism, the GA today is concerned to 
achieve many forms of extended government activity 
and expenditure. Members consider that the Association 
is different from other organisations, though there 
is some difference of opinion on the extent of the 
differences. They also see the Association as being 
a responsible and influential body, with a political 
style different from that of its rivals.
IV. BEHAVIOUR
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CHAPTER 7
Style, Scope, Intensity and Co-operation 
Political Style
Political style is an important aspect of pressure 
group behaviour, but one that defies precise and 
rigorous analysis. It refers to the distinctive manner 
in which a group performs its political actions. 
Individual pressure groups have distinctive styles in 
much the same sense as do musicians and sportsmen. A 
musician’s style is something more than his skill and 
his techniques. Two musicians may have equal skill, 
they may use similar techniques, and they may even 
share similar beliefs about music, but each will have 
his own distinctive style of performing. Something 
of the same kind is true of pressure groups. Two 
groups may be concerned with achieving the same 
political goals and may even use the same general 
tactics, but each will perform its political actions 
in its own distinctive way.
The political style of a pressure group is 
derived primarily from the political culture of its 
leaders and activists, and also from the pattern of 
beliefs built up over a period of time about the 
organisation’s identity and how it should behave in 
politics. The GA ’s political style is elegant and 
polished, with an element of artfulness. In politics 
it gives the impression of being confident and
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experienced. Its political actions and statements are 
generally in ’good taste’ and, even in public 
campaigning, its performance is restrained. In fact, 
the GA’s political style is very similar to the 
political style of its individual leaders, and bears 
the marks of the grazier sub-culture and of a social 
and economic elite.
In contrast, the UFWA has a distinctively different 
political style that reflects the wheat-sheep farmer 
sub-culture. The difference in style between these 
two organisations is evident throughout their activities 
even in where they choose to hold their annual 
conferences and how their conferences are run. The 
GA traditionally has held its conference in the Wool 
Exchange in the heart of the down-town commercial 
section of Sydney. Its conference is characterised 
by an emphasis on serious discussion, logical argument, 
and strict rules of debate. In contrast, most UFWA 
conferences have been held in the Buffalo Hall near 
Central Railway Station, and oratory and appeals to 
emotions play a much bigger part in debates than at 
GA conferences.
Scope
Scope refers to the range of issues in which the 
group is interested, the volume and kinds of demands 
it makes, and the degree to which it employs political 
means to achieve its goals. Scope is influenced 
mainly by the character of the political environment, 
by economic factors and by the group’s goals and
resources.
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When the GA was first drawn into politics the 
range of issue-areas on which it sought to influence 
policy and administration was very limited. But over 
the years, as the scope of government activity increased, 
touching the lives of graziers in new ways and making 
them increasingly dependent on government assistance, 
the Association modified its goals and took interest 
in more and more aspects of government. Table 12 
shows the extremely wide range of issue-areas with 
which the GA is concerned today. In this respect, 
the GA differs little from its competitors in the farm 
sector. Indeed, concern with a wide range of issue- 
areas seems to be a characteristic of Australian farm 
organisations and one that distinguishes them from 
trade unions and business groups which have more 
limited interests.
In the literature of political science it is 
often suggested that groups concerned with a wide range 
of policy-areas are at a distinct disadvantage compared 
to those which are concerned with a very limited 
range. Irish and Prothro state:
The more goals a group tries to achieve, 
the weaker it becomes in its pursuit of 
any one of them. If it can concentrate 
on an overriding aim, as the Anti-saloon 
League did in battling for prohibition, 
its chances of maintaining cohesion and 
winning success are enhanced.^
1
Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics of 
American Democracy, Englewood Cliffs (New J ers ey), 1959 » 
pTW2
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Table 12
Main Issue-Areas of Interest to the GA
(Compiled from volumes of Report of Proceedings and 
minutes of Annual Conference and General Council)
Commonwealth Government 
Taxation
Economic policy, banking, credit 
Trade and tariffs
National wage cases and general employment conditions
Pastoral industry awards
Wool marketing, promotion, research
Meat marketing and promotion
Wheat stabilisation and overseas sales
Livestock disease control and eradication
Livestock, crop and pasture research
Agricultural extension
Water conservation
Shipping freights and services, and containerisation 
Telephone and postal services 
Radio and television services
N.S.Wo Government
Land taxation and probate duty
Control and eradication of livestock diseases 
Cattle compensation
Livestock, crop, and pasture research 
Abat toirs
Land legislation and administration 
Railway facilities and freight rates 
Road transport regulations and taxation 
Main roads
Wheat storage and transport 
Pest control
Water conservation and irrigation 
Soil conservation 
Stock stealing 
Use of firearms
Education - schools, universities, agricultural and 
technical colleges 
Hospital services
Local government administration and rates
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Table 12 (continued)
Main Issue-Areas of Interest to the GA
(Compiled from volumes oT Report of Proceedings and 
minutes of Annual Conference and General Council)
N . S G o v e r n m e n t  (continued)
Port facilities
Airport facilities and air services 
Industrial awards and conditions 
Industrial development and decentralisation
Local Government
Roads
Rates
Stock saleyards and abattoirs
Electricity
Community facilities
While this generalisation is often true, in the case 
of economic pressure groups there are definite 
advantages in being concerned with a wide range of 
policy-areas at three different levels of government.
If one department or one level of government is 
unsympathetic, there is always the possibility of 
securing some success with other departments or at 
other levels of government. On the other hand, 
interest in a wide range of issue-areas poses problems, 
though in the case of the GA these are related not to 
cohesion but rather to the sheer difficulty of 
keeping in touch with developments in each issue-area, 
in formulating realistic demands, and in establishing 
and maintaining close relations with all the appropriate 
authorities. With its strong secretariat and committee
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system, the GA has an advantage over other farm 
organisations with a similar range of interests. But 
even so, the Association’s resources are often severely 
taxed.
Table 12 gives a picture of the importance to the 
GA of the three levels of government. Analysis of 
the volume of demands made in relation to each level 
of government confirms the proportions in the table.'*' 
The State Government is still slightly more important 
than the Commonwealth, and both Commonwealth and State 
Governments are vastly more important than local 
government. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that, 'because of its overriding power, the Commonwealth 
is the most important level of government, and that 
the number of issue-areas and volume of demands do not 
provide an accurate indication of the relative 
importance of different levels of government to a 
pressure group. Be this as it may, the GA leaders 
and staff still tend to consider that the affairs of 
the N.S.W. Government have greater importance for the 
Association. But they recognise that the situation is 
changing, and that the importance of the Commonwealth 
is rapidly increasing. Not all members and activists 
however, think this way. Indeed, the more parochially- 
minded branches are still heavily orientated towards 
local government matters.
1
An analysis of the motions passed at the 19^7 Annual 
Conference revealed that, of those relating to national 
and State government, approximately 40 per cent related 
to State government while 60 per cent related to 
national government.
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Since the 1920s the volume of demands made on 
governments and government authorities by the GA has 
expanded enormously. Volume of demands is extremely 
difficult to measure but, using as a rough measure 
the number of motions passed by Annual Conferences and 
by meetings of the General Council and the Executive 
Committee, and the number of political activities 
listed in the Association’s annual reports, it appears 
that since the 1920s the volume of demands made by the 
Association has increased at least three or four times. 
This increase has resulted from the expanded range of 
government activity, the increased dependence of 
graziers on governments, the growing complexity of 
modern government, the increased tendency for the GA 
to act as an ombudsman on behalf of its members, and 
the increased size and functions of the GA’s secretariat.
The GA makes many different kinds of demands on 
governments and government authorities, and their 
relative importance and volume depend mainly on the 
motivation provided by environmental factors. For 
example, in recent years many of the GA’s demands have 
been related to the ’cost-price squeeze' in the wool 
industry and to problems of silo storage for wheat.
The GA’s demands are also closely related to the 
demands made by other pressure groups and to the 
policies and action of governments.
The demands that the GA makes on governments 
differ from one another in many respects. First, they 
differ in the tone in which they are made. On 
occasions demands take the form of strong and vocal
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protests, sometimes with a hint of the use of some 
retaliatory action if the demand is not met. An 
example of use of a mild threat was in 1 9 5 0  in 
relation to the wool sales deduction acts when the 
GA hinted that if its demands were not met the 
Government could face loss of electoral support.^ But 
generally the G A 's demands are simple, precise, 
straight-forward requests, and are usually couched in 
the officialese of government bureaucracies.
Second, demands include actual demands for change 
as well as requests for information about existing 
policy and administrative practice, or about projected 
changes. Demands which seek change vary according 
to the type and degree of change sought. Some call 
for fundamental policy changes, others for the 
application, extension or variation of established 
policy. Others again seek purely administrative 
modifications. Numerically, demands for fundamental 
policy changes are the least important; at Annual 
Conferences or meetings of the General Council most 
resolutions call for the application, extension or 
variation of established policy (usually to secure 
increased government responsibility and expenditure) 
or for purely administrative modifications. The case- 
study on cattle compensation (see chapter 12) shows 
that once the objective of securing a fundamental change 
in the form of the establishment of a cattle
1
See chapter 11 for a detailed account.
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compensation scheme was achieved, the GA ' s demands on 
this question afterwards related solely to the extension 
and variation of policy, and to administrative 
modifications. Nevertheless, from the Association’s 
viewpoint, the fundamental changes it seeks are often 
of great importance, and it pursues them with vigour 
and persistence.
Third, the G A ’s demands include both ideological 
demands and purely economic demands. The GA has its 
own ideological orientation, and seeks to promote it.
At times the Association calls for government action 
to promote this outlook, and also to safeguard its 
members and the community from forces which it considers 
provide a threat to their security. In March 1950 the 
G A ’s General Council resolved that it
...applauds the action of the Federal 
Government in making operative the 
provisions of the Crimes Act as a 
counter to Communist activities in the 
Commonwealth. It trusts that such 
action is only a forerunner to further 
definite steps to rid the community of 
the canker which seeks to destroy the 
very foundation of the nation. This 
Association pledges itself to provide 
every possible assistance to the 
carrying out of^the government’s policy 
in this regard.
This resolution was publicised, and a copy was forwarded 
to the Government. Since the early 1950s, with a non- 
Labor government in power in the Commonwealth parliament
Minutes of General Council, 24 March 1950.
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and with comparative industrial peace, the GA has been 
pre-occupied with securing economic goals and relatively 
little concerned with ideological demands. The economic 
demands that it makes are generally realistic, reasonable 
and backed-up with evidence and argument. For example, 
on tariff policy the GA does not expect the Government 
to abandon protection for secondary industry. It seeks 
rather to have protection confined only to those secondary 
industries which are clearly economic, and for the degree 
of protection given to secondary industry to be kept in 
close check. One of the best statements of the GA ’ s 
rational and realistic approach to economic policy 
questions was given by B.A. Wright in his address as 
President to the 1967 Annual Conference:
We live in strenuous times: strenuous
because of the pressures exerted upon 
primary industry by rapid economic growth, 
deliberately undertaken as national policy. 
Australia’s take-off on this adventure 
began about the time of the second World 
War, stimulated by the need to develop 
manufactured import substitutes. The pace 
has been accelerated by the realisation 
that full-scale economic development is a 
condition precedent to national security.
The industrial revolution of Australia is 
well advanced: it has gathered momentum:
it will not be put into reverse. We have 
no option but to adapt ourselves to it: 
but in the manner of adaptation we may 
indeed have options....
Quite apart from the basic function of 
feeding and clothing people, primary 
industry in Australia - the nation’s 
principal source of exports - is, at this 
stage of development, the source of foreign
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exchange for the purchase of materials 
which are essential to our national growth.
The ability of primary industry to function 
economically in this role is a basic 
necessity for the achievement of the national 
objective.
Economic growth is inflationary: but we
sell on overseas markets. We are in 
consequence subject to the pressure of 
costs constantly rising against whatever 
prices we can secure on the world’s 
open markets.
Costs are, of course, the prices of the 
commodities and labour we buy to run our 
industry. That they will rise is 
inevitable. That is the lesson of history.
Our first function is to try to restrain 
the rate of increase; and in particular 
to keep that rate to that at which wo^ld 
price levels generally are increased.
After stating that the Association’s first recourse 
must be to arbitration tribunals in order to restrain 
wage increases to keep parity with increases in 
productivity, Wright went on:
Our second line of attack must be through 
the tariff and this will not be easy, 
because the thinking of many manufacturers 
and of Labor has become conditioned to 
concepts which are no longer valid. We 
must try to convince the Australian worker 
that, unless tariff protection is selective, 
it can defeat the objective of full employment 
and deliver the profits derived from Australia’s 
more profitable undertaking to foreign 
investors.
1
Annual Conference records, 1967.
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This Association is not a free trade 
organisation. It does, however, call 
for practical recognition of the fact 
that the development of secondary and 
tertiary industries in Australia is 
dependent upon trade balances which our 
export industries provide: and that the
ability of export industries to fulfil 
that function is determined by the 
relationship of the costs they incur to 
the prices they receive.^
Apart from appeals to arbitration tribunals and the 
Tariff Board, the Association seeks to restrain costs 
by persuading government authorities to reduce fixed 
charges and taxes, and by securing subsidies on 
fertilizer and government grants for research and 
promotion. To a layman, its whole approach to economic 
matters appears to be eminently sensible and rational.
Despite its ideological commitment and political
orientation, the GA is inclined to pragmatism on
economic questions. For example, in 1965 the
Association opposed a reserve price plan for wool
marketing largely (but not exclusively) on the grounds
that the plan involved government intervention in the 
2industry, but at the same time it supported the 
government-operated wheat stabilisation scheme, based 
on a uniform guaranteed price per bushel and compulsory 
acquisition of each grower’s crop. Throughout the
1
Ibid.
2
Chapter 12 gives a detailed account of the Association's 
opposition to the reserve price plan in 1965*
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1930s, the GA strongly opposed proposals for wool 
marketing reform or for a direct subsidy. But in the 
end, after years of low prices, the Annual Conference 
in 1939 carried a resolution asking the Government to 
grant a subsidy of Id per lb on wool when the selling 
price fell below l/- per lb for the year."^
Fourth, some demands seek extension of government 
activity while others seek retention of the status quo, 
or reduction in government activity. In its early 
years in politics, as we have seen, the GA had a strong 
negative orientation towards government activity; its 
main concern was to secure retention of the status quo, 
and reduction in government controls and charges. But 
over the years, as graziers like all other producers 
became increasingly dependent on government assistance, 
the Association’s orientation changed. Today the GA 
is essentially positive in its approach to politics, 
and it makes many demands for increased government 
activity and expenditure. Such demands are seen not 
as being in conflict with a free enterprise ideology 
but as perfectly fair and just, particularly since 
agriculture is the ’backbone’ of the economy.
Fifth, demands include those where the GA is the 
initiator of change, or where it supports the 
initiative of another group or groups, and those 
where the GA seeks to veto the demands of other groups,
1
Annual Conference minutes, 1939* This decision was 
not pursued far since in September 1939 an appraisement 
scheme was introduced as a war-time measure.
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or to veto government action or proposed action. In 
its early history in politics, the GA was primarily 
concerned with the use of veto power. In this sense 
too its political orientation was negative. While it 
still makes many demands that seek to veto proposed 
changes, today the GA ’ s approach is more positive and 
in agricultural policy it is an important initiator 
of change.
We have already seen how the politicisation of 
the GA resulted from the influence of various 
environmental factors. To what extent does the GA 
today attempt to achieve its goals by political means?
An analysis of the Association’s records shows that 
it seeks now to achieve its goals primarily by political 
action. At least 95 per cent of resolutions passed 
by Annual Conferences call for or imply political 
activity of some kind. Nevertheless, the GA still 
seeks to achieve some goals by independent action.
For instance, it still negotiates directly with wool 
brokers, wool buyers, stock and station agents and 
shipping companies. But the importance of these means 
of achieving its goals is rapidly diminishing.
Int ensity
Intensity refers to the fervour and persistence 
with which a group pursues its political objectives.
For a number of reasons the GA displays a high 
degree of intensity. It is constantly and seriously 
involved in politics, it sees political means as the 
best way of achieving most of its goals, it makes 
demands which it considers to be realistic and
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theoretically possible of achievement, and it has a 
well-staffed secretariat to assist in demand articulation 
and to pursue the demands made. Moreover, in politics 
the GA does not expect immediate success with every 
demand it makes, but recognises that the achievement 
of some objectives will take time, effort and the use 
of varying strategies, This persistent and repeated 
following up of ’requests* is itself a kind of pressure, 
especially as the GA does not immediately take ’n o ’ 
for an answer. The case-study on cattle compensation 
(see chapter 12) illustrates the G A 's persistence in 
one field, and how it employs different strategies and 
arguments to achieve a single objective.
Although the level of intensity with which the GA 
pursues its political goals can be thought of as high 
at any time, it does vary from year to year, and from 
month to month. Intensity also varies between different 
issue-areas at any one time, and on the same issue-area 
from time to time.
Variations in intensity from year to year depend 
mainly on the political party or parties in government, 
whether there are industrial disturbances, action 
taken by other groups, and economic factors such as 
price fluctuations or droughts. In respect to its 
fervour rather than its persistence, the general 
intensity of the GA ’s political behaviour was much 
greater in the late 19^0s when the Chifley Labor 
Government was in power than it has been in recent years.
Variations in intensity during the year are partly 
related to the same factors but also the Association’s
227
internal characteristics, and to the varying tempo 
of politics throughout any year. Immediately after 
each Annual Conference and the two main meetings of 
the General Council, the GA transmits many of its 
demands for the year to governments and statutory 
authorities. The tempo of politics varies throughout 
any year depending mainly on when the N.S.W. and 
Commonwealth parliaments are in session, when official 
groups such as the Loan Council and the Agricultural 
Council are scheduled to meet, and on the timing 
of election campaigns. In addition, January is 
usually a slack month for political activity.
Variations in intensity between different issue- 
areas at the one time, and on the one issue-area 
from time to time are considerable but extremely 
difficult to measure. Nevertheless, some indication of 
the approximate intensity with which specific proposals 
in each issue-area are sought can be secured from an 
analysis of the number of resolutions submitted in 
each issue-area to Annual Conferences. This method 
assumes that generally more resolutions are submitted 
in issue-areas which appear more important to branches 
and about which members feel more strongly, and that 
the Association generally pursues proposals on these 
with greater intensity. Moreover, the variations in 
intensity suggested in Table 13 are substantiated by 
other evidence. For example, from the records of the 
Association and from press reports, it is clear that 
in both 1966 and 1967 the GA pursued its demands on 
wool policy with a high degree of intensity. Drought 
was a particularly important issue-area in 1966 ;
228
Table 13
Number of Resolutions Submitted to Annual Conferences
in Main Issue-Areas"*“
(Source: Agenda papers 1966 and 1 9 6 7  Annual Conferences)
Main Issue-Areas Annual Conf erences
Industrial
1966
10
1 9 6 7
11
Meat and Livestock 33 23
Drought 33 14
Land 10 12
Water and Irrigation 40 1 6
Wheat 8 87
Wool 6 0 97
Taxation 30 3 8
Economic 6 17
Fires, Bushfires, Insurance - 9
Pests 3 6
Education 11 6
Local Government 3 12
Roads - 3
Transport 7 23
Communications 3 9
Agricultural/Pastoral Supplies 11 2
Others 12 8
1
The ordering of the issue-areas in the table follows 
that of the 1 9 6 7  agenda paper. The table shows the 
number of resolutions submitted by branches, district 
councils, committees, and members of the General 
Council, and not the actual number of separate 
resolutions appearing on the agenda paper (which was 
less since the staff compound almost identical 
resolutions to reduce the length of the agenda paper). 
Resolutions on organisational and political matters 
are not included. The total number of resolutions 
submitted in 1 9 6 7  was significantly greater than in 
1966 because of special interest in and problems 
concerning wool and wheat matters.
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because of a prolonged and serious State-wide drought 
branches came forward with many schemes for long-term 
planning to provide for droughts as well as with 
demands for short-term relief. Table 13 shows that in 
1966 the number of resolutions on the main issue-areas 
varied from nil to sixty, and in 1967 from two to 
ninety-seven, Similar variations occurred on individual 
issue-areas between the two years with the biggest 
variation on wheat. In 1966, following drought 
conditions there was little concern about wheat storage 
facilities, However, in the 1966/7 season conditions 
were particularly favourable, with a record crop being 
produced, and as a result storage and transport 
facilities were severely strained.
The intensity with which the Association makes 
and pursues any single proposal depends on a number 
of factors. The GA seeks to achieve goals more 
intensely when it is reacting to some perceived threat 
to its well-being or the well-being of its members.
Thus it reacts strongly to industrial disturbances, 
discriminatory government action against graziers, 
attacks on the free auction wool marketing system, or 
a sudden decline in profitability of members’ 
enterprises. In the last decade demands relating to 
wool marketing and the ’cost-price squeeze’ have been 
pursued with greater intensity than any others.
The GA also seeks to achieve specific goals with 
greater intensity when its sense of fair-play is 
outraged, The case-study on the wool sales deduction 
acts (see chapter ll) illustrates this point. One
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reason why woolgrower organisations felt so strongly 
about these acts was that they considered woolgrowers 
alone were being made to bear the main burden of the 
government's anti-inflationary measures.
Intensity is often related to urgency. Pressure 
groups invariably try to influence proposed legislation 
before it becomes law, ’Once the bill becomes law’, 
one prominent member told the 1919 Annual Conference,
’it is very difficult to get an amendment but if the 
Minister can be approached before the Bill becomes 
law, it is more easy to get him to shape the Bill 
into something which would be equitable to the 
producers’.^
Intensity is also related to expectations of 
success. Usually the GA does not pursue non-ideological 
goals with vigour if it thinks there is little 
possibility of at least partial success. When Labor 
governments are in power, the GA recognises that 
some of its demands will have little chance of success. 
In 1963 a GA sub-committee recommended.that the 
Association press for special rebates on probate and 
estate duty in respect of land used continuously for 
primary production. The GA however, did not make a 
serious approach to the N.S.W. Labor Government to 
achieve this proposalc Its annual report explained:
’The Association has already approached the N.S.W. 
Government on this issue and been refused and it is 
plainly a principle that Labour will not accept’
1
Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 1919*
Report of Proceedings I963, p .6l.
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Considerations of strategy also influence the 
intensity with which the GA articulates its demands.
The GA does not seek a specific goal with vigour if 
it considers that this will adversely affect 
negotiations on some more important issue, or that it 
will stimulate other, and perhaps stronger groups, to 
make counter-demands, or that it will lead to a full- 
scale review which could lead to the GA being more 
adversely situated than under the status q u o ♦ For 
these reasons at times the GA and the AWGC delay making 
demands or even abandon the idea altogether. In 1963, 
according to the G A ’s annual report, the AWGC refrained 
from acting on a request from the GA in connection 
with death duties because at the time it was negotiating 
to obtain a substantial subsidy for wool promotion.^
The intensity with which resolutions passed by 
the Annual Conference and the General Council are 
communicated to authorities depends largely on the 
Executive Committee and the staff. After each Annual 
Conference, the Executive Committee and the staff 
have the task of conveying up to two hundred separate 
resolutions to authorities. A small number of these 
are chosen for special attention. Detailed submissions 
are prepared and the requests are often followed up 
with letters and press publicity. The remainder of 
the resolutions are communicated to the appropriate 
authorities by means of formal letters stating that at
1
Ibid.
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the Conference a certain resolution was passed and 
asking that consideration be given to the matter.
The choice of resolutions for special treatment 
depends on a number of criteria including: urgency,
possibility of success, ease with which a satisfactory 
and convincing submission can be prepared, and 
intensity of members’ feelings. A similar procedure 
is adopted after meetings of the General Council.
Co-operation
As an aspect of pressure group behaviour, 
co-operation refers to the extent to and means by which 
a group co-operates, combines or forms alliances 
with other groups to achieve its goals. Co-operation 
is influenced by environmental factors and by the 
group's internal characteristics.
The Australian political system encourages economic 
pressure groups to co-operate, combine, form alliances, 
and even to amalgamate with other groups. For State- 
based groups, such as the GA, some form of co-operation 
is almost inevitable in order to command effective 
political influence at the national level - a level 
of government which has become of great importance 
to all economic pressure groups. State-based groups 
can approach Commonwealth departments and authorities 
directly, but compared with national representative 
groups they carry little weight. Thus, to be effective 
they must combine with other groups to form national 
structures„
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On the whole, both State and Commonwealth 
governments prefer to deal with large, representative 
groups which can speak for an industry or for a whole 
economic section, and in recent years have encouraged 
groups to combine. The following statement from a 
speech by John McEwen illustrates what he and other 
Commonwealth Ministers have been telling farm 
organisations:
...the Government wants to continue to 
work with industry and continue the basis 
that we have established of a concept of 
partnership between government and industry.
But there must be the maximum achievable degree 
of unity amongst the Australian producers 
themselves. If the Government is willing - and 
this is a real advance - to consult primary 
industry, it is essential that primary ^
industry be able to speak with a united voice.
And when farm organisations have followed this advice,
they have often received a pay-off in the form of
increased recognition and greater opportunity to
participate in policy-making and administration.
The shift of political power to the executive and 
bureaucracy in all western politics has also 
encouraged groups to combine. In Political M a n ,
Lipset writes:
I would suggest as a research hypothesis
that the more centralized an industry,
the more need for a union to be bureaucratic.
1
Speech by the Hon. John McEwen, Minister for Trade 
and Industry, to the Annual Conference of the 
Tasmanian Farmers’ Federation, 30 June 1965*
234
A union like the steelworkers’, which 
bargains with a few gigantic corporations, 
must set up a union authority-structure  ^
which parallels that of the corporations.
This hypothesis can apply equally well to pressure 
groups with regard to their relations with governments. 
’Big government' necessitates big pressure groups.
Large representative pressure groups are better able 
to negotiate and bargain with expert bureaucracies 
and powerful executives.
The multiplicity of economic pressure groups 
representing each of the three main economic sections 
in the Australian political system provides considerable 
scope and motivation for groups to form different kinds 
of alliances with many different groups. Few economic 
pressure groups are able to establish and maintain 
exclusive clientele relationships with government 
departments. Most have to compete, not only against 
groups from other economic sections, but against rivals 
from the same section. But in many cases competitors 
can also double as allies, and groups naturally tend 
to co-operate and combine with those groups that share 
common goals. Since most farm organisations are 
concerned with a wide range of policies, there is 
considerable scope for establishing different kinds 
of alliances with many different groups. In respect 
to particular policy-areas and goals, the GA finds 
that it shares common objectives with business groups,
1
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, 1964 edition, 
p.360.
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and/or other graziers’ associations, and/or other 
farm organisations. At times it even shares common 
objectives with non-economic pressure groups.
Political factors however, impose constraints on 
co-operation. Traditional rivalry provides a barrier 
to co-operation between the GA and the UFWA, and between 
the AWGC and the AWMPF, while the GA’s ties with 
political parties would be a hindrance to amalgamation 
with other groups.
Political culture provides additional motivation 
for co-operation. To some extent all primary producers 
are concerned about their declining numbers, and 
consider that they are politically disadvantaged. This 
tends to draw farmers together and to increase their 
enthusiasm for the amalgamation of farm organisations.
On the other hand, cultural factors also provide 
constraints on co-operation. In the case of the GA, • 
the differences between the graziers’ and wheat sheep 
farmers’ sub-cultures tends to make co-operation with 
the UFWA difficult.
Economic factors limit rather than motivate 
co-operation. In the wool, wheat and meat industries 
alone, economic diversity has created differences in 
economic interests which are an impediment to co­
operation. Moreover, because of economic diversity, 
it is difficult to devise suitable structures to 
combine associations that differ not only in interests 
but in size and in political resources.
The extent to which the GA is willing to co­
operate and combine with other groups, its choice
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regarding which groups it wishes to co-operate with, 
and the actual form that co-operation takes is also 
influenced by its internal characteristics, particularly 
its perceptions of threats and danger, its operational 
norms, and its beliefs about its own identity.
Co-operation with Business Groups
Co-operation is best analysed separately in 
relation to the three main groups with which the 
Association co-operates, combines and forms alliances: 
business groups, other graziers’ associations and 
other farm organisations.
Unlike its two main rivals, the GA has co-operated
informally and formed alliances with business groups
almost since its inception. Faced with a common threat
from militant trade unions in 1890, the Association
combined with other employers’ bodies to break the
strikes and defeat the unions.'*" Since then it has
often co-operated informally with business groups on
matters of mutual concern. In 1900 it combined with
other employers’ associations in N.S.W. to resist
trade union demands with respect to an industrial
2arbitration bill before the State parliament.
Immediately after the second world war the Association 
supported business interests in opposing efforts of 
the Chifley Government to nationalise banks and 
airlines. Apart from informal co-operation on an
1
See chapter 3*
Minutes of Council, 6 July 1900.
2
ad hoc basis, the GA has had various formal alliances
with business groups. In 1967 its formal alliances
included direct membership of the Employers’ Federation
of N.S.W., the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, and the
Taxpayers’ Association of N.S.W. and, through the
AWGC, membership of the National Employers’ Associations,
the National Employers’ Policy Committee, the National
Industrial Committee, the Australian Tariff Council,
and the Australian Overseas Transport Association.'*’
All these alliances related primarily to economic
objectives. In addition, the GA at different times
has formed alliances with business groups primarily
to achieve ideological goals. In the 1930s and 1940s
the GA helped finance the Sane Democracy League, an
2anti-communis t propaganda organisation. In 1947 with
five business groups it founded a propaganda organisation
called the Central Public Relations Bureau to combat
3communism and to improve industrial relations. The 
five business groups were the Country Traders’ 
Association, the Retail Traders’ Association, the 
Employers’ Federation of N.S.W., the Sydney Maritime 
Underwriters’ and Salvage Association, and the Fire 
and Accident Underwriters' Association. Each
1
Compiled from various publications of the GA.
2
Minutes of the Special Purposes Committee, 18 August 
1936 and 28 November 1944, and annual financial 
statements.
3
Explanatory notes for agenda of 1949 Annual Conference 
(Annual Conference records, 1949); and minute book 
of the Central Public Relations Bureau.
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organisation initially contributed £500 and soon the 
Bureau had a staff of four, two of whom were 
university graduates.^
Co-operation with business groups has always come 
easily and naturally to the GA and has imposed little 
strain and tension. Culturally and politically 
graziers and businessmen have much in common. As 
employers of labour, they oppose demands of trade unions. 
As entrepreneurs, they oppose unnecessary expansion 
in public bureaucracies, undesirable forms of 
government regulation of economic life, high taxation, 
and attacks on the principle of free enterprise. They 
share the same fear of socialism, communism and 
nationalisation. The formal alliances have always 
worked well, mainly because they have been confined 
to specific, narrow issue-areas or goals, and because 
they have imposed few restrictions on the independence 
of member organisations. To give one example, the 
National Employers’ Policy Committee, which is the 
executive committee of the National Employers’ 
Associations, is concerned solely with national 
arbitration matters and with national wage cases* On
1
Ibid. In January 1948 the name of the organisation 
was changed to Central Research Bureau. This name 
however, was not suitable to the Registrar General 
for registration under the Business Names Act and so 
in March the same year the name Industrial and Economic 
Research Service was adopted. In late 1948 the 
Service’s chief employee, Stewart Howard, floated a 
proprietary company and took over the Research Service, 
while the participating organisations formed themselves 
into the Public Relations Committee which continued 
in existence into the 1950s *
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the Committee, the AWGC is by no means a minor member 
(its President, in fact, in 1966 was appointed 
Chairman of the Committee for 1966/7)^ and it 
participates with other organisations in planning 
the general case to put before the Arbitration 
Commission. In addition, the Committee’s detailed 
rural case is prepared by the AWGC’s own industrial 
officer.^
Co-operation with Other Graziers’ Associations
Co-operation with other graziers’ associations 
today takes two main forms: informal co-operation
in relation to specific goals or issues, and formal 
alliance through the AWGC.
Some informal co-operation takes place between 
the GA and graziers’ associations in other states but 
more important is the co-operation between the GA 
and the other two graziers’ associations in N.S.W. 
in relation to matters of common concern at State 
level. The area of common interest between the three 
associations is considerable, and they co-operate by 
exchanging information, supporting one another’s 
demands, and making joint approaches to government 
departments. They also send delegates to one 
another’s conferences and meetings, and the GA and the
1
Report of Proceedings 1966, p .6.
2
From information given by the GA President in his 
address to the 1967 Annual Conference (Annual 
Conference records, 1967).
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Graziers’ Association of Riverina operate joint branches 
along their territorial border. The effectiveness of 
this co-operation however, is limited. Liaison is slow 
and difficult because the two smaller associations run 
their affairs from offices in Melbourne and Broken Hill. 
They also fear that extensive co-operation with the GA 
will reduce their independence, and make it more 
difficult to refuse the GA’s proposals for 
amalgamation.
More important than informal co-operation is the
formal alliance with other graziers’ associations
through the AWGC. As we have already noted, graziers
established their first federal organisation in 1890
and the same factors which brought the pastoralists’
unions into being motivated the formation of the
2Pastoralists’ Federal Council. Because of the serious 
threat that pastoralists faced, the founding member 
organisations readily agreed to constitutional 
provisions which bound them on decisions made by the 
Council. These provisions enabled the Council to 
present a united front against the shearers’ unions, 
and later to speak with a single voice on political 
questions.
With the formation of the Commonwealth, the 
Pastoralists’ Federal Council assumed new functions.
1
For many years the GA has favoured amalgamation with 
the two smaller graziers’ associations. Approaches 
were made to this end as early as 1921 (General Council 
minutes, 4 February 1921).
2
Minutes of Council, 19 September 1890.
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Almost immediately it began communicating demands on 
behalf of its member organisations to the Commonwealth 
Government, and once the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
was established it assumed the task of defending the 
interests of graziers and resisting demands of the AWU 
for increased shearing rates. Originally the Council 
consisted of four member organisations but by i9 6 0 it 
had nine."*" After 1919 it was known as the Graziers’ 
Federal Council.
In 1919 the Association was represented at a
2conference in Melbourne when the AWC was formed, and 
it became one of the founding member organisations. 
Later it supported the conversion of the AWC from a 
temporary to a permanent organisation. In 1946 the 
GFC and AWC established a joint secretariat headed 
by J.W. Allen who had been Secretary of the GA since 
1912. In i9 6 0 the two organisations merged to form the 
AWGC, and the GA’s President became the AWGC’s first 
President while a member of the G A ’s General Council
3was appointed as its Chief Executive Officer.
Formal co-operation with other graziers’ 
associations has been of advantage to the GA. Today 
the AWGC provides the GA with its main channel of 
communication for policy demands to the Commonwealth
1
Explanatory notes to agenda for i9 6 0 Annual Conference 
(Annual Conference records, i9 6 0 ).
2
N.S.W, Graziers’ Annual 1920, p.45.
Report of Proceedings i9 6 0 , p .6.
3
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Government. Through the AWGC, the GA is consulted 
about major policy changes affecting the wool and meat 
industries, and has opportunity to participate in 
negotiations. Through the AWGC the Association 
participates in the determination of wages (in both 
the federal pastoral award and national wage cases) 
and is represented on the AWIC, the Australian Wool 
Board, the Australian Meat Board and various advisory 
committees. The AWGC is by far the most impressive of 
all the commodity federations. For a commodity 
federation it makes decisions quickly, and since its 
member organisations are bound by its decisions it can 
speak confidently and authoritatively. As we have 
observed, it is the only commodity federation with its 
own secretariat; and in 1967 it had a staff of eight, 
four of whom were university graduates."*“
On the other hand, from the G A *s viewpoint these 
formal alliances with other graziers’ associations have 
never been completely satisfactory. Despite their 
cultural homogeneity, the graziers’ associations differ 
considerably in their economic interests. The Queensland 
and Northern Territory associations, for instance, are 
primarily concerned with beef cattle rather than wool.
The GA has often been worried about the extent to which 
its interests differ from those of other associations.
For ten years it opposed the amalgamation of the GFC 
and the AWC, mainly because it wanted to retain the
1
Information supplied by the Chief Executive Officer 
of the AWGC.
AWC as a separate body concerned only with wool
policy.^ Mainly because of economic differences between
the wool and meat industries in each State, the graziers
associations differ enormously in their membership size
and the number of stock owned by members. These
differences have made it difficult to devise fair and
workable systems of representation on federal bodies
and bases for membership contributions. Both the
Pastoralists1 23 Federal Council and the GFC used a system
of scaled voting which favoured the smaller associations
while contributions were based on member’s stock 
2numbers. The GA, as the largest association,
consequently bore a large proportion of the financial
burden, but had proportionately less voting power. In
1952, for instance, the GA contributed 40 per cent of
the GFC’s income but had only four votes out of
3seventeen. At the same time, the four smallest 
associations each had one vote, but together 
contributed slightly less than 10 per cent of income. 
Thus, it was possible for a combination of smaller 
associations contributing much less income to outvote
1
Minutes of Annual Conferences, 19^9» 1951» 1952, 1953» 
195^ +» 1957» I960; and minutes of General Council 22-23 
June i960.
2
The system of voting used on the AWC also favoured 
smaller organisations. However, the AWC had no income 
of its own, and its expenses were provided by the GFC.
3
Explanatory notes to agenda for 1952 Annual 
Conference (Annual Conference records, 1952).
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the GA. This sometimes happened, and on such occasions
the position was made more intolerable for the GA
since it was constitutionally bound to uphold such
decisions. On a number of occasions the GA threatened
withdrawal from the GFC . In 19 -^2 it actually resigned
over a difference about meat policy,^ but finally the
other member organisations gave way and the GA withdrew
its resignation.^ In 1959-60, on the threat of
withdrawal from the GFC, the GA secured a more
adequate basis of representation on the projected
AWGC. It also obtained a constitutional provision
enabling member organisations representing a majority
of actual members to elect not to be bound by decisions
carried by a majority vote representing a minority of3actual members. After securing these concessions, the 
GA agreed to the amalgamation of the GFC and the AWC, 
and confidently expected that the AWGC would prove a 
more effective structure. But these hopes have been 
frustrated. The GA still lacks adequate representation 
in relation to its membership size, and to the 
financial support it contributes. The AWGC*s 
performance has disappointed the G A , particularly in 
relation to wool marketing, and despite pressure the
4AWGC has refused to open an office in Canberra.
1
The Graziers* Annual 1942, p.4l.
2
Minutes of General Council, 24 March 1942.
3
Minutes of General Council, 4-5 November 19595 and 
Report of Proceedings I960, p.6.
4
Minutes of Annual Conference, 19675 and discussions 
with leaders and staff.
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With the increasing power of the Commonwealth 
Government, its relationship with the AWGC is one of 
the most pressing problems facing the GA. The GA 
would like to reconstruct the AWGC - perhaps to give 
it a unitary rather than federal structure - to make 
it a more effective body. This will not be an easy 
task. Another possible strategy - and one it has 
seriously considered - is to withdraw and try to 
establish itself as a national body. This however, 
would be a risky and perhaps dangerous move since the 
Commonwealth Government might well refuse to recognise 
it as a national body.
Co-operation with Other Farm Organisations
Co-operation with other farm organisations takes 
place on both an informal and a formal basis.
The main informal co-operation is between the GA 
and the UFWA, though at times the GA co-operates with 
other bodies including the APPU and the Primary 
Producers’ Union of N.S.W. The case-study on cattle 
compensation illustrates some aspects of the informal 
co-operation that operates on non-controversial issues. 
The closest and most effective informal co-operation 
between the GA and the UFWA is often at branch level 
in relation to specific local issues. But some 
co-operation does take place at senior levels. The 
two organisations exchange information. At times they 
support one another’s demands on matters of mutual 
interest and, on occasions, even make joint approaches 
to government departments. The scope and effectiveness 
of this co-operation are limited by traditional rivalry,
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the long history of dispute over wool marketing and 
promotion, cultural differences and differences in 
political style.
Over the years the GA has co-operated formally 
with other farm organisations through membership of 
peak organisations of various kinds at State and 
national levels. In 1967 it was a member of the N.S.W. 
Chamber of the NFU and of the Australian Wheatgrowers’ 
Federation. Through the Wheatgrowers’ Federation and 
the N.S.W. Chamber of the NFU it was represented on 
the NFU, and through the AWGC on the AWIC.
The GA ’ s enthusiasm for formal co-operation 
through membership of peak organisations and for 
amalgamation with other organisations has varied 
considerably. Its attitude to co-operation and 
amalgamation has been influenced primarily by the nature 
and seriousness of external threats, by the 
effectiveness of the G A ’s access to and influence with 
governments, by its perception of the degree of common 
interest existing among primary producers, and by 
pressure from its members.
For the first two decades after its foundation, 
the question of co-operation with other farm bodies 
did not arise. But with the accession of the Labor 
Party to office in N.S.W. and the Commonwealth, the GA 
soon sought allies among other farm bodies. In 1917 
it promoted the establishment of the Producers’ 
Associations’ Central Council, the first peak 
organisation of farm bodies in N.S.W.,"*” and in 1919
T
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1918, p .44
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it co-operated with the FSA to form the Country Party.
It also explored the possibility of uniting all farmets
in a single organisation. Motions in favour of the
amalgamation of all farm organisations were discussed
at the 1918, 1919 and 1920 Annual Conferences.^ In
1921 the Secretary of the GA drew up a plan for
uniting all farmers in a single body with distinct
departments to deal with the special interests of
2each primary industry. This plan was publicised and 
then debated at the 1921 Annual Conference. Many 
delegates to the Conference supported the proposal, 
arguing that by uniting, farmers would be better able 
to resist the attacks of trade unions and Labor 
administrations. Others warned against the plan.
’The Graziers and Farmers and Settlers', Colin Sinclair,
a wealthy grazier, told the Conference, ’are like oil3and water, they will not mix'. However, the 
Conference agreed to convene a meeting of all farm 
organisations to discuss the matter. The GA Secretary 
subsequently issued invitations to other organisations, 
but the response was discouraging. The Pastoralists’ 
Association of West Darling intimated that it wished 
to retain its separate identity, the Graziers’ 
Association of Southern Riverina and the Primary 
Producers’ Union stated that they were opposed to 
amalgamation while the GA was affiliated to the Country
1
Minutes of Annual Conferences, 1918, 1919» 1920.
2
The Sydney Stock and Station Journal, 1 April 1921.
3 Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 1921.
Party; the Sheepbreeders1 Association declined the
invitation; the Stockowners’ Association made no
reply; and the FSA stated that it considered that it
was an inopportune time to consider the matter/
Until the Producers’ Associations’ Central Council
collapsed in 1937» following the withdrawal of the
FSA and the Primary Producers’ Union, the GA
channelled many of its demands to State and federal
authorities through this peak organisation. Generally
2it was well satisfied with the Council’s performance, 
mainly because it successfully dominated the Council’s 
decision-making and its General Secretary: acted as 
the Council’s Secretary.
The 1940s witnessed a second major burst of GA 
enthusiasm for formal co-operation through peak 
organisations. Faced with a Labor government in Canberra, 
and later with the twin threats of APPU expansion 
and the establishment of a government controlled peak 
organisation of farmers (as foreshadowed in the tenth 
annual report of the Rural Reconstruction Commission) , 
the graziers’ associations through the GFC participated 
actively in the formation (in--1943) and development
I
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1
Statement to the 1922 Annual Conference by the GA 
Secretary (Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 
1922).
2
See annual reports of the GA Secretary and addresses 
by the Presidents to Annual Conferences in issues of 
the N.S.W. Graziers* Annual.
3
See President's address to 1948 Annual Conference 
(Annual Conference records, 1948).
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of the Primary Producers’ Council of Australia, which
in 19^9 became the NFU.  ^ In N.S.W., with a Labor
government also in power, the GA promoted efforts to
form an effective State peak organisation. In 19 +^2
the Agricultural Bureau instigated the establishment
of the New South Wales Council of Primary Producers’
2Organisations. The GA joined, but soon withdrew on
the grounds that it was ’under the aegis of the
3Department of Agriculture’. Soon after the GA 
promoted the Primary Producers’ Consultative Council, 
a loose body without a formal constitution. In 19 +^8, 
in reaction to aggressive organisation in N.S.W. by 
the APPU, the GA and other organisations promoted the
4formation of the Primary Producers’ Council of N.S.W. 
which in i960 became the N.S.W. Chamber of the NFU.
Once a non-Labor government returned to office 
in the Commonwealth parliament, the GA had less need 
of a national peak organisation. However, some time 
passed before its enthusiasm for the NFU showed signs 
of wavering, and in the early 1960s the GA strongly 
supported the formation of the AWIC. In N.S.W. with a 
Labor government still in power, the GA was more 
enthusiastic about unity. On a number of occasions
1
Harman and Smith, p.73*
2
The Graziers’ Annual 1943? p.6l-3«
3
Explanatory notes for 19^8 Annual Conference (Annual 
Conference records, 1948).
4
Ibid., and Muster, 2 February 19^8, pp.9-11*
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throughout the 1950s the GA considered the possibility 
of amalgamation with the FSA and in i960 actually 
made an unsuccessful approach to the FSA to commence 
negotiations towards a merger."*" Nevertheless, during 
the early 1960s an increasing number of prominent 
members within the Association began to voice doubts 
about the value of peak organisations and of working 
towards union with other organisations.
Since 1962 or 1963, despite the general tide of 
opinion among farmers in favour of unity, the GA and 
most of the other graziers’ associations have moved 
towards isolation. In July 1965 the AWGC surprised 
other farm organisations with the announcement that it 
was withdrawing from the NFU at the end of 1965» Its 
President explained:
My council, which is responsible for 
protecting the interests of the 
unprotected wool and meat producers, 
has formed the view that those interests 
are not sufficiently consistent with 
producers of commodities mainly marketed 
within Australia, or which enjoy export 
subsidies....^
But apart from the belief that the interests of graziers 
were different from those of other farmers and that these 
interests were not being properly protected and 
promoted, the A¥GC was dissatisfied with the NFU’s
1
Minutes of General Council, 5-6 August 1959; Annual 
Conference minutes, I960; letter Ick-Hewins to G.G. 
Ashton 18 January 1961 (GA file 98O).
2
The Land, 1 July 1965»
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performance (particularly its slowness in decision­
making), its political style, and its membership 
contribution system based mainly on ability to pay 
rather than on a per capita basis.^  There was also 
fear among the graziers* associations that the 
projected merger of the NFU with the APPU might result 
in deletion of the veto clause in the NFU*s 
constitution. (This clause allowed any member 
organisation to veto discussion of any subject which 
it considered to be a matter of domestic concern).
The GA * s leaders today lean towards isolation, 
though they are not opposed to all forms of unity.
In his presidential address to the 1966 Annual 
Conference, B.A. Wright gave a clear statement of the 
present state of thinking within the GA - and one 
which contrasts with many of the muddled statements 
on unity from other farm organisation leaders. He 
stated:
Unity of primary producers* organisations 
involves the sacrifice of autonomy.... There 
is no unity when organisations accept that 
discipline if it suits them and reject it if 
things are not going their way. We must be 
satisfied therefore that the sacrifice of 
autonomy is justified by practical results.
What is the real object? Many people, seeking 
to answer this question, seize on the catch 
phrase - ’To speak with one voice*. This 
implies, ambiguously, that the object is 
to create a more effective pressure group.
1
Since 1965 the NFU has adopted a per capita 
contribution scheme, at least in principle.
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It is ambiguous because some conjure up the 
picture of massed primary producers miraculously 
reduced to - or is it intimidated into - 
unanimity and all roaring for the same thing.
The more realistic and, in fact, the only 
possible interpretation is that decisions, 
constitutionally resolved, will be accepted 
as binding, so that, on any specific matter, 
the government or other responsible authority 
will be delivered only one message and will 
be relieved of the responsibility of 
reconciling, compromising or choosing between 
conflicting policies. In other words, the 
political risks are to be accepted by the 
organisation - and with them the risks of 
disintegration. It is small wonder that the 
concept of primary producer unity has 
received considerable support in political 
circles.
In my view we should not be concerned with 
the convenience of government or of political 
parties. Our concern is with the convenience 
and efficiency of primary producers in 
organisation. Amalgamation, of groups which 
in social, economic and political philosophy 
are sufficiently homogeneous should not 
create an insuperable problem qnd could 
enable administrative rationalisation and 
the getting-in of financial resources with 
which to improve staff efficiency. But to 
force into a common organisation interests 
which are not ideologically homogeneous must - 
and does - lead to the suppression of ideas, to 
intolerable delays in evolving policy and to 
the emergence of watered-down compromise 
lacking in the vigour of conviction. I fear 
the regimented suppression of opinion far more 
than I do the consequences of government being 
confronted with conflicting policies. ^
Since the controversial reserve price referendum,
opinion among GA leaders towards unity has hardened.
1
Annual Conference records, 1966.
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The GA became disillusioned about the value of the 
AWIC and the campaign reduced the possibility of 
further co-operation and amalgamation with the UFWA, 
at least for the short-term future. But despite this, 
among rank and file members, and even members of the 
General Council, there is considerable enthusiasm for 
the idea of co-operation and amalgamation with other 
farm organisations. Some delegates to the 1966 Annual 
Conference voiced their disappointment at the AWGC ’ s 
withdrawal from the NFU,  ^ and at the 1967 Conference 
a sub-committee was appointed to study the question 
of unity.^ While it is unlikely that pressure from 
the membership will result in a complete and sudden 
change in the thinking of GA leaders, membership 
opinion will probably tend to moderate any further 
swing to isolation. It seems highly unlikely that 
the GA in the near future will withdraw from the 
N.S.W. Chamber of the NFU, or will press for withdrawal 
of the AWGC from the AWIC. It is even less likely 
that the GA will withdraw from the Australian 
Wheatgrowers’ Federation to which it gained admission 
only in 1966 after years of effort and constant 
pressure from its wheatgrower members.
1
Based on the writer’s observation of the Conference 
debates.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1967.
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CHAPTER 8
Form: Primary Political Targets
Form
Of the four dimensions of behaviour in his model, 
’form* is the one that Eckstein describes in greatest 
detail and one of the two that he employs extensively 
in the empirical section of Pressure Group Politics. 
Eckstein defines form as ’the principal channels and 
means through which pressure groups act on government 
and the character of the relations between the groups 
and organs of government'.  ^ For analysis Eckstein 
divides form into two components; channels of influence 
and character of relations. What he thinks of as 
channels of influence is evident in the following 
quotation:
Broadly speaking, pressure groups may try 
to exert political influence through four 
major channels: the electorate, the political
parties, the legislature and the administrative 
departments. That British pressure groups tend 
to concentrate on the last of these channelspis borne out by the BMA.
For our analysis we will employ Eckstein’s general 
concept of form but modify its definition and use 
different components for analysis. We will define
1
Eckstein, p.15.
Ibid., p.73.
2
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form as the means employed by a pressure group to 
communicate demands to centres of official decision­
making and the means employed to exert political 
influence. For our purpose form is essentially a 
process of demand communication. In our analysis we 
will divide form into four components: organs of demand
articulation, political targets, channels of 
communication, and character of relations. The reason 
for using these four components needs explanation.
Eckstein’s two components proved useful for his 
analysis of the BMA. However, in many respects the 
form of the GA’s behaviour is more complex than that 
of the BMA’s. As we have already seen, the GA conveys 
demands to a wide range of decision-makers at three 
different levels of government on a great variety of 
issues. To give an adequate explanation of the form 
of the GA’s behaviour, it is helpful to make a 
distinction between the political targets to which it 
communicates demands, and the actual channels of 
communication employed for this purpose. Thus, for 
our purposes, what Eckstein refers to as channels of 
influence become political targets. The term channels 
of communication we will use to refer to letters, 
formal submissions, deputations, press releases and 
the like.
Our four components for the analysis of the form 
of the GA’s behaviour come from a simple model of the 
process of communication. In essence, the process of 
communication involves a sender, a message, a channel 
and a receiver. The messages or demands communicated
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by the Association have already been analysed. Thus 
we are left with three elements: the organs that send
the Association’s messages or demands, the channels 
used to convey them, and the targets to which they are 
directed. To these three we will add a fourth, 
character of relations, but instead of using Eckstein’s 
definition we will broaden its scope so that it will 
include relations between individual organs of demand 
articulation and all the political targets. The 
relationship between the four components of form can 
be shown as follows:
Character of relations
Organs of demand Political targets
articulation < ----- ---- —------- :--— ---=>Channels of communication
The arrows pointing in both directions indicate that 
communication is a two-way process: the GA communicates
demands to political targets, and the political targets 
send back replies and other messages.
Organs of Demand Articulation
At this point we must explain in greater detail 
what is meant by organs of demand articulation. This 
term refers to those structures used by a pressure 
group to prepare demands for transmission and/or to 
actually transmit them to political targets. Sometimes 
the one structure both prepares and transmits a demand; 
at other times a demand is prepared by one structure 
and transmitted by another. Organs of demand
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articulation include organs within the Association’s 
structure as well as those outside it; the latter are 
those groups with which the GA is formally linked and 
which articulate certain kinds of its demands.
The number and character of a pressure group’s 
organs of demand articulation, and the relative 
importance of each organ are determined primarily by 
a group’s internal characteristics. As already 
indicated, decision-making power within the GA is 
shared by a number of organs and, to some extent, by 
the Association’s secretariat. Many organs within the 
Association’s structure also enjoy a large degree of 
autonomy with regard to specified policy-areas, and 
are permitted to make independent approaches to 
government authorities and to issue statements to the 
press. Consequently, the GA has many separate internal 
organs of demand articulation. These include central 
organs (such as the Executive Committee and General 
Council), local organs (local granches and district 
councils) and the secretariat. The secretariat 
prepares and transmits some demands (mainly on 
administrative matters or in response to complaints 
from individual members) independently of other organs, 
but most of the demands it transmits are on behalf 
of the central organs and, to some extent, of local 
organs.
Other factors as well as group characteristics 
help determine the number and importance of organs of 
demand articulation. For instance, local organs are 
important because of the need to communicate demands
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to shires, municipalities and county councils. The 
development of numerous standing and ad hoc committees 
in recent years is related to the expanded opportunities 
for pressure groups to participate in decision-making, 
and also to the tremendous increase in the volume of 
business transacted between the Association and 
governments. It is also largely because of the kind 
of political setting in which it operates that the GA 
chooses to articulate some of its demands, particularly 
those relating to national issues, through other bodies 
to which it is formally allied.
The main organs of articulation used by the GA 
are set out below:
I . Organs within the GA’s structure
1. Central Organs
(a) President
(b) Executive Committee
(c) General Council
(d) Annual Conference
(e) Standing and ad hoc Committees
2. Local Organs
(a) District Councils
(b) Branches
3. Secretariat
(a) Chief Executive Officer
(b) General Secretary
(c) Public Relations Department
(d) Other staff
II. External Organs
1. The AWGC
2. Bodies to which the AWGC is affiliated:
(a) National Employers’ Policy
Committee
(b) Australian Tariff Council 
(c ) The AWIC
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XI. External Organs (continued)
3. The Australian Wheatgrowers * Federation
4. The NFU (N.S.W. chamber)
5. The Employers’ Federation of N.S.W.
That these different organs should articulate 
different kinds of demands and use different kinds of 
channels of communication to convey demands to 
different targets is not surprising. Neither is it 
surprising that organs should differ in the volume, 
importance and range of the demands they articulate. 
The central organs, for instance, communicate a much 
greater volume and range of demands than local organs. 
The specialist committees are concerned with a very 
limited range of issue-areas and convey demands to a 
limited number of targets. To take one example, the 
Cattle Council is concerned solely with matters 
relating to beef cattle and almost all its dealings 
are with the N.S.W. Department of Agriculture. In 
contrast, the Executive Committee and staff are 
concerned with an extremely wide range of issue-areas, 
and with all the Association’s political targets. 
Nevertheless, within the secretariat senior staff 
members specialise in matters relating to certain 
policy-areas. Demands articulated by external organs 
are those relating to fields of Commonwealth 
responsibility and those which the Association 
considers are better dealt with by united rather than 
individual action.
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Political Targets
Political targets are those structures of official 
decision-making in the political system to which a 
pressure group directs its demands, and they can be 
divided into primary targets and other targets.
Primary targets are the major centres of official 
decision-making that make decisions on matters which 
affect the group. The other category includes both 
secondary and intermediate targets, the first being 
centres of official decision-making that are of minor 
importance to the group, the second structures to 
which demands are conveyed in order to reach or bring 
pressure to bear on the primary targets.
The GA *s primary political targets are 
Commonwealth and N.S.W. governments and statutory 
authorities, and local government bodies. Its 
other targets are the electorate, political parties, 
members of parliament, the judiciary, official 
committees of inquiry and royal commissions, and other 
pressure groups. Political parties, committees and 
royal commissions, and other pressure groups are 
intermediate targets while those remaining, at least 
on occasions, are both intermediate and secondary 
targets. To take one example, the electorate is 
generally viewed by the GA as an intermediate target, 
and by means of regular propaganda and public campaigns 
the Association attempts to influence public opinion 
in order to influence government. But at times the 
electorate is also an independent and autonomous centre 
of official decision-making, and on such occasions,
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when the decisions affect the lives of graziers, the 
Association communicates its demands directly to the 
electorate. On constitutional amendments the 
electorate has autonomous decision-making power, once 
Commonwealth or State parliaments have drawn up a 
proposed amendment to be submitted to electors. 
Consequently, when the N.S.W. Labor Government in 1961 
submitted the question of abolition of the upper house 
to the electorate, the Association appealed directly 
to the electorate to veto the Government’s proposal.
On marketing schemes for primary products, the practice 
has been for the Commonwealth Government to submit 
proposals to producers for determination. Thus, in 
1951 and again in 1965 the GA and other groups vetoed 
proposals to introduce a reserve price wool marketing 
scheme by persuading a majority of woolgrowers to vote 
against the scheme. Intermediate targets are generally 
employed by the GA as complements and alternatives to 
direct communication to primary targets. The GA uses 
regular publicity and propaganda aimed at the 
electorate as a complement to direct communication to 
primary targets. When direct communication fails, 
the Association often appeals to electors as an 
alternative means of communicating its demands to 
primary targets and influencing them.
A pressure group’s political targets are 
determined by the political setting, political culture, 
and the internal characteristics. Briefly, the 
political setting provides the range of potential 
targets, political culture determines which of these 
can legitimately be used and how they can be used,
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and the group’s internal characteristics influence 
its decisions about which targets it will use. The 
political setting is probably the most important 
factor. To be effective in politics, it will be 
remembered, a group must adjust itself to the formal 
structure of government and to the location of 
effective power within official institutions. Since 
government structure divides the functions of 
government between three levels of government and 
since decisions taken at each level affect the lives 
of graziers, the GA must communicate demands to targets 
at each level of government. Because effective power 
at both State and Commonwealth levels has become 
concentrated in the executive and bureaucracy, and in 
statutory authorities, parliament is now a target of 
only secondary importance. The actual structure of 
the primary targets determines the number and kinds 
of levels at which the GA can gain access. As Table l4 
shows, access to ministerial departments and commodity 
boards at both Commonwealth and State levels, and to 
local government authorities is available at three 
distinct levels. However, groups can communicate 
demands to the Tariff Board and arbitration tribunals 
at one level only, and generally such communications 
must take the form of presentation of evidence at 
formal hearings.
Since the Association became actively involved 
in politics, there has been a marked expansion in 
the number of primary political targets to which it 
communicates demands. This has resulted from a 
number of factors including expansion in the scope of
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government activity and in the number of government 
departments, statutory authorities and local 
government bodies; increased dependance of all producers 
on governments; and broadening of the Association’s 
goals. An indication of the extent of the expansion 
since the mid-1920s in the number of ministerial 
departments and statutory authorities to which the GA 
communicates demands is given in Table 15- This table 
lists only those departments and authorities to which 
explicit reference was made in the minutes of the G A ’s 
Annual Conferences for 1926 and 1927, and for 1965 and 
1966, and in the Association’s annual reports for 
those years. The two most striking features in this 
table are the increase in the number of Commonwealth 
departments, and the increase in the number of 
statutory authorities. Table 15 does not refer to 
local government where the increase in the range of 
targets has been less marked. The expansion of 
targets at local government level has resulted mainly 
from the creation of new local government authorities 
(mainly county councils) and from the assumption of 
new functions (such as the reticulation of electricity) 
by local government authorities.
Character of Relations and Channels of Communication
Relations between the Association’s different 
organs of demand articulation and political targets 
show great variations. Similarly, different organs 
use different channels to communicate demands. The 
easiest means of analysing character of relations and 
channels of communication is to do so in relation to
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Table 15
Political Targets: Ministerial
Departments and Statutory Authorities
(Source: N.S.W. Graziers1 Annual, 1926, 1927; Report
of Proceedings, 1965, 1966; Annual Conference
minutes, 1926, 1927, 1965, 1966).
1926-7 1965-6
Commonwealth Departments
Treasury (including Taxation Treasury (including
Branch) Taxation Branch, and
Bureau of Census and 
Statistics )
Postmaster-General1s Postmast er-General’s
Trade and Industry 
Labour and National 
Service
Primary Industry 
(including the Bureau 
of Agricultural 
Economics)
Interior (including 
the Bureau of 
Meteorology)
Health
National Development 
Civil Aviation 
Army
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities
Commonwealth Arbitration Court Commonwealth
Industrial Court 
Conciliation and 
Arbitration 
Commission 
Tariff Board 
Australian Wool Board 
Australian Meat Board
Table 15 (continued)
Political Targets: Ministerial
Departments and Statutory Authorities
(Source: N.S.W. Graziers1 Annual, 1926, 1927; Report
of Proceedings, 1965» 1966; Annual Conference
minutes, 1926, 1927, 1965, 1966),
1926-7 1965-6
Commonwealth. Statutory Authorities
Australian Wheat Board 
Australian Meat 
Research Committee 
Australian Agricultural 
Council 
Australian 
Broadcasting 
Commission 
Aus tralian 
Broadcasting Control 
Board
Commonwealth 
Scientific and 
Industrial Research 
Organisation 
Snowy Mountains Hydro- 
Electric Authority 
Australian National 
University
N.S.W. Departments
Treasury
Labour and Industry
Agriculture
Railways
Lands
Local Government 
Chief Secretary’s 
Police
Treasury
Labour and Industry
Agriculture
Railways
Lands
Local Government 
Chief Secretary’s 
Police
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Table 15 (continued)
Political Targets: Ministerial
Departments and Statutory Authorities
(Source: N.S.W. Graziers* Annual, 1926, 1927; Report
of Proceedings, 1965» 1966; Annual Conference
minutes, 1926, 1 9 2 7, 1965, 1966).
1926-7 1965-6
N.S.W. Departments
Mines Mines
Health 
Main Roads 
Motor Transport 
Education and Science 
Technical Education 
Decentralisation and 
Development 
Cons ervation 
Valuer General’s 
Premier's 
Public Works 
Housing 
Jus tice
N.S.W. Statutory Authorities
State Conciliation Commission Industrial Commission
Main Roads Board Grain Elevators Board
Maritime Service Board 
Water Conservation 
and Irrigation 
Commission 
Prickly Pear 
Destruction Committee 
University of New 
England
University of New 
South Wales
1
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specific targets. Thus, for the remainder of this 
chapter we will be concerned with primary targets, 
while in the following chapter our concern will be 
secondary and intermediate targets. Before turning 
to this detailed analysis however, three general points 
should be made.
First, according to one strand in Australian 
political folklore, pressure groups channel their 
demands largely through members of parliament who are 
contacted by lobbyists in the corridors of the 
parliamentary buildings, and who are influenced through 
lavish entertainment (’wining and dining’), sometimes 
by bribery, and occasionally by threats of action to 
jeopardise their chance of re-election. These notions 
are without foundation in the case of the GA (and I 
suspect for most, if not all, of the leading economic 
pressure groups). The GA relies primarily on direct 
communication to governments rather than on influencing 
members of parliament. There is no evidence that it 
has ever used bribery, and threats of campaigning to 
jeopardise the return of governments or individual 
members of parliament are rarely made. Moreover, the 
Association entertain politicians and public servants 
infrequently. In fact, it is probably true that 
Ministers entertain the Association's leaders more 
often than the latter entertain Ministers."*"
1
According to various leaders of farm organisations, 
Ministers often entertain members of deputations or 
groups participating in discussions in their rooms or 
elsewhere.
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Second, the character of the relations between 
the GA and governments largely determines the extent 
to which the GA relies on intermediate targets from 
time to time as a means of communicating with its 
primary targets. Because of its political orientation, 
the GA finds direct communication with Labor governments 
more difficult, and Labor governments are more inclined 
to take action likely to provoke the GA ' s use of veto 
power. Consequently, the Association tends to rely 
more on communication with intermediate targets when 
Labor governments are in office.
Third, at any one point of time the GA is usually 
communicating demands on a wide range of issue-areas 
to numerous political targets. Consequently, relations 
between different organs and different targets can 
vary tremendously at the one time - from extremely close 
and friendly relations, to open hostility. Similarly, 
at any one point of time, the Association usually 
employs a variety of channels of communication. 
Frequently it uses a number of channels concurrently 
to communicate with different targets about the same 
issue. In 1962, for example, following the Labor 
Premier's announcement that the N.S.W. Arbitration Act 
would be amended to make it obligatory for industrial 
tribunals to grant upon application a forty hour week 
to workers under N.S.W. rural awards, the GA took a 
deputation to the Premier and at the same time launched 
a press and radio publicity campaign."*' Even on
1
Report of Proceedings 1962, p.4.
270
largely non-controversial issues, the Association often 
uses publicity to complement direct approaches.
Relations and Channels: Primary Targets
For analysis we will divide primary targets into 
four categories:
1. The N.S.W. Government;
2. The Commonwealth Government;
3. Arbitration tribunals and the Tariff Board; and
4. Local government authorities.
N.S.W. and Commonwealth Governments refer to Ministers 
and public servants in government departments, and to 
statutory authorities except those in category 3»
N.S.W. Government
In this section we will confine our analysis to 
communications by internal organs only.
Relations between the GA and Labor ministries are 
seldom friendly and close, and never intimate. Labor 
governments have often treated larger graziers harshly, 
and have frequently ignored demands made by the GA. On 
occasions Labor Ministers have refused outright 
requests made by deputations from the GA. One notable 
occasion was in January 1926 when a deputation waited 
on J.T. Lang, the Premier at the time, requesting that 
the Government change its mind about abolishing the 
Legislative Council. Lang not only refused the request 
point-blank, but told his audience that he would do
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everything in his power to see the Council abolished.
At times, on specific issues related to declared Labor 
policy, Labor Ministers have refused even to meet 
deputations from the GA.
The poor rapport that has often existed between
the GA and Labor governments has by no means been solely
the fault of Labor governments. The Association is
always highly suspicious of Labor administrations and
expects little sympathy. In more recent years the
Association has often not bothered to take deputations
to Labor Ministers on matters arising from Labor
governments' stated objectives or those of the ALP.
Activists as well as leaders in the Association are
well aware of the situation. 'It is well known that
2we didn't cut much ice up there’, one delegate told 
the 1966 Annual Conference, when referring to the 
various government departments during the long period 
of Labor rule which ended in 1965. The GA has never 
shown any reluctance to criticise Labor governments. It 
has often campaigned against the Labor Party, and its 
close relations with the Country Party are no secret.
In contrast, relations with non-Labor Ministers 
are usually extremely friendly and close. As far as 
possible non-Labor governments have tried to meet the 
Association's major demands, or at least to make
1
'Statement showing the manner in which Resolutions 
of the Ninth Annual Conference have been dealt with', 
Annual Conference records, 1926.
2
From the writer's observation of the Conference.
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significant concessions. Shortly after coming to
power, the Askin Government, for example, lifted
closer settlement proclamations over 22 m. acres of
private land in response to demands from the GA.
With non-Labor Ministers GA members feel that they
share the same outlook and values - as one member put
2it, ’we operate on the same wave-length’. At times 
the Association has been disappointed and even 
dissatisfied with the performance of non-Labor 
governments; but even then, it has been unwilling to 
embarrass the Government to the extent of giving the 
Labor Party any real electoral advantage. In 1928, 
when non-Labor governments were in -power in both 
Commonwealth and State parliaments, the GA President 
explained to the Annual Conference:
1
See Annual Conference minutes, 1966; and Muster,
13 April 1966. These proclamations, mostly imposed 
by Labor governments, stopped legal transfer of land 
without the consent of the Minister for Lands. Some 
proclamations dated back to 1908. The GA argued that 
the Government should retain proclamations only over 
land that was immediately needed for closer settlement 
projects. The Askin Government followed this plan, 
releasing 22 m. acres and retaining proclamations over 
250,000 acres, enough for its closer settlement 
programme for two years. The Government also announced 
that its policy would be to resume land for closer 
settlement only from large landowners, particularly 
overseas companies, who were not making ’the maximum 
economic use of their land’.
2
Interview with the writer.
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X do not wish to convey the idea that 
we are perfectly satisfied with the 
Federal Government or that either the 
Federal Government or State Government 
should not be criticised by u s . The 
perfect Government has not yet arrived, 
and probably none of us will ever see i t .
But our criticism should be constructive, 
and we should constantly keep in mind 
what a return to power of the Labour Party^ 
as it is controlled to-day, would mean....
Despite their inclination to give preference to
the GA, non-Labor governments have been limited by
financial considerations, and by the need to win wide
electoral support and consent from other interests in
the amount of preference they have been able to give.
Despite vocal protests from the GA, the Askin
Government in its first term of office refused to
abolish the system of land taxation established by
Labor in the 1950s since its budget depended on this
2source of income. In 1928 the Bavin-Buttenshaw
Government refused a request from the Association to
repeal Labor legislation, establishing an adult
3franchise for local government elections.
1
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual.1928, p.15.
2
These protests included strongly worded resolutions 
passed at Conferences, press publicity and even public 
protest meetings arranged by local branches.
3
Minutes of General Council, 6 June 1928. Local 
branches also made independent approaches on this 
matter. For an account of the action of one branch, 
see G.S. Harman, ’Politics at the Electoral Level - 
A Study in Armidale and New England, 1899 to 1929*> 
M.A. honours thesis, University of New England, 1964,
(continued on p.274)
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Labor governments have been similarly limited in 
the amount of preference they have been able to give 
to their supporting interests, and on non-party political 
matters have often agreed to demands from the GA and 
other farm organisations in the hope of winning electoral 
support in country districts. The fact that the Labor 
Party in N.S.W. has been able to win a share of the 
country seats has therefore worked to the Association’s 
advantage. And apart from financial considerations 
and the need to broaden their base of electoral support, 
Labor governments have often granted concessions to the 
GA on non-controversial matters because of the assumed 
importance of the role of graziers in the economy/
Access to public servants in government departments 
is easy for recognised economic pressure groups, 
irrespective of governments. Relations- between the 
Association and public servants differ little whether 
under non-Labor governments or Labor governments, with 
the exception that under Labor administrations officers 
concerned with party-political issues are somewhat 
reluctant to maintain really close relations with the 
Association.
1 (continued from p.273)
p .666. The Government refused the GA’s request for two 
reasons: Bavin believed in an adult franchise and had
crossed the floor to vote for it, and it was considered 
that to withdraw a right already enjoyed by electors 
could result in a strong reaction from government 
supporters and potential supporters.
1
The cattle compensation scheme (see chapter 13) 
is a good example.
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The actual character of the GA’s relations with 
public servants shows significant variations between 
departments On the one hand, officers in some 
departments are extremely friendly towards the 
Association and have an intimate knowledge of its 
activities and policies. On the other hand, officers 
in other departments with which the GA deals know little 
about the Association and have no special feelings of 
friendship towards it. The character of the relations 
between the GA and any department depends on a number 
of variables which include: frequency and type of
contact; the types of demands the Association makes 
(i.e. the issue-areas involved, the degree and kind of 
change it seeks, and whether its demands seek to 
initiate change or to veto proposals from other groups 
or from within the department); the extent to which 
officers in the department feel dependent on the 
Association for information, advice, consent, and 
administrative help; and the ability of the Association 
to make things difficult for the department should it 
choose to do so. By far the closest and friendliest 
relations are with officers in the Department of 
Agriculture with whom the Association constantly 
transacts a large amount of business. Most of the GA1s 
demands relate to administrative changes on non- 
controversial issues, and seek to initiate changes 
rather than to veto proposals of the Department or of
1
This section is based mainly on interviews with the 
Association’s staff and leaders, and with public 
servants in a number of government departments.
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other groups. Officers of the Department depend to a 
high degree on the GA’s information, advice, consent 
and help in administering policies. As the case-study 
on cattle compensation indicates, the Association acts 
as a sieve for grievances, and so saves departmental 
officers a great deal of time and bother. Individual 
organs within the GA ’ s structure and individual members 
of the Association’s senior staff maintain particularly 
close, personal relations with individual officers in 
certain divisions of the Department of Agriculture. To 
give one example, members of the Cattle Council have 
close relations with the Chief of the Division of 
Animal Industry and his officers with regard to disease 
control among beef cattle, livestock and pest research, 
and operation of the cattle compensation scheme. Soon 
after his retirement, one former Director-General of 
the Department, in a discussion with the writer, 
indicated that he had an excellent knowledge of the GA 
and its activities, and was personally acquainted with 
its senior staff members and many of its leaders. At 
the other end of the scale are those departments that 
do not regard the GA as being among its regular 
clientele and with which the GA has irregular contact. 
This category includes the Departments of Education, 
Technical Education, Justice and Housing.
Different channels of communication are used by 
the Association according to the kinds of demands being 
communicated and the particular target. Channels of 
communication can be conveniently divided into written 
and personal communications. Written communications 
take three main forms: letters, telegrams and
submissions.
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Each week dozens of letters go out from the 
Association’s secretariat to Ministers and departments 
communicating the decisions of the Association's 
central organs, requesting information or changes in 
policy, or conveying complaints from members. Letters 
sent by the secretariat are couched in clear, precise 
pubfic service language, and in format and tone are 
similar to the letters that come back from Ministers 
and departments. Sometimes delegates to the 
Association’s Annual Conference complain that the staff 
rely too much on letters. ’The personal touch’, one 
delegate in 1937 stated, 'carries more weight than a 
letter'."*- The staff appreciate the value of personal 
contacts, but the volume of the Association’s demand 
output makes it impossible for all demands to be 
communicated personally. In addition, some demands 
are best conveyed by letter.
Trunk-line telephone calls have largely replaced
the use of telegrams. Telegrams however, are still
used to convey formal statements on matters of urgency,
and in crises as a means of protest. In the crisis over
the wool sales deduction acts, as the case-study 
2indicates, the Association encouraged local branches 
to send telegrams of protest to the Federal Treasurer 
and to local members of parliament.
Submissions are usually prepared by the staff at 
the direction and often with the help of the Association’s
1
Verbatim report of debates, Annual Conference records,
1937.2
See chapter 11.
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central organs. Because of the expertise of its senior
staff members and the facilities available in its
secretariat (particularly those provided by the library),
the GA is able to prepare submissions which are often
superior to those of other farm organisations; some
have run to thirty or forty pages of typescript."*- They
usually include a great amount of evidence quarried
from government publications, periodicals, and the
Association’s records, as well as data supplied by
2local branches. In their style and format, the GA’s 
submissions resemble submissions prepared by 
departments for Cabinet. They are divided into sections 
and sub-sections, a summary of the submission is 
provided at the beginning of the document, and the 
source of all important data used is clearly stated.
The Association’s submissions are based on rational 
and logical argument; they argue their case on the 
basis of statistical evidence, precedents, anomalies, 
practice in other States or overseas, or administrative 
convenience and efficiency.
Personal communications take various forms. The 
least formal, but by no means unimportant, are the
1
For example, the Association’s submission in September 
1965 to the Minister for Agriculture on Bovine 
Tuberculosis control and eradication in N.S.W. ran to 
thirty-five pages. The text was divided into twelve 
chapters and was accompanied by a summary and 
statistical appendices. The submission was bound in an 
attractive folder for presentation to the Minister.
2
One common problem for the staff is to get local 
branches to take the trouble to collect and forward 
data for specific submissions.
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communications that take place through informal social 
contacts. Senior staff members of the Association 
frequently meet their opposite numbers in government 
departments at social functions arranged by farm 
organisations, departments and statutory authorities, 
at meetings of professional associations such as the 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society, at animal 
health and farm machinery field-days, and through 
membership of the same exclusive clubs in Sydney.'*’ 
Leaders of the Association too, frequently meet 
socially with permanent heads and other senior public 
servants. In recent years the Association has invited 
the Prime Minister, the Premier, or another senior 
Commonwealth or State Minister to open the Annual 
Conference. After the opening ceremony, the President 
and members of the Executive Committee as a rule 
entertain the visitor to lunch in one of the exclusive 
clubs. Commonwealth and State Ministers and senior 
public servants are also invited to the Association’s 
annual dinner held during the Annual Conference. While 
some business is transacted through these social 
contacts, they are more important in establishing close 
and friendly relations, and in building up confidence 
and trust.
The most frequent form of personal communication 
is the daily informal contact between the Association’s
1
e.g. the University, Union or Australian clubs. This 
section is based on interviews with staff members of 
the GA and other farm organisations, and on interviews 
with public servants.
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staff and public servants, The Association's staff 
are in constant contact by telephone and personal 
visits with their opposite numbers in the Department 
of Agriculture, and to a lesser extent in the 
Departments of Lands, Conservation, Railways, and Labour 
and Industry. Relationships between staff and public 
servants are very friendly, often on a first-name 
basis. Generally these communications relate to routine 
matters of administration, to complaints from GA members 
and to minor non-controversial policy decisions. At 
times however, questions of high policy are discussed, 
but such discussions usually are strictly ’off-the- 
record’. Some informal contact also takes place 
between the President of the GA, or members of the 
Executive committee or standing committees, and public 
servants. Members of the Cattle Council, for example, 
often have informal discussions with officers of the 
Division of Animal Industry in the Department of 
Agriculture.
Formal personal communications take three main 
forms. First, at intervals the Association conveys 
demands relating to major questions of policy to 
Ministers by formal deputations. Formal deputations 
are usually arranged some days in advance by the 
Association’s secretariat, normally to coincide with 
meetings of the Executive Committee or other organs. 
Deputations generally consist of three to six members 
and, on legal or technical matters, are usually 
accompanied by a senior member of the staff. Except 
on party political matters, Ministers usually have the 
permanent head of the department and/or other senior
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officers present. Apart from party political 
considerations, the success of a formal deputation 
depends on prior preparation. Usually the case to be 
presented is carefully prepared by leaders and staff 
who believe that, as Ick-Hewins puts it, unless they
1’do their homework’ they have little chance of success. 
Often the permanent head or heads of sections are 
consulted in advance about what changes are feasible 
and practicable, and about what alternatives the 
Department might be prepared to accept. Usually a 
written submission is presented to the Minister by 
the deputation, or forwarded soon after.
Second, the Association’s views are communicated 
to senior Ministers who are invited to opfen the 
Association’s Annual Conference, and to Ministers and 
public servants who accept invitations to address any 
of the Association's central organs. The usual practice 
in both cases is for a period of questions to follow 
an address; through questions Ministers and public 
servants are usually made well aware of the Association's 
views and complaint.
Third, Ministers and senior bureaucrats often
solicit the Association's views on proposed policy or
2administrative changes or on certain problems, and 
frequently invite leaders and staff to participate in
1
Interview with the writer.
2
For example, in 1961 the Association was asked by 
the N.S.W. Labor Government to comment on a proposed 
companies bill. See Report of Proceedings 1961, p.75*
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discussions. Eckstein makes a distinction between 
consultations and negotiations. Consultations take 
place, he states, when the views of organisations ’are 
solicited and taken into account but not considered 
to be in any sense decisive’;^  negotiations occur when 
a ’governmental body makes a decision hinge upon the 
actual approval of organizations interested in it,
2giving the organizations a veto over the decision'. 
However, in the case of the GA something between 
consultation and negotiation is more common than either. 
Moreover, it is not the Government alone which can 
decide whether it will consult, or negotiate, or 
something between. Instead, the relationship depends 
on many factors in the power and psychological 
situations. Often in discussions both the leaders of 
the Association on the one hand, and Ministers and 
public servants on the other, are prepared to bargain 
and compromise, and consequently the final outcome is 
frequently other than the initial position of either 
party. Ministers and public servants, no less than 
leaders and staff of the Association, are limited in 
their powers and scope for manoeuvre. The former need 
to consult Cabinet and other departments to gain 
approval for major changes in policy, and they must 
work within the limits of declared government policy 
and often within an established departmental view. 
Leaders and staff of the GA have to work within the 
limits of the Association’s ideological outlook and
1
Eckstein, p.23.
2
Ibid.
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declared policies. Although the Association delegates 
considerable powers to its President and Executive 
Committee, because of its strong tradition of democracy, 
leaders are generally unwilling to accept responsibility 
for giving consent to policies which are not in line 
with the Association’s policy or on which the Association 
has no declared policy. But while both sides are 
limited in their powers and in their scope for manoeuvre, 
most negotiations and discussions take place with the 
knowledge that in the last analysis the Government’s 
will can prevail.
Lastly, the Association is able to communicate 
demands through its representatives on statutory boards 
and advisory committees. Representation on such formal 
institutions of government is highly prized by all 
pressure groups. Like other groups the GA spends 
considerable energy in trying to persuade governments 
to provide greater scope for the representation of farm 
interests on boards and committees, and to secure 
appointment of its members to such bodies. At State 
level the GA is well represented on a wide variety of 
bodies. In 1967 these included the Rural Workers’ 
Accommodation Advisory Committee, the Pastoral Employees 
Conciliation Committee, the State Development Corporation, 
the Bushfires Committee, the Fauna Protection Panel, 
the Road Safety Council of N.S.W., the Advisory 
Committee on Safety in Rural Industries, the Rural 
Youth Council, and the North Coast Cattle and Beef 
Research Liaison Committee."*" However, to date the
1
Compiled from various publications and records of the 
Association.
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Association has failed to secure representation on the 
Grain Elevators Board which, unlike many other boards 
and committees, is elected directly by growers.
Following the Board’s reconstitution in 1967? the GA ran 
candidates in three out of the four electorates but 
all four seats were won by candidates sponsored by 
the UFWA.  ^ Perhaps the most valuable form of direct 
representation the GA has at State level is its 
representation, through its Chief Executive Officer, 
on the Rural Workers’ Accommodation Advisory Committee. 
This Committee consists of three members: a departmental
officer, a representative of employers (ick-Hewins), 
and a representative of employees (an AWU nominee). 
Through this Committee, many potential matters of 
conflict and controversy between the GA and the AWU 
are successfully resolved by negotiation and discussion. 
All applications by employers for exemptions or partial 
exemptions from provisions of the Rural Workers’
2Accommodation Act are referred to the Committee.
Relations with statutory authorities and the 
channels of communications used to convey demands to 
such bodies generally follow the same lines as with 
Ministers and departments, except that relations with 
autonomous statutory authorities vary little with changes 
in government.
1
Report of Proceedings 1967» PP»73-^»
2
See various editions of the Reports_of Proceedings
and the Rural Workers’ Accommodation Act 1951*
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Commonwealth Government
The character of the relations between the 
Association (and the AWGC) and Commonwealth Ministers, 
departments and authorities follows in many respects 
the same pattern as that at State level. With non- 
Labor governments relations have generally been close 
and friendly, while relations with Labor governments 
have often been strained and even antagonistic.
Rapport with the last Labor government to hold office, 
the Chifley Government (19^6-9) was particularly poor.^ 
Relations also vary with departments, the closest 
relations being with the Departments of Primary 
Industry, and Trade and Industry.
Similarly in communicating demands the GA and the
AWGC use both written and personal channels of
communication. The AWGC prepares many detailed
submissions, particularly on economic matters. Both
directly and through the AWGC the Association is
represented on a wide range of commodity boards and
2advisory committees. Members of the GA and its 
federal bodies have also on occasions been appointed 
as members or advisers to Australian delegations to
1
The GA not only reacted strongly to the Chifley 
Government's attempts at nationalisation, but through 
the GFC clashed with the Government on many issues 
including soldier settlement schemes and the de-control 
of hides and skins.
2
The two most important boards on which the GA is 
represented through the AWGC are the Australian Meat 
Board and the Australian Wool Board.
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international trade conferences. However, since the
second world war the graziers’ associations have had to
share representation on the wool and meat boards with
the wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations. Despite
repeated attempts, the GA has still not gained
2representation on the Australian Wheat Board, though
in 1967 it secured representation on the N.S.W. Wheat
3Industry Research Committee. As at State level, the 
GA and its federal bodies have regularly pressed for 
wider representation of graziers on all statutory 
authorities and committees which are concerned with
4matters related to their interests.
1
For example, Sir Frederick Tout attended the Ottawa 
talks in 1932 as a consultant; P.B. Newcomen, as 
President of the GFC, in 19^ +7 was attached as non­
official adviser to the Australian delegation to the 
International Trade Conference in Geneva; and C.M. 
Williams was a member of the Australian delegation of 
the International Trade Conference at Geneva in 195^ + 
to discuss the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,
2
Like the Grain Elevators Board of N.S.W., the 
Australian Wheat Board is elected directly by 
wheatgrowers. In 1965 the GA ran two candidates but 
the two seats being contested were, won by the UFWA. 
(Report of Proceedings 1965» p.29).
3
Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1967. Despite its 
name, this committee is appointed by the Commonwealth 
Minister for Primary Industry under provisions of the 
Wheat Research Act, 1957*
4
For example, the graziers' associations have at various 
times pressed for their nominees to be appointed to the 
Tariff Board and the boards of the various government 
banks.
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At the same time, there are some important
differences between the two levels of government with
respect to character of relations and channels of
influence. The most obvious differences arise from
federalism. We have already seen that in theory the
GA ’ s demands to the Commonwealth Government are
communicated through the AWGC and other national
organisations. In practice the Association handles
most administrative matters (including complaints from
individual members)'*' itself, and frequently writes to
Commonwealth departments to support demands made by
the AWGC. In addition, in cases of urgency it
sometimes makes its own approaches to the Commonwealth
or boards on questions of policy. One such case was
in 1966 when the Association's Mutton and Lamb
Committee considered that a lamb promotion campaign
was necessary to overcome a seasonal glut of lamb.
The AWGC was not scheduled to meet for some weeks, so
the Association conveyed its request directly to the
Meat Board. However, it specifically requested a
promotion campaign in N.S.W. alone, thus technically
2making the request a matter of State concern.
The AWGC*s relations with Commonwealth Ministers 
and bureaucrats are somewhat different from those 
between the GA, and State Ministers and bureaucrats,
1
These mainly involve taxation, postal services, civil 
aviation, and radio and television services.
2
Statement by the GA General Secretary to the New 
England District Council, 2 November 1966.
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and the AWGC relies on slightly different channels of 
communication. Since the AWGC does not handle 
complaints from individual graziers or act as an 
ombudsman on their behalf, and since it has no office 
in Canberra, its staff have much less frequent contact 
with officers in Commonwealth departments than the 
staff of the GA have with their counterparts in N.S.W. 
departments. Consequently, informal and semi-formal 
personal communication between staff and bureaucrats 
is much less important. There is also less frequent 
contact between leaders of the AWGC and public servants 
than there is at State level. In recent years the 
usual practice has been for the President and the two 
senior staff members of the AWGC to go to Canberra at 
irregular intervals for up to a week at a time in 
order to transact business with Ministers and 
bureaucrats,^ Apart from lack of frequent contact, 
relations between the AWGC and Commonwealth public 
servants are less intimate because of a suspicion among 
graziers, dating back to the 19^0s, that the 
Commonwealth public service has a distinct liking for 
government intervention and economic planning - 
’bureaucracy of the worst kind’ - and that Commonwealth 
departments are inhabited by academic economists, many 
of whom are to the ’Left' in politics. At the 195^+ 
Annual Conference, C.M. Williams, then the immediate 
Past-President of the Association, warned delegates of
1
This section is based on an interview with the 
President of the AWGC on 15 November 1966.
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’the long-haired socialists we have in the various 
Departments in Canberra’.'*' It is partly because of 
this suspicion of the political outlook of senior 
Commonwealth public servants that some of the graziers’ 
associations have opposed attempts by the GA to have 
an AWGC office established in Canberra. They reason 
that with an office in Canberra there is the danger 
that AWGC staff members might become too friendly 
with public servants, and so be influenced by them.
Consultations and negotiations appear to be more
important at the national level than at State level.
Since 1962 the AWGC has participated with other
leading economic pressure groups in the regular
series of discussions, usually in February and June 
2each year, with senior Ministers on the state of
3the economy. Proposed changes in policy for wool 
and meat as a rule are discussed by the Commonwealth 
with the AWGC before a decision is announced, and the 
AWGC usually has opportunity for some degree of 
negotiation. But in negotiations, the Commonwealth,
1
Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 195^*
2
In 1968 no talks were held in February because of 
the change in Prime Ministers.
3
The AWGC is usually represented at these discussions 
by its President. In 1965-6 the practice was for the 
representatives of the four farm organisations (the 
AWGC, the AWMPF, the NFU and the APPU) to have a full 
morning with Ministers. The discussions were usually 
informal, though the farm organisations brought with 
them formal submissions. After the discussions, the 
Prime Minister usually entertained the farm 
representatives to drinks.
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even more than the N.S.W. Government, always holds the 
upper hand and, in the case of wool and meat matters, 
it can exploit the differences between the AWGC and 
the two rival organisations for its own ends.
While the GA strongly supports the principle that 
commodity federations should be consulted prior to any 
changes in policy that affect their interests, it 
objects to the secrecy that surrounds most consultations 
and negotiations between the Commonwealth and the 
commodity federations. In 1950 and 1951 the GA 
protested against the secrecy with which the negotiations 
for a reserve price wool marketing scheme were carried 
o n /  As a protest and in order to inform members of 
the nature of the proposals being discussed, in March 
1951 it published in its newspaper a detailed statement 
of the main features of the plan being considered/
Almost immediately the Chairman of the AWC received a 
telegram from the Department of Commerce and 
Agriculture demanding an explanation and, according to 
the President of the G A , the Department took
3action tantamount to severing relations with the AWC. 
Concerning this incident, the President told the 1951 
Annual Conference in April:
1
See Minutes of General Council, 5-6 July 1950 and 
18-19 July 19515 and minutes of Annual Conference, 1951* 
2
Muster, 1 March 1951> pp.427-42.
3
Address to Annual Conference (Annual Conference 
records, 1951)•
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„..what the governmentalist requires 
of primary producers’ organisation is 
that it shall preferably be one and 
indivisible; and that its leaders shall 
negotiate on its behalf with full powers 
to commit their organisation, while the 
individual members are kept entirely 
ignorant of what is taking place. To 
inform members even in a publication 
that has the status of little more than 
a private circular is, in the eyes of 
the governmentalist, an offence.^
A more recent example was over the New Zealand-Australia
Free Trade Agreement which came into force on 1 January
1966. The Commonwealth consulted, among others, leaders
of the commodity federations concerned with meat
matters but restrained them from discussing the
matters raised with their member organisations. At
the Association’s 1966 Annual Conference delegates
expressed annoyance that the GA had not been consulted,
particularly about the question of the removal of
import duties on New Zealand lamb, and resolved to
protest to the Ministers of Trade and Industry, and
Primary Industry about the limited nature and secrecy
2of the prior consultations. On 27 September 1966, 
McEwen replied:
In respect of lamb, the Government held 
extensive consultations with industry 
representatives and demonstrated the 
importance which it attaches to an 
effective and continuing exchange of
1
Ibid.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1966.
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views between the industry and the 
Government in advance of international 
trade negotiations. There is hardly 
need for me to stress, however, the 
need for such consultations to be 
held on a confidential basis as 
publicity could seriously impair 
Australia's tactical position in trade 
negotiations.^
Secrecy in negotiations with farm organisations 
is obviously necessary on policy proposals involving 
inter-government trade negotiations, but on others 
there seems to be no good reason why discussions 
should be confidential and why information should be 
unavailable to the public until the policy has been 
crystallised and the decision announced to parliament. 
The GA generally holds a similar view to that of 
Professor Campbell, believing that public discussion of 
policy proposals is in the interest of affected groups 
as much as the general public. Yet there appears to 
be little likelihood of any immediate change since the 
Commonwealth Government and its public service show a 
marked tendency to what Sawer has referred to as 
'government by secrecy’
Arbitration Tribunals and the Tariff Board
Because of their structure and functions these 
autonomous statutory bodies can only have formal
1
'Report of Proceedings 1st July to 9th November, 1966’, 
document prepared for General Council, November 1966,
p . 20.
2
Geoffrey Sawer, 'Between the Lines', The Canberra 
Times, 5 July 1967.
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relations with pressure groups, and the channels of 
communication are limited to submission of evidence 
at formal hearings.
While wages and working conditions for employees 
in N.S.W. are determined by both Commonwealth and 
State arbitration tribunals, the GA is predominantly 
concerned with decisions handed down by the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.'*' In particular,
1
The first award for the pastoral industry was handed 
down by the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1908.
In the 1920s the N.S.W. Industrial Commission also 
made awards for pastoral employees. This caused 
confusion and, when the awards differed, was a source 
of dispute. In 1929 a non-Labor government took away 
from the N.S.W. Industrial Tribunal the power to make 
awards for rural industries. This power was restored 
in I9 5I by a Labor Government and the State Industrial 
Commission made a State pastoral award in 195^* 
Differing State and Commonwealth awards in 1956 
contributed to the conditions which produced a major 
shearing strike in that year. Employees of members 
of the GA are now generally covered by Commonwealth 
awards. In 1956 the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
was replaced by the Commonwealth Industrial Court 
(which deals with judicial matters associated with 
industrial arbitration) and the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (which handles 
the functions of conciliation and arbitration). In 
many respects the Industrial Court is better considered 
with the judiciary rather than as a primary target.
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it is concerned with the Federal Pastoral Industry Award 
(which since 1917 has prescribed conditions of employment 
and rates of pay for station hands as well as shearers)/ 
the Federal Woolclassers and Shearing Staff Employees 
Award, and with what have come to be known as the 
national wage cases.
For many years the GA Secretary appeared on behalf
of the Association and the other graziers’ associations
2in hearings on the Federal Pastoral Award, but in
recent years all arbitration work with respect to
Commonwealth tribunals has been handled by the AWGC.
The AWGC has two qualified industrial officers who
devote their time fully to arbitration matters. In
addition, as already indicated, the AWGC is a member
of the National Employers’ Associations and its two
committees, the National Employers' Policy Committee
3and the National Employers’ Industrial Committee.
The National Employers’ Associations, established in 
the late 1950s as an organisation to promote the 
interests of employers in the formulation of national 
wage policy, had approximately forty member organisations 
in 1967. The Policy Committee consists of one 
representative from each of the following four 
organisations: the Australian Council of Employers'
1
See 'History of Industrial Arbitration in Relation to 
Pastoral Awards in N.S.W., The Graziers' Annual 193Q > 
p.100; and recent issues to Report of Proceedings.
2
e.g. see minutes of Council 26 June 1907.
3
This section is based on articles by E.S. Cole, the 
AWGC’s industrial officer, in Muster, 25 January and
22 March 1967.
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Federations, the Associated Chambers of Manufactures 
of Australia, the Australian Metal Industries Association 
of the AWGC. The Industrial Committee is composed of 
industrial officers from these four organisations and 
is responsible for the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings, preparing material for counsel, and the 
general organisation of the cases to be presented on 
behalf of employers. The Policy Committee, in 
conjunction with periodic general meetings of the 
National Employers’ Associations, decides overall 
policy. As the national wage case in recent years has 
assumed greatly increased importance, the industrial 
officers of the AWGC are devoting an increasing 
proportion of their time to the work of the National 
Employers’ Industrial Committee.^
As well as submitting evidence at formal hearings, 
the AWGC at times takes the initiative and requests the 
Commission to intervene because of a ’dispute' in the 
industry. (The Commission is able to intervene only 
where there is 'dispute'; a ’dispute’ occurs when a 
claim made by either employees or employers is rejected 
by the other party). The Commission then intervenes, 
and holds a formal hearing at which the affected parties 
present their cases. Hearings often take months.
Finally a decision is handed down, either making a new 
award, varying an existing award or leaving the 
existing award unaltered. Determinations by the 
Commission have the force of law.
Report of Proceedings 1967, p .4 .
1
Of the commodity federations and national farm 
organisations, the AWGC alone takes a serious interest 
in arbitration and has its own special industrial 
officers/ However, other organisations occasionally 
make cursory appearances at hearings, mainly to 
satisfy their members and to secure publicity.
The Tariff Board was established in 1921 as an
impartial body to advise the Commonwealth Government
on protection for Australian industry, and to inquire
into proposals for new, increased or reduced tariffs
or bounties/ It consists of eight members, three of
whom are public servants. The other members are not
appointed to represent special interests, though they
are often deliberately chosen from among business3interests, farm groups and trade unions. The Board 
investigates industries only when it is given a 
'reference’ by the Minister for Trade and Industry. 
Usually a group seeking a variation in the tariff 
first approaches the Department of Trade and Industry 
and attempts to convince officers that a prima facie 
case exists for a variation. If it succeeds, a specific
296
1
See Commonwealth Arbitration Reports for information 
to the parties to disputes. The UFWA has a separate 
organisation, the Farmers and Settlers’ Industrial 
Association, to handle its industrial work. However, 
this organisation has no separate staff, and most of 
its work is performed by the Employers’ Federation.
2
See Tariff Board Act 1921-1962, and Corden, pp.l8l-4. 
3
In 1967, of the five non-public servant members, one 
was a grazier, one a farmer, and three had backgrounds 
in commerce or manufacturing.
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reference is given to the Board which then makes its 
own inquiries, holds public hearings and reports to 
the Minister. However, there is no compulsion for the 
Minister to release the report, or to adopt its 
recommendations.
Since the Board’s inception the GA has presented
evidence, either directly or through other
organisations, at hearings concerned with proposals to
vary duties on manufactured items used by graziers.
In the 1920s the GA ’s Secretary appeared on a number of
occasions on behalf of the Association/ but in 1932
the Joint Committee for Tariff Revision took over the
2task of presenting evidence to the Board. In recent
years the Association’s tariff work has been handled
by the AWGC. The AWGC’s economist gives evidence at
hearings - for example, in 19^5 he gave evidence at
inquiries on industrial chemicals, replacement internal
combustion engines for vehicles and certain replacement3parts, and the marketing of crude oil, - and the 
AWGC also conveys its demands through the Australian
4Tariff Council, as the Joint Committee is now called.
1
For example, in 1924 the Secretary presented evidence 
jointly on behalf of the GA and the Producers' 
Associations' Central Council in an inquiry on duties 
on barbed wire, sheep shearing and agricultural machinery, 
and pastoral supplies.
2
The Association joined the committee in 1932 (N . S . W .
Graziers’ Annual 1932, p.44).
3
Report of Proceedings 1965, p.37»
4
The members of the Australian Tariff Council are the 
AWGC, the NFU, the Australian Council of Retailers, and 
the Sydney Chamber of Commerce.
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Sometimes both the AWGC's economist and the Secretary 
of the Tariff Council give separate evidence at the one 
inquiry on behalf of the AWGC.^
On tariff matters the graziers’ associations have 
done much more than other farm organisations in the way 
of presenting substantial evidence at public hearings.
But their performance on tariff matters has been much 
less impressive than it has been on arbitration and on 
many other issues. They have relied on periodic protests 
to the Minister for Trade and Industry about the high 
level of tariffs and the adverse affect of tariffs on 
their costs, and on presenting evidence to inquiries 
intitated by manufacturers to secure increased 
protection. Their submissions have been generally sound, 
but in many inquiries they have been outmatched by 
manufacturing interests. Manufacturers with an interest 
in securing or raising tariff protection for a single 
item or small range of items are in a better tactical 
position than organisations like the graziers’ 
associations which aim to veto increased tariffs on 
any major items used by graziers. But despite this, the 
graziers associations have not used the available 
machinery to its best advantage, and have lacked any 
overall co-ordinated strategy. Their approach to 
tariff matters has been very much on an ad hoc basis. 
They have used the machinery of the Tariff Board merely
1
Tariff Board’s Report on Replacement Motor Vehicle 
Engines and Certain Replacement Parts, 30th September 
1965 > and Tariff Board’s Report on Industrial Chemicals 
and Synthetic Resins, 13th April 1966.
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to veto demands by manufacturers for increased protection, 
rather than to initiate inquiries for tariff reductions 
on specific items used by graziers.
Since 1967 however, the AWGC appears to have
adopted a more realistic and useful approach. In 1967
it applied to the Minister for Trade and Industry for
an inquiry into rural machinery, submitting as a basis
a list of sixteen items including ploughs, reapers,
binders and mowers which carried import duties ranging
from as high as 45 per cent general to 22.\ per cent
preferential.'*" The Minister referred the matter to the
Tariff Board which opened its public hearing in June
1968.^ This approach is likely to have a much higher
pay-off, particularly if the AWGC is able to have
detailed cases prepared for submission to inquiries, and
if it follows up the inquiries by demanding the immediate
release of reports and the implementation of favourable
recommendations. The AWGC may also be able to capitalise
on the proposals by the Tariff Board to classify
industries according to the degree of tariff protection
they need and to make a thorough review of the existing
3tariff protection for all industries. But to be more 
effective, the AWGC will need a larger staff and will 
need to develop closer relations with officers of the 
Tariff and Import Division within the Department of 
Trade and Industry.
1
Report of Proceedings 1967? p.68.
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1968 p.l4; Muster, 
19 June 1968, p.l.
Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 1967*
3
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Local Government Authorities
The main communication to local government bodies 
is from branches and district councils to individual 
shires, municipalities and county councils, though on 
occasions the GA1s central organs and secretariat 
communicate demands to individual councils, or to all 
local government bodies through the Shires’ Association 
and Local Government Association.
Relations between local branches and shire councils 
are generally friendly, and branches rely mainly on 
personal communications to convey their demands. 
Frequently members of the Association hold office on 
shire councils and so provide an effective channel of 
communication. In 1966 the writer attended one branch 
meeting where the local Shire President was present 
as a member of the branch. When local government 
matters were discussed, he explained the Council’s 
policies and the background to certain decisions, and 
listened to complaints voiced by GA members.
Relations between GA branches and municipalities 
and between branches and shire councils dominated by 
councillors representing urban ridings are often less 
friendly, and in such cases the Association relies 
on more formal channels of communication.
Communications between branches and district 
councils, and shire, municipal and county councils 
relate mainly to rates, roads, saleyards, abattoirs, 
and electricity services.
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CHAPTER 9
Form: Other Political Targets
Our category other political targets, it will be 
remembered, includes both secondary and intermediate 
targets. Secondary targets are centres of official 
decision-making power that are of less importance in 
themselves and/or to the group than primary targets, 
whereas intermediate targets are structures to which 
the group conveys demands in order to reach or to bring 
pressure to bear on primary targets.
The Electorate
The electorate (or sections of it) constitutes both 
an intermediate and a secondary target. Communication 
to the electorate takes two forms: regular publicity
and special campaigns.
In some respects it is surprising that the GA uses 
regular publicity so extensively as a means of achieving 
political goals. As we have seen, graziers prefer to 
transact their business, whether it be commercial or 
political, by direct, personal negotiation, with a 
minimum of fuss. They dislike campaigning in public, 
and have some distaste for modern public relations 
techniques. These attitudes are reinforced by the 
Association’s operational norms, which place high 
emphasis on responsible behaviour, and on achieving 
political goals by reasoned argument and carefully
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prepared submissions. Yet the GA relies heavily on 
publicity. Each year it spends large amounts on public 
relations - probably more than any other farm 
organisation in Australia and, at a guess, as much as 
many large business pressure groups. The explanation 
is that despite cultural factors and operational norms, 
the Association is compelled by the political context 
in which it operates and by pressure from its members 
to make extensive use of publicity.
These pressures on the Association operate in a 
number of different ways. Zeigler suggests that one of 
the important variables which determines the extent to 
which a pressure group relies on public relations is 
the degree to which it is subjected to hostile publicity. 
Because it represents a socio-economic elite and 
operates in a political context of strong competition 
against other groups, and because of its anti-Labor 
orientation and its policy differences with other farm
1
Between i960 and 1966 the GA spent in the vicinity of 
15 to 20 per cent of its budget on public relations.
This estimate is based on an analysis of the Association's 
financial records and on a document, 'Report from the 
Executive Committee on Public Relations', submitted to 
the General Council in July 1967* Little information is 
available on how much or what proportion of their budget 
other pressure groups spend on public relations.
However, we know that the UFWA spends only one-third of 
the amount spent by the GA, and in 1964 only 13 per cent 
of its income was used on publicity and public relations. 
Most other farm organisations spend comparatively little 
on publicity. Eckstein records (p.73) that in 1937 the 
BMA spent 4.6 per cent of its total budget on public 
relations.
2
Zeigler, p.234.
organisations, the GA is subjected to more hostile 
publicity than most farm organisations, and most 
economic pressure groups. In consequence, it feels the 
need of publicity in order to answer criticisms, and to 
reply to attacks. The GA1s leaders and staff react 
strongly to misrepresentation of the Association’s 
tactics and policies, particularly as they take pride 
that the Association behaves responsibly in politics 
and that its policies are soundly based. One of its 
policies most frequently misrepresented, leaders and 
staff consider, is that on closer settlement. The GA 
insists that it is opposed not to closer settlement, but 
only to uneconomic schemes and to the unfair resumption 
of holdings. The Association's view today is still the 
same as expressed by one of its presidents nearly forty 
years ago:
...as practical men we object to many of the 
hairbrained schemes that are politically 
paraded in the name of closer settlement. We 
are for a sane system that treats the present 
landowner fairly, safeguards the sheep studs, 
and gives a new settler every reasonable chance 
to succeed. We are opposed to the give-every- 
man-a-block-of-land system that is designed 
to play up to the extremists who know nothing 
of the land difficulties and care less for the 
interests of the primary producers.-^
1
Address by C.G. Waddell to 19^7 Annual Conference 
(N.S.W. Graziers Annual 1927, p.23).
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Like other farm organisations, the GA reacts angrily to 
what it considers to be unfair criticism by academic 
economists of the wool, wheat and meat industries, and 
of graziers . ^
The GA also feels it necessary to employ publicity 
in order to correct misleading and false information 
conveyed to the public by the mass media. GA members 
consider that the press, radio and television often 
mislead the public, particularly about the wealth of 
graziers and the profits they make. At each Annual 
Conference, almost without exception, branch delegates 
complain that city newspapers report only top auction 
prices and not average prices for wool and livestock, 
and that they make no efforts whatsoever to publicise 
information about graziers' costs of production, taxation 
liabilities, and problems with drought and pests. To 
counteract this situation, delegates press for the 
Association to expand and improve its own public 
relations work.^
1
For example, in 1965 the GA reacted as angrily as the 
UFWA and other wheatgrowers' organisations to an article 
by E.J. Donath in the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 December 
1965» which questioned the need for the payment of a 
subsidy to wheatfarmers (see letter by B.A. Wright,
Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1963) p.2).
2
Typical of motions introduced by branch delegates 
calling for more effective publicity was a motion moved 
at the 1962 Conference by Ian Sinclair (now a senior 
Commonwealth Minister) on behalf of the Tamworth branch 
calling for greater publicity for the 'daily greasy 
average as well as top [woolj prices'. (Annual Conference 
minutes, 1962 ).
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At times the GA also feels the need of publicity
to protect and promote its political ideology. In the
late 1940s, when Labor administrations were in office
in N.S.W. and the Commonwealth, and when the Chifley
Government was experimenting with nationalisation
schemes, the GA ran a sustained publicity campaign to
warn the public of the dangers of socialism and
communism, and to demonstrate the advantages of the free
enterprise system/ It also co-operated with business
groups in forming and maintaining the Public Relations
Bureau which circulated anti-communist propaganda and
carried out special surveys. One survey the Bureau
made was of the time lost to industry through strikes
2by Communist controlled unions. Another concluded that 
the Government’s social services schemes cost the 3ordinary worker far more than he received in benefits.
In its ideological publicity, the GA has never thought 
in terms of persuading members of the public to its 
point of view. Rather, it has naively believed that if 
only the ’true facts’ can be properly presented, the 
public will see their danger, and come to share its 
viewpoint.
1
The G A ' s newspaper, Muster, carried numerous articles 
and editorials about socialism and communism. On
1 December 19^+9 it published a long article entitled
’The Free Enterprise System and Socialism (A Comparison)’ 
A note explained: ’This factual comparison is carried
by Muster without comment’.
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 22 April 19^ +8.
Muster, 15 June 19^8, pp.9-10, 18.
3
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In any pressure group with a mass membership, 
publicity is essential to inform members of the group’s 
policies and activities, to convince them that their 
interests are being adequately promoted and safeguarded, 
and to mobilise their support on particular issues.^"
In the case of the G A , the need for publicity to 
communicate with members is great because of the spatial 
distribution of members and because the Association 
operates in a context of political competition. Its 
competitors make extensive use of publicity; consequently, 
to satisfy its members and to mobilise their support the 
Association must do the same. In addition, publicity 
is necessary to compete with rivals in attracting new 
members.
Economic pressure groups also use publicity as a 
means of establishing their claims to speak on behalf 
of industries or economic sections, and securing 
recognition with governments. One of the main aims of 
the extensive publicity on wheat policy in recent years 
has been to establish the Association’s claim as a 
legitimate voice of wheatgrower opinion and to gain 
recognition by governments as a spokesman for the industry. 
In this way the Association hopes to secure greater 
opportunity to participate in discussions on wheat policy, 
to be consulted by governments on all proposed changes, 
and to secure representation on all appropriate committees 
and boards. The Association’s claim to speak for the 
wool and meat industries is well established, though
1
On this point, see a useful discussion in Zeigler,
pp.234-3.
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competition from the UFWA and the APPU necessitates 
constant efforts to see that its status is safeguarded.
Finally, publicity is necessary to complement and 
supplement personal and written communications to 
governments. Most economic pressure groups publicise 
details of many of the demands they make directly on 
governments in order to bring some public pressure to 
bear on decision-makers and, more important, to be in 
a position to mobilise public support should some 
crucial request be refused. Publicity is also used as 
a supplement to other forms of communication to primary 
targets. In Australia the practice has developed 
whereby governments and pressure groups communicate 
with one another indirectly through the press, radio 
and television, as well as directly. Leakage of Cabinet 
decisions or possible changes in policy is now a routine 
public relations exercise employed by Ministers and 
departments to prepare the way for projected changes 
and to test the reaction of pressure groups. Pressure 
groups in turn constantly keep governments informed of 
their thinking, even before changes in policy are 
mooted by governments. They ’war n ’ of possible dangers, 
’urge’ government action, 'forecast’ possible trends, 
’welcome’ hints of favoured changes.
Most of the Association’s regular publicity is 
handled by the Executive Committee and the secretariat
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with the assistance of an independent public relations
firm. The President and senior staff members frequently
reply to hostile publicity by letters to the city dailies,
and to country and farm newspapers. A well-produced
weekly newspaper, Mus ter, is published by the Association
and circulated to all its members, and to members of
State and Commonwealth parliaments and to government 
2departments. The Association also publishes a
ocomprehensive annual reportJ (under the title of 
Report of Proceedings), The Graziers* Annual, and 
occasional booklets and pamphlets. It maintains a 
comprehensive news release service to the metropolitan
4press, rural weeklies, country press, Australian
1
From 1 July 1967 a public relations firm headed by 
Stewart Howard, who was the principal employee of the 
Central Public Relations Bureau and later editor of the 
Association’s newspaper, took over many of the functions 
performed by the G A ’s News Bureau, which had been 
established in 1957* (’Report from the Executive 
Committee on Public Relations’, July 1967)-*
2
Muster was established in 19^6. For its first year 
it was a monthly journal, and then was published bi­
monthly. Since April 1931 it has been a weekly tabloid 
newspaper. Issues now vary in length from twenty to 
twenty-eight pages.
3
The Report of Proceedings for 1967 ran to ninety-two 
pages„
4
Relations with the two main rural weeklies in N.S.W., 
Country Life and The Land, are close. The Association 
has a representative on the board of directors of both 
(though with The Land the representative is not an 
official nominee of the Association) and in addition has 
a financial interest in Country Life.
309
Associated Press, and radio and television media. On 
occasions, the Association organises press conferences, 
and supplies newspapers with information, editorials 
and sometimes special articles.^ Press representatives 
attend and report on the Annual Conference and meetings 
of the General Council. Leaders and staff sometimes 
take part in radio and television programmes. A 
hospitality tent is provided by the Association at the 
Sydney Sheep Show and country shows to provide contact 
with members and prospective members.
In addition, the function of publicity is also 
performed by local branches and district councils, by 
the AWGC, and by other organisations with which the 
Association is directly affiliated. Some active local 
branches secure a great amount of publicity, even in 
the city daily press.^
While the GA*s publicity is as effective as that 
of other farm organisations, in view of its resources 
and the amount it is prepared to spend on public 
relations, it could do much better. Xn the past its 
public relations work has suffered from lack of 
planning, from frequent administrative and policy 
changes, and from a desire to secure maximum publicity
1
For example, in 1967 and 1968 articles were prepared 
on the national drought fodder reserve scheme, a 
superannuation scheme for the grazing industry, and the 
special problems of producers in the Western Division.
2
Some branches get good publicity in the rural section 
’On the Land’ in country editions of the Sydney Morning 
Herald.
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on certain specific matters, yet to remain withdrawn.
from reporters. Until recently, when the Executive
Committee took a much greater interest in the
Association’s public relations work, little effort had
been made to formulate an overall public relations
policy. Confusion about the role of the Association’s
newspaper was just one symptom of this; some thought
it should be a house journal, while others believed
it should be a general rural weekly. Many of the
Association’s public relations projects were hurriedly
conceived and implemented, without detailed planning
or costing. In the 1930s the Association sought a
licence to establish a radio station, and later combined
with other interests to found a station in the central-
west of N.S.W.^ However, the GA had no clear idea of
how it would use a radio station to achieve its goals,
and made no efforts to found or participate in other
stations. In the late 1930s, it commenced a weekly
radio programme which was later expanded to other
stations. However, in the early 1950s this project
2was suddenly discontinued. More recently the 
Association made frequent ad hoc administrative changes
1
The Graziers’ Annual 1936» p.31* This station was 
2GZ, Orange; the GA invested £3,000 in the project.
2
These were commenced on 2GZ. By 19^8 they were 
broadcast on four stations, and in the early 1950s 
on five. In the 1930s, the GA also negotiated 
unsuccessfully to buy a country newspaper (the Bathurst 
Times) without any clear plan in mind. The minutes of 
the Special Purposes Committee record the negotiations 
that took place.
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in its public relations staff. Today the GA is still 
less accessible to reporters than many other 
organisations. While it allows reporters to attend 
the Annual Conference and meetings of the General 
Council,"*" business is frequently discussed in committee 
with the representatives of the press excluded. Many 
reporters find the UFWA more accessible, and are 
allowed to attend even meetings of its Executive 
Committee. On the other hand, it appears that many of 
the Association’s leaders and senior staff now recognise 
that the public relations work has been weak, and efforts 
are being made to overcome deficiencies.
The GA employs special propaganda and publicity 
campaigns for two distinct purposes. As already 
explained, on certain matters the electorate, or part 
of it, has autonomous decision-making powers.
Consequently, when the interests of graziers are 
affected, the GA appeals to the electorate as a secondary 
political target. In the second place, when the 
Association is denied access to governments, or when 
its demands on important issues are refused, or when 
a special effort is needed to veto some government action, 
it stages intensive short-term campaigns, appealing to 
the electorate in the hope of bringing pressure to bear 
on the government. We will examine each of these 
circumstances in some detail.
1
Reporters were not permitted to attend some of the 
early Annual Conferences. (Annual Conference minutes 
1918, 1919, 192l). Meetings of General Council have 
been open to the press only since 19^6.
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The Association appeals to the electorate as a
secondary target at Commonwealth and State general
elections, constitutional referenda, referenda connected
with industry marketing schemes, and ballots for the
election of representatives to marketing boards and
committees. Most farm organisations participate in the
last two, but few participate actively in constitutional
referenda and general elections campaigns. The GA
participates in these campaigns mainly because of its
strong anti-Labor orientation. In 1961 it waged an
active campaign in the referendum on the proposed
abolition of the Upper House in N.S.W., and the GA
President sent out a circular to all members explaining
that retention of the Legislative Council was necessary
as an ’essential safeguard to public liberty and
property'.  ^ Frequently during general election
campaigns the GA comes out openly against the Labor 
2Party, and campaigns on behalf of the non-Labor parties.
On occasions over the years staff have been made
available to assist in the preparation of publicity
and in providing a research service for non-Labor
3candidates and speakers.
1
Report of Proceedings 1961, p .70.
2
For instance, in the 195^ federal election the 
President of the GA issued a press statement highly 
critical of the Labor leader’s policy speech (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 May 195^)•
3
The N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1933» P •52, records that 
in the 1932 State election campaign a member of the GA’s 
staff was made available to answer questions and
(continued on p.3 1 3 )
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The most common type of short-term intensive
campaign waged by the GA is what Finer"*” describes as
a ’fire-brigade campaign’, aimed to veto or influence
some action about to be taken by a government. The
aim of such a campaign is to mobilise support among
members and other groups, so forcing the Government to
back down, or at least to compromise. On occasions,
the GA has waged campaigns of this kind even before a
policy change has been officially announced. In 1936,
for example, the Association’s President, J.P. Abbott,
launched a strong attack on the Government at the Annual
Conference, claiming that he had learned from a reliable
source that the Government planned to place restrictions
on trade with Japan, one of Australia’s main customers 
2for wool. Government spokesmen immediately attacked 
him for making an ’irresponsible’ statement, but two 
months later the Government increased tariff duties 
on Japanese goods entering Australia, and Japan 
retaliated by stopping all purchases of Australian wool.
4 (continued from p.312)
generally assist non-Labor candidates and speakers. 
Schedules of likely election questions and suitable 
answers were prepared and distributed throughout the 
State. More recently staff have assisted Liberal and 
Country Party campaigns in State elections, though no 
record of this is to be found in the Association’s 
annual reports.
1
S.E. Finer, Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby
in Great Britain, London, 1966 edition, p.93*
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1936 and The Lan d , 
20 March 1936.
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Most of the GA ’ s special short-term campaigns have
been directed against Labor administrations. One of
its most sustained and energetic of these was in the
late 19^+0s against the Chifley Government’s plans to
nationalise banks. By means of press publicity, radio
talks, public meetings and articles in its newspaper
the GA endeavoured to arouse public opinion/ It
warned electors that nationalisation of banks was the
first step in a carefully planned movement by the
Government towards complete socialism; after banks, it
claimed, nationalisation of insurance companies, wool
firms, steel plants, coal mines and the mass media
2would automatically follow. In one broadcast message,
a GA spokesman explained that bank nationalisation
raised the issue of ’whether Australia is to remain a
free country or whether we are to have the clock turned
3back and become a slave State’. The Association’s 
President wrote to all members urging them to attend 
specially organised local protest meetings, and to 
write or telegraph their local member of the Commonwealth
4parliament and also N.S.W. Senators. But not all 
campaigns have been directed against Labor Governments.
1
Typical of the articles that Muster carried was one 
by the Chairman of the Associated Banks of Victoria 
entitled ’No Efficient Banking Possible under Government 
Monopoly: No Place for Socialism in Australian Way of
Life’.
2
For example, see Muster, 1 October 19^7> p.l.
3
Report in Muster, 15 September 19^7, p.19*
4
Enclosure in Muster, 15 September 19^7*
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In 1950 and 1951 the GA campaigned against the wool
sales deduction acts, introduced and passed by the
Menzies Government; a detailed study of the Association’s
behaviour in this campaign is presented in chapter 11.
A more recent example was in 1967 when the Association
campaigned for exemption from land tax of all land used
for primary production. In this case, the main pressure
for the campaign came from local branches which
organised their own protest meetings. The biggest
and best publicised of these meetings was at Moree in
June 1967, when 1,200 landholders heard the Chief
Executive Officer of the Association present the GA’s
case for relief from the burden of land tax in the
presence of the Premier, R.W. Askin (Liberal Party
leader), and the Deputy Premier, C.B. Cutler (Country
Party leader), and other politicians.  ^ After Ick-
Hewins spoke, Askin explained to the meeting some of
the difficulties of budgeting faced by his Government,
but admitted that land tax was a ’bad tax’ and promised
2some relief in his 1967/8 budget. In its public 
campaigns directed against non-Labor governments, the 
GA has always been limited by the fear of unseating 
the government; even if a non-Labor government refuses 
its demands on an important issue, the GA considers that 
such a government is still preferable to any Labor 
administration. But even with Labor governments, the 
GA is seldom prepared to let all restraint go.
1
The Land, 15 June 1967*
2
Ibid. Later in the year the Premier announced that 
land tax on rural holdings would be abolished progressively 
over a number of years.
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The GA has done better in special campaigns than 
in regular publicity. It has demonstrated an ability 
to mobilise its resources and to fight impressive and 
sustained campaigns. In attempts to veto proposals of 
governments it has often appealed successfully to 
farmers’ conservatism and effectively exploited both 
their hostility towards public bureaucracies and their 
fear of socialism and communism. In some of its appeals 
to the electorate the GA without doubt, has been 
influential; in 1951 and again in 1965, in combination 
with other groups, it successfully vetoed attempts to 
introduce reserve price wool marketing schemes.'*" But 
in some attempts, such as those to secure seats on the 
Wheat Board, the GA has failed. Special campaigns 
waged by the GA to veto proposed legislation or to 
secure changes in government policy likewise have 
varied greatly in their success. Some of its most 
impressive campaigns - for example, the campaigns 
against bank nationalisation and the wool sales 
deduction acts - failed to achieve their goals, while 
other more modest efforts achieved success, or at least 
secured useful concessions. Obviously, in special 
campaigns the measure of success that a group can 
achieve depends on many variables apart from its 
political resources, the extent to which it mobilises 
them, and the methods and tactics it uses. In the 
bank nationalisation campaign, the Chifley Government 
proceeded with its plans despite the opposition of
1
See Chapter 12.
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business and farm groups because it regarded the policy 
as a fundamental objective. In the case of the wool 
sales deduction acts, a non-Labor Government refused to 
give in to woolgrowers (though it agreed to some 
concessions) because of the budgetary problems that it 
faced.
Political Parties
The GA ’ s close relations with and its use of 
political parties make it unique among economic pressure 
groups in Australia, apart from trade unions. Today 
most farm and business groups proclaim loudly and 
incessantly that they are non-political. By this 
they mean that they have no formal ties with parties, 
that they do not supply parties with finance, and 
that officially they favour neither one party nor 
another. Non-partisanship has obvious advantages: 
it places groups in a strong position to approach any 
government in power, it facilitates recruitment of 
members from among supporters of all parties, and it 
eliminates potential internal disputes about party 
politics. The GA however, makes no pretence to be 
non-partisan. It openly declares its opposition to 
the Labor Party, and it is well-known that it gives 
financial support to the Country Party and, to a much 
smaller extent, to the Liberal Party. Moreover, it
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helped found the Country Party in N.S.W. in 1919» and 
from then until 19^5 was formally affiliated with that 
Party.
But while most farm and business groups are officially 
non-partisan, many of them,in fact, work to some extent 
through political parties. They do so mainly through 
their individual members who contribute funds to, or 
who are active in parties. Sometimes groups deliberately 
encourage their members to penetrate parties and seek 
to use parties for clearly defined purposes. But 
generally individual members of groups act more or less 
independently within parties on behalf of their groups. 
Consequently, the influence of most farm and business 
groups on parties is usually un-co-ordinated, unplanned 
and highly informal. At the same time, groups can often 
significantly influence the policies of parties, 
particularly detailed policies related to specific 
industries, and sometimes the election promises made 
by parliamentary leaders. Through parties groups can
1
Apart from the GA, the following farm organisations 
at one time were affiliated with Country Parties: the
United Graziers’ Association of Queensland; The Tasmanian 
Farmers, Stockowners and Orchardists’ Association; the 
F S A ; the Farmers and Settlers’ Association of South 
Australia; the Farmers and Settlers’ Association of 
Western Australia; the Primary Producers Association in 
Tasmania; the Queensland Farmers Union; and the United 
Cane Growers’ Association in Queensland. But except 
for the FSA and the Farmers and Settlers’ Association 
of Western Australia (renamed the Primary Producers’ 
Association in 1920), all these farm bodies withdrew 
soon after the Country Parties they fostered came into 
being. The GA was the last farm body to withdraw its 
affiliation and, as far as we know, the only one that 
has continued to supply financial support.
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also publicise and win wider support for specific 
proposals, secure easy and convenient access to 
Ministers and opposition spokesmen, and on occasions 
bring some pressure to bear on Ministers, especially 
when access is denied, when requests are refused, or 
when negotiations break down.
Apart from its influence based on its special 
relationships, the GA also uses parties as intermediate 
targets in a similar fashion to many other groups.
Cross-membership between the GA on the one hand, and 
the Country Party and the Liberal Party on the other, 
is common. Moreover, many of the Association’s leaders 
and rank and file activists are also active in local 
party branches, or on the central governing bodies 
of the two parties. In most years the G A ’s Executive 
Committee and General Council include a large number 
of party activists. In 1965* for instance, the three 
senior officers elected at the March meeting of the 
General Council were all Country Party activists.
T.B.C. Walker, the President, was well-known as a 
Country Party supporter. One Vice-President, F.M. 
Macdiarmid, was Chairman of the Canbe.rra- Queanbeyan 
branch. The other Vice-President, J.B. Fuller, had 
been a member of the Central Council continuously since 
1945, and the Party’s Vice-Chairman from 1956 to 1959 
and Chairman from 1959 to 1964. He had also been a 
member of the Legislative Council since 1961 and in 
July 1965, after being appointed Minister for 
Decentralisation and Development, resigned from office 
in the GA , This overlap in membership, especially 
among leaders and rank and file activists, enables
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the Association to use the two parties in a number of 
ways to advance its interests. GA leaders and activists 
try to persuade the parties to adopt as policy 
proposals already decided upon by the Association.
They also endeavour to use the parties to publicise 
and secure wider support for demands made by the 
Association on governments. One reported example 
occurred in July 1968 when the President of the 
Association, B.A. Wright, as a delegate from the 
Armidale branch of the Country Party successfully moved 
at the Party’s annual conference that the State 
Government be requested to supply finance to establish 
a Faculty of Natural Resources at the University of 
New England at Armidale. The idea for such a faculty 
first came from the New England District Council of 
the Association. With the Association’s support, the 
District Council had publicised the proposal and 
secured from the University a promise that such a 
faculty would be established as soon as funds were 
available. As part of its drive to persuade Commonwealth 
and State governments to make funds available, the GA, 
through its President, thus used the Country Party as 
an intermediate target. Leaders of the Association 
and the AWGC frequently use their own party contacts 
to facilitate approaches to non-Labor Ministers. T.B.C. 
Walker told the writer in 1966 that, as President of 
the AWGC, he generally arranged interviews with
1
The Land, 11 July 1968, p.3.
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Commonwealth Ministers in Canberra through personal 
friends in the parliamentary Country Party.“*" In a. 
similar way informal or semi-formal discussions on 
policy are sometimes arranged between leaders of the 
Association or the AWGC, and sub-committees of 
parties.^
Admittedly, this informal relationship that the 
GA has with the two parties through its individual 
members is closely related to its more formal 
relations. Indeed, in some cases it is difficult to 
distinguish between the two kinds of relationships. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the cross membership 
between the Association and the Country Party is 
largely the result of the Association's role over the 
years as one of the Party's founders and its main 
financial guarantor, and that the G A ’s leaders and 
activists successfully influence policy within the 
Party partly because of the financial support that 
the Association provides. But at the same time, it is 
necessary to recognise the distinction between the 
two kinds of relationships. Through them both the GA 
secures support and publicity for policies, gains
1
Interview, 15 November 1966.
2
For example, in September 1967, a meeting was 
arranged in Canberra between the Liberal Party Federal 
Rural Committee, and the President and the Executive 
Committee of the AWGC. At this meeting the problems 
of the wool industry, promotion, drought, tariffs and 
wages were discussed. According to a report in Muster 
(6 September 1967), on 'such vital points as arbitration, 
total wage and tariffs, there was complete agreement'.
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access to Ministers and opposition spokesmen, and puts 
pressure on governments. However, the GA has always 
seen its more formal relations with political parties, 
particularly the Country Party, primarily as a means 
of keeping Labor out of office and securing the return 
of governments sympathetic to the interests of graziers. 
In addition, the GA found its formal link with the 
Country Party useful as a means of securing seats in 
parliament for its leaders and members.
The GA began the practice of giving financial 
support to political parties during the first world 
war. Reacting to the first majority Labor governments, 
the Association actively sought every means possible 
to protect the interests of its members and to secure 
greater influence in politics. As we have already seen, 
organisers were appointed to recruit new members, 
particularly smaller woolgrowers. Allies were sought 
among other farm bodies, and in 1917 the Association 
successfully promoted the Producers’ Associations’ 
Central Council. In 1916 it established a Producers’ 
Special Purposes Fund
...to assist any organization, political 
or otherwise, to further the ends of 
pastoralists and rural producers, and to 
oppose any projects of the State and 
Commonwealth governments that are 
detrimental to their interests.'*'
Members were asked to contribute at the rate of 3/- per
1,000 sheep, and 25/- per 1,000 cattle and horses.
1
Minutes of Council, 29 March 1916.
Over £4,500 was subscribed within twelve months, and 
most of this was used to assist individual National
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Party candidates in the 1917 Commonwealth and State 
elections.'*" In both elections the Association also 
employed its own political organisers to assist 
candidates. Had not the Association in 1919 decided 
to participate in forming the Country Party this 
practice would probably have been continued.
The idea of forming a separate Country Party
came from the F S A , but without the G A ’s help the
project most likely would not have been so successful.
For many years the FSA had been keen to establish a
farmers’ party. However, each of its attempts had
failed. In March 1919» after a brief period of
alliance with the Nationalists, the FSA decided to
make a further attempt and in September invited the
2GA and other bodies to assist. Even before the FSA 
issued its invitation, many GA members soon became 
enthusiastic about a separate party following the 
F S A ’s decision of March 1919 and advocated that the 
Association should co-operate with the FSA. At the 
time many graziers felt extremely dissatisfied with 
the performance of both the Hughes and Holman 
Nationalist Governments, particularly over the 
continuation of price-fixing and the general neglect
1
Statement by GA President to 1918 Annual Conference 
(Verbatim report, Annual Conference records 1918).
2
Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties,
pp.109, 116, 121.
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of rural interests. They feared the radical tendencies
of Hughes and Holman, both ex-Labor leaders, and were
disappointed with the Association’s lack of opportunity
to influence the selection of Nationalist candidates.
Moreover, the logic of a separate party was obvious;
surely, they argued, producers needed their own party
if they were to be as effective in politics as the
trade unions. Fifteen GA branches submitted resolutions
to the 1919 Annual Conference, scheduled to commence
on 30 June, in favour of the Association conferring with
the FSA, the Primary Producers’ Unions and others with
the aim of establishing a ’Producers’ Party’ . At the
last moment, after copies of the preliminary agenda
had been distributed, the Conference was postponed
because of an influenza epidemic. The delay provided
opportunity for further discussion and, by the time
the Conference met in mid-September, another seventeen
branches had submitted resolutions in favour of forming 
2a new party. And by then the FSA had issued its 
invitation to the G A .
Delegates to the Conference agreed that the grazing 
industry needed better representation in parliament.
’The industry is a hundred years o l d ’, one delegate 
claimed, ’and has not had proper representation in
1
Preliminary agenda paper for Conference to commence 
on 30 June 1919* (Annual Conference records, 1919)*
2
Agenda paper, Annual Conference records, 1919.
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Parliament for the whole period’. Even Nationalist 
supporters admitted that the National Party had not 
adequately met the needs of graziers. However, opinion 
was sharply divided on whether the Association should 
withdraw support from the Nationalists and help 
establish a third party. Supporters of the National 
Party argued that a third party would split the non- 
Labor vote and make it more difficult to keep Labor 
out of office. They advocated discussions with the 
National Party as well as the F S A . Supporters of the 
Country Party idea argued that apart from the poor 
performance of both Nationalist governments, there was 
little chance that the Association would be able to 
significantly influence the choice of Nationalist 
candidates or to control Nationalist members of 
parliament. Because of the new voting systems, they 
asserted, there was no danger in splitting the non- 
Labor vote, and a Country Party would be likely to 
attract farmers who, because of their dislike for the 
National Party, would otherwise vote for Labor. 
Eventually, the Conference rejected a proposal to confer 
with the National Party, and instead voted to co-operate 
with the FSA and other bodies ’with the view to securing, 
if possible, candidates suitable to all these parties
2in the producers’ interest, e.g. a Producers’ Party’.
1
From a speech by W.T. Munro (Verbatim report, Annual 
Conference records, 1919)* A detailed report of the 
Conference, entitled ’Graziers in Politics: Annual
Conference Debate: How the Decisions were made’, was
published in The Sydney Stock and Station Journal on 
17 October 1919 and later as a booklet.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1919*
To raise finance for the venture, the Conference 
authorised a compulsory levy on members at the rate of 
£1 per 1,000 sheep (or the equivalent in cattle or 
horses) and provided for a special committee to administer 
the Special Purposes Fund into which receipts from the 
levy would be paid.^
Graham has argued that in ’New South Wales..,it
was the influence of small graziers and mixed farmers
within the GA which caused it to link up with the 
2Country Party’. While many smaller landowners within
the GA were undoubtedly in favour of a Country Party,
support for the idea was not confined to smaller
landowners. Indeed, some of the most enthusiastic
supporters were wealthy graziers such as Colin Sinclair
and F.B.S. Faulkiner (owner of the famous pastoral
property ’Haddon Rig’). Moreover, there is little
evidence to support Graham’s contention that at the
time newly enrolled smaller landowners were exerting
a significant direct influence on policy decisions
3within the Association.
Negotiations with the FSA and other groups 
commenced soon after the 1919 Conference. On l4 October
1
Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
p.120, wrongly states that this was a voluntary levy.
2
’Graziers in Politics, 1917-29’» p.597*
3
Graham uses this argument, both in the paper cited 
immediately above (see p p .596-7) and in the Formation 
of the Australian Country Parties, pp.102 and 120, 
to explain not only the G A ’s participation in the 
formation of the Country Party, but also its support 
for retention of the war-time wool scheme in 1919*
(See Chapter 12).
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it was announced that the G A , the FSA and the People’s 
Party of Soldiers and Citizens were combining to form 
a ’Progressive Party’ and that a Central Electoral 
Council had already been established to contest seats 
in the next State election.'*’ The task of organising
2soon commenced. The GA supplied most of the finance,
and GA and FSA branches provided most of the electoral
organisation in country areas. The result was that in
the elections on 20 March 1920 fifteen Progressive
candidates were returned. Meanwhile, in the federal
elections in December 1919 a few FSA and GA branches
endorsed candidates, and early in 1920 two of them who
were successful joined with others to form a separate
3Country Party in the Commonwealth parliament.
When the decision was made by the Annual Conference 
in 1919 to participate in forming a separate party, 
few delegates foresaw some of the problems that were 
soon to emerge. The first was a serious division 
within the Association. Many members objected to the 
idea of a third party in competition with the National
1
Sydney Morning Herald, l4 October 1919* A full 
report was also carried in The Stock and Station 
Journal on 17 October.
2
In October 1919 the GA made £3,500 available to the 
Electoral Council for organising, and during the 
State election campaign supplied more finance and a 
paid organiser.
3
The two members were Earle Page and Alexander Hay.
See Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
pp.130-1; Ellis, Australian Country Party, pp.50-1; 
and Harman, p p .351-5«
Party. In some areas Peelings within the Association 
ran high during the State election campaign of 1920,^ 
and opponents ol the Country Party idea were even more 
annoyed when the Progressive Party won seats from the 
National Party and contributed to the defeat of the 
Holman Government. Moreover, many members including 
some major wool firms objected to the principle of a 
compulsory levy to finance the Progressive Party.*'
3Many refused to pay the levy; others resigned from the 
Association in protest. In May 1920 at the Annual 
Conference a motion to negotiate a reconciliation 
between the Progressives and Nationalists was
4defeated by only thirty-nine votes to thirty-three. 
Opposition to the policy of supporting the Progressive 
Party (which adopted the name of Country Party in 1923) 
continued for a number of years, and declined only 
after the Association adopted the practice of 
supporting National Party candidates (and later those 
of the United Australia Party and the Liberal Party)
1
Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 1920.
2
Graham (Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
pp.172-3) records that in March 1920 the General 
Manager of Goldsbrough, Mort and Co., wrote saying 
that his firm would not contribute to the Special 
Purposes Fund on the ground that it was necessary 
for forces opposed to the Labor Party to avoid fighting 
among themselves.
3
In May 1920 only 2,200 out of 3 ,^ +00 members had paid 
the levy. In 1922 1,339 had still not paid.
4
Annual Conference minutes, 1920.
in seats not contested by the Progressives, and after 
the two non-Labor parties were brought into close 
alliance.
The other problems related to the new party’s 
electoral and parliamentary strategies, its relations 
with the National Party (and that party’s successors), 
its detailed policies, its means of financial support, 
and its performance when in office. In view of the 
differing outlooks and interests of the GA and the 
FSA - the Party’s sole supporting outside groups after 
1920 - it was almost inevitable that friction should 
occur. On the other hand, it was a remarkable 
achievement that the two groups co-operated so long 
and so effectively within the Country Party.
The first disagreements were over parliamentary 
and electoral strategies. The GA favoured close 
alliance with the Nationalists and was opposed to any 
attempt to defeat a National government if it meant 
Labor rule. Moreover, because of dissension within 
the Association, leaders recognised the need for a 
close alliance to be achieved as quickly as possible.
On the other hand, the FSA expected the new party to 
use its power to the limit to secure concessions for 
farmers, and at all costs to retain its separate 
identity and its autonomy.
In the N.S.W. parliament the Progressives adopted 
a conditional support strategy. A major crisis 
occurred in December 1921 when the Labor Government 
was defeated on a censure motion. Rather than form a 
minority government from his own party, the Nationalist
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leader invited the Progressives to form a coalition
government/ The Progressives divided on what action
to take. One group of city and older country members
favoured the idea of a coalition, while a group of
younger members from the country feared that in a
coalition with Nationalists their party would lose its
independence and identity. On 16 December the
parliamentary Progressive Party decided by seven votes
to six to join a coalition, but the same day the Party’s
Central Council divided eight votes to eight on the
question. Four days later, without the authority of
the Central Council, the Progressives joined the
Nationalists to form a government which was defeated
the same day. And even more serious, the Progressive
Party split on the issue. Almost immediately the
FSA came out in support of the group who left the party
because they opposed the coalition. In the GA opinion
was divided. Of the Association’s five delegates on
the Central Council, four had supported formation of 
2the coalition. On 16 January 1922 from 9*30 a.m. to 
6.15 p.m. the GA Council discussed the question of 
whether the Association should support the coalitionists 
or the ’True Blues’ (as those who opposed the coalition 
called themselves). In the end, it was decided to
1
For detailed accounts of this crisis, see Graham, 
Formation of the Australian Country Parties, pp.168-7^; 
Ellis, The Country Party, pp.60-6; and Don Aitkin,
The Colonel: A Political Biography of Sir Michael
Bruxner,Canberra(forthcoming).
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support the ’True Blues’. However, the Council made 
it clear that in the forthcoming State elections 
differences between non-Labor forces were to be sunk, 
that it expected an electoral arrangement with the 
National Party, and that
Progressive Party candidates be urged... 
to refrain from attacking Anti-Labor 
candidates from the platform and elsewhere 
and to advocate giving next preferences 
to Anti-Labor candidates
The G A ’s decision to support the ’True Blues' was 
motivated by its concern to keep Labor out of office, 
rather than by a desire to keep going a concern in 
which it had invested time and money. Its aim was 
simply to avoid a breach in the anti-Labor front. 
Moreover, leaders of the GA believed, as the Secretary 
later explained in his annual report for 1922,
that a larger number of votes would be 
secured to the Progressive Party if it 
maintained its separate entity than would 
be the case if it coalesced with the 
National Party, more especially as the 
Progressives have throughout stood against 
machine politics, and in favour of more 
sympathetic legislation and administration 
in respect of country needs.3
The outcome of the crisis was that while the Progressive 
Party retained its conditional support strategy, its
1
Council minutes, 16 January 1922.
2
Ibid.
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1922, p.51*
3
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leaders were made well aware that the GA expected closer 
co-operation with the Nationalists. In the 1922 State 
elections both parties fought separate campaigns, but 
there was little friction or conflict.
Later the same year the GA made it clear to the 
leader of the Progressive Party that it would not 
tolerate any attempt to defeat the Nationalist 
Government which took office after the 1922 elections.
In August the Progressives threatened to bring down 
the Government on the issue of compensation to 
wheatfarmers for losses incurred in the operation of 
the war-time wheat pool. The GA secretary wrote to the 
leader of the party stating that the Association 
considered the matter of compensation to be
...purely a legal one ... [and] it is not 
only unseemly but is a waste of public 
time to debate it on the floor of the 
House. Moreover to threaten to overthrow 
a Government on a question which should 
be settled by the ordinary Courts ... is 
likely to discredit the Progressive Party, 
and will certainly cause discontent to many of 
the members of this Association.
My Executive do not claim the right to 
dictate to you what your political actions 
are to be, but it considers that it has 
the right to criticise such actions.
Fortunately for the Progressives, the Government gave 
way and promised a full inquiry. Soon after the 
Progressives reached an understanding with the Government 
for the remainder of the session.
1
Aitkin, The Colonel.
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In 1926 and 1927 the Country Party in N.S.W. 
finally gave way to GA pressure for electoral and 
parliamentary alliances with the Nationalists. By 
then many members of the parliamentary party recognised 
that the strategy of conditional support was not only 
dividing the party but was unsatisfactory. In 1926 
an electoral agreement was negotiated between the two 
parties for the 1927 State election, and in 1927 a 
coalition government was formed in N.S.W. Despite 
occasional disagreements within the Country Party and 
some friction with the other non-Labor party, the 
policy of alliance was continued and is still in 
operation today. Much of the credit for this, at 
least until 19^5> must go to the G A . The GA also 
encouraged an alliance of the parties at the federal 
level. When friction occurred between the two parties 
in N.S.W. it acted as a mediator, and in 1931 th GA 
President led a United Advisory Council which brought 
together disparate anti-Labor groups and the-Country 
Party to fight the federal elections of that y e a r /
1
This Council consisted of some prominent Sydney 
businessmen, F.H. Tout from the GA , A.K. Trethowan 
from the FSA, and a few leading State and federal 
non-Labor politicians. The Council decided which party 
should contest each seat, and raised almost £16,000 
in election funds from business interests, wool firms 
and a few weal thy graziers . Over £5,000 was used by 
the Council itself on publicity. M.H. Ellis and U.R. 
Ellis were employed to direct the publicity campaign; 
they arranged for advertising agencies to prepare 
posters and press advertisements, for material to be 
prepared for speakers, for journalists to write articles 
on inflation, banking and returned soldiers, for picture- 
show advertising, and for the distribution of press
(continued on p.33^+)
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The other problems that participation in the
Country Party raised were less serious but by no means
insignificant. The matters of financial and
electoral support and influence on the party’s policies
were sources of friction and misunderstanding between
the GA and the FSA. The GA was smaller and less
electorally useful (in 1919 it had 5,173 members and
ninety-three branches, while the FSA had 7>000 members
and 326 branches)"^ but much more wealthy. Consequently,
it was able to contribute more than the FSA in
financial support, but less in electoral organisation.
The compulsory levy imposed on members in 1919 raised 
2over £17,000, and from the early 1920s the Association
encouraged members to make an annual voluntary
contribution for political purposes equal to their
ordinary membership contribution. Between 1922 and 19^-5
generally over half the members made such a
contribution, and the Association’s Special Purposes
Fund had an annual income which varied between £2,000
and £8,000. The bulk of this money went to the Country 3Party. Even as late as the end of the 1930s, the GA
1 (continued from p.333)
releases. Almost £7,500 was distributed to the non- 
Labor parties and groups. The GA provided the office 
accommodation for the Council and its staff. The whole 
operation is carefully documented in the records of the 
Council held by the G A .
1
Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
P.123.
2
Statement by GA Secretary to 1922 and 1923 Conferences.
3
Some money however, from this fund went to other 
organisations in which the Association had an interest.
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was supplying between one-third and half the party’s
regular income and almost all of its special elections
funds.^ At times the GA was resentful that the FSA
did not contribute more in financial support. On the
other hand, it recognised that without its funds the
Country Party would probably fail and that its financial
support was a source of power. Without doubt, the GA
used its wealth to secure the most influence it could.
Its donations were ear-marked for specific purposes:
head office expenditure, election expenses, employment
of organisers, salary for a Federal publicity officer,
allowances for party whips, and special grants to party
leaders for election campaigns.^ Since it contributed
up to £8,000 or £9»000 for single election campaigns
it was able to influence election strategy, and
from 1926 to insist on co-operation with the National
Party and its successors. In the late 1930s the GA
developed the practice of providing funds for election
campaigns only after the Country Party General Secretary
3furnished a detailed budget. Through its financial 
dominance the Association was also able to influence 
policy and the performance of the party when in office. 
In 1937 Earle Page, the party’s federal leader, 
attended a meeting of the Special Purposes Committee
1
Country Party balance sheets held by GA.
2
Detailed accounts of expenditure were given to delegates 
at Annual Conferences. See also the minutes of the 
Special Purposes Committee.
3
Minutes of Special Purposes Committee, 23 February
1938.
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and, after being allocated funds for special publicity, 
gave an assurance that the As s o c i a t i o n ’s representations 
on shipping freights would, in future, receive adequate 
consideration„^
But despite the influence that its financial power
gave the Association, its members often considered that
the FSA had far greater influence on policy and,
particularly in the late 1930s and early 19^-Os, were
frequently dissatisfied with the performance of both
State and federal coalitions. Conflict on policy was
almost inevitable since the objectives of the GA and
FSA differed in a number of respects. The GA was
primarily concerned with keeping Labor out of office;
it also wanted ’sound government', maintenance of law
and order, a minimum of government intervention and
certain forms of legislation to benefit graziers. In
contrast, the FSA sought wheat and wool marketing reform,
closer settlement schemes, and measures to benefit
smaller producers. In 1936 the FSA tried to get the
Country Party to make closer settlement the foremost
2plank of its policy, and in 1937 the two farm groups 
quarrelled over the constitutional referendum on 
marketing. At the Association's 19^+3 Conference 
one delegate aptly summed up the dissatisfaction of many
1
I b i d . , 1 April 1937•
2
Report of Special Purposes Committee to GA General 
Council, 26 November 1936. (Special Purposes Committee 
minute-book).
3
Sydney Morning Her a l d , 6 September 1937 and The L a n d , 
6 August 1937-
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members about the F S A *s influence on the Country Party:
’It is wheat that dominates them’, he claimed, ’and
I think that they should have at their conference one
grain of wheat hung up (Laughter).’’*’ Dissatisfaction
with the performance of the Country Party in coalition
governments was also inevitable. Tensions usually arise
between parties and the groups which support them,
especially when they are in office. Moreover, in both
parliaments the Country Party not only had to face the
conflicting pressures of the GA and the F S A , but was
limited by the policies of the coalition partner. Thus
in the late 1930s and early 19^+0s the GA complained,
among other things, of the failure of the State
Government to introduce a stock agents bill and a stock
foods bill, and to amend the Stamp Duty Act. It also
2complained about the Commonwealth's tariff policies.
While the link with the Country Party provided 
problems and did not always achieve as much as 
expected, at the same time the GA considered that it 
was well worthwhile. By providing a non-Labor 
alternative for country people who disliked the 
National Party (and its successors), the Country Party 
provided a means of increasing the non-Labor vote. It 
also provided the Association with access to 
parliamentary spokesmen, with a means of securing the
1
Verbatim report, Annual Conference records, 19^+3-
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 1937 5 General Council 
minutes, 6 July 1939» 21 November 1939» and 21 March 
19^1; and verbatim report, Annual Conference records,
1939, 19^0, 19^1.
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implementation of goals, and the election of a number
of GA leaders and members to parliament/ While GA
members often thought that the Country Party was
influenced too much by the FSA, the GA clearly had a
definite influence on policy as well as on strategy.
And while members complained about the performance
of coalition governments, they also praised many of
the actions of Country Party ministers. Consequently,
the GA was keen to retain its link with the party,
and it disaffiliated in 19^5 reluctantly, for the sake
2of the party’s futures.
Despite the end of the formal link the GA’s 
relationship with the Country Party did not change 
greatly. While the Association no longer had its own 
representatives on the Country Party’s Central Council, 
it continued to supply the party with a large amount
1
Between 1920 and 19^5 three GA Presidents and ex­
presidents secured seats in the N.S.W. Legislative 
Council, one ex-president was elected to the House 
of Representatives and one ex-vice-president to the 
Legislative Assembly. At least another eight activists 
were also elected to parliamentary office.
2
In 1 9 ^  the FSA withdrew from the party because of 
dissatisfaction, particularly over wheat policy, and to 
secure greater freedom in approaching Labor governments. 
Moreover, its affiliation with the Country Party was 
seen as the main stumbling block to unity with the 
Wheatgrowers’ Union. The G A ’s withdrawal was 
recommended by the Association’s leaders after 
discussions with the Country Party. The GA Secretary 
reported to members in 19^+6 that the Association 
withdrew ’to relieve the Country Party from any charge, 
however ill-founded, that it was the political 
representative of one section of the community only, and 
to leave the party free to establish itself as 
representative of country people in the broadest 
possible sense’, (The Graziers’ Annual 19^-6, p . 92) .
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of finance and to have a real influence on strategy and
policy. Likewise it continued to keep the Country Party
in close alliance with the Liberal Party. Since 19 +^5
the Association has often been dissatisfied with the
party’s performance while in office. In 1950 it reacted
angrily to the Menzies Government's wool sales
deduction acts,“*“ and more recently it has expressed
strong dissatisfaction with the tariff policies
2followed under John McEwen. In the last decade the GA 
has also complained frequently that the Country Party 
pays too much attention to the demands of wheat-sheep 
farmers and dairyfarmers. But at the same time, the 
GA still sees a value in its close association with and 
support of the Country Party, and should Labor return 
to office in either parliament its enthusiasm for the 
Country Party will inevitably be quickly rekindled.
Since 19^5 the GA has also continued its policy 
of supporting individual Liberal Party candidates in 
country electorates not contested by the Country Party. 
In the 1950s, it also provided support for Liberal 
candidates running against the federal Labor leader,
1
See Chapter 11.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1962, 1966, 1967* In 1967
a new organisation opposed to the Country Party's 
policies, particularly on tariffs, attracted considerable 
attention. At the time it was rumoured that this 
organisation, called the Basic Industries Group, was 
being supported by many prominent graziers. However, 
there is no evidence that any leaders of the GA were 
connected with this organisations, and it is doubtful 
whether it was any more than a front for a few wealthy 
Country Party defectors.
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Dr H.V. Evatt, in the Sydney electorate of Barton,
In 1951 Evatt held his seat by a majority of 2^ +3 votes, 
in 195^ by 993, and in 1955 by 226. The GA sees its 
support for the Liberal Party as a contribution to the 
battle to keep Labor out of office, and only 
secondarily as a means of achieving specific policies 
in the interests of graziers.
Members of Parliament
In the early years of its career in politics
the GA relied extensively on appeals to individual
members of parliament. This was mainly because its
chief concern was to block the passage of legislation
detrimental to the interests of graziers, rather than
to initiate changes or secure government assistance.
Moreover, until the second decade of this century the
party situation was more fluid and party discipline
was less strict. Thus, in 1907 the Association lobbied
members of the State parliament to secure amendments to
2a shearers' accommodation bill; in I9O0 it wrote to
all N.S.W. members of the Senate asking them to press
3for the removal of duties on shearing machines;
1
In 1957 the GA President told delegates at the Annual 
Conference: 'I assure the Conference that Nancy Wake
[who opposed Evatt in 1951] would never have opposed 
Dr Evatt, and I do not think Dr Evatt would have been 
opposed in the last elections, if it had not been for 
the support of the Special Purposes Fund'. (Verbatim 
report, Annual Conference records, 1957)*
2
Council minutes, 29 November 1907*
Ibid., 29 January 1908.
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and in 1910 representations were made to members of 
both houses of the State parliament to secure the defeat 
of a closer settlement bill.^
Today appeals to individual members of parliament
are relatively much less important in the Association’s
overall political strategy. With a much greater interest
in initiating changes and securing new forms of
government assistance, and with the increased dominance
of the Executive over parliament, the Association now
relies mainly on direct approaches to Ministers and
departments. In addition, the GA now has appreciably
fewer of its members and ex-leaders in parliament than
2in the period from 1920 to 1945* Nevertheless, members 
of parliament still constitute a useful intermediate 
political target, and sometimes a secondary target,
1
Annual Report, 1910. Matthews (’The Political Activities 
of the Australian Employers’ Federation') has shown that 
in this period lobbying members of parliament was one 
of the main tactics used by employers’ groups.
2
In the period 1920-45, members and ex-leaders who held 
parliamentary seats included: C.L.A. Abbott (M.H.R.,
1925-9 and 1931-7), J.P. Abbott (M.H.R., 1940-9);
James Ashton (M.L.C., 1907-34), A.E. Hunt (M.L.C.,
1916-30), Sir Norman Kater (M.L.C., 1923-54), W.W. Killen
(M.H.R., 1922-31), A.G. Manning (M.L.A., 1917-20 and
M.H.R., 1922-8), H.C. Moulder (M.L.C., 1934-46), W.F.M.
Ross (M.L.A., 1932-41), C .A . Sinclair (M.L.A., 1932-4l),
Sir Frederick Tout (M.L.C., 1932-46), Sir Graham Waddell
(M.L.C., 1937-49), and J.C. White (M.L.C., 1908-27).
In 194i the Association made efforts to have its General 
Secretary nominated for election to the Legislative 
Council, but the coalition Government was defeated 
before this was achieved.
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to block unfavourable legislation, to publicise the 
Association’s policies, and to bring pressure to bear 
on governments.
The GA makes the most frequent use of appeals to
members of parliament when Labor is in office» It
regularly supplies leaders of both non-Labor parties
with statements of its policies, detailed information
and arguments to use in debates and public statements,
possible amendments to bills, and suggestions for
items to be included in policy speeches during election
campaigns. In 1963, for instance, the Association
kept in close touch with the leaders of both opposition
parties in the N.S.W. parliament when the Labor
Government introduced the Crown Lands (Amendment) Bill
which provided for increased rentals on future Crown
leases/ The following year the GA supplied leaders
of both parties with a detailed statement of its
policy on tuberculosis testing of cattle, and suggested
that reference to this subject might be included in the
2Liberal leader’s policy speech. On major matters the 
GA also appeals to all non-Labor members (in the case 
of the Commonwealth parliament to members from N.S.W.) 
as well as the party leaders. Because Labor 
Governments have often lacked effective majorities in 
the N.S.W. upper house, on a number of occasions the 
Association has been able to block or amend legislative
1
Report of Proceedings 19^3» p.44.
Report of Proceedings 1964, p.15*
2
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proposals of Labor governments by appeals to non-Labor
members of the Legislative Council."* On rare occasions
the GA has appealed to Labor members, as well as non-
Labor members, in an effort to block legislation
introduced by a Labor Government. One example was in
19^7 when the Association requested its members and
local branches to write letters and send telegrams to
their local federal members protesting against the
2Government's plans to nationalise banks.
But at times the GA also appeals to non-Labor 
back-benchers and even to Labor members to veto 
proposals of non-Labor governments. In i960 the GA 
wrote to all N.S.W. Country Party members of the House 
of Representatives in an effort to bring pressure to 
bear on the Government to provide additional finance
3for the construction of wheat storage facilities.
A decade earlier the Association lobbied all non-Labor 
members of the federal parliament from N.S.W. to veto 
the wool sales deduction proposals of the Government.
It also encouraged branches to protest to their local
4members, both non-Labor and Labor. Approaches to
1
For instance, in 1962 the Association secured an 
amendment to the Government's Factories, Shops and 
Industries Bill by appealing to members of the 
Legislative Council. The amendment excluded rural 
holdings from the definition of 'factory'.
2
Muster, 15 September 19^7*
3
Report of Proceedings i960, p.3^+; Council minutes, 
22-23 June i960.
4
See chapter 1 1 .
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Labor members to help block the proposals of a non-Labor 
government however, are rarely made since the Association 
is reluctant to give Labor any assistance whatsoever 
and to take any action which could jeopardise a non- 
Labor government’s future. And when such approaches 
are made, they come from individual members and from 
local branches rather than from the Association’s 
leaders or staff.
The Judiciary
In Australia the judiciary is generally 
considered to be apart from politics, and political 
scientists have done little to dispel this notion.^
Yet the judiciary is clearly involved in the political 
process. Judges and magistrates constitute another set 
of actors in the political system, and the law courts 
are another arena of government in which conflict 
is resolved and in which authoritative decisions are 
made on public policy. Consequently, the judiciary and 
the courts provide another means by which groups can 
achieve political objectives.
1
Political scientists have neglected almost completely 
study of the Australian judiciary. Two exceptions 
however, are John Playford, ’Judges and Politics in 
Australia’, A .P . S.A . News, Vol. 6, No.l (August 
1961); and Glendon Schubert, ’Political Ideology on the 
High Court’, Politics, Vol. Ill, No.l (May 1968). 
Schubert considers that if Australian political 
scientists ’aspire to a comprehensive analysis, 
understanding, and explanation of the Australian 
polity, then [they] ... must pay greater attention in 
the future, than they have in the past, to the study 
of the politics of the judiciary’.
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For well over half a century the GA and its federal
bodies have channelled demands to the judiciary. But
while the judiciary has been an important political
target, it has always been of secondary importance,
compared to direct appeals to Ministers and departments,
for a number of reasons. Like most economic pressure
groups, the Association generally appeals to the courts
only when it is denied access to its primary targets,
or when other action fails. Litigation involves more
work and effort than direct approaches to government.
It is often a lengthy process, and the costs can be
heavy. In the early 1950s joint participation with a
number of other farm groups in one case which involved
an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council cost the Association almost £7,000.^ The
judiciary is also a secondary rather than primary target
because the range of objectives and demands that a
group can achieve by litigation is extremely limited.
Generally there is only limited scope to use appeals
to the judiciary as a means of initiating new
government action, and groups can successfully veto
the implementation of regulations or legislation only
if it can be shown that they are legally invalid.
Moreover, sometimes when the validity of regulations is
questioned by pressure groups, departments make changes
2without litigation being commenced; frequently the
1
Annual Report 195^» p.8. This case concerned taxation 
of profits to woolgrowers from the sale of the war-time 
stockpile of wool. The total cost of the action was 
£ 18,105 .
2
This apparently happened in 1962 with regulations 
issued to rangers by the Department of Agriculture.
See Report of Proceedings 1963» p .19•
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threat of litigation is suff icient to secure changes»
In Australia the scope for pressure groups to employ 
litigation, to achieve their goals is more limited 
than in the United States where groups can influence 
the apointment of judges and have the advantages of the 
amicus curiae brief.^ Apart from all these factors, 
the extent to which the GA employs legal action is also 
limited by the natural reluctance of its leaders and 
staff to embark on action that could prove costly, 
unless they think there is a good chance of achieving 
success. On many occasions the GA has secured legal 
advice on an act or regulation considered to be against 
the interests of graziers, but then, on the basis of 
the advice, has decided against instituting legal 
proceedings.^
In Australia the High Court, which exercises the
power of judicial review, is the main target for
3pressure groups within the judicial system. The 
High Court can declare legislation or regulations of 
both Commonwealth and State governments void if they 
are found to be inconsistent with the constitution of
1
See Zeigler, pp.308-17; Holtzman, pp.l34~7; and 
Clement E. Vose, ’Litigation as a Form of Pressure 
Group Activity’, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science^  Vol. 319 (September 1958). 
In many courts including the United States Supreme 
Court pressure groups can file an amicus curiae brief 
which enables them, even though they may not be a direct 
party to a dispute, to file briefs and/or present oral 
arguments to the court.
2
One example was over the wool sales deduction acts. 
(See chapter ll).
On the powers of the High Court, see Crisp, chapter 3*
3
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the Commonwealth» It has power to interpret the
constitution. But although it is the main target within
the judicial system, the High Court is not, as Matthews
implies,^" the sole target. Certainly it is not the
sole target for the GA, as will be shown later.
Moreover, although the GA uses litigation mainly to
veto legislation and regulations when direct action
fails, in a sense it sometimes employs litigation to
initiate changes or as a stop-gap measure until it can
secure changes by other means. In 19655 for example,
following a ruling of the Commonwealth Industrial
Court in 1964 that shearing employees could quit sheds
without forfeiture of wages, graziers were troubled
2by shearers leaving during shearing. As a protective 
möve, the Association prosecuted a group of shearers 
who walked out at one station in the Armidale district. 
In the Armidale court five of the offenders were fined 
£5 each, with costs varying from £8.7*0 to £18.17*10.
The Association reported to members:
The case received some publicity and it is 
considered that this action by the 
Association had a salutary effect until 
more adequate disciplinary provisions 
were obtained in the 1965 Pastoral 
Industry Award,
Matthews, 'Pressure Groups in Australia', pp.215-17*
Report of Proceedings 1965? P •5
Ibid.
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The structure of the judicial system, as well as 
the Australian political culture, limits the kind of 
relations that groups can establish with judges, and 
also the channels that they can use to convey demands» 
Relationships can only be formal, and demands can only 
be conveyed through formal judicial procedures. Judges 
are insulated from most of the outside political 
pressures to which Ministers and bureaucrats are 
subjected, and the ’rules of the game’ stamp as 
improper any attempts by groups to work outside these 
bounds.
The Association participates in legal action in 
three different ways. Occasionally it initiates 
proceedings in its own name. The case already cited 
concerning the prosecution of shearers is one example. 
Another occurred in 1933-4 when, with five other 
employers’ organisations, the GA challenged in the High 
Court the validity of the N.S.W. Labor Government’s 
Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act which 
introduced compulsory unionism.^ This action was 
initiated because the Association’s legal advisers 
were of the opinion that the Act could not be applied 
to employers whose business consisted mainly of 
interstate trade or commerce (i.e. because of section 92 
of the Commonwealth constitution) or to members of a
1
Annual Report, 1933 d p.18; Annual Report, 1934, p .10; 
and Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1933« The other 
employers’ organisations were the Chamber of 
Manufactures of N.S.W., the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, 
the Employers’ Federation of N.S.W., the Metal Trades 
Employers’ Association, and the Retail Traders’ 
Association.
349
State branch of a union registered under the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act,
The extent to which pressure groups can initiate
litigation in their own name is very limited since as
a rule in Australia only direct parties to a dispute
can initiate and participate in legal action, Thus,
the GA relies mainly on test cases, and on giving
financial support to other groups and to non-members
involved in litigation. With a test case, a member
of the Association who can claim to be a direct party
to a dispute becomes the nominal litigant, and the
Association bears the financial responsibility of
litigation in order to establish some general
principle. The GA has often employed this procedure.
For example, in 1923 the Executive Committee decided
to initiate a test case in the name of a member to
test the validity of the basis on which taxation
authorities were assessing income derived from the
liquidation of the war-time stock-pile of wool.^
In 1927 the GFC successfully challenged in the High
Court, by means of a test case, the validity of the
methods adopted by the Federal Taxation Commissioner
in assessing the value of Crown leaseholds for
2taxation under the Commonwealth Taxation Act. More 
recently in the 1960s the GA made plans to challenge
1
Minutes of Council, 25 May 1923*
2
N.S.W, Graziers* Annual 1927, pp.49-50« The matter 
was dealt with by the Graziers’ Vigilance Committee, 
a sub-committee of the GFC.
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the validity of the practice of the Commissioner of
Taxation in assessing gift duty on the purchase of
property by instalments, free of interest. To escape
liability for gift duty, many graziers had adopted
the practice of transferring property to their
children by sale at market price, but with payment
spread over a number of years and with no interest
being charged. The Commissioner of Taxation then
began assessing gift duty on the amount of interest
that might have been payable, and calculating this at
7 per cent per annum. In 1962 the Association invited
members who had met this problem to contact the
secretariat. Many did so, and the Association advised
them how to protect their interests until a test case
could be initiated.^ In the end, the Association did
not proceed with its plans for a test case, but instead
supported financially an appellant from another State
pwho had already initiated litigation. In 1965 in this
case (McGain v. the Commissioner for Taxation) the High
3Court found in favour of the Commissioner. These 
examples of test cases relate to the initiation of 
litigation. In addition, on occasions the GA also 
defends members in prosecutions in order to establish 
general principles. For instance, in i960 the 
Association successfully defended two members before 
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, one in a
1
Report of Proceedings 1962, pp.3^-5*
2
Report of Proceedings 1965> p.36.
Ibid.
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prosecution for breach of the Federal Pastoral Industry
Award, and the other for breach of the Commonwealth
Conciliation and Arbitration Act for alleged
victimisation of station hands when they joined the
AWU.^  In 1961 it successfully defended a member
against prosecution by the Wade Shire Council for
2failure to eradicate Bathurst Burr. In this case 
the Executive Committee considered that the member had 
consistently used approved methods to eradicate weeds. 
Subsequently the Shire Council withdrew similar 
prosecutions against other landowners in the area.
The following year the Association defended a member 
in the Young district in a prosecution for alleged 
assault on a union organiser. At the first hearing 
the charge was found proved, but the summons was 
dismissed. On appeal by the Association the
magistrate’s finding was upset, the judge holding that
3the evidence did not support the finding.
Less frequently the Association gives financial 
support to other groups and non-members who have initiated 
litigation that has a direct bearing on the interests of 
its members. One example has already been given.
Another case was in 1953 when the Association supported 
the Australian Hauliers’ Federation which, through the 
firm of Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd., sought from the High
1
Report of Proceedings i960, p.8.
2
Report of Proceedings 1961, p .67 »
Report of Proceedings 1962, p .5•
3
Court a declaration that the N.S.¥. State Transport
(Co-ordination) Act 1931-1950 was beyond the powers of
the State Government in that it infringed section 92
of the Commonwealth constitution.^ When the High Court
upheld the validity of the Act, Hughes and Vale
successfully appealed to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council which subsequently declared the
2legislation invalid. As a rule, most cases in which
the Association participates through giving financial
support are cases initiated by business pressure groups
or commercial firms. However, at least on one occasion,
the Association has supported wheat-sheep farmers'
organisations in a test case. In the late 19^+0s wheat-
sheep farmers’ organisations, led by the F S A , formed
3the Australian Wheat Industry Defence Council to 
initiate a test case, in the name of Nelungaloo Pty.
Ltd., to challenge the validity of regulations and 
orders under which wheat was compulsorily acquired during 
the war by the Commonwealth. The contention was that 
section 51 of the constitution required wheatgrowers to be 
paid prices equal to the 'export parity' prices that they 
would have received if the pool had not operated, 
whereas under the pool they had received lower prices 
since the Australian Wheat Board had sold about half 
the war-time crops in Australia at prices less than
1
Report of Proceedings 1953°
2
Matthews, 'Pressure Groups in Australia', p„2l6. 
3
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 19^8.
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those obtained overseas« Under pressure from its
2wheatgrowing members, the GA subscribed £500 to assist
the case but, in order to limit its financial
responsibility to this amount, it refused membership
3of the Council. The High Court found in favour of 
the Commonwealth, and appeals to both the High Court
4and the Privy Council failed.
The GA tends to use appeals to the judiciary more 
often when the Labor Party is in power because Labor 
administrations often pass legislation and make 
regulations that graziers consider to be a threat to 
their interests. The GA also has less effective access 
to Labor governments. Nevertheless, as our examples 
show, the GA has often challenged regulations, and 
sometimes legislation, of non-Labor governments.
Committees of Inquiry and Royal Commissions
Governments in Australia frequently appoint official 
committees, consisting of parliamentarians, public 
servants or persons outside government, and Royal 
Commissions to make investigations on specific questions 
and to draw up recommendations for action. But with 
both official committees and Royal Commissions,
1
Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 
1929-19^9, Melbourne, I9 6 3 , p.2l4.
2
Minutes of Annual Conference, 19^+8.
3
Minutes of General Council, l4-15 July 19^+8.
4
Sawer, p„2l4, and Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1952.
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governments are under no legal compulsion to adopt 
whatever recommendations are made. Often they do adopt 
them;, but at other times they implement only those 
recommendations that suit, or virtually reject them 
entirely by failing to take any action whatsoever.
Since committees and Royal Commissions are advisory 
rather than decision-making bodies, they provide 
pressure groups with a potential intermediate target.
By persuading a committee or Commission to its point 
of view, a group can possibly influence Ministers and 
departments.
For many years the GA has utilised every possible 
opportunity to influence governments through committees 
and Commissions. As early as 1913 it presented 
evidence to a Commonwealth Royal Commission on 
industrial arbitration and in 1920 to a Commonwealth 
Royal Commission on taxation. Even earlier, it 
submitted evidence to a number of official committees 
of inquiry appointed by N.S.W. governments.
The GA uses four distinct strategies with regard 
to committees and Commissions. In the first place, 
when it considers that an official inquiry on some 
specific matter could work to its advantage, it 
presses the appropriate government for a committee or 
Commission to be appointed. For a number of years the 
Association pressed, principally through the AW G C ,
1
Minutes of Council, 30 July 1913) 12 March 1919)
and 2 k November 1920.
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for the Commonwealth Government to appoint an expert 
committee to undertake a general enquiry into the 
Australian economy and economic policies,  ^ When such 
a committee was eventually appointed in 1962, the 
Association claimed part of the credit for its 
appointment, and noted with satisfaction that the 
terms of reference given to the committee included 
all the main items which it had sought.1 2
Second, the Association tries to influence the
terms of reference given to committees and Commissions
and, in the case of committees, the appointment of
their personnel. In i 960 the GFC unsuccessfully tried
to persuade the Federal Treasurer to widen the terms
of reference given to an official committee appointed
3to investigate income tax laws. Influencing the 
appointment of committee personnel is even more 
difficult. However, at times the GA appears to have 
exerted some influence on appointments, and sometimes 
its leaders or members have been appointed to 
committees, though as a rule they have been appointed 
as individuals and not as representatives of the 
Association. With regard to securing representation 
on official committees, the GA was in a stronger 
position before the wheat-sheep farmers' organisations 
emerged as a legitimate voice of woolgrower opinion,
1
Report of Proceedings 1962, pp.40-1; and Annual 
Conference minutes, 1962.
2
Ibid., p.4l.
Report of Proceedings i960 , pp.47-8.
3
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Xt secured its most advantageous position on a 
committee in the late 1920s when Dr Norman Kater 
was appointed by the Commonwealth Government as 
chairman of a committee of five to inquire into the 
pastoral industry with special reference to drought, 
and I,Wo Allen, the Association’s Secretary, was 
appointed as secretary to the committee."*"
Third, once committees and Commissions are
appointed, the GA prepares submissions and then at
public hearings submits oral evidence. In recent
years the GA has presented submissions and evidence to
many inquiries including a N.S.W. Royal Commission on
2Local Government Finance and Valuation, select
3committees on the timber industry and on drought
4relief, the Commonwealth Wool Marketing Committee of
er
Enquiry, and (through the A W G C ) the Committee of 
Economic Enquiry.^ The Association’s submissions are
1
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 1928, p .45; and N.S.W. Graziers’ 
Annual, p p •39, 59*
2
Report of Proceedings 1966, pp.51-2.
3
Report to General Council, 19-20 July 1967*
4
’Drought Control and Drought Relief’, submission by 
the Association to the Select Committee of the 
Legislative Assembly upon Drought Relief, 15 March 1966.
5
Report of Proceedings 1961, pp.80~5.
6
See, The Australian Grazing Industry: A Case for
Economic Independence, a booklet published by the 
AWGC in 1963 based on its submission to the Committee 
of Economic Enquiry.
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always carefully prepared and well-documented; usually
specialist sub-committees and outside experts assist
the staff in their preparation. Oral evidence is
usually presented by staff members of the Association
or the AWGC, or by outside experts. For example, the
Association's case to the Royal Commission Local
Government Finance and Valuation was presented by the
AWGC1s Economist, the Association's consulting valuer,
2and the Association's Research Officer, The Research
Officer appeared twice, the first time to present the
Association's submission, and the second time at the
request of the Commission to comment on the likely
effects of a change from the unimproved capital value
system of rating to a system of assessed annual value
rating. At times local branches also submit evidence 
3to enquiries. Relations with members of Royal 
Commissions, like those with the judiciary, can only 
be formal, and only formal channels of communcation 
can be used. On the other hand, members of committees 
can sometimes be lobbied individually, and on 
occasions they seek advice and information individually 
from interested pressure groups. On one occasion in 
recent years the chairman of a select committee
1
For example, the Association’s submission to the 
Select Committee on Drought Control ran to twenty-nine 
pages, It was divided into twelve chapters, and 
included two appendices.
2
Report of Proceedings 1966, pp.51-2.
3
A number of local branches submitted evidence to 
an inquiry in 1965-6 on drought relief. See, Second 
Progress Report from the Select Committee of the 
Legislative Assembly upon Drought Relief, Sydney, 1966.
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discussed technical details in his draft report with 
the Association’s staff.
Finally? once a committee or Royal Commission has 
submitted its report, the Association presses for it 
to be publicly released and, if the recommendations 
are favourable, for their implementation0
Other Pressure Groups
The Association uses other pressure groups to 
communicate its demands to government in two distinct 
ways: peak organisations and commodity federations
with which it is institutionally linked, it will be 
remembered, are used to communicate demands on the 
Association’s behalf, while a wide range of other 
groups are used as intermediate targets.
As a rule, other groups are used as intermediate 
targets only when the Association feels that it needs 
additional support on some particular issue. On 
such issues it lobbies other farm groups, business 
groups and even non-economic pressure groups in order 
to get them to voice support for its demands, and/or 
to make separate representations. Sometimes other 
groups have to be convinced that their interests are 
affected. For instance, in 1956 the N.S.W. Government 
announced that it planned to introduce a land tax on 
the unimproved capital value of land. As well as 
making direct representations to the Government and 
waging a public campaign, the Association lobbied 
all municipalities and shires, after discussions 
with the Local Government Association, ’drawing
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attention to the serious encroachment into a field of 
taxation traditionally left to Local Government'
Even rival pressure groups sometimes have a gentlemen’s 
agreement to give support to each other on certain non- 
controversial issues. Such an arrangement appears to 
operate on occasions between the GA and the U F W A .
1
Report of Proceedings 1956.
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CHAPTER 10
P olitical Effectiveness
As a pressure group, the G A ’s main aim is to 
influence the content and administration of public 
policy in order to promote and protect the interests 
of its memberso Consequently, its effectiveness in 
politics must be judged primarily on the basis of the 
political influence or power that it commands. At the 
same time, there are other criteria for assessing the 
political effectiveness of a group. Two criteria that 
we will use are the Association’s impact on other 
political actors and on the political system, and its 
own assessment of its success in achieving its political 
goals.
Political influence
Briefly, a pressure group can be said to have 
achieved political influence or power when it induces 
a government, government department, or statutory or 
local government authority to act in a specified 
direction in relation to a particular policy or its 
administration, and despite some degree of resistance 
or reluctance. As we have seen, the GA is constantly 
involved in efforts to initiate changes in public 
policy and administration, and to veto changes proposed 
by governments and governmental authorities, and by 
other pressure groups.
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According to our model, the Association's political 
effectiveness is dependent on environmental factors, 
group characteristics and the way the Association 
behaves in politics. As well as having a direct 
influence on effectiveness, environmental factors also 
have an indirect influence through their influence on 
group characteristics and behaviour. The Association's 
group characteristics likewise affect its effectiveness 
indirectly through their influence on its behaviour. We 
must now examine the factors within each of our three 
categories that are of major importance in determining 
the GA’s political influence, and assess in which 
direction they operate (i.e. whether they increase or 
limit its influence).^
The influence that any economic pressure group 
commands is closely related to many different economic 
factors including the importance of the industry or 
industries represented in terms of production, 
employment and export earnings, and the state of the 
economy. Because of the declining relative importance 
of primary industries compared to secondary industries, 
and the much greater importance of secondary industries 
as employers of labour, all primary producers’ bodies 
are at a clear political disadvantage when competing
1
Some useful suggestions about factors which affect 
the political influence of pressure groups are to be 
found in Zeigler, pp.iv-vi; Finer (second edition, 1966), 
p p .74-82; Lawrence D. Longley, 'Interest Group 
Interaction in a Legislative System', The Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 29, No.3 (August 1967); and Eckstein,
pp.92-112.
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for influence against manufacturers. On the other hand, 
all governments are well aware of the economic 
importance to the nation of rural industries, and in 
particular the three major rural export industries, 
wool, wheat and meat. Governments, as well as producers, 
have a vested interest in these industries; a bad wheat 
season, or a fall of a few cents per pound for wool can 
mean a loss to the nation of millions of dollars in 
export income. Consequently, it is not difficult for 
farm organisations to persuade governments to adopt 
policies which promise to increase the efficiency and 
productivity of these industries - provided, of course, 
the policies are economically sound and not too costly, 
and have the wide support of producers. Many forms of 
assistance such as bounties on fertilizer, and 
government grants to match growers' levies for research 
and promotion programmes, have been secured by the GA 
in conjunction with other groups without the use of 
any real 'pressure'. Then, too, economic conditions are 
particularly important when groups seek financial 
assistance or concessions. Frequently governments are 
prevented from adopting proposals put forward by 
responsible groups simply because money is unavailable 
at the time. At other times governments are unable to 
reduce taxation or charges because they need the 
revenue such measures provide. As we have noted, the 
Askin Government in its first term of office refused 
GA demands for abolition of land tax on rural properties 
largely because it needed the income the tax provided.
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Similarly, as the case-study on the wool sales deduction 
acts shows,"*" the Menzies Government in 1950 persisted 
with the pre-payment plan, despite angry protests from 
woolgrowers, because it faced a serious problem of 
inflation, caused partly by high wool prices, and because 
it needed to balance its budget.
Cultural factors also play an important part in 
determining success in politics. Any pressure group is 
more likely to succeed when its goals are not in 
conflict with the values of society. Moreover, its 
chances of success are improved when its demands are 
supported or favoured by a large section of the 
population, and when it can convince the public that 
what it seeks is in the public interest. Thus, when 
the GA and other groups have campaigned for government 
measures to control tuberculosis and other contagious 
diseases among cattle, they have had no difficulty 
in arguing that their demand is in the interest of public 
health as well as to the advantage of graziers and 
farmers. At the same time, lack of sympathy for 
graziers because of their wealth and high social status 
has often worked to the Association’s disadvantage 
over issues like closer settlement and taxation concessions 
for owners of larger holdings. Groups can often 
capitalise on deep-seated community prejudices and 
beliefs. In 1951 and 1965, for instance, the GA and 
other groups played effectively on woolgrowers' fears 
of socialism, bureaucracy and government intervention
1
See chapter 11.
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in their campaigns to defeat proposals for reserve 
price marketing schemes.
Political factors are perhaps of even greater 
importance. Whether the GA or any other pressure group 
succeeds or fails with any demand depends above all on 
the official actors in government. GA leaders and staff 
are well aware of this fact; they do not subscribe to 
the view that governments are mere pawns to be pushed 
around at the whims and fancies of powerful groups. 
Admittedly, governments frequently give the major 
economic pressure groups what they demand, or at least 
make some concessions to their demands. But the important 
point is that governments can and do refuse the demands 
of powerful groups, even those which contribute financial 
support to keep them in office. And in the short term, 
there is little that an individual pressure group can 
do to change the unfavourable decision of a government.
As we have noted, while the GA secures preference from 
non-Labor governments, such governments often refuse 
its demands and on occasions introduce legislation which 
GA members strongly oppose. Then too, whether the 
Association succeeds or fails with any demand it makes, 
depends largely on the amount of support it receives 
and opposition it faces from other pressure groups.
Its chances of success are at a minimum when it is 
opposed by its rivals in the wool, wheat and meat 
industries. Similarly the GA’s probability of success 
is reduced when there is strong opposition from both 
business interests and trade unions, particularly if the 
GA is trying to initiate rather than veto changes. The 
powerful opposition of manufacturers and labour is
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perhaps the most important reason why farm groups have 
been so ineffective in securing changes in tariff policy. 
On the other hand, the GA has often done particularly 
well on matters such as cattle compensation, pest control, 
storage facilities for wheat, drought relief, and rail 
facilities for stock on which it has been able to work 
harmoniously with other farm groups and on which it 
has faced no opposition from the other major economic 
sections.
We have already seen that the GA has many useful 
political resources but some serious disabilities.
Its advice on technical matters concerning wool policy 
carries weight because it speaks for a high proportion 
of larger growers. Because it has a large and constant 
membership and because it has the financial and staff 
resources to fight effective campaigns, governments are 
loath to antagonise the GA unnecessarily on issues about 
which its members feel strongly. As a result of the 
successful campaign the GA fought in 1965 over the 
reserve price referendum,'*“ it seems unlikely that any 
government in the near future would attempt to alter 
the wool marketing system without taking into account 
the possible implications of opposition from the G A „
On the other hand, the GA’s inability to speak for all 
wool, wheat and meat producers and its smaller size in 
comparison to the UFWA limits its influence. GA leaders 
recognise this fact. On occasions non-Labor Ministers 
have admitted to them privately that they prefer a
1
See Chapter 12.
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policy proposed by the graziers’ associations rather 
than one sought by the wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations, 
but that for electoral reasons they are unable to adopt 
the graziers’ proposal.
Finally, the Association’s political effectiveness 
depends on its behaviour in politics - in other words, 
the mobilisation of its political resources for political 
ends and to achieve specific objectives, its skill in 
doing this, and the tactics it employs. Particularly 
on non-controversial issues the GA’s influence with 
governments is enhanced by the quality of its 
submissions. Frequently the Association has succeeded 
in influencing a government simply because it has put 
forward an economically sound and well-argued case.
The GA has also been able to influence governments 
because of its reputation for giving accurate 
information and sound advice. Government departments 
know which of their clientele groups can be relied 
upon for information and advice. The GA’s chances of 
success are also improved by its persistence, by its 
realistic approach to economic policy matters, by its 
wide interests in government of three different levels, 
by its concentration as far as possible on direct 
approaches to decision-makers, and by its alliances 
with other influential pressure groups to secure 
certain of its goals. On the other hand, its influence 
is limited with Labor governments because of its 
ideological position and inability to establish close 
relations with Ministers. Similarly its influence 
at the national level is limited by organisational 
problems and the fact that the AWGC does not have an 
office in Canberra.
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Assessment of Political Influence
Power and influence are key concepts in political 
science, and ones that in the last decade have been 
subject to rigorous analysis."*" But the techniques 
that have been developed for detecting, measuring and 
comparing political influence and power are relatively 
crude instruments and not well-suited to the analysis 
of the political influence of a pressure group. Indeed, 
little has yet been done to develop techniques
2specifically for analysing pressure group influence.
There are many difficulties in analysing the 
political influence of a pressure group even in relation 
to individual policy-areas and demands. Influence is 
difficult to detect. The fact that a pressure group is
1
See Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis,
Englewood Cliffs, 1963, Who Governs?, and ’The Concept 
of Power', Behavioral Science, Vol. 2 (1957)5 Nelson W. 
Polsby, Community and Political Theory, New Haven, 1963; 
Robert Presthus, Men at the Top; a Study of Community 
Power, New York, 1964; Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: 
Political Process in American Society, New York,I967I 
Parker, ’Power in Australia’; and S. Encel, ’Power’, in 
Peter Coleman (ed.), Australian Civilization, Melbourne 
1962 .
2
There are three main methods that have been developed 
to study power relations in a society. These are the 
positional method (as used by C. Wright Mills in The 
Power Elite), the reputational method (developed by 
Floyd Hunter and used in his Community Power Structure, 
Chapel Hill, 1953) and Robert Dahl’s method as used in 
Who Governs?) of studying participation in decision­
making within key issue areas. Of the three methods, 
the latter would appear to hold the most promise for 
the development of suitable techniques to study the 
power and influence of pressure groups.
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consulted by governments and represented on official 
advisory committees is not proof of influence. Moreover, 
a government can change a policy in a direction sought 
by a pressure group yet without being influenced by the 
group. And even when a group is influential in securing 
the modification of a policy or retention of the status 
quo, it is often extremely difficult to secure conclusive 
evidence that this was the case. In most cases such 
evidence could not be obtained without interviewing all 
the major actors and without access to the records of 
the groups concerned as well as all official documents. 
Such a procedure is time consuming and often impossible. 
It is also difficult to measure the relative influence 
of different groups and of a single group on different 
demands. One reason is that in a power situation 
we do not always know the real positions of different 
actors at the outset, nor how much they have actually 
changed. Generally economic pressure groups ask for more 
than they expect to receive. In bargaining situations 
both groups and governments usually begin by taking up 
extreme positions, hoping to eventually arrive at a 
position close to their real or expected goal. Another 
problem in assessing influence on particular demands is 
that groups frequently achieve success only after a 
number of initial refusals. Thus, the influence of a 
pressure group needs to be studied on a long-term basis.
The task of assessing the overall influence of a 
pressure group is even more difficult, particularly 
in the case of complex organisations (like the GA) 
which are constantly communicating a large range and 
volume of demands to many different primary targets
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at three different levels of government. With the GA, 
the task of assessing political influence is made more 
difficult by the fact that frequently other pressure 
groups as well are involved in attempting to influence 
governments on the same issues as the GA.
While no wholly satisfactory solution is available 
to overcome these problems, it is still possible to 
make an assessment of some value. There is no doubt 
that the GA is relatively influential as a pressure 
group. With representation on many different boards 
and committees,^ and having opportunities to participate 
in negotiations, the GA is often in a position to 
influence policy and administration. Moreover, not 
only its rivals but also Ministers and public servants 
consider that the Association is influential. Sometimes 
governments even admit that they are making changes in 
response to requests from the GA.
The GA can point to many notable successes. With 
other groups it has successfully vetoed many attempts 
of wheat-sheep farmers to secure stabilised marketing 
for the wool industry. The Association’s greatest 
achievements have probably been the defeat of the two 
reserve price schemes in the wool referenda of 1951 
and 1965» The GA can justly claim much of the credit 
for the establishment and development of the extensive 
wool promotion and research programmes, for the 
initiation of similar programmes for the meat industry,
1
See chapter 8.
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for the development and modification of the N.S.W. 
cattle compensation scheme, and for the many taxation 
advantages and concessions enjoyed by graziers and 
farmers/ It played an important part in securing 
a subsidy on superphosphate and later a bounty on
2the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilisers in Australia. 
It has always been influential on industrial matters. 
Apart from its more notable and publicised successes, 
over the years the GA has secured numerous minor policy 
and administrative changes in many different fields.
The case-study on cattle compensation shows some of the 
numerous minor changes it has secured in this field. 
Similar changes have been achieved in many other areas, 
particularly with State and local government authorities. 
Some observers would probably regard many of the minor 
successes claimed by the Association as trivial. For 
instance, the successes claimed by the Association in 
its annual report for 1966 included: agreement by the
ABC to a request to make occasional reference to 'red 
meats’ in its programme 'To Market To Market'; the 
repair and alteration by the Railways Department of the 
trucking yards at Bourke in response to a request by 
the Association; and a promise from the Postmaster- 
General's Department that the question of increasing 
the number of after-hours telephone connections in the
1
For claims of successes see various issues of the 
Report of Proceedings and Muster, 7 July 1965.
2
On this see Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April I966 and 
The Land, 27 October 1966.
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Tilpa district would be investigated by the District 
Telephone Manager who would visit the area personally 
and discuss the matter with subscribers.  ^ But in the 
case of the GA, as with any economic pressure group, 
such trivial successes are valued by members and 
considered to be definite achievements.
While the GA has undoubtedly secured as many
successes as, if not more than, its rivals, it has had
its fair share of failures. Indeed, because it explores
so many different possible avenues for securing
concessions to benefit its members, the Association
probably has a higher ratio of failures to total
demands than most other farm organisations. Each year,
of the total number of demands it makes, comparatively
few result in clear successes. Many are refused outright;
others secure from departments or Ministers promises of
further consideration at a later date or when funds
are available, or they drag on without any final
2decision being made. Moreover, the Association has 
had many notable failures such as its attempt to 
veto the introduction and passage through parliament 
of the wool sales deduction acts. When Labor governments 
have adopted harsh measures affecting larger graziers,
1
Report of Proceedings 1966, pp.71> 76.
2
Of the political demands made by the Association in 
1965 and reported in the Report of Proceedings 1965? 
approximately 9 per cent were successful, another 19 
per cent were partly successful, 30 per cent were 
unsuccessful, while the outcome of the remainder was 
still not known when the report was compiled.
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the GA has often been unable to take any effective veto 
action, other than to work to defeat the government and 
secure the return of a more sympathetic administration,’*"
The G A 's political influence naturally varies from 
time to time, depending on whether Labor or non-Labor 
governments are in power, on economic conditions, on 
the specific goals that the Association seeks to achieve, 
and on the actions of other pressure groups. Its 
influence also varies between different departments 
and authorities, between different areas of policy, 
and between different types of demands. Generally the 
GA is more influential with those departments with which 
it has frequent dealings and which need its co-operation 
and assistance. It probably commands greater influence 
with the N.S.W. Department of Agriculture than with any 
other department of authority. Its influence on 
different policy areas varies considerably. On wool, 
meat, livestock and arbitration matters it is much 
more influential than on wheat, tariffs, and economic 
policy. This is because on the former it has a high 
status with the appropriate authorities, and is 
recognised as a responsible and representative 
spokesman. Moreover, in these areas it is particularly 
well-experienced and it has employed its staff 
resources extensively. On wheat matters, the GA still 
has to secure full status as a spokesman, and on general
1
Issues of the Graziers* Annual and Report of 
Proceedings record many examples of unfavourable 
legislation and regulations which the GA was unable 
to do anything about.
factors that Ministers and bureaucrats must take into 
account. As we have noted, the GA also has a marked 
impact on the behaviour of its rivals, especially the 
UFWA. Particularly on wool policy, but also on many 
other matters, UFWA leaders take the GA into account 
when they are planning their tactics and approaches.
Thus, the GA ’ s impact can be said to be far greater 
than the actual influence it commands. And because 
of this impact on individual political actors it can 
be said to have an impact on the operation of the 
political system.
Another criterion of effectiveness is the 
assessment of members, leaders, and staff concerning 
the group’s success in achieving its goals. Without 
a survey it is impossible to know precisely what the 
Association’s members think about its effectiveness 
in politics. There is however, considerable evidence 
to suggest that most members are well satisfied with 
the Association’s work. As we have noted, the 
turnover in membership and the number of members who 
fall into arrears with their annual contributions 
are small, and no splinter groups have ever broken 
away from the Association. Admittedly, members 
sometimes complain about certain policy decisions, and 
about the Association’s tactics and performance in 
certain issue-areas. Indeed, GA members probably 
complain more than members of rivals organisations, 
mainly because dissent and criticism are freely 
permitted as being in keeping with democratic principles. 
During controversial campaigns the GA has also lost some 
members through resignation. But on the whole, members
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have been well satisfied with the work of the Association. 
They are always impressed most by major successes such 
as in the reserve price referendum campaign, and by 
Association’s work as an ombudsman.
Leaders and staff too, believe that the Association 
is effective in achieving its goals, although they are 
probably more critical than members of certain aspects 
of its work. Staff members see many ways in which the 
Association’s effectiveness could be increased with a 
larger staff, and many leaders would concede their 
point. On the other hand, both leaders and staff have a 
better appreciation of the difficulties facing the 
Association, and take a more realistic view of the 
amount of success that they can expect in different 
fields. They recognise that governments are often 
swayed more by votes and considerations of political 
expediency, than by rational appeals based on argument 
or by considerations of justice to all sections of 
the community. They judge effectiveness, not in terms 
of notable successes so much, as on the basis of 
performance in relation to resources and potential, 
and particular political circumstances.
To sum up, the Association’s effectiveness in 
politics is determined by environmental factors, its 
internal characteristics, and the way it behaves in 
politics. On the basis of its political influence, its 
impact on other political actors and the political 
system, and the assessment of its members, leaders and 
staff, the GA must be regarded as a relatively 
effective pressure group.
VI. CASE-STUDIES
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CHAPTER II
The Wool Sales Deduction Acts
The wool sales deduction acts of 1950 placed the GA 
in the kind of situation in which partisan political 
pressure groups sometimes find themselves when a 
favoured political party secures office and introduces 
legislation that is extremely unpopular with members. 
These acts which appeared to discriminate directly 
against woolgrowers were introduced by a Liberal- 
Country Party Government that the GA supported and had 
helped put into office. Moreover, they were introduced 
less than twelve months after the Government assumed 
office, and the Minister who conceived and introduced 
the legislation was the leader of the Country Party, 
the party which the GA had helped found and which it 
supported financially. Under pressure from its members, 
the Association sought to veto the introduction of the 
legislation, and later worked to secure its repeal.
But because of the Association’s anti-Labor orientation 
and ties with the Country Party, it found that its scope 
for influence and manouevre was severely limited. 
Consequently, its representations were largely 
unsuccessful, though it secured some concessions, 
Throughout the crisis the Association’s behaviour was 
erratic, and conflicting pressures and loyalties 
subjected the Association to all kinds of strains and 
tensions. Relations with the Country Party were damaged, 
and these took time to repair.
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In addition, the incident illustrates many other 
aspects of the GA*s pressure group behaviour. It shows 
the role of the Association’s leaders and staff in a 
crisis situation. It illustrates the GA’s decision­
making processes and the difficulty facing federal 
commodity organisations in making rapid and well- 
informed decisions in a crisis at the national level 
of government. It provides a good example of how the 
GA ’s tactical decisions are often influenced by the 
behaviour of its rivals. It also illustrates the types 
of problems that pressure groups sometimes encounter 
in confidential negotiations with governments.
Background
Throughout the 19^0s the GA made no secret of its 
close relations with and preference for the non-Labor 
parties, and of its strong desire to see the Labor 
Government defeated. It will be remembered that 
although the Association disaffiliated from the Country 
Party in 19^ +5 its close ties were not severed, and it 
continued to provide a large proportion of the party's 
finance. In the hope of seeing Labor defeated, it 
contributed generously to the Country Party’s federal 
election campaigns in 19^6 and 19^9. In the post-war 
period its antipathy towards the Government greatly 
increased; in particular, it opposed Labor’s attempts 
to nationalise airlines and banks. The Association 
saw the 19^ -9 general election as a clear choice between 
socialism and bureaucratic control on the one hand, 
and free enterprise on the other. Its newspaper 
explained:
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This election is the most vital of all,
Australians are now at the cross-roads.
That to the left leads to Socialism, 
full and complete with all its attendant 
controls and dictatorship; that to the 
right the road of free enterprise on 
which Australia has risen to whatever 
greatness that has been achieved. ^
With a sense of relief the GA witnessed Labor’s defeat 
in the election and the formation of a Liberal-Country 
Party Government under Menzies in December 19^9*
The new Government inherited a problem of serious 
inflation which was aggravated in 1 9 5 0 by the outbreak 
of the Korean war and the consequent rapid increases 
in commodity prices, particularly in wool. From 19^ +6, 
when wool auctions resumed, prices rose steadily and by 
the end of the 19^9/50 season they were roughly three 
times as high as at the beginning of the 1 9 +^6 / 7  season. 
In the 1 9 5 0 / 1  season, all-time record prices were 
reached, with the peak prices in February 1951 being 
almost seven times greater than those at the opening 
of the 19^6/7 season.^
Inflation and the prospect of record wool prices 
presented the Government with a difficult problem as 
it prepared its 1 9 5 0 / 1  budget, particularly as increased 
revenue was needed to meet the cost of war gratuities, 
commitments in Korea and new expenditures on health 
and social services.
1
Editorial in Muster, 15 November 19^9, p.l.
2
L.J. Hume, ’Wool in the Australian Economy, 19^6-58’, 
in Barnard, pp.6l6-8 , and Statistical Handbook of the 
Sheep and Wool Industry, 1 9 6 1 .
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Graziers regarded the high wool prices as their
due reward after years of low wool prices, droughts and
labour shortages. They also saw the increased prices
as means to reduce their indebtedness and improve
their properties. The GA and its federal bodies were
well aware however, of the economic problems facing
the Government. Early in 1950 a GFC sub-committee
studied the situation and recommended that the best
means of overcoming inflation was to increase
production by means of taxation and wage incentives,
to lift restrictions on imports, to reduce government
expenditure and, as a last resort, exchange appreciation.
At the 1950 Annual Conference the GA President expressed
a similar view, except that he came out strongly against
2currency appreciation.
While the GA applauded many of the new Government’s 
measures, such as the Communist Party Dissolution Bill 
and the decision to commit forces in Korea, it was less 
satisfied with developments over wool marketing. The 
new Country Party Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, 
John McEwen, continued negotiations commenced by the 
Labor Government for a stabilised marketing scheme for 
wool. In April 1950 he intimated to woolgrower 
organisations that the Government was unwilling to 
participate further in inter-government negotiations 
for a wool scheme unless woolgrowers accepted the
1
Annual Conference records, 1950.
Musjber, 1 April 1950, pp.5~7*
2
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principle that they would be responsible for financing
the scheme.^ The AWMPF and the APPU readily agreed;
the AWC was hesitant, but in the end gave its approval*
Legislation was then passed providing for a levy on
wool sold at auction to raise the necessary capital
for the scheme. In July 1950, when the Government
fixed the rate of the levy for the 1950/1 wool season
at 7"2 per cent, the GA was highly critical and accused
the Government of using the levy as an anti-inflationary 
2device. McEwen replied to this criticism in the press, 
needling the GA with his comment that:
As each of the main woolgrowers1 23 organisations 
was a Federal body, it would be preferable 
if the Federal body alone spoke, as contradictory 
opinion expressed by constituent bodies would be 
confusing to growers and the public.3
This exchange provoked the release of pent-up feeling 
within the GA against any form of wool stabilisation 
and, even before the crisis on the wool sales deduction 
legislation developed, relations between the Government 
and the GA were somewhat strained, and the section of 
the GA strongly opposed to government intervention was 
alert ed.
1
For a detailed account of negotiations on the principle 
of grower finance, see Hitchins, pp.129-32, and a report 
published in Muster, 15 August 1950, pp.l4l-9.
2
Muster, 15 August 1950, p.l43.
3
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 1950, p.3-
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The Copland Plan and Woolgrower Reaction
The Government recognised the dangers of inflation, 
but was slow to take action because opinion in Cabinet 
was divided on what measures to adopt. A powerful 
section in Cabinet pressed for appreciation of 
Australian currency to bring it into parity with sterling 
(at the time £A123=£S100). Country Party Ministers 
opposed this proposal as it would have meant reduced 
export prices for primary products. They also opposed 
an export tax on wool because of the likely unfavourable 
reaction from woolgrowers.^
On 1 September 1950 the press announced details 
of a plan to control inflation formulated by Sir 
Douglas Copland, Vice-Chancellor of the Australian 
National University. Copland’s main proposal was a 
33 l/3 per cent export tax on wool, a suggestion which 
brought forth an immediate and hostile response from 
woolgrowers. Some prominent woolgrowers in N.S.W., 
including J.P. Abbott (a former President of the GA 
and Country Party member for New England 19^0-9), used 
the Copland plan as an opportunity to launch a strong 
attack on the power of bureaucrats and economists 
(Copland had been an economic adviser to governments 
and Commonwealth Prices Commissioner) and on the 
extension of government control. Abbott, himself a 
university graduate, portrayed Copland as a university 
theorist without experience of real life. ’Detached 
from the realities of life in his eyrie at Canberra’,
1
Ellis, Australian Country Party, p.286.
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he wrote, ’the Professor surveys the whole Commonwealth.. 
Distinguished with the degrees and Doctorates of many 
learned Universities, the Professor suffers from the 
fact that he is not a graduate of..."The University of 
Experience" ’ . ^
The GA soon was under pressure to take action 
from members who assumed that Copland was speaking for 
the Government. ’If the Graziers’ Association don’t 
fight those political hypercrits [sic] at Canberra to 
the last ditch’, wrote one angry member to the 
Association’s Secretary, ’they can wipe my name off 
the Association register.... I have always voted
2Country Party, no more, Commo next time for m e ’.
But the GA was hesitant on what action to take, and it 
felt bound to wait until the federal bodies of the 
graziers’ associations could formulate policy. On 
2 September the AWC Secretary had requested constituent 
associations by telegram to give their views on the 
Copland plan. The GA General Secretary (ick-Hewins) 
immediately sent telegrams to all members of the GA 
Executive Committee asking for their views. He 
suggested:
POSSIBLE ANSWERS INCLUDE AGREE OR DISAGREE 
COPLAND PREFER REVALUATION OR,PROVISION INCOME 
DEPOSITS TAXED ON WITHDRAWAL.
1
Muster, 1 October 1930, p.197- See also Abbott’s 
letter in the Sydney Morning Herald, l4 September 1930,
P-2.
2
GA file CF142 Wool Tax Vol. N o .2 (1930).
3
GA file CF142 Wool Tax Vol. N o .1 (1950).
4
Ibid.
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All members of the Executive Committee expressed 
opposition to the Copland plan, but they were equally 
divided on the question of revaluation and the proposal 
for voluntary income deposits to be taxed on withdrawal. 
Their replies were communicated to the GA President 
who by then was attending a meeting of the AWC Executive 
Committee in Melbourne. The AWC Executive Committee 
decided to issue a press statement rejecting the notion 
that wool prices were the basic cause of inflation 
and expressing opposition to any export tax on wool.“*"
It also decided to press the Government to consult with 
woolgrowers1 2 organisations before any decision was 
made .^
Once the AWC had decided on a course of action the 
GA and the other graziers’ associations launched their 
own public campaigns. The GA President immediately 
issued a press release in which he stressed that an 
export tax would fall heavily on small growers, 
especially ex-servicemen. Throughout the crisis the 
GA wisely played on the plight of small growers since 
it realised that it could count on little public 
sympathy for large graziers. On l4 September the GA 
wrote to N.S.W. Liberal and Country Party members of 
the Federal Parliament expressing opposition to an
1
This was published on 13 September.
2
An urgent telegram was sent to the Federal Treasurer 
on 13 September. It read: 'AUSTRALIAN WOOLGROWERS'
COUNCIL URGES YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO DECISIONS ON 
PLANS TO COMBAT INFLATION WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE 
WOOL INDUSTRY WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH WOOLGROWER 
ORGANISATIONS'.
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export tax on wool and urging consultations between 
the Government and industry organisations. The letter 
concluded:
If the government does not seek to establish 
the woolgrowers' support for this proposal 
by an adequate discussion with the growers’ 
organisations, it can blame no one but itself 
if that support is lost at the polls.^
Four days later the GA sent telegrams to each of its
110 branch chairmen asking them to convene protest
meetings to urge the Government to consult with
woolgrower organisations, and to communicate their
demands directly to the Federal Treasurer and to local
2members of Parliament. Seventy GA branches held protest 
meetings. At some centres local non-Labor members of 
the Federal Parliament addressed the meetings and 
supported woolgrowers’ opposition to the Copland plan. 
Many of these meetings telegraphed their anger to 
Canberra. Typical was the following telegram sent 
by the Goulburn branch on 22 September to Fadden (the 
Treasurer) and to the local Federal member.
GROWERS THIS DISTRICT STRONGLY AGAINST 
PROPOSED WOOL TAX WITHOUT CONSULTATION 
STOP SECTIONAL NATURE OF PROPOSED TAX 
CONSIDERED MOST UNFAIR TO PRODUCERS OF 
WOOL AND TO AUSTRALIA
SECRETARY
GRAZIERS, GOULBURNJ
1
Muster, 15 November 1950» p.269.
2
GA file CF142 Wool Tax Vol. N o .1 (l950).
3
Ibid.
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In Sydney a public protest meeting of nearly 500 graziers
was held in early October under the joint sponsorship
of the GA and other farm organisations. J.P. Abbott
and some (but not all) leading figures behind the
organisation of this meeting hoped to use the meeting
to attack the proposed wool marketing scheme as well
as the Copland plan. Advertisements in the press
announced the meeting’s objects were to ’register a
combined protest against any proposals to levy a sectional
tax on wool’ and to ’insist upon the holding of a
referendum of qualified producers before any wool scheme
is imposed on the industry’ . But as a result of
2pressure from the GA Executive Committee, the protest 
meeting was confined almost exclusively to the wool 
tax.
While continuing to press for consultations, the 
member organisations of the AWC discussed alternative 
schemes which they could put to the Government. The 
Victorian, South Australian and Tasmanian associations 
favoured a system of compulsory tax-free deposits of 
part of woolgrowers’ incomes. The GA and the 
associations in Western Australia and Queensland 
opposed the principle of compulsion. The GA had no
1
Copy in GA file CFl42 Wool Tax Vol. N o .2 (1950). 
See also Country Life, 22 September 1950»
2
The GA Executive Committee felt the GA should not 
be in any way committed to a policy until the wool 
plan was discussed by the Annual Conference. See 
note from Assistant General Secretary to General 
Secretary, GA file CFl42 Wool Tax Vol. No.2 (l950).
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serious objections to a voluntary system of deposits,
but it explained to the AWC Secretary that it considered
’that even this proposal should not be sponsored by
your Council, but might be raised at the stage of
consultation with the Government1 234.^ During this time
the AWC Executive Committee did not meet, and the AWC
President had to decide policy himself. He consulted
with the GFC President (P.A. Wright, an ex-President
of the GA) and with him issued a joint statement
2suggesting a voluntary deposit scheme.
Pre-Budget Consultations
On 22 September the AWC Senior Vice-President,
D.T. Boyd, secured an interview with the Prime Minister
O(R.G. Menzies ) in Melbourne. According to the reportJ
sent to affiliated associations, Boyd explained to
Menzies that the AWC opposed an export tax on wool as
it would be unfair to woolgrowers and could damage the
wool trade. Menzies replied: ’I am aware it is a bad
thing, and if there is a tax it will not be an export 
4tax’. Menzies then said that he would like to speak 
off the record. Boyd replied that this would be in order, 
but that he wished to receive an official reply for 
the AWC. Menzies agreed to make a reply to the AWC
1
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executive but explained that 'it was not for publication 
because the matter is one of great crisis at this 
moment'. Menzies then went on:
I say to you officially that this wool tax 
question has been considered by Cabinet and 
is being considered by Cabinet simply 
because Cabinet has been unable to agree on 
any other measures. That is official. I 
would further repeat to your President and 
your Council that this is a time of great 
crisis in the Government of this country 
and I would ask for tolerance and that 
nothing be done in regard to my reply to 
this for a time.^
Two days later the AWC Secretary wrote to the 
Prime Minister reiterating the Council's objection 
to the Copland plan and to any sectional tax on 
woolgrowers, and warning that protest meetings were 
being arranged by woolgrowers.^ Copies of this 
letter were sent to all members of the Federal Cabinet. 
The AWC President, R.D. Bakewell, then had second 
thoughts about the tone of this letter, and the next 
day had the AWC Secretary write again to Menzies, 
expressing his personal thanks for granting Boyd an 
interview and his appreciation of the assurance that 
no export tax would be levied. This letter went on:
The confidential nature of your talk with 
Mr Boyd is fully appreciated, and no 
announcement thereof will be made other 
than to Executive Committees of the Affiliated
Associations.3
1
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In early October Bakewell, Wright and Williams
(the GA President) were invited to take part in
confidential discussions with the Prime Minister and
senior Cabinet members. The most significant discussion
was between Bakewell and the Prime Minister on 3 October.
According to a confidential report^ sent to affiliated
associations on 10 October, Menzies explained that,
because of inflation and the need for additional revenue,
the Government planned to withhold part of woolgrowers1
incomes. He told Bakewell that the Copland plan was
not made at the request of the Government. ’In fact’,
he said, 'it had seriously embarrassed the Cabinet which
2had completely rejected the idea of an export tax’. 
Menzies convinced Bakewell that woolgrowers would not 
be treated differently from salary and wage earners 
who paid their tax progressively. He pandered to 
Bakewell’s sense of importance, telling him not to make 
it widely known that he had seen Bakewell as he had not 
consulted any other farm organisation. Bakewell 
reported to affiliated associations:
He paid A.W.C. a compliment when he said that 
he regarded us as responsible sensible people 
and that he had great respect for our views.
I gathered that he did not have the same 
opinion of some other organisations.^
this
After7discussion with Menzies and senior Ministers the 
AWC Secretary informed member organisations by telegram:
1
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FOLLOWING TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND 
OTHER MINISTERS BAKEWELL HAS DECIDED 
REFRAIN FROM ISSUING FURTHER PRESS 
STATEMENT UNTIL BUDGET PROPOSALS KNOWN STOP 
MEETING WITH MINISTERS MUST REMAIN 
CONFIDENTIAL STOP REPORT BEING FORWARDED.
In November Ick-Hewins explained to members in the
Association’s newspaper:
These discussions were confidential 
because nothing relating to the budget 
could be released in advance of the 
Budget speech. I was not present at 
those discussions but I gained certain 
impressions from reports of them which 
I received. Now that the budget has 
been presented I feel that I may say 
that our leaders made firm statements 
about the attitude of the industry 
towards proposals based on those put 
forward by Professor Copland or anything 
like them. It was put to our representatives 
that the Government had large and inescapable 
commitments, including the payment of £67m. 
war gratuities, for which ready funds were 
not available. Unless funds could be 
derived from some prepayment of taxation, 
these commitments would have to be financed 
by the issue of treasury bills, which would 
inject another large dose of inflation into 
our economy. It was proposed to impose on 
gross wool proceeds a provisional tax of 
20 per cent....This was not a scheme of 
additional taxation but one only for tax 
prepayment.^
Participants in the discussions gained the impression
that the deductions would be limited to meet specific
1
Ibid. This telegram was sent on 9 October.
Muster, 15 November 1950» PP»273~5*
2
difficulties for the year 1950/1 , that adequate 
provisions would be made to deal with hardship cases, 
and that other industries would share the burden through 
excess profits taxation or other means,^
After these discussions, the GA and its federal
bodies issued no further press statements until the
Government announced its plans. As Ick-Hewins later
explained, the GA refrained from commenting on a widely
publicised statement that a taxation pre-payment plan
with a sliding scale up to 75 per cent of wool receipts
would be imposed because it knew ’it was wrong in fact
and the knowledge possessed by the Association of its
inaccuracy proceeded from information which had been2received in confidence’. This silence was 
misinterpreted by many GA members to mean that their 
leaders were inactive. The GA’s leaders and senior 
staff members were well aware of what members would 
think, but they could see no alternative. Ick-Hewins 
later explained:
It might have been possible to wreck the 
Government through uncompromising opposition 
to the tax prepayment proposal but this was 
a Government most of our members had fought 
to put into office. There was no alternative 
anti-inflationary programme to be anticipated 
from the Labour side of the House, except the 
reimposition of controls which members had 
urged should be lifted, Reimposition of 
controls would inevitably mean the tightening
1
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of the Socialist regimen with consequences 
which could be much more disastrous to the 
wool industry than any scheme of tax 
prepayments, however, unattractive.^
Having accepted the Government’s plan as inevitable, 
the GA sought to ensure that the arrangements to deal 
with hardship cases were adequate. Detailed proposals 
for the creation of special hardship tribunals in each 
State were presented personally to the Prime Minister 
in Canberra by J.P. Abbott.
The I95Q/I Budget
A week before the budget was introduced the Prime
Minister outlined the Government’s budgetary programme
2in a broadcast speech. He announced that the 
Government had decided against currency revaluation 
and planned to control inflation by reducing spending 
power and by offering incentives to stimulate 
production. He forecast an excess profits tax, 
increased taxation on luxury goods, various controls 
on use of resources and measures ’to prevent the 
present almost fantastic prices for wool from having
too violent an inflationary effect particularly during
3the current financial yea r ’. He added that the 
budget would be ’perfectly fair to woolgrowers but will 
give some protection to the rest of u s ’.
1  *
Ibid.
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On 12 October full details of the budget were
announced to Parliament by the Treasurer who explained
that the Government proposed to make a 20 per cent
deduction from income from wool to be held in credit
for woolgrowers against future taxation commitments.
Many woolgrower organisations immediately launched
bitter attacks, but the GA and its federal bodies
voiced no criticism. Immediately after Fadden’s speech
to Parliament, Bakewell released a statement to the
ABC expressing satisfaction with the budget and
commenting: M t  does not appear to impose any
additional taxation on woolgrowers' /  The GA President
issued a non-committal statement saying that sufficient
detail had not been provided to make a proper
assessment of the plan, but stressing the need for
2adequate provision to deal with hardship cases. On 
13 October Bakewell telegraphed Fadden:
RESPECTFULLY REQUEST YOU INSERT PROVISION IN 
WOOL TAX PREPAYMENT LEGISLATION TO ENABLE 
PROMPT CONSIDERATION CASES INDIVIDUAL 
HARDSHIP OR IN EVENT SUDDEN DECLINE WOOL 
PRICES DURING SEASON.3
Fadden replied:
HAVE YOUR TELEGRAM STOP NO REASON CONCERN 
AS AMPLE AND APPROPRIATE PROVISION IN 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION.^
1
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At Bakewell 5s direction the AWC Secretary replied:
BAKEWELL APPRECIATES YOUR TELEGRAM STOP 
CAN YOU GIVE ASSURANCE TAX KILL OPERATE 
FOR ONE YEAR ORLY STOP ANXIOUS OBTAIN 
COPY BILL SOON AS POSSIBLEo1
In the following week the AWC and affiliated
associations privately made it clear to Fadden that
their support of the plan was conditional upon certain
features being incorporated in the legislation. In a
letter dated 18 October, the AWC clearly stated its
objection to the retrospective operation of the scheme
and requested that the scheme's operation be limited
2to the current wool selling season. It also requested
proper machinery to deal with hardship cases. The
following day it requested that the 20 per cent deduction
be made before deduction of the 7^ per cent levy. But
during this period neither the AWC nor its members made
3open attacks on the Government or its policy.
The Wool Sales Deduction Acts
On 19 October Fadden introduced the Wool Sales 
Deduction (Administration) Bill in Parliament. The 
graziers' associations were dismayed to discover that 
many of the provisions they had been led to expect were
4not included. The duration of the scheme’s operation
1
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was not limited to one season, the deductions were to 
be retrospective to 28 August 1950» and the hardship 
clause was unsatisfactory. Applications for exemption 
for hardship would be considered only after taxation 
returns for the current year had been lodged and no 
special hardship boards were to be set up.
Before the graziers' associations could take action 
the Sydney Morning Herald carried a press statement by 
Bakewell and Wright, prepared some days before, under 
the caption ’Wool Tax Scheme Approved by Growers’.^
This statement gave clear support to the Government's 
policy. Bakewell and Wright immediately issued another 
statement clarifying the position and explaining that 
the previous statement
was made before the introduction of the 
Wool Sales Deduction (Administration) Bill, 
in the belief that assurances given to the 
Australian Woolgrowers’ Council would be 
carried out. These assurances were that 
proper provision would be made to deal 
promptly with hardship cases and with the 
situation that will arise if wool prices 
suddenly fall during the season. The council 
had reason to anticipate also that the 
measure would have a duration of only one 
year. None of these expectations has been 
fulfilled. The council has accordingly 
requested the Government to hold up the 
passage of the bill until its provisions 
have been discussed with representatives
1
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of woolgrowers, The council has made no
suggestion to the Government or to the
public that the measure, in the form in
which it has been introduced, has the1support of the woolgrowing industry,
incensed at the Government’s apparent betrayal,
the GA President also issued a separate statement
2sharply attacking the Bill, Other action followed 
quickly. The AWC telegraphed Fadden asking for 
postponement of the debate on the Bill until consultation 
with woolgrowers’ organisations. On 24 October, while 
on his way to Canberra, P . A . Wright interviewed Fadden
3at Mascot aerodrome, and in Canberra he had discussions 
with the Chief Taxation Commissioner and the Prime
4Minister. Wright explained to the Chief Taxation 
Commissioner that graziers wanted hardship cases dealt 
with before the 20 per cent deduction was made. The 
Commissioner claimed this was administratively impossible 
and that machinery for review of hardship cases was 
adequate. However, when Wright questioned whether 
snowballing of applications might cause delays, the 
Commissioner agreed to check that adequate staff was 
available, Wright asserted that it was unreasonable 
for a grower to wait until his income tax return for 
the year was lodged before he could make a claim on 
grounds of hardship. On this the Commissioner agreed
1
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to recommend that applications for hardship relief 
should be allowed immediately after the issue of 
deduction certificates by woolsellers„ In his interview 
with Menzies, Wright was assured that any amendments 
with regard to hardship which the Taxation Department 
recommended as practicable would probably receive the 
support of the Government. Subsequently Wright saw 
Fadden who agreed to some concessions. Fadden conceded 
that growers with less than thirty bales should be 
given first consideration in the hearing of hardship 
applications, and agreed to see whether it would be 
possible for the 20 per cent deduction to be made after 
transport costs had been deducted from wool receipts.
Before the GA Executive Committee met on 24 October, 
a telegram suggesting further action by member 
organisations was received from the AWC. It read:
BAKEWELL SUGGESTS BRANCHES TELEGRAPH FEDERAL 
REPRESENTATIVES PRESSING FOR ASSURANCES 
LIMITING DURATION OF THE WOOL TAX BILL AND 
AMPLE PROVISIONS FOR PROMPT RELIEF IN CASES 
OF HARDSHIP.1
The GA Executive Committee felt this procedure could 
lead to confusion and instead sent a letter to all 
members of the Cabinet and to N.S.W. Federal Liberal 
and Country Party members stating:
This is to inform you that this Association 
is receiving a large correspondence in 
connection with [the Wool Sales Deduction
1
GA file CF142 Wool Tax Vol. N o .1 (1950). (Cited in 
a letter from the AWC Secretary to affiliated 
associations, 24 October 1950)•
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(Administration) Bill]...and the general 
tenure [sic] of it is not favourable and 
that we see little chance of modifying the 
outlook of woolgrowers towards what the 
Government is doing unless the measure is 
amended to deal adequately with three items, 
namely -
(1) hardship;
(2 ) the duration of the legislation;
(3 ) the incidence of the^7^ per cent 
contributory charge.
The letter went on to spell out in detail the amendments 
required: machinery for hardship cases to be examined
as soon as deductions are made, and for immediate 
exemptions to be granted; limitation of the legislation 
to the I950/I season; and calculation of the 20 per 
cent deduction after deduction of the 7ir per cent levy.
On 26 October the Sydney press carried a statement
by the General Secretary of the GA to the effect that
indignation was growing against the Government’s wool
deduction plan and that the GA could not accept without
strong protest the situation in which its members would
2be placed if the Bill became law. That evening the 
following telegram was received from Fadden:
HAVE SEEN YOUR STATEMENT ON WOOL SALES 
DEDUCTION BILL AS REPORTED TODAY’S "HERALD".
WOULD POINT OUT THAT PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 
HARDSHIP CLAUSE WILL PROVIDE DIRECT ACCESS 
LAND VALUATION BOARD IF COMMISSIONER FAILS 
TO GIVE DECISION ON APPLICATION WITHIN THIRTY
1
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DAYS FROM DATE OF APPLICATION. WOULD ESPECIALLY 
DRAW ATTENTION TO FACT THAT APPEALS ARE REFERRED 
TO LAND VALUATION BOARDS, OF WHICH TWO ARE 
SPECIALLY PROVIDED FOR N.S.W. AND WHICH HAVE 
NO CURRENT WORK TO IMPEDE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING 
OF APPLICATIONS RELATIVE WOOL DEDUCTION. I 
HAVE SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES FROM COMMISSIONER 
AND THE BOARDS THAT UNDUE DELAY WILL NOT OCCUR 
AND HEREBY GIVE MY ASSURANCE THAT IF THEY DO 
OCCUR STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO REMEDY THE POSITION. 
LIFE OF ACT CANNOT POSSIBLY, OWING TO VERY 
NATURE OF IT AND REASON FOR IT, BE RESTRICTED TO
ONE FULL YEARS SELLING SEASON___THE INDUSTRY
CAN BE WELL ASSURED THAT THIS MEASURE WILL NOT 
CONTINUE ONE MINUTE LONGER THAN THE OVERALL 
ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE COUNTRY DEMANDS OF A 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. A CLAIRVOYANT CANNOT 
FORSEE THE FUTURE HAVING REGARD TO NOT ONLY 
OUR NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES BUT TO OUR 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ALSO. RESPECTFULLY 
SUGGEST YOU GIVE EARNEST CONSIDERATION MERITS 
OF PROPOSED SCHEME AS COMPARED WITH ALTERNATIVES 
FROM WHICH THE WOOL INDUSTRY HAS BEEN SAVED. 
WOULD CONSEL [Sic] TEMPERING CRITICISMS, 
SUSPICIONS AND DOUBTS SO THAT THIS SCHEME,
WHICH IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES MOST ADVANTAGEOUS 
TO INDUSTRY, WILL BE ACCEPTED EVEN WITH ANY 
ANTICIPATED IMPERFECTIONS AS BEST POSSIBLE 
ALTERNATIVE. REGARDS.1 2
On 26 October the GA had an independent research
organisation make an examination of the relationship
between the actual amounts of deductions proposed by
the Bill and the projected taxation liability of 
2woolgrowers. It revealed that for a grower with 1,300 
sheep and no other source of income, the 20 per cent
1
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deduction would equal his taxation commitment for 
1930/1, but for growers with less than 1,300 the 
deduction would be greater than the actual tax payable. 
Copies of these findings were forwarded to Fadden and 
presented by a deputation to the Commissioner of 
Taxation.^ The Commissioner cast doubt on the accuracy 
of the figures and queried whether anyone without access 
to taxation records could produce adequate figutes. A 
statistical expert in the Department was then interviewed 
by the members of the deputation and, from information 
he supplied on departmental methods of calculation, an 
appendix to the report was prepared and sent to Fadden 
and the Commissioner. While in Canberra the deputation 
also interviewed Fadden who promised to consider 
amending the Bill to allow for the percentage deducted 
to be fixed annually.
Shortly afterwards Ick-Hewins arranged for Stewart
Howard of Research Services to interview Fadden. By
this time Fadden was willing to yield more ground and
informed Howard that some of the GA’s objections would
2be met in amendments he planned to introduce.
The November GA General Council Meetings
Many members of the GA General Council came to 
the November Council meeting with serious misgivings 
about the GA’s strategy. Its qualified support for the
1
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Government’s plan until the Bill was introduced had
discredited the GA in the eyes of many smaller
woolgrowers. Other organisations (particularly the
APPU) and the Labor Party had capitalised on this, and
had told smaller woolgrowers that they had been 'sold
out' by the graziers. 'I am amazed', the N.S.W. Labor
Minister for Lands told a reporter for a Sunday
newspaper, 'that Mr Bakewell and Mr Wright are so
steeped in political loyalty that they are prepared to
disregard completely the views and interests of their
1less fortunate rank-and-file members'. Ick-Hewins
also had doubts. 'I cannot help wondering', he wrote
on 2 November in a letter to the AWC Secretary, 'whether
we are letting political considerations outweigh our
2better judgment'. The GA had received many protests 
from members (over sixty from 11 September to the end 
of December) and threats of resignation. There was 
little to show for the harder line adopted by the 
Association since late October. Its letter to members 
of Parliament, its public statements and its direct 
approaches had brought little apparent success. In 
the debate on the Bill (which was still proceeding when 
the Council met) Country Party and Liberal members from 
N.S.W. grazing seats who had taken part in protest 
meetings a month earlier came out in support of the 
Government's policy. One of them (D.H. Drummond) had 
told a protest meeting in Armidale a few weeks earlier
1
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that he was ’one hundred per cent’ opposed to any tax
on wool. In the debate no Government members referred
to the representations of the GA, and the interests of
woolgrowers (especially small producers) were defended
by Labor members - a novelty which Menzies aptly
described as one of the ’most delightful things in the
history of politics’.'*’ Labor speakers referred to the
GA ’s protests and even quoted from press statements by
2Ick-Hewins, Wright and Bakewell.
The debate in the GA General Council on the Wool
Sales Deduction Bill began on a motion, moved by one
of the Vice-Presidents on behalf of the Executive
Committee, to the effect that the Association ’come out
in the open and use every means in its power to oppose
the wool tax pre-payment system and expose in their
true light the provisions of the Wool Sales Deduction
3Acts’. P.A. Wright and other Country Party stalwarts 
anticipated this move and had arranged for Sir Earle 
Page (Minister for Health and former Country Party 
Federal leader) to be available to address the meeting. 
They persuaded the meeting to allow Page and a Liberal 
member of the Cabinet to speak before any decision was 
taken. The debate was then adjourned. Page attended 
at 5 p»m. the same day and addressed the Council and 
answered questions until 6.25 p.m. The following
1
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morning P.A. McBride, the Minister for the Interior 
(and a grazier from South Australia), explained the 
reasons for the Government's policy. What was said 
by Page and McBride is unknown, but their arguments 
were apparently convincing. Once the debate was 
resumed the motion was withdrawn and substituted by 
another which read:
That this Association use every means in 
its power to place before its members the 
true facts of the Wool Sales Deduction 
Bills and the circumstances that led to 
their introduction.^
This was carried without debate. Wright then moved:
That this Association reaffirm its loyalty 
to the Federal Government and its desire to 
assist in any equitable way possible to 
overcome the difficulties brought about by 
the legacies left by the ineptitude of the 
Chifley Government together with the 
necessity to safeguard the defence of the 
Nation in consequence of recent international 
developments.^
This was carried unanimously. A further motion resolved 
that the Association press for the burden of inflation 
control to be spread over the whole community, for 
limitation of the levy to a specific period, for 
efficient machinery to handle hardship cases, and for a 
downward graduation of the levy on smaller clips.
The same night in Federal Parliament, when the 
debate on the Wool Sales Deduction (Administration) Bill
1
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entered the committee stage, Fadden introduced a number 
of amendments, the most important being the removal of 
any reference to a specific rate of levy for 1950/1 » 
the insertion of a clause requiring the deduction rate 
to be determined annually by Parliament and provisions 
to show greater leniency in cases of hardship.1 This 
Bill, together with two machinery bills2 to implement 
the scheme, then passed through all stages in the House 
before midnight. From these events it seems reasonable 
to conclude that members of the GA General Council had 
been told of the planned amendments.
Repercussions on the GA
The GA came out of the crisis better than many of 
its leaders anticipated. Some concessions had been 
secured, and the GA had reverted to a policy of support 
for the Government.
But this was not the end of the incident. In the
months which followed members debated the pros and cons
of the Government’s policy and the Association’s actions.
In the Association’s newspaper Country Party supporters
applauded both the Government’s policy and the G A ’s
performance, Others complained of the scheme’s injustice
and of ’lost confidence in politicians and our own
3representatives in particular’. Events of late 1950 
and early 1951 gave support to the arguments of those
1
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defending the Government’s policy and the G A 's action«
Wool prices continued to rise rapidly until February 
1951 (between November 1950 and February 1951 prices 
rose over 40 per cent) and measures adopted by the New 
Zealand Government in December 1950 to counteract the 
rise in wool prices were more drastic than those 
implemented by Fadden.’*' Events also showed the wisdom 
of advice secured by the GA from legal counsel not to 
challenge the legality of the wool sales deduction 
legislation. The APPU gained useful publicity by its 
decision to take legal action, but in the long run 
lost face by failing to secure an injunction to stop 
the Taxation Commissioner collecting the levy, and in 
its appeal to the High Court on the legality of the 
legislation.
The GA Executive Committee continued to have doubts 
about its strategy. Perhaps it should have taken legal 
action to satisfy the demands of members? Many individual 
members and branches were unhappy about the decisions 
of the November meeting of General Council. ’Your 
Mr P.A. Wright’, wrote one member on 5 December 1950,
’is Without Doubt the Giddy Limit ... to him the 
Socialistic octupus [sic] ceases to be what it is if 
it is Labelled Nazi - instead of Commo. He would lick 
the Boot that is kicking h i m ’.^
1
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Then followed the problem of what tactics to follow 
to secure repeal of the legislation. The graziers’ 
associations of Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia favoured pressing for the discontinuation of 
deductions from the end of 1950 and the immediate repeal 
of the legislation,"*" But the GA Executive Committee 
felt bound by the decisions of its General Council. On 
the other hand, it realised the necessity for action 
to satisfy members that it was working for the removal 
of the legislation. Eventually the Executive Committee 
decided to press for repeal of the legislation at the 
end of the financial year (i.e. from 30 June 195l)»
On 21 December it sent a circular to branch chairmen 
explaining this decision and suggesting that branches 
contact local members of Parliament and submit motions 
to the 1951 Annual Conference calling for the repeal 
of the legislation at the end of the financial year.
’It appeared to us then, rightly or wrongly’, Ick-Hewins 
later explained to an irate member, ’that unless some 
hope of positive action were held out, there would be 
a mighty swing away from this Association to the 
A ,P .P .U . ’ . 1 2
Almost all GA branches discussed the matter and
over half of them submitted resolutions to the 1951
Conference calling for repeal of the wool sales deduction
3acts.' A number submitted motions expressing annoyance
1
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at or disagreement wlth the resolution of the General 
Council reaffirming loyalty to the Government, but 
others submitted motions supporting government policy 
and expressing confidence in GA leaders. However, 
before the Conference met the whole political situation 
changed,
On 9 March 1951 the High Court ruled that the 
Communist Party Dissolution Act was invalid and a week 
later both houses of Parliament were dissolved. In 
the election campaign which followed communism was the 
primary issue, but the wool sales deduction legislation 
played a prominent role. The Government promised 
repeal of the deduction acts as soon as circumstances 
would permit. The Labor Party went further and 
promised their immediate repeal and refund of amounts 
collected. Before the Annual Conference of the GA met 
in mid-April, the GA's newspaper carried editorials 
urging support for the Government."*" These editorials 
admitted that the Government's performance was open to 
criticism, but argued that any criticism that could be 
brought against the Menzies administration could be 
brought even more strongly against the Chifley regime.
The 1951 Annual Conference opened on 16 April. In
his presidential address, C.M. Williams played down the
importance of the wool sales deduction acts and warned
delegates not to be taken in by the promises of the 
2Labor Party. The debate on the wool sales deduction
1
e.g. Muster, 15 March and 16 April 1951*
2
Annual Conference records, 1951*
407
acts began on a motion aiming to rule out of order any
resolution supporting or criticising a political party.
Its mover (G,G. Ash ton ) explained that, while he
agreed with the sentiments of the General Council’s
motion reaffirming loyalty to the Country Party, he
considered the actual motion ’was unnecessarily
political in character, and that it was in the nature
of a whitewashing motion1 , This motion was defeated, ^
and the real debate came on a motion expressing support
for the Government’s actions. Delegates were sharply
divided, but no speaker advocated action which would
3embarrass the Government in the election campaign.
In the end a compromise was reached which read:
That in view of the Prime Minister’s 
assurance that the Wool Sales Deduction 
Acts will be repealed as soon as 
provisional tax reasonably provides for the 
taxation obligations of the woolgrower, the 
Commonwealth Treasurer be requested to 
investigate this to ascertain whether the 
position will be reached this year and, 
if not, that the Acts be repealed as soon 
as it occurs.
Later the section of the agenda paper dealing with
’political’ matters was debated in committee. One 
motion called for the Conference to express the 
opinion that ’great harm has been done to the Country
1
Ibid. (verbatim report),
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1951’
3
Verbatim report, Annual Conference records,
4
1951.
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Party by the lack of' co-operation of' the Federal
Government’ with the GA’s federal bodies, and to inform
the party that ’a strong feeling exists within the
Association advocating withdrawal of financial
assistance unless the position is soon rectified'.^
Its mover explained that, because of the wool sales
deduction acts and secrecy over the proposed wool 
2marketing plan, many members of the Association planned
3to withdraw support from the Special Purposes Fund»
The debate again showed up different attitudes to the 
Country Party. Country Party men loyally defended the 
Government. P.A. Wright explained that the difficulty 
between the GA and the Government arose solely because 
of lack of co-ordination and communication. Opponents 
of the Country Party produced their usual line of 
arguments - that the Country Party was not properly 
representing the interests of graziers, and that there 
were practically no graziers among Country Party members 
of Parliament. The debate also touched on whether it 
was right and prudent to threaten the Country Party 
with withdrawal of financial support. G.G. Ashton 
thought it undesirable to aim a 'political gun’ at the 
head of members of Parliament; others warned against 
’pressure politics’, and cautioned that any public 
rebuke could injure the party in the elections, Some
1
Ibid.
2
See Chapter 12,
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speakers however, thought the Country Party should be 
taught a lesson, or at least be made clearly aware of 
feelings in the GA . D J ,  Bucknell suggested that the 
party should be told: 'look here we are trying to
play the game with you, come on and play the game with 
u s ' .  ^ In the end an amendment suggested by Ashton was 
carried. This stated:
That the Country Party be informed that 
this Conference is of the opinion that 
great harm has been done to the Country 
Party by the lack of cooperation of the ^
Federal Government with our federal bodies.
Af termath
In the general elections which followed, the GA 
gave greater financial support to the Country Party 
than it had in the 1949 election. The Government was 
returned to power with a loss of six seats in the 
House of Representatives ~ three from the Country Party 
and three from the Liberal Party. The only seat lost 
by the Government in New South Wales was Hume on the 
south-west slopes. In Hume Country Party activists 
and the defeated member, Col. C.G.W. Anderson, all 
blamed the GA for loss of the seat. Anderson, a grazier, 
resigned from the GA, In a letter to the General 
Secretary a fortnight after the election he wrote:
1
Ibid.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1951«
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I feel that the Graziers5 Association 
approach to the problem was hasty and 
ill conceived, and further, there has 
been unquestionably a selfish attitude 
of placing self-interest before that 
of the nation,^-
Ick-Hewins replied to this letter and to others from 
Country Party activists. 'We sincerely regret the loss 
of the Hume Seat', he told one activist, 5 and we did 
contribute very heavily to the Country Party campaign'
It has often been asserted that as a protest against
the wool sales deduc tion acts many graziers and
woolgrowers voted against the Government in 1951 thus
3causing the loss of up to five grazing seats. An 
analysis of polling figures for both the 19^9 and 1951 
elections casts doubt on this assertion, at least 
for N.S.W. While in each grazing seat government 
candidates secured a smaller proportion of votes in 
1951 than in 19^9 ? the reduction was small - between 
one and three per cent of the total valid votes. Hume 
was lost by a loss of 1.3 per cent of votes. Moreover, 
the actual loss of support by the Government was as 
great in many urban seats as it was in the grazing
1
GA file CF142 Wool Tax (1951).
2
Ibid,
3
For example, in a paper written for an international 
conference in 1957•? W.A. Townsley asserted that 
5 graziers caused the Menzies-Fadden coalition government 
to lose two seats in the 1951 election because of 
resentment against the government's action in holding 
back 20 per cent of wool cheques under the tax-pre­
payment plan', ('Pressure Groups in Australia’, p.l4).
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seats» Webb suggested that the decline in Liberal- 
Country Party strength in 1951 could be regarded 
partly as ’the sort of electoral reaction which 
usually happens after a Government has been in office 
for a short time’»  ^ But had not communism been the 
main issue of the 1951 election, a much larger 
proportion of woolgrowers» though probably not GA 
members, might well have voted against the Government 
as a protest against the wool sales deduction acts.
At the end of the 1950/1 wool selling season the
controversial acts were repealed» By then wool prices
had fallen considerably. But the Government’s actions
were not quickly forgotten and harmonious relations
between the GA and the Country Party took time to
restore. Ill-feeling against the Country Party was
displayed in motions placed before Annual Conferences
calling for the cessation of financial support for the
party. One unsuccessful motion debated by the 1952
Conference called on the GA to withhold all financial
aid to the Country Party ’until Sir Arthur Fadden
resigns the leadership or is expelled from the Country 
2Party’» Even today some GA members still feel bitter 
about the whole incident»
1
Leicester Webb, Communism and Democracy in Australia: 
A Survey of the 1951 Referendum, Melbourne, 195^9 p .42. 
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1952.
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Review
The GA reacted more strongly to the wool sales 
deduction acts than to any other legislation passed 
by a non-Labor government, There were two main 
reasons for this. First, members of the Association 
considered that it was grossly unfair that woolgrowers 
should be singled out to bear the main burden of the 
Government's policy to counter inflation. Second, as 
a consequence of the long period of Labor rule in both 
the Commonwealth and N.S.lf, parliaments for most of the 
1940s, both members and leaders had forgotten past 
dissatisfactions with non-Labor governments and the 
Country Party, and had unrealistically high expectations.
Moreover, the impact of the wool sales deductions 
acts on the Association was greater than any other single 
act of any Commonwealth or N.S.W. government. In May 
1950 Ick-Hewins wrote to a GA member:
The legislation had a most definite impact 
upon this Association in loss of members, 
vitriolic criticism of our capacity to 
protect the interests of the industry and 
withdrawal of support from our Special 
Purposes Fund,
The legislation also caused a serious division of 
opinion in the Association, and led some to question 
the competence of leaders. Ihis was the price the GA 
had to pay for its links with the Country Party; but 
it was also the price of its anti-Labor orientation.
GA file CF.142 Wool Tax (1951)«
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Quite apart from its links with the Country Party, the 
GA would have been in some kind of political difficulty. 
Indeed, its scope for manouevre was restricted more 
by its unwillingness to take action which could assist 
Labor to return to office than by any ties of loyalty 
and friendship with the Country Party, But had the 
Association still been formally linked to the Party, 
the crisis could have called the future of this 
relationship into question,
In the confidential discussions the graziers’ 
associations were obviously out-manouevred by the 
Government. Admittedly, the leaders of the graziers’ 
associations were naive, but more important was the 
fact that the government held the upper hand. In the 
circumstances it is doubtful whether even the most 
capable and experienced pressure group leaders would 
have done better.
As the study illustrates, decision-making by the 
AWC was slow and difficult. Since 1931 better 
communications have admittedly brought some 
improvements, but most of the same problems exist today 
with the AWGC. Commodity federations are distinctly 
unsuited to rapid and complex decision-making in a 
crisis situation.
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CHAPTER 12
The Reserve Price Referendum
The reserve price referendum was a compulsory 
ballot of Australian woolgrowers conducted in late 1965 
by the Chief Electoral Officer under terms laid down 
in the Wool Prices Plan Referendum Act 1965. Woolgrowers 
were asked to express their approval or disapproval of 
a plan to incorporate a reserve price mechanism within 
the traditional auction system of wool marketing»
The actual referendum was preceded by a prolonged 
and heated campaign ~ probably the most bitter and 
intense in the history of any rural industry. It was 
a climax to the long history of dispute over wool 
marketing and promotion - a history with which many of 
the leading participants were particularly familiar.
Many participants, in fact, saw the referendum not in 
terms of a simple ballot to decide on a specific plan 
of wool marketing, but as a direct confrontation between 
two different philosophies concerning marketing and 
government intervention, and as a further episode in 
the struggle to see who should determine policy for 
the wool industry,
The GA ' s role m  the referendum campaign and its 
influence on the referendum result provide a useful 
case-study of the Association's behaviour in a crisis 
situation involving a matter of high policy and 
relations with wheat-sheep farmers' organisations, and
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an example of the use of veto power by the means of a 
public campaign dire< ted to the electorate of woolgrowers. 
This campaign also illustrates many other aspects of the 
GAf s behaviour, including its decision-making processes 
on a matter of importance, its ability to mobilise 
resources for a public campaign,, its relations with the 
AWGC and the AW1C, and the kinds of internal conflicts 
generated by participation in a controversial public 
campaign,
Historical Perspective
The reserve price referendum cannot be properly 
understood without some detailed knowledge of the 
history of the dispute over marketing and promotion.
Wheat-sheep farmers and small woolgrowers first 
thought seriously about stabilised wool marketing 
during the first world war. From I9I6 to the end of 
the 1919/20 wool season, the British Government 
purchased the entire Australian wool clip and wool 
auctions were replaced by an appraisement system. This 
war-time scheme worked to the advantage of small 
woolgrowers9 providing them with a steady market, with 
returns twice as great as pre-war levels for lower 
value crossbred wools, and with payment of 90 per cent 
of the appraised value of wool within fourteen days of 
appraisement„  ^ Because of these advantages, wheat-sheep 
farmers and small woolgrowers wanted the scheme (as well
1
Graham, Formation of the Australian Country Parties,
pp.101-2.
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as the war-time wheat stabilisation scheme) to be
continued after the war, Large graziers were less
enthusiastic, and justifiably looked forward to higher
prices (especially for fine merino wool) when auctions
resumed. But when the end of the war came many graziers
feared that an immediate return to the auction system
could lead to price instability, particularly in view
of the hugh stockpile of 2\ m. bales of unsold wool.
Thus they favoured a temporary extension of the
appraisement system and gradual transition back to the
free auction system. The 1919 GA Annual Conference
resolved to request the Commonwealth to ask the British
Government to continue the war-time scheme until 1923,^
and the following year most GA members supported an
unsuccessful effort to control wool marketing by a joint
2council of woolgrowers and brokers. Because of the
1
Annual Conference minutes, 1919- Graham (Formation 
of the Australian Country Pa rtie s , p.102) sees this 
decision as an indication of pressure from smaller 
woolgrowers within the GA for a stabilised marketing 
system, However, the conference records do not support 
this view. The verbatim report shows that large graziers 
such as Dr N.W. Kater spoke in support of the motion.
Most supporters expressed a preference for return to 
the free auction system, but considered that because 
of the stockpile of wool and shipping difficulties 
the transition should be gradual. The mover of the 
motion (k ,S. Clift) stated: 'Although I believe in an 
open market ... times are not normal, and I think if we 
could possibly get an arrangement to carry us over 
until shipping is normal it would be a great thing’.
2
This scheme did not eventuate when in a ballot the 
approval of only per cent of woolgrowers was
secured. Before the ballot was taken, it had been 
agreed that the scheme would not be introduced unless 
75 per cent were in favour.
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economic importance of the wool export industry, the
Australian Government was well aware of the dangers of
an immediate return to the auction system. It managed
to secure retention of the appraisement scheme until
June 1920, and in January 1921 participated in the3formation of BAWRA, an organisation to supervise the 
orderly liquidation of war-time wool stocks.
During and immediately after the war, wheat-sheep 
farmers and small woolgrowers made little real effort 
to secure retention of the appraisement system or a 
permanent form of stabilised wool marketing. But in 
1921, shortly after the return to the auction system, 
when wool prices fell sharply, they soon demanded 
revival of the war-time scheme or extension of the 
functions of BAWRA to include marketing of the whole 
Australian wool clip. Largely as a result of the 
demands of wheat-sheep farmers, the Chairman of BAWRA, 
Sir John Higgins, unsuccessfuly tried to persuade
2brokers to allow BAWRA to market all crossbred wools, 
and then set about to convert BAWRA into a permanent 
organisation to market all rural products. In October 
1922 he announced his plan to achieve this goal and 
convened a meeting of BAWRA shareholders for 6 December 
in Melbourne. Wheat-sheep farmers, particularly in
1
Its full title was the British Australian Wool 
Realisation Association Ltd. For an account of BAWRA, 
see E.C. Dyason, 'BAWRA', The Economic Record, February 
1928; and W. Millar Smith, The Marketing of Australian 
and New Zealand Primary Products, London, 1936.
2
Graham, 'Pools and Politics'.
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Victoria, supported Higgins’s plan while graziers and 
brokers expressed their opposition. The GA Council 
met on 22 November and came out strongly against the 
plan. Armed with an amendment drafted by a firm of 
solicitors,  ^ the Association’s President, Dr N.V« Kater, 
went to the BAWRA shareholders’ meeting. The moment 
Higgins’s plan was seconded, Kater moved his amendment, 
which called Tor BAWRA’s dissolution once the wool stock­
pile was liquidated, This was carried by 600 votes to 
2twenty, and so the first real attempt to abandon the 
auction system was defeated.
From that time on wheat-sheep farmers saw the GA 
as the real enemy of marketing reform. On each of the 
succeeding occasions when the Association played a 
leading part in frustrating their attempts to secure 
stabilised marketing, wheat-sheep farmers’ antipathy 
towards the GA increased, and it was made even more 
intense by the fact that the GA and the wool brokers 
were always found together on the same side in any 
dispute over marketing. Wheat-sheep farmers noted that 
some GA members held directorships on wool broking 
firms and that some employees of wool firms were 
co-opted members of the GA General Council. Thus they 
developed the notion of a GA-woolbroker conspiracy.
In the 1951 wool marketing referendum campaign, the idea 
of such a conspiracy featured prominently in wheat-sheep
1
Letter Kater to Ick-Hewins dated l4 April 1964 in GA 
biographical file.
2
Graham, ’Pools and Politics’.
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farmers* propaganda. AWMPF spokesmen claimed that 
seven of the leading members of the 'No Committee' led 
by J.P. Abbott (an ex-president of the GA ) held twenty- 
five directorships in wool broking firms and other 
allied businesses. They repeatedly asked in the press 
and over the radio: 'In whose interests do these
gentlemen offer advice - to woolgrowers, or the financial 
and commercial institutions they represent?'^
Although after 1922 the GA was a consistent opponent
of marketing reform, its policy on marketing was never
as rigid as that of most wheat-sheep farmers'
organisations. From the 1920s there was always a minority
(which often included some very influential members)
within the Association in favour of stabilised marketing,
and discussion of marketing schemes occupied many hours
of GA conferences and committees. The GA made a number
of genuine attempts to find a suitable alternative to
the auction system. The first of these attempts was
made almost immediately after the defeat of Higgins's
scheme in 1922. At the 1923 Annual Conference it was
decided that Higgins should be asked to formulate a
2more suitable scheme. By 1923 the GA had persuaded a 
majority of the other member organisations of the GFC3to agree. An approach was made to Higgins who produced
1
Hitchins, p.137* See also Sydney Morning Herald,
2 August 1931j p.2.
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1923•
3
Annual Conference minutes, 1924; Council minutes,
4 October 1923 and 26 March 1924; and N.S.W. Graziers' 
Annual 1923? p.101-2.
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another scheme, but it was rejected by the GA and other
member organisations of the GFC on the grounds that it
would necessitate some degree of government control.
Over the years the GA examined many other schemes, and
rejected each one. But in each case the decision was
not made by the GA Executive Committee alone. In 1925
the decision to reject Higgins’s second scheme was made
by a special conference.^ Copies of the scheme were
circulated and discussed by branches well before the
conference met. Thirty-eight branches submitted
resolutions against the proposal, while only nine were
2in favour of it. The conference rejected the scheme 
by a clear majority.
During the 1930s the graziers’ associations
developed the idea that the problems of the wool
industry could be better solved by wool promotion and
research rather than by marketing reform. The GA ’s
enthusiasm for promotion and marketing went back to the
1920s, and from 1930 on it pressed for a compulsory
3levy on woolgrowers for research and promotion.
In 1936 the AWC and the GFC agreed to approach the
4Government, and as a result of their approach federal 
legislation was passed providing for a levy of 6d a bale 
and the establishment of a Wool Board to control
1
Special conference minutes, 29 July 1925»
2
Special Conference records, 29 July 1925»
3
Annual Conference minutes, 1930*
4
The Graziers’ Annual 1936, p.28.
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expenditure of' the levy fund. Wheat-sheep farmers found 
graziers’ enthusiasm for promotion and research hard 
to understand. Some saw it as a diversionary tactic, 
others as misguided optimism, and to most of them it 
seemed strange that graziers should support government 
intervention to provide for a compulsory levy (and later 
government subsidies for research and promotion),’*" yet 
oppose government intervention to secure marketing reform.
Continued low wool prices in the early 1930s
provided wheat-sheep farmers with the stimulus to make
determined efforts to secure marketing reform, In these
depression years struggling wheat-sheep farmers developed
the notion that a reserve price system of marketing
would provide the ideal solution to all their economic
problems. The more graziers and wool brokers frustrated
their efforts to secure this goal, the firmer and more
emotionally they became committed to the reserve price
concept. Throughout the 1930s graziers and brokers
successfully blocked numerous attempts by wheat-sheep
farmers to secure marketing changes. An Empire Wool
Conference arranged by the AWC and held in Melbourne in
June I9 3I quickly rejected three different proposals put
forward by wheat-sheep farmers on the grounds that they
2involved price fixing, and another scheme presented by 
Higgins was conveniently shelved. The AWC opposed
1
In 1945 "the Commonwealth Government first contributed 
to research and in 1964 to wool promotion.
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 24 June 1931» P*9» and 25 June 
1931» p .7. These were from organisations in Western 
Australia, Tasmania and Queensland.
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wheat-sheep farmers’ demands for a Royal Commission on 
the wool industry, then changed its mind and secured an 
Official Committee of Inquiry which it tried to dominate. 
This Committee in the end recommended that the export
2of wool be prohibited unless it reached a fixed price, 
but this was not implemented because of graziers’ 
opposition. This pattern was repeated many times. Out 
of frustration wheat-sheep farmers formed many new 
radical organisations with the aim of securing stabilised 
marketing (one such organisation was the Australian 
Farmers and Graziers’ Stabilisation Association, formed
Oat Moree in 1933)» and in 1939 the wheat-sheep farmers’ 
organisations formed their own federation. The graziers’ 
associations strongly resented the attempts of wheat- 
sheep farmers' organisations to gain recognition as 
spokesmen for the wool industry. Consequently, the 
conflict over marketing became a struggle over power in 
the wool industry - a struggle to see whether wheat- 
sheep farmers’ organisations should be recognised as a 
legitimate voice of woolgrowers’ opinion, and later 
whether wheat-sheep farmers or graziers should determine 
policy for the industry.
During the second world war the British Government 
again purchased the entire clip and the auction system
1
Hitchins, p , 42 .
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 1932, p.15*
3
Ibid., 14 March 1933» P*7* See also Sydney Morning 
Herald, and 10 May 1933» p • 11.
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was replaced by an appraisement system. The debate on 
marketing was temporarily pushed to the background but 
after the war, largely on the initiative of the AWMPF, 
a scheme was developed for a reserve price marketing 
system to take over from the ’Joint Organisation’ (j0)~*~ 
formed to liquidate war-time wool stocks. The AWC 
participated in the negotiations which developed this 
’Post-JO plan’, but in the end the graziers' associations 
came out strongly against it. The referendum campaign 
of 1951 was prolonged and bitter. The GA actively 
campaigned against the scheme, and publicised its 
viewpoint by means of public meetings, and press and 
radio advertising. And for months before the GA came 
out officially against the scheme, individual members 
led by J.P. Abbott waged their own campaigns, The GA 
and other opponents of the scheme successfully played 
on woolgrowers' conservatism and fears of government 
intervention and bureaucracy, and to the disappointment 
of wheat-sheep farmers' organisations the 'Post-JO 
scheme’ was overwhelmingly rejected by woolgrowers.^
While fear of government intervention and bureaucracy 
played a major part in determining the outcome, a 
number of other factors operated. Wool prices were
1
The Joint Organisation was set up by the United 
Kingdom, Australian, New Zealand and South African 
governments to dispose of stocks of dominion wool 
accumulated by the United Kingdom Government under the 
war-time purchase arrangements. The full name of the 
Joint Organisati on was the U . K .-Domini on Wool Disposals 
Ltd.
2
Of the 80,380 valid votes cast, 63?7^0 were against 
the scheme.
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abnormally high, woolgrowers were still incensed about 
the wool sales deduction acts of 1 9 5 0 » and some wool 
woolgrowers undoubtedly rejected the scheme in order 
to secure the return of the 7 "2 Per cent levy imposed 
by the Government in 1950 in order to build up a capital 
fund for the scheme.
Falling Wool Prices and Conflict
After the 1951 referendum, under the influence 
of high wool prices, the wool industry enjoyed a brief 
period of calm. But once wool prices began to fall, 
wheat-sheep farmers renewed their demands for marketing 
reform while graziers sought increased expenditure on 
promotion and research.
At first however, both wheat-sheep farmers* 
organisations and the graziers’ associations showed some 
desire for compromise. In I960 the AWMPF agreed to an 
increase in the wool promotion levy from 4/- to 5/- 
a bale. While the graziers’ associations were not 
prepared to agree to a reserve price scheme, they were 
not opposed to the investigation of marketing systems. 
The AWC and some of its constituent associations 
(including the GA) made their own investigations, and 
in late I960 the newly established AWGC supported a 
request by the AWMPF for an independent committee of 
inquiry into wool marketing."*' The Commonwealth 
Government readily agreed to appoint such a committee, 
and in January 1961 the names of the three members of
1
Report of Proceedings I960, p .9•
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the committee headed by Sir Roslyn Philp (a judge of 
the Queensland Supreme Court) were announced.^
A few days earlier the Australian Wool Bureau
announced plans for a greatly expanded wool promotion
campaign, and requested woolgrower organisations to
agree to an increase in the promotion levy from 5/~ to
10/- a bale for 1961/2 and 1962/3, and then to a series
2of increases to bring the levy up to 18/- by 1966/7°
The AWGC readily agreed, but the AWMPF stated that it 
was opposed to any increase until implementation of a 
reserve price scheme. This marked the real beginning 
of the conflict which continued up to the reserve price 
referendum and after. The AWMPF refused to give in, In 
the press wheat-sheep farmers expressed their doubts 
about the value of promotion - some suggested the 
promotion levy was being wasted on cocktail parties 
and easy jobs for bureaucrats - and insisted that 
marketing reform should come first. The AWMPF's leaders 
had an additional reason for opposing the increase - one 
not perceived by many rank and file members of wheat- 
sheep farmers' organisations. They reasoned that, since 
a reserve price scheme would necessitate a large capital 
fund which would have to be raised at least partly by
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 26 January 1961. The other two 
members were M.C. Buttfield (former General Manager of 
the AMP Society) and D.H. Merry (Chief Economist of the 
ANZ Bank).
2
Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 1961. This refers 
to the promotion levy and does not include the 2/- 
research. levy.
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a levy on woolgrowers, a heavy promotion levy would 
make it more difficult to persuade woolgrowers to accept 
an additional levy to raise the capital fund. In the 
end under government pressure (in March 1961 John McEwen, 
Minister for Trade, warned woolgrowers that if they 
failed to reach agreement on the promotion levy ’they 
need not be surprised or offended if they have aid to 
reach agreement') /  and in the hope that the Philp 
Committee would come out strongly for a reserve price 
scheme, the AWMPF in July 1961 agreed to an increase 
of the levy to 10/- a bale for 196l/2. According to 
press reports, the President of AWMPF used his casting 
vote in favour of the increase.2 But to the 
disappointment of wheat-sheep farmers the Philp Committee 
in March 1962 reported against any change in the
marketing system and came out in favour of increased
3expenditure on promotion and research.
Soon after, the newly re-constituted Australian 
Wool Board (which replaced the Wool Bureau) asked for
4further increases in the promotion levy. Wheat-sheep 
farmers reacted angrily, and at Hamilton (in western 
Victoria) they pelted the Chairman of the Wool Board,
1
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 March 1961.
2
Ibid., 6 July 1961.
3
Commonwealth of Australia: Report of the Wool
Marketing Committee of Enquiry. The report was dated 
February 1962,butwas notreleased until March.
4
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Sir William Gunn, with eggs and flour bombs when he 
tried to explain the case for the increased levy to a 
meeting of 1,400 woolgrowers. Eventually, the AWMPF 
again gave in after the Wool Board had appointed a 
marketing committee to make a further examination of 
possible alternatives to the auction system, and after 
the Government had promised during the 1963 election 
campaign to match £1 for £1 any increases in growers’ 
contributions to wool promotion."*' In January 1964 the 
AWIC agreed by forty votes to ten to the increases 
proposed by the Wool Board. Many wheat-sheep farmers 
were disappointed with this decision which had the 
effect of increasing their determination to secure 
marketing reform.
The Plan and the Ballot
The Wool Board appointed a marketing committee on
20 June 19639 just over six weeks after its first
meeting. In July 1964, after receiving the marketing
committee’s report, the Board recommended to the AWIC
2in favour of a reserve price scheme.
This recommendation did not come as a surprise. 
From the time the Wool Board set up its marketing 
committee, it had been rumoured that the Board would 
come out for marketing reform so as to secure the
1
Ibid,, and Wool and Politics, p.186.
2
Australian Wool Board: Report and Recommendations
on Wool Marketing Presented to the Australian Wool 
Industry Conference Canberra, July, 1964.
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continued support of' wheat-sheep farmers' organisations 
for its promotion campaign. Some people also predicted 
that the Wool Board would support a reserve price 
marketing scheme as a means of expanding its own role 
and power,
The Wool Board’s report to the AWTC gave support
to the substance of these rumours and suspicions. The
report recommended a scheme which had been rejected by
the Philp Committee just two years before, yet provided
little detailed argument and evidence to support its
recommendation. It even failed to provide a detailed
plan for the scheme.^ The Minister for Primary Industry
later explained that the Board ’did not put forward a
detailed plan for such a scheme because it considered
that this was a matter for consultation between the
2Wool Industry Conference and the Government’. This may
well have been the case, but in July 1964 there were 
good reasons for believing that the Wool Board had made 
its decision on political rather than economic grounds.
The AWTC discussed the Wool Board’s report and
recommendation at its meeting in July, and decided that
its Executive should negotiate with the Government
concerning details of the scheme and provision of a 
3capital fund. By voting as a bloc, the AW G C ’s
1
On this, see R„M. Parish, ’The Wool Board’s Report 
on Marketing’, The Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVI, 
No.3 (September 1964),
2
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representatives could have defeated the plan at this 
point, However, they were loath to provoke the wheat- 
sheep farmers' organisations unnecessarily, and they 
probably felt some sense of obligation to support the 
Wool Board Chairman, Sir William Gunn (an ex-president 
of the GFC ) , after his vigorous personal efforts to 
persuade woolgrowers of the need to increase expenditure 
on promotion. But by supporting this decision, the 
AWGC's representatives to some extent committed the 
graziers' associations to support the plan, or at least 
made it more difficult for them to come out against it.
Negotiations with the Government began on 27 August 
1964 when the AWIC Executive presented a submission to 
the Minister for Primary Industry,^ This submission 
was considered by Cabinet and referred to an inter­
departmental committeeo Differences of opinion between 
departments and in Cabinet on both the merits of the 
scheme and possible methods of financing it caused 
considerable delay. Eventually the Government agreed 
to the scheme in principle, and then negotiated with 
the A¥!C Executive Committee on details and financial 
arrangements. On 1 April 1965 the Minister for Primary 
Industry announced that agreement had been reached on a 
'conservative reserve price s c h e m e ' O f  the £80m, 
required, the Government would provide £50mo (not £60m. 
as the AWTC requested) and the remainder would be 
raised by a levy on woolgrowers over seven years.
1
Wool, and Politics, p.l87°
Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April 1965, p .1.
2
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The Minister however, made it clear that the Government's 
participation was conditional upon approval by the AWIC 
and woolgrowers at a referendum.
The revised plan was submitted to the AWIC on
22 A p r i l T o  give woolgrower organisations the
opportunity to discuss the plan and make their decisions,
the AWIC decided to defer making a decision until June.
It agreed however, to recommend to the Government that
in the referendum voting be compulsory, that the
decision be determined by a simple majority, and that
the minimum voting qualification be the production of
2ten bales of wool. The last two of these decisions 
brought forth strong criticism from the GA which favoured 
a minimum qualification of more than ten bales, and a 
weighted vote based on production.
In May before the AWTC met, the Wool Board issued3a new document describing the revised scheme. This 
document, which had been prepared by the Board in 
conjunction with the AWIC Executive Committee, was more 
cautious than the Board's 1964 report, and acknowledged 
that the scheme involved some risks. On 23 June the 
AWIC discussed this report, and resolved by forty-five 
votes to five in favour of the scheme and to give its
4support to the introduction of a reserve price plan.
1
Muster, 28 April 1965? p.l.
2
Ibid.
3
The Reserve Price Plan for Wool Marketing, Australian 
Wool Board, 1965.
4
The Bulletin, 24 July 1965 > p.4l.
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This was a surprising decision in view of the previous 
opposi t i on from graziers 5 and also in view of later 
events, We can only assume that most of the AWGC*s 
delegates had either decided in favour of the p1an , 
or voted for the plan in order that it should be 
submitted to growers to make the decision, or felt some 
sense of obligation to support the AWTO Executive 
Committee. Whatever the case, the fact that the A.W1C 
approved of the scheme by such an overwhelming majority 
and that twenty of the AWGC ' s twenty-five delegates 
voted for it had an important impact on the conduct 
of the referendum campaign.
Once the AW1C had approved the plan, the Government 
began to organise the postal ballot of woolgrowers 
which was held between early November and early December. 
All woolgrowers who produced ten or more bales of wool 
in the 1964/5 season or owned 300 or more sheep were 
eligible to vote, Each member of a partnership was 
entitled to a vote (provided he met the minimum 
production or stock requirements) but pastoral companies 
received only one vote each. With their ballot paper 
voters received three booklets, one setting out details 
of the scheme and the other two providing summaries 
of the arguments for and against the plan. The booklet 
explaining the scheme stated that the aim was to
encourage a more stable and stronger
overall demand for wool in world markets
by reducing price fluctuations and
432
particularly by giving wool users the 
assurance that wool prices would not 
fall below a certain level.'*'
It explained that floor prices would be set for each 
type of wool at the beginning of the season by the 
wool marketing authority to be set up„ Each lot of 
wool offered would be appraised and if it failed to 
realise the appropriate reserve price it would be 
5 bought-in’ by the authority at the reserve price and 
later resold when the market improved. The booklet 
setting out the case in favour of the plan was prepared 
by the AWTC Executive Commit tee« it argued that a 
reserve price system would reduce price instability 
for wool, thus assuring growers of better returns
and greater security, and enabling wool ’to hold its
2own in the textile trade* <, The booklet providing the 
case against the plan was prepared by the GA , the 
Committee Tor the Retention and Improvement of the Free 
Wool Market, the two other graziers* associations in 
N„SoW. and the graziers* associations in Victoria and 
South Australia, It argued that the costs of the 
scheme would be enormous, but that there was no 
guarantee that it would achieve price stability or 
secure better overall returns to growers» It also
1
Reserve Prices Plan for Wool 1963, published with 
the authority of the Minister for Primary Industry, 
October 1965, P * 3 «
2
A rguments in Favour of the Reserve Prices Plan for 
Wool, prepared in accordance with Section 6 of the Wool 
Reserve Prices Plan Referendum Act 1965» p.3»
3
Although the five organisations authorised the case 
presented, the GA prepared the document»
4.33
warned that through stock-piling a reserve price scheme 
could undermine confidence, and thus depress prices 
and dislocate the world wool market,^
The Actors in the Campaign
To understand the GA ’ s behaviour and role during 
the campaign, and in order to make an assessment of its 
influence on the referendum results, it is necessary 
to know who the other actors in the campaign were, 
whether they supported or opposed the plan, what kinds 
of resources they had available, and to what extent 
they mobilised these resources in the campaign. It is 
also necessary to know generally the kind of campaigns 
waged by supporters and opponents.
On paper the supporters of the plan were in a far 
2stronger position. They included all the State wheat- 
sheep farmers’ organisations as well as the AWMPF, the 
Executive of the AWIC and (at least in name) the AWTC 
itself, the Wool Board, the APPU, three of the member 
organisations of AWGC and prominent individual members 
of other graziers’ associations (including the President 
of AWGC and three members of the GA Executive Committee), 
and special organisations formed to support the plan in
1
Arguments Against the Reserve Prices Plan for Wool, 
prepared in accordance with Section 6 of the Wool 
Reserve Prices Plan Referendum Act 1965.
2
The information in this section is from press reports, 
personal interviews, and E.D. Daw, ’Woolgrowers and 
Wool Marketing', The Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII, 
N o „3 (September 1965)•
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the referendum. In addition, two leading agricultural 
economists (Professor F.H. Gruen and Mr A»G. Lloyd) and 
leading rural newspapers such as The Land (in N.S.W.) 
gave their support. Although the Government remained 
neutral, some senior members of the Cabinet (in 
particular, the leader and the deputy-leader of the 
Country Party) announced their personal support for 
the plan. The plan was also supported by many Government 
backbenchers and by the Labor Party. The support of 
wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations, the APPU, 
politicians of all parties, and the rural press was not 
unexpected. Indeed, it would have been extremely 
strange if wheat-sheep farmers had not come out strongly 
for this plan which followed the model they had advocated 
for so long. What was surprising was the support of 
the Wool Board (a statutory authority), the three 
graziers’ associations and individual members of other 
graziers’ associations. The Wool Board justified its 
entry into the campaign on the grounds that it was 
merely explaining details of the plan to growers. The 
three AWGC member organisations (the United Graziers’ 
Association of Queensland, the Pastoralists and Graziers’ 
Association of Western Australia, and the Tasmanian 
Farmers, Stockowners and Orchardists' Association) had 
always shown some enthusiasm for a reserve price scheme. 
Moreover, in Tasmania and Western Australia the stronger 
wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations had built up such a
1
These were the Vote ’Yes’ Committees and the Australian 
Growers’ Wool Marketing Committee. The Vote ’Yes’ 
Committees were organised in N.S.W. by a GA member.
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strong climate of opinion among woolgrowers in favour 
of a reserve price scheme that declared opponents of 
stabilisation schemes in the graziers’ association 
found themselves outvoted. The individual members of 
other graziers’ associations who gave their support 
included traditional enthusiasts for marketing reform 
(such as B.R. Bremner and A.W. Scott of the GA) and 
recent converts (such as T.L. Bull, President of AWGC 
to June 1965, and his successor, T.B.C. Walker).
Apart from their numerical strength, supporters 
of the plan had superior political resources - at least 
on paper. The wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations claimed 
a total membership of almost double that of the graziers’ 
associations. They were deeply committed to the reserve 
price idea and after years of frustration were prepared 
to mobilise their secretariats, their publicity vehicles, 
and their branch structures as fully as possible. Unlike 
the graziers’ associations, they were untroubled by 
internal dissension over the plan. In addition, they 
were campaigning for the principle of stabilised 
marketing that had been successfully applied to many 
other rural industries and which was well accepted in 
the Australian community. The Wool Board’s own 
political resources were considerable. Its financial 
strength enabled it to undertake extensive radio and 
press publicity campaigns far more expensive than any 
wool grower organisation could afford. Its Chairman,
Sir William Gunn, was well known to woolgrowers and to 
a large section of the Australian public. At the opening 
of the campaign, his reputation was high. Each of his 
campaigns since i960 to increase the promotion levy had
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succeeded, and even his opponents agreed that he was 
probably the most forceful and successful leader the 
Australian wool industry had ever produced.
Some of the individual members of graziers’ 
associations who supported the plan were influential 
figures in their own organisations and were prepared 
to mobilise their own personal resources in the campaign. 
Bryce Killen, for example, was a member of the G A ’s 
Executive Committee and a former Vice-President of the 
Association. A member of a wealthy pastoral family 
with extensive business interests, Killen had travelled 
extensively overseas and had made his own investigations 
of opinion within the British textile industry on wool 
marketing methods. He also was an experienced speaker, 
and had the reputation of being a creative thinker.
During the campaign he addressed many public meetings, 
and flew the Managing Director of the International 
Wool Secretariat (who made a special trip from London 
to undertake a brief campaign in support of the plan) 
around N.S.W. to meetings in his own private plane.’'"
Opponents of the plan were in a much weaker position. 
They entered the campaign late, when supporters of the 
plan had their campaigns well under way. Some of the 
graziers’ associations were undecided for a long period 
and came out against the plan only shortly before the 
ballot commenced. The GA was the first graziers’ 
association to decide against the plan, and its decision
1
The Land, 4 November 1965*
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undoubtedly influenced other graziers’ associations»
When it made its decision, on 11 June 1965, the only 
other opposition had come from individual members of 
graziers’ associations, the daily press and some 
academic agricultural economists (particularly Professor 
R.M. Parish of the University of New England). Although 
the press had announced”*- in May that an organisation 
was being formed in N.S.W. to fight the plan, the actual 
formation of this organisation, which took the name of 
the Committee for the Retention and Improvement of the 
Free Wool Market (but became known as the Retention 
Committee), did not take place until the second week 
in June.^ Just before the GA made its decision, three
wool broking firms in N.S.W. also announced their own
3opposition. Once the GA had announced its opposition 
other support came gradually. The four other graziers’ 
associations which eventually came out against the plan 
were slow to decide their policy. The Graziers’ 
Association of Riverina, the Pastoralists’ Association 
of West Darling, and the Graziers’ Association of
4Victoria waited until August, and the Stockowners’
Association of South Australia did not make its decision
5until 7 September. Other opposition to the plan came
1
Ibid., 6 May 1965.
2
See report in The Land, 24 June 1965.
3
The Land, 10 June 1965.
4
Mus ter, 4 August, 25 August, 1 September 1965*
5
Ibid., 15 September 1965*
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from wives of members of the Retention Committee (who
formed the Women’s Anti-Reserve Price Group),  ^ the
2N.S.W. Sheepbreeders’ Association, and some Liberal
backbenchers. It was also rumoured that one
Commonwealth Liberal Cabinet Minister from N.S.W. had
expressed the hope in a letter to constituents that the3plan would be rejected.
Apart from being numerically weaker than the
supporters of the plan, the opponents had serious
political disabilities. They were embarrassed by the
defection of individual graziers and the three graziers’
associations, and by the failure of the AWGC to come
out against the plan. On 22 June 19^5 the AWGC decided
’in view of the need to allow individual organisations
to declare and present their own policy... that no policy
4on the proposed marketing scheme be determined.,.’.
However, the AWGC agreed to press for multiple voting
rights for large graziers and for voting rights for
5individual members of family companies. Although three 
wool broking firms in N.S.W. declared their opposition 
to the scheme (these were the Australian Mercantile Land
1
Ibid., 4 August 1965*
2
Ibid., 28 July 1965
3
e.g., see The Bulletin, 25 September 1965» p .17•
4
The Land, 24 June 1965.
5
Neither of these concessions were secured. Because of 
the provision of only one vote to each pastoral company, 
many larger graziers were, in fact, disadvantaged.
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and Finance Co, Ltd.; Pitt, Son and Badgery; and 
Winchcombe Carson Ltd.), the two largest Australian 
wool broking firms, and the National Council of Wool 
Selling Brokers all remained neutral. Admittedly, the 
graziers’ associations had considerable political 
resources - financial strength, skill in campaigning 
and well-developed secretariats - but because of internal 
dissension they were limited in the extent to which they 
could mobilise them in the campaign. The graziers’ 
associations and the Retention Committee headed by 
R.W. Macarthur-Onslow (a descendant of John Macarthur) 
and G.G. Ashton (Treasurer of the GA) also had the 
political disability of being closely linked with the 
wool broking firms. Macarthur-Onslow admitted that he 
and another member of the Committee were directors of 
the Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company,’*’ 
and the General Manager of this wool firm, G.S. Le 
Couteur, had assumed the role of principal spokesman 
for opponents of the plan in N.S.W.
The Campaign
In view of the long history of dispute over 
marketing, the rivalry between woolgrower organisations, 
and the deep emotions associated with the question of 
marketing reform, it was not surprising that the 
campaign was intense, sustained and characterised by 
angry exchanges. Journalists saw in the campaign all 
the elements of a first-rate political drama, and
1
The Land, 24 June 1965»
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reports of day-to-day developments filled columns of 
the city dailies for weeks. Both sides used the same 
vehicles for their propaganda - press releases, 
newspaper advertisements, letters to the press, public 
meetings, pamphlets, and radio and television interviews. 
There were also personal encounters between leading 
opponents on television and in a number of public debates
Despite the numerical superiority of supporters 
of the plan and their superior political resources, the 
campaign clearly went better for their opponents. In 
the early stages most observers were confident that 
woolgrowers would accept the plan by a clear majority.
But as the campaign proceeded they became less certain, 
and by the close of polling it was predicted that the 
vote would be close, though most prophets still predicted 
that the plan would be accepted.
Opponents of the plan had one tactical advantage 
which they exploited fully. Supporters had to convince 
growers not only that change from the traditional 
auction system was necessary, but that the proposed 
reserve price plan was a safe, well-designed scheme 
which could guarantee to reduce fluctuations and give 
overall better long-term returns. Their opponents had 
only to show that the case for the plan was not proved - 
that the scheme might fail to produce the promised 
results and, in fact, might cost woolgrowers enormous 
sums without yielding worthwhile returns. Opponents 
of the scheme also were able to capitalise on woolgrowers 
deep-seated fears of government intervention and 
bureaucracy.
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The main opponents of the scheme in N.S.W. (the GA, 
the Retention Committee, and the Daily Telegraph) 
produced well thought-out, rational arguments which 
cast doubts on the validity of the scheme and the 
claims of its supporters. They warned of the danger of 
a stockpile of wool if the authority ’bought i n ’ too 
much (as, in fact, happened in New Zealand two years 
later). They produced detailed figures to show how 
costly the scheme might be. The Retention Committee 
asserted that the Wool Board had kept information back 
from woolgrowers, that it was ’treating the woolgrowers 
like sheep’, and that the scheme was ’the "thin edge 
of the wedge" to ultimate socialisation of the industry’.
Moreover, the actual course the campaign took
worked to the advantage of the opponents of the plan.
In the early stages the campaign was more a debate on
general principles - a debate in which neither side
scored a significant advantage. But from late September
the campaign was concerned primarily with details,
particularly of how the scheme would operate, what the 
2costs would be, and whether European and British 
textile manufacturers favoured retention of the auction 
system. The resulting confusion and lack of agreement
1
Advertisement in Muster, 25 August 1965* The Committee 
also published a fourteen-page booklet entitled What 
Every Woolgrower Should Know about the Dangers of the 
Reserve Price Wool Marketing Scheme.
2
e.g., see debate on costs in Sydney Morning Herald,
23 November 1965* and The Land, 18 and 25 November 1965*
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on these details tended to build up doubt in the minds 
of the uncommitted woolgrowers.
Supporters of the plan fought an extremely active 
campaign justifying the need for marketing change and 
explaining the projected benefits of the proposed plan. 
They also queried whether those woolgrowers opposing 
the plan were speaking as woolgrowers, or on behalf of 
brokers and other financial interests. The campaign 
in support of the plan was dominated by the Wool Board 
and by Sir William Gunn - and by the end of the campaign 
this proved to be a disability. Opponents of the plan 
questioned the legality of the use of promotion money 
by the Wool Board for a political campaign, and even 
appealed to the Attorney General to take action.
They also asked whether it was proper for the ’impartial' 
Chairman of the AWTC (Dr J. Melville) and the Managing 
Director of the International Wool Secretariat (Mr 
W.J. Vines) to participate in the campaign. Gunn's 
forceful campaigning undoubtedly won much publicity and 
support for the plan, but it also created the impression 
among woolgrowers that he was applying undue pressure.
In 1966 the writer talked to many woolgrowers who 
claimed they voted against the scheme because they 
objected to dictation by Gunn. Gunn's failure during 
the campaign to win Country Party pre-selection for 
the seat of Maranoa (in Queensland) may have seriously 
damaged his reputation. 'Gunn's crash in Maranoa', 
one observer wrote in October 1965, ’is just the sort 
of thing that is likely to lead the non-member grower...
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into the "no" camp. Was not Sir William Gunn the man 
who was supposed to be getting the wool industry- 
organised? ’ ^
Although overshadowed by Gunn and the Wool Board, 
the wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations fought an active 
campaign. Undoubtedly their enthusiasm for the plan and 
accusations about grazier-broker-business conspiracies 
influenced many woolgrowers in favour of the scheme.
But their personal attacks on leaders of the opposing 
side, their accusations about numerous conspiracies, 
and their lack of rational argument cast doubts in the 
minds of other growers. The leaders of wheat-sheep 
farmers’ organisations resented careful economic analysis 
of the scheme as being malevolently inspired and 
bordering on sabotage. Many of them saw the campaign 
in terms of struggle between different social classes.
The General Secretary of UFWA accused the Womens’ Anti- 
Reserve Price Group of being ’a group of leading society 
women’ who ’probably gained their inspiration to oppose 
the reserve price scheme over a meal at one of Sydney’s 
plush restaurants'.^
The G A ’s Role and Behaviour
Despite the fact that the GA was more seriously 
divided over the reserve price scheme than any other 
issue in its history, its behaviour followed a predictable 
pattern.
1
The Bulletin, 23 October 1965> p .62.
2
Quoted by Janet Ashton in letter to Muster, 1 September
1965.
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Unlike the wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations, the 
GA characteristically delayed making a decision until 
the full details of the plan were known, and this 
decision was made according to a thoroughly democratic 
procedure. But in the meantime, the GA Executive 
Committee waged a clever pseudo-campaign aimed to 
satisfy members that the Association was active without 
committing it to a definite policy. This pseudo­
campaign consisted of a constant flow of comments on 
each new development or official statement, reiteration 
of the fact that the Association had not made a decision 
on the plan, and repeated demands for more information 
on the plan. In January 1965 the Chairman of the AFIC 
asked woolgrower organisations to refrain from comment 
until negotiations with the Government were concluded.'*' 
The GA refused to keep silence since supporters of the 
plan were having their viewpoint put forward by the 
AFIC Executive and the Fool Board. It also considered 
that the request was unwise since any proposal needed 
to be thoroughly discussed by growers. ’Notwithstanding 
our refusal to be tied to a pledge of silence’, the GA 
President explained to the I965 Annual Conference in
March, ’we have endeavoured to avoid unnecessary
2speculative discussion’.
1
The Australian, 12 January 1965.
Annual Conference records, 1965.
2
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Once the final details of the plan were announced,
the Association's Executive Committee, as directed by
Council and Conference/ called a specral conference
for 11 June. It also arranged for a series of country
meetings where members of the Executive Committee could
explain to members the details of the plan, and present
arguments for and against its adoption. Between 10 May
and 25 May the President (T.ß.C. Walker) and four other
members of the Executive Committee addressed over 2,000
2woolgrowers at twenty-four different meetings. From
press reports, it appears that as a group, but not always
individually, they conscientiously put forward arguments
3for and against the plan. Local branches and district 
councils then met to determine policy. By the time the 
conference met, eleven branches had decided for the plan 
and fifty-seven against it, while many others were still
4undecided. The debate at the conference on the reserve
price plan lasted eight hours. A motion in favour of
the plan was discussed at length, Various amendments
were moved and lost, and finally the motion was lost
by ninety-six votes to fifty, with fifty delegates
5abstaining from voting, A resolution directing the GA
1
General Council minutes, 29-30 July 1964; and Annual 
Conference minutes, 1965»
2
R eport of Proceedings 1965  ^ p »6, and press reports.
3 '
e.g. The Land, 3 June 1965 *
4
Agenda paper in Special Conference records, 11 June 1965»
5
Special Conference minutes, 11 June 1965»
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to reject the reserve price plan as outlined by the
AWIC was then carried. The conference also decided
that ’the Association’s opposition to the scheme and
the reasons for it be published as widely as possible’
with special emphasis being given to the weaknesses
in the scheme."*" A surprise move at the conference came
in the debate on the motion to support the plan when
the President, T.B.C. Walker, (who at the time was a
member of the AWIC Executive Committee) vacated the
chair and supported an amendment favouring the scheme,
subject to certain conditions. Walker explained that
he had always been opposed to any change in the auction
system, but that after serious consideration he was
prepared to support the revised scheme. A number of
other prominent members of General Council also
announced that they too had changed their minds and now
supported the idea of a reserve price plan. The
decision of the conference to oppose the plan and to
campaign to secure its defeat placed Walker in a
difficult position. Fortunately for him he was elected
President of the AWGC a fortnight later, and at the
July meeting of General Council he had a suitable excuse
2to retire from the presidency. He was followed as 
President of the Association by B.A. Wright, a declared 
opponent of the scheme.
1
Ibid. See also report in The Land, 17 June 1965*
General Council minutes, 8-9 July 1965*
2
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Following the special conference the Executive
Committee had the responsibility of directing the
Association's campaign. Its first action was to
authorise the preparation and publication of a booklet
setting out the reasons why the Association opposed
the scheme.^ Approximately 30»000 copies were printed
and circulated. During the campaign, on the Executive
Committee's instructions, the Association issued
numerous press releases, inserted advertisements in
newspapers (country and city) and used radio and
television media to publicise its views. The
Association's case against the scheme was presented
in a characteristic rational, logical way, with the
possible exception of its one line of argument that
the scheme could lead to increased government control
and perhaps nationalisation of the wool industry. Its
main argument in the campaign was that insufficient
information was available to make a proper judgment,
but that with any reserve price scheme there was the
possibility that the heavy costs involved could
2outweigh any advantages. It also warned of the dangers 
of wool stock-piles, and cast doubt on whether the scheme 
would significantly reduce price fluctuations and 
protect growers against long-term price declines. This
1
e.g. The Land, 4 November 1965.
2
The G A 's case was set out in greatest detail in the 
booklet it published entitled The Wool Marketing 
Referendum: Vote No.
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rational, academic approach was one that well suited the 
G A 's style of political campaigning, and one that made 
good use of the expertise of its senior staff members.
In all, the GA spent almost £7,000 on the campaign.^
During the campaign individual members of the GA 
campaigned for the plan, and many GA branches held 
meetings addressed by speakers for and against it.
Some GA supporters of the plan objected to the Executive 
Committee's active campaign and asserted that it had 
exceeded the instructions given to it by the special 
conference in June. A censure motion against the 
Executive at the November GA General Council meeting 
nevertheless failed, and the Council carried a vote of 
confidence in the Executive and commended 'the 
dignified, logical and equitable statements issued 
by the President ... and his executives'.^ In a press 
statement issued with the authority of the Executive 
Committee soon after this meeting of the Council, Ick- 
Hewins explained that:
The executive at no time lost sight of 
the fact that there was a minority vote of 
50 on the main issue or of the fact that 
negative inferences are capable of being 
drawn from lost motions. Its attitude on 
these matters had, of necessity, to be 
conditioned by the express will of the 
majority and by the terms of the resolutions 
actually carried....The executive
1
Report of Proceedings 1965» P»7* The main items 
of expenditure were advertising and printing.
2
General Council minutes, 10-11 November 1965»
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examined the position in the light of 
the verbatim report of the Special 
Conference and determined that its 
obligation to both majority and minority 
would be fulfilled if it placed no limit 
of time upon its statement, remained free 
to deal with matters arising after the 
June Conference, used all available media 
of publicity to reach growers in N.S.W. 
and other States, accepted the position , 
vis-a-vis the Wool Board that the question 
was a controversial one but that this 
controversy should be carried out in a 
dignified way, and (by way of further 
negative inference) avoided disputation 
with other woolgrowe.r organisations.
From the Association’s records and press reports it is 
clear that this in fact was the policy that the 
Executive Committee followed.
In the referendum campaign the GA clearly played 
a crucial role. At the time this was acknowledged by 
both impartial observers and by the Association’s 
opponents. But how important the GA’s role in N.S.W. 
was compared to that of the Retention Committee and the 
Daily Telegraph is difficult to assess. Because of 
the overlap in membership between the GA and the 
Retention Committee, it was difficult at the time to 
distinguish between their separate campaigns, and in 
fact the Retention Committee was often thought of as 
the conservative wing of the GA. Practically all 
members of the Retention Committee's Central Committee
1
Muster, 24 November 1965*
4^0
and local branches in N.S.W. were GA members. G.G.
Ashton, the Committee’s Deputy-Chairman, was Treasurer 
of the GA, and G.S. Le Couteur (of the Australian 
Mercantile Land and Finance Company), who became the 
Committee’s principal spokesman in public debates, 
was Chairman of the G A ’s Cumberland (i.e. Sydney) local 
branch. The GA ' s influence in the campaign extended 
well beyond New South Wales. If the GA had not come out 
against the plan in June 1965, it seems unlikely that 
the other four graziers’ associations would have done so.
In other States (particularly Victoria) the activities 
of the GA during the campaign were well publicised and 
through this publicity the GA undoubtedly had some 
influence on woolgrower opinion.
Results and Aftermath
The results of the referendum announced on 10 December 
1965 were a severe blow to the hopes of wheat-sheep 
farmers - and a pleasant, though somewhat unexpected 
surprise to the G A . The scheme was rejected with 53*55 
per cent of valid votes cast against its adoption.
However, majorities in favour of it were secured in four 
out of six States. Details of voting are shown in 
Table 16. In each of the three States where the graziers’ 
associations came out in support of the plan (Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania) affirmative majorities 
were secured. In Victoria there was a majority in 
favour of the scheme despite the campaign of the Graziers’
1
See The Graziers' Annual 1965-1966 edition, p.13.
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Association of Victoria, but this was not surprising.
The Graziers’ Association of Victoria was numerically 
much weaker than both the Victorian Wheat and Wool 
Growers’ Association and the wool section of the APPU. 
Moreover, Victorian wheat-sheep farmers for years had 
been almost fanatical in their enthusiasm for the 
reserve price idea. The N.S.W. results were particularly 
surprising and indicated that many wheat-sheep farmers 
as well as graziers must have rejected the scheme. The 
N.S.W. vote, because of its sheer size, was crucial.
Even if N.S.W. woolgrowers had been evenly divided, 
there would have been an overall majority of over 
2,000 votes for the scheme. In sum, it is highly 
probable that the GA had a vital influence on the outcome 
of the referendum. For our purposes it seems valid 
to consider this as a case of the successful use of 
veto power.
The announcement of the results did not mean that 
the campaign was immediately over and forgotten. For 
months both sides indulged in recriminatory attacks 
until the Wool Board released a further report1 on 
31 October 1967 and a new debate began. For a time 
the AWTC’s future seemed somewhat in doubt. The result 
of the referendum damaged its reputation as the 
responsible voice of woolgrower opinion. Some 
advocated its abolition, while others suggested 
different methods of electing its members. But in the 
end no change was made.
1
Australian Wool Board: Report on Wool Marketing,
Melbourne, October 31st, 1967.
453
Within the GA the campaign had far reaching 
repercussions. The day before the results were 
announced P.A. Wright, the father of the President 
(and a past-President of both the Association and the 
GFC), called for an end to ’the unfortunate and 
deplorable controversy that has marred the progress 
of the campaign... and has caused so much ill-feeling 
that...a great deal of harm has been done which will 
take much time to repair’.^  This appeal had little 
effect, and as Wright prophesied, the damage took time 
to repair. Through its vigorous campaign against the 
plan the Association lost a number of members, including 
some chairmen of local branches. On the other hand, it 
gained some new members, and its members who opposed 
the plan probably felt a greater sense of satisfaction 
with the GA. The real aftermath of the campaign was at 
the 1966 Annual Conference when both opponents and 
supporters of the reserve price plan submitted a great 
number of motions which were debated at length. The 
main debate centred on the AWIC, with opponents of the 
wool plan calling for its abolition and supporters 
wishing to give it additional powers and functions.1 2 
In the end a compromise decision was agreed to: the
Conference refused either to pass a vote of confidence 
in the AWIC or to call for its abolition, but decided 
to work for its reconstitution and to secure nine 
instead of the five AWGC seats. Some members of the
1
The Land, 9 December 1965.
Annual Conference minutes, 1966.
2
Conference questioned whether the three members of the 
Executive Committee who campaigned for the plan acted 
properly. It was suggested that the Executive Committee 
was like a Cabinet, with each member being bound to 
follow official policy. Others questioned whether 
delegates from branches to Conference, or from the 
Association to federal bodies, had the right to make up 
their own minds, after hearing new evidence and listening 
to the debate, on how they should vote or whether they 
were strictly bound to carry out instructions of 
branches or Conference.
The Association’s active campaign had a marked 
effect on its relations with other organisations. It 
widened the rift between the Association and the UFWA, 
making co-operation even at branch level more difficult 
and the possibility of amalgamation more remote. In 
the eyes of wheat-sheep farmers’ organisations throughout 
Australia the GA, more than ever before, was seen as 
the arch-enemy of marketing reform.
The campaign did not seriously affect the 
Association’s relations with the Commonwealth Government, 
though it did not improve relations with Country Party 
Ministers. Moreover, because members of the Federal 
Parliamentary Country Party supported the plan, the GA 
had an added cause for being dissatisfied with the 
Country Party. To GA rank and file activists and 
leaders the Country Party’s support for the plan was 
seen as a further example of the Party’s practice of 
following the demands of wheat-sheep farmers rather 
than of graziers. On the other hand, the referendum 
result added considerably to the GA’s status and
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reputation with the Government. With any future wool 
marketing plan, it seems unlikely that the Commonwealth 
will follow a recommendation of the AWTC or the Wool 
Board unless the GA and other graziers’ associations 
give their support. Without doubt the GA today has 
considerable power on wool policy as a veto group.
Despite the aftermath and bitterness, the GA came 
out of the reserve price referendum far better than many 
members anticipated. The over-all loss in membership 
was slight, there were no protest resignations from 
the Executive Committee or Council, and the successful 
campaign certainly acquired additional status for the 
Association. But if the referendum had been carried, 
the story might have been very different.
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CHAPTER 13 
Cattle Compensation
Cattle compensation is an example of one of the 
many non-controversial and non-partisan matters with 
which the GA is concerned. This case-study of the 
Association’s representation to the N.S.W. Government 
on this matter illustrates its role as an initiator of 
policy and as an ombudsman on behalf of its members, 
the persistence with which it pursues its objectives, 
and the character of its relations with Labor 
administrations on non-controversial and non-partisan 
matters.
Development of the N.S.W. Cattle Compensation Scheme
The N.S.W. cattle compensation scheme is operated 
by the Department of Agriculture. When beef and dairy 
cattle are condemned because of disease and subsequently 
destroyed, owners are paid compensation from a cattle 
compensation fund.
The idea of a cattle compensation scheme for N.S.W. 
was borrowed from Victoria, and the actual system 
eventually put into operation was closely modelled on 
the Victorian scheme, which had been established in the 
mid-1920s. When the latter began to operate, cattle 
owners in southern N.S.W. had to pay stamp duty on stock 
sold in Victoria and thus developed an interest in a 
similar scheme for N.S.W. The 1929 GA Annual Conference 
discussed the matter and instructed its Meat Committee
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to make a detailed investigation of the Victorian
scheme/ The following year the Committee reported
that it favoured the Victorian example in principle,
but considered that other farm organisations and
Queensland interests should be consulted before a
2decision was made. The Association referred the 
matter to the Producers’ Associations’ Central Council, 
but by then farmers and graziers were too pre-occupied 
with the economic problems of the depression.
For more than a decade little further thought was
given to cattle compensation. In 193^ the GA
established its Cattle Council but it was not until
1943 that the Cattle Council gave consideration to a
cattle compensation scheme. In July 1944 it reported
to the General Council in favour of the establishment
of a government controlled scheme financed by a
compulsory levy on cattle owners with a matching
3government subsidy. The GA then approached the FSA 
and the Primary Producers’ Union (representing dairy 
farmers). Both agreed to support the GA ’s proposal, 
and in 1946 the three organisations made a formal
4approach to the Minister for Agriculture.
1
2
3
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N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 19^9? p.43*
N.S.W. Graziers’ Annual 193Q> P»53* 
General Council minutes, 11-12 July 1944. 
The Graziers’ Annual 1946 edition, p.65*
The response of the Minister and senior officers 
of his department was encouraging, but negotiations 
proceeded extremely slowly. The Department of 
Agriculture was still under-staffed because of the 
war and during discussions with spokesmen of the three 
organisations, officers of the department became aware 
of the differing views on how a scheme should be 
financed.
While negotiations were still proceeding the G A ,
the FSA and the Primary Producers’ Union, together
with the Wheatgrowers’ Union, developed a more
ambitious plan to control the whole meat industry by
a board consisting of primary producers."*“ This
board would control cattle sales and stock prices,
trade in meat and meat products, and run a cattle
compensation scheme. This plan was submitted to the
Minister for Agriculture who, after considerable
delay, replied that he and his officers thought the
scheme was impractical. The four organisations then
decided to press for a cattle compensation scheme
divorced from the other proposals. In January 19^8
representatives of the G A , the FSA and the Primary
Producers’ Union, meeting as the Primary Producers’
Consultative Council, agreed on the broad principles
for a scheme and appointed a committee to prepare a 
2draft bill. The GA Cattle Council also appointed
1
Muster, 15 March 19^+8, pp.19-20.
Ibid., 2 February 19^8, p.3*
2
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its own sub-committee to make recommendations to the 
inter-organisation committee.^
Before the organisations reached agreement on a
draft bill, an unexpected move came from a senior
2officer of the Department of Agriculture. In August 
1948 the Association sponsored an animal genetics 
conference which was attended by academics, officers 
of the Department of Agriculture and primary producers. 
In an informal conversation with the GA President 
(P.A. Wright), the Chief of the Division of Animal 
Industry (W.L. Hindmarsh) expressed the wish to talk 
to some primary producers about proposals for a cattle 
compensation scheme. He explained that the Government 
intended to have a bill drafted as soon as possible. 
Wright discussed this request with members of the 
Executive Committee and with the General Secretary.
They all recognised that if a bill was about to be 
drafted it would be advantageous for representatives 
of the Association to put their views to Hindmarsh 
who, no doubt, would draw up proposals for the scheme. 
On the other hand, Wright was loath for the Association 
to take independent action (he felt this would be a 
breach of faith, especially at a time when the GA was 
seeking to develop an effective State peak organisation 
to speak for farmers) or to participate in negotiations 
without definite guidance from the Cattle Council. In 
the end, Wright agreed to take part in preliminary
1
Ibid., 1 December 1948, p.9*
2
Ibid., p p .9-10.
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talks with Eindmarsh that week; these took place in 
Hindmarsh's office, Wright took with him a leading 
member of the Cattle Council, Also present were two 
representatives of the relatively unimportant United 
Purebred Cattle Association, Why Hindmarsh should 
not have invited representatives of the other interested 
organisations is puzzling, although he may have looked 
on the discussion as nothing more than an opportunity 
to sound out some individual leaders on proposals 
he had in mind,
Hindmarsh took notes of the discussion and later 
forwarded copies to the participants. According to 
these notes^ agreement was reached on the basic 
features of a compensation scheme, which included:
(i) funds be obtained by a levy made by Pastures 
Protection Boards on all owners of cattle in each 
Pastures Protection District and by a matching 
government contribution; (ii) reciprocal arrangements 
be made with adjoining States to provide for the 
payment of compensation for cattle coming from other 
States; (iii) compensation payments be related to the 
market price of stock; (iv) full value be paid for 
cattle condemned and found free of disease on 
slaughter, and three-quarters of the value in other 
cases; (v) consideration be given for adequate 
compensation for stud animals; and (vi) compensation 
be paid for cattle from Queensland after being in 
N.S.W. for six months.
1
Ibid., 15 February 1949, pp.8-9.
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In the discussions the GA representatives argued 
that, since more compensation would probably be paid 
in respect of dairy than beef cattle, dairy farmers 
should pay an additional levy based on cream or milk 
production. This was rejected by Hindmarsh. The GA 
representatives also stressed the need for realistic 
compensation for stud stock (most beef cattle stud- 
owners were members of the G A ) and for reciprocal 
agreements with other States (beef cattle producers 
often bought Queensland stock and graziers in 
southern N.S.W. sent stock to Victorian markets).
The proposal to limit compensation for cattle from 
Queensland to those in N.S.W. for six months or more 
was insisted on. by Hindmarsh. ^
Wright emphasised in the discussion that the 
views he and his colleague expressed were not to be 
taken as an expression of official GA policy.
Hindmarsh’s notes recorded:
Mr. Wright pointed out that the Graziers’ 
Association had appointed a sub-committee 
to go into the matter of cattle compensation, 
and whilst the views expressed would, he 
thought, represent the views of this sub­
committee, he could not commit the Association2to them in entirety at the present time.
On receipt of these notes Ick-Hewins wrote to Hindmarsh
3to clarify the position. He explained that the
1
Ibid., 1 December 1948, p.9*
2
Ibid., 15 February 1949? p-9*
3
Ibid.
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recently constituted Primary Producers’ Consultative 
Council (consisting at the time of the GA , FSA, the 
Primary Producers’ Union and the Wheatgrowers’ Union) 
had discussed cattle compensation and planned to bring 
the Graziers’ Association of Riverina and the 
Pastoralists’ Association of West Darling into their 
discussions. He suggested to Hindmarsh that instead 
of consulting these organisations separately he should 
approach the Primary Producers’ Consultative Council. 
But by this time it was clear to Hindmarsh that the 
Government was in rather less hurry to implement a 
cattle compensation scheme, and negotiations between 
Hindmarsh and industry representatives proceeded no 
further.
During 1949 the sub-committee of the Association’s 
Cattle Council drew up its proposals. These were 
identical with the points agreed to in the discussions 
with Hindmarsh, except for the addition of a proposal 
for state assistance for tuberculin testing of cattle. 
No doubt in drawing up its proposals the sub-committee 
considered not only the interests of' members, but what 
proposals were likely to be accepted by Hindmarsh, by 
the Minister and by other organisations. The idea of 
an additional levy on dairy cattle was dropped as 
being politically unrealistic. The six month 
qualification period for Queensland cattle as favoured 
by Hindmarsh was accepted, even though it was thought 
to be unfair to some beef cattle producers.
1
Ibid., 15 August 1949, p.ll.
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Discussions with other interested organisations 
were delayed for some time because of the dissolution 
of the Primary Producers’ Consultative Council and 
the formation of a new body, the Primary Producers’ 
Council, Once discussions commenced within the new 
Council, the GA found itself in agreement with other 
interested organisat ions on all significant points, 
except the method of raising the fund,^ It favoured 
a per capita levy, based on cattle numbers, and collected 
by Pastures Protection Boards, while the others favoured 
a stamp duty on sales as used in Victoria, The G A ’s 
ostensible argument for the per capita levy was ease 
of operation, but its real reason for favouring this 
method was that it would place less financial burden 
on beef cattle producers.
In January 1950 the interested organisations
finally reached agreement on a submission to be
2presented to the Department of Agriculture, At the 
decisive meeting of the Primary Producers’ Council 
representatives of the five organisations that had 
been participating in the discussions were present 
as well as representatives of the Agricultural Bureau, 
the Royal Agricultural Society, the Australian Poll 
Hereford Society, the Poll Shorthorn Society and the 
United Stud Beef Cattle Breeders’ Association. Except 
for the method of raising finance, all the main points 
in the G A ’s proposal were included in the submission.
1
Ibid.
2
Ibid., 1 February 1950? p.10.
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The submission however, suggested a qualifying period 
of ninety days :ior Queensland cattle (instead of six 
months) and requested the Government to bear all 
compensation payable in respect of tubercular infected 
cattle,
By the time this submission was presented to
Hindmarsh^ the parliamentary session was drawing to
a close. Parliament was dissolved on 22 May 1950» and
general elections were held on 17 June. In his rural
policy speech the Labor Premier, James McGirr, promised
the establishment of a cattle compensation scheme.
Before the new parliamentary session opened in July,
the Association’s Cattle Council tried to re-open
negotiations with the other organisations on the
question of the method of raising finance for the
2compensation fund. Two members of the Cattle Council 
were appointed to approach the FSA and the Primary 
Producers’ Union. Neither organisation showed any 
inclination to re-open discussions and the matter lapsed.
Establishment and Implementation of the Scheme
On 25 September 1951 a Bill providing for the
establishment of a cattle compensation scheme was
introduced by the Minister for Agriculture, the Hon.
3E.H. Graham. Graham told the Legislative Assembly
1
Ibid., 15 July 19505 p.113
2
Ibid.
N.ScW.P.D. (Second Series), Vol. 196, p.31?8.
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that there was a pressing need for a compensation 
scheme so as to encourage cattle owners to report 
outbreaks of disease and to deal with the public 
health hazard of tuberculosis infection from cattle. 
The Bill provided for payment of compensation to 
owners of both cattle and carcasses destroyed because 
of disease under the authority of government officers. 
Compensation payments would be based on market values 
with a maximum payment of £36 per head. Stock 
suspected of being diseased and found to be disease 
free at slaughter would be paid full market value, 
while those found to be diseased would be paid seven- 
eighths of market value. Payments would be made from 
a fund raised by a stamp duty on cattle sales - Id 
in the £ of the purchase price with a maximum of 3/~ 
per head. In the case of payments for tuberculosis 
the Government would contribute 20 per cent of the 
payments for a period of three years. This scheme 
was very similar to that operated by the Victorian 
Government (the Minister admitted this) and followed 
the main lines of the proposal put forward by the 
Primary Producers' Council.
Once the contents of the Bill were revealed, the 
GA contacted the parliamentary leaders of the Country 
Party, Lt. Col. M.F. Bruxner and the Hon. R.C. Wilson 
M.L.C., informing them that it desired the cattle 
compensation fund to be raised by a levy on stock 
rather than by stamp duty on stock sales,^ Wilson
1
Annual Report, 1951 * P»5«
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was manager of Grazcos Co-operative Limited, a contract
shearing company founded by the Association; from 1939
he had been a member of the GA General Council, and
from 1947 to I95O had been a member of the Executive
Committee., Bruxner and Wilson and other Country Party
members gave voice to the GA ' s viewpoint, but none of
them pressed the matter. Immediately after Graham
introduced the Bill into Parliament, Bruxner welcomed
the establishment of a compensation scheme, but
criticised provisions of the bill on the grounds that
the stamp duty on sales would throw the financial burden
on beef cattle producers, and that the maximum
compensation payable was too low, especially for stud
stock.^ In his second reading speech, Graham replied
2to these criticisms. He pointed out that only one 
organisation (obviously the G A ) had suggested a per 
capita levy based on annual stock returns, while all 
the other leading organisations including the Graziers’ 
Association of Riverina (which he was careful to name) 
supported the stamp duty tax. Moreover, he explained, 
the Council of Advice of the Pastures Protection Boards 
was unwilling for Pastures Protection Boards to accept 
responsibility for collecting the per capita levy.
For owners of stud stock he had little sympathy: if
they wanted additional compensation, let them take out 
their own insurance policies. Graham concluded his 
speech confidently asserting that the ’principle of
1
N . S . W. P .D . (Second Series), Vol. 196, pp.3178-81.
2
Ibid., pp.3205-9.
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this legislation has the full support of the majority 
of primary-producer and local-government organisations’. 
In the upper house Wilson and Sir Norman Kater (an 
ex-President of the GA and a stud sheep breeder) echoed 
Bruxner’s criticisms. Kater particularly stressed the 
need for adequate compensation for valuable stud stock. 
But the Bill was treated as a non-party measure and 
passed through both houses without a division. In his 
second reading speech, Bruxner reiterated his preference 
for a per capita scheme of raising finance, but 
conceded: ’However, I am satisfied with the Minister’s
proposal - provided that it can be implemented’. ^  On 
29 October the Cattle Compensation Bill, together with 
an accompanying measure imposing the stamp duty, 
received the Governor's assent.
In retrospect the GA had good reason to be 
satisfied. In his annual report for 1951 the General 
Secretary stated proudly, and accurately, that apart 
from the method of raising the fund ’the measure 
conforms closely with the recommendations of the 
Cattle Council’.^
But even so, the GA was not prepared to leave it 
at that. Between the passage of the legislation and 
the implementation of the scheme in late 1952 it made 
a number of representations to both the Chief of the
1
Ibid., p .3209.
2
Ibid., p.3211.
3
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Division of Animal Industry and to the Minister for 
Agriculture,, Its chief concerns were the qualifying 
period of six months for cattle from Queensland (it 
had changed its mind on this matter) and the method 
of financing the compensation fund. In November 1951 
P.A. Wright (by this time a past-President ) led a 
deputation from the Association’s Cattle Council to 
interview Hindmarsh,^ Wright sought elimination of 
the qualifying period on the grounds that it 
encouraged owners to conceal outbreaks of disease. 
Hindmarsh conceded that there was some validity in this 
argument and promised to consider the G A ’s submission.
Later another GA deputation on the same point
2produced a new argument (and a more valid one): 
cattle from Queensland were often sold once or twice 
in their first six months in N.S.W. and stamp duty 
was paid at each sale; thus their owners should 
qualify for compensation. The deputation suggested 
that a fair method would be to tax Queensland cattle 
on entry to New South Wales, but pointed out that 
such a tax would probably contravene section 92 of the 
Federal constitution. As an alternative, it proposed 
that owners of cattle from Queensland be eligible for 
compensation by making voluntary contributions at a 
fixed rate. Hindmarsh thought this proposal had merit 
and referred it to the Minister for Agriculture. 
However, the reply was unfavourable: if the proposal
1
Muster, 22 November 1952.
Annual Report, 1952, pp.9-10.
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was adopted, the Minister argued, N.S.W. would become 
a dumping ground for pleuro-infected cattle from 
Queensland, The Minister had good reason for taking 
this view, At the time Queensland had no cattle 
compensation scheme and disease eradication methods in 
Queensland had proved less effective than those adopted 
in N.S.W. Outbreaks of pleuro-pneumonia in N.S.W. 
were often attributed to infected cattle from Queensland.
In 1952 the GA asked the Minister to amend the 
Act to provide for a per capita form of assessment to 
finance the compensation fund. Since the scheme was 
just about to go into operation, the Minister justifiably 
refused the request and repeated the convenient argument 
that the Council of Advice of the Pastures Protection 
Boards objected to boards collecting the levy."*"
Pressure for Modifications, 1952-1956
The first complaint from the GA after the scheme 
commenced related to a legal technicality. Ick- 
Hewins1s sharp eye for detail discovered what appeared 
to be an anomaly in the Act. This referred to the 
question of cattle suspected of being diseased and 
ordered to be sent to abattoirs for slaughter. Ick- 
Hewins considered that, while the Act clearly provided 
for compensation for cattle destroyed immediately on 
the order of a stock inspector, there was no legal 
obligation for the Department of Agriculture to pay 
compensation for suspect cattle ordered to be sent
1
Ibid., p.10.
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to the abattoirs. The Chief of the Division of Animal 
Industry agreed that this appeared to be an anomaly 
and referred the matter to the Minister.^ The Minister 
refused to enter into a discussion on the legal issue 
involved, and stated that, since the Department of 
Agriculture had been paying compensation on such 
cases, primary producers had no cause for concern,
In his annual report for 1953 Ick-Hewins commented:
While this assurance is welcome, payments 
made pursuant to it are, in my opinion, 
ex gratia and not authorized by the statute 
and are not, therefore, an entitlement 
conferred upon the cattle owner by law.
In his report Ick-Hewins also suggested that the Act
did not authorise the payment of the difference between
the maximum compensation and the price obtained at sale
as followed by the Department, and queried whether
it could be regarded as an offence under the Stock
Diseases Act for graziers to sell diseased stock.
But no further action was taken. Apparently the GA
considered that the ministerial statement provided
3sufficient safeguard for members.
In 1954 the GA renewed its demand for a per 
capita cattle levy in place of the stamp duty on 
cattle sales. Its spokesmen reiterated the old 
argument that the stamp duty on cattle sales was unfair
1
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to beef cattle producers. By 195^ the Association had
good cause to complain that the scheme was unfair to
beef cattle producers. The report of the Department
of Agriculture for the year 1952/3 revealed that in
the first ten months of the scheme’s operation over
7 0 per cent of compensation payments had been on
account of tuberculosis.^ This meant that the bulk of
payments had gone to dairyfarmers. The FSA then
changed its mind, and supported the G A ’s demand for a
2per capita levy. Much to the surprise of both 
organisations the Minister for Agriculture later in 
195^+ announced that the Act would be amended to provide 
for a per capita system of assessment.
One reason for the change in government policy 
was that the Council of Advice of the Pastures 
Protection Boards had changed its mind. No doubt 
both the GA and the FSA had lobbied individual Pastures 
Protection Boards, many of which were composed largely 
of GA and FSA members. Another reason for the change 
was that the Government planned to make the scheme 
self-supporting by withdrawing the 20 per cent subsidy 
at the end of August 1955* It apparently considered 
that a levy would raise more finance. In view of the 
Government’s announced intention to amend the legislation, 
the GA suggested to the Minister that amendments should
1
Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year
ended 30th June 1953.
2
The Farmers and Settlers’ Association of N ew South
Wales: Report of the Proceedings of the Sixty--First
Annual Conference,
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be made to enable all cattle owners to be eligible 
for compensation irrespective of the time that their 
animals had been infected by disease, and to make the 
Chief of the Division of Animal Industry's decisions 
with respect to compensation claims subject to appeal 
to a judicial tribunal,^ On the first the GA used its 
old argument that the qualifying period of six months 
on cattle from Queensland led to the concealment of 
disease. Again it suggested that cattle from 
Queensland should be able to qualify for compensation 
on entry to N.S.W. by voluntary payments by their 
owners. On the second the GA suggestedthat, while it 
acknowledged the leniency shown by the Chief of the 
Division of Animal Industry, it considered that it 
would be fairer to all concerned if there was provision 
for appeals. To these two requests the Minister 
replied that it would be impossible to provide for 
voluntary contributions for Queensland cattle because 
of the difficulty in valuing cattle as they entered 
New South Wales, and that it was essential for the 
Department of Agriculture to be the final arbiter 
with respect to compensation claims.
During 1955 the Association also requested the
appointment of additional stock inspectors to authorise
the destruction of diseased cattle and to determine
2the amount of compensation to be paid. Stock owners
1
Annual Report, 1955» pp.6-7*
Ibi d., p .6 o
2
473
had good cause to complain of delays between 
notification and inspection by a stock inspector; even 
the annual report of the Department of Agriculture for 
1954/3 admitted that delays had frequently occurred/
Legislative Amendments: 1956 and 1958
In October 1956 the Minister for Agriculture
introduced into Parliament a Bill to amend the Cattle
Compensation Act. It provided for abolition of the
stamp duty on cattle sales and provision of a new
method of financing the cattle compensation scheme:
a per capita levy on all cattle, collected by the
Pastures Protection Boards, and a stamp duty of l/-
per head on cattle delivered to an abattoir for
slaughter. In his second reading speech, the Minister
explained that while the existing system had worked
well it had been unfair to beef producers. He told
the Legislative Assembly that the proposed change inlevy
the manner of the/collection was supported by the GA
2and many other rural organisations. Other
3organisations accepted the amendments happily enough, 
but not the G A . While it supported replacement of the 
stamp duty on sales by a per capita levy, the GA had 
four serious objections to the the amending legislation:
1
Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year 
ended 30th June, 1955» p .42.
2
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of the Primary Producers' Union and the FSA respectively) 
reported the changes without comment.
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there was no government contribution to the scheme; the
six months qualification on Queensland cattle remained;
there was no provision for appeals to a judicial
tribunal; and it considered that the stamp duty at
the point of slaughter should be paid by cattle buyers
and not by owners."*" However, the Bill provided a
concession to the GA's demand for appeals to an
independent tribunal: in future owners refused
compensation could in certain cases appeal directly
to the Minister. The Association conveyed its views
2on the Bill to R.C. Wilson, but again the measure 
was treated as a non-party issue. Wilson did not even 
participate in the debate, but may have conveyed the 
GA’s views privately to the Minister.
For the next twelve or eighteen months the GA 
concentrated on three aspects of the administration 
of the cattle compensation scheme. First, it took 
up the case of members whose claims were rejected 
on the grounds that they had failed to notify 
departmental officers of the disease at a time when 
they ought reasonably to have been aware of its 
presence. Many members whose claims were rejected 
ran beef cattle in rugged country where it was 
difficult to carry out regular inspection for disease. 
On this occasion the Association used a different 
strategy. It wrote to the Department asking for a
1
Annual Report, 1956, pp.17-18, and Muster, 6 November 
1956.
2
Annual Report, 1956, p.18.
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clear statement of what procedure it expected cattle
owners to follow in order to qualify for compensation
payments , It did this to get a clear statement for
the guidance of members and to look for loop-holes in
the Department’s regulations. The Department
provided a clear and detailed statement of its policy
and its rationale for the actual procedures used. The
GA later circulated copies of this document to its
members. Apparently no loop-holes were discovered.
The second matter was a request for claim forms to be
re-designed to include a serial number and to be
issued in duplicate so that claimants could retain a
copy. This request was refused, although no valid
2reasons were given. On the third request the GA 
was successful. The Minister agreed to remove the
3exemption from the levy on herds of less than ten.
In 1958 the Cattle Compensation Taxation Act 
was further amended to increase both the per capita 
levy and the levy at the point of slaughter from l/- 
to l/6d. These increases were necessary because 
payments from the fund for the previous two years 
exceeded income. Payments had increased considerably - 
from £179,955 in 1954/5 to £292,114 in 1 9 5 7 ~
1
Report of Proceedings 1957) p .12.
2
Ibid., pp.12-13.
3
Ibid., p.13.
4
Annual reports of the Department of Agriculture for
1955 and 1958.
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as a result of acceleration of the Department of
Agriculture's programme of dairy herd testing for
tuberculosis. Again the GA communicated its views to
members of the opposition parties. Bruxner took up
the case of graziers whose claims were rejected because
of delayed notification.^ T.L. Lewis (Liberal member
for Wollondilly) spoke against the increased levy
and the need for appeals to an independent tribunal.
Unlike Country Party members who often were reluctant
to mention the GA by name, Lewis specifically stated
2that he was speaking for the Association. Again the 
Bill was treated as a non-party issue and was passed 
after a minimum of debate.
Subsidising the Dairy Sector
The increase in the levies focused attention 
again on the greater benefits being derived from the 
fund by dairyfarmers. In Parliament the Minister 
admitted that the increases resulted from the 
accelerated tempo of tuberculin testing of dairy 
cattle with the consequent detection of cases of 
tuberculosis. Between 1956/7 and 1958/9 the number 
of compensation claims increased from 6,069 to 9?733 
and payments from the fund from £215,830 to £293,481,
while the proportion of cases with tuberculosis
3remained well over 70 per cent. The GA considered
1
N.S.W.P.D. (Third Series), Vol. 23, p.3 1 3 4 .
2
Ibid., P.3135.
3
Annual reports of Department of Agriculture for
1957 and 1959.
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that it was unfair that beef cattle owners should be 
providing two-thirds of the finance, while over 70 
per cent of payments went to dairyfarmers. In late 
1958 the Association submitted a request to the 
Minister for a government subsidy for tuberculosis 
compensation^ but this was refused. The following 
year a sub-committee of the Cattle Council drew up a 
proposal for the establishment of a separate 
tuberculosis fund supported by a government subsidy
and continuation of the existing fund to provide
2 ,compensation for other diseases. In I960 the 
Association made a formal submission to the Minister 
along these lines. It specifically requested 
maintenance of the existing rate of the levies in 
respect of registered dairy herds, reduction of the 
tax levy on beef cattle to a figure reasonably 
commensurate with the needs of the fund in respect 
of diseases other than tuberculosis, and payment of 
a government subsidy for tuberculosis compensation.
This request was refused. In his reply however, the 
Minister conceded that the bulk of compensation 
payments were going to dairyfarmers, but defended 
retention of the existing policy on the grounds that 
eradication of tuberculosis benefited beef cattle 
producers as well as dairyfarmers, that the incidence 
of tuberculosis was declining, and that the Department’s 
disease eradication programme included other aspects
1
The Graziers* Annual 1958 edition, p.29.
Report of Proceedings 1959? p.10.
2
4?8
which benefited beef cattle producers more than
dairyfarmers,  ^ The 1961 GA Annual Conference resolved
to press for division of the cattle compensation fund
2as proposed by the Cattle Council. A further 
submission was prepared and presented, but again the 
Minister refused.
The GA then changed its strategy. The Executive 
Committee and staff apparently realised that 
establishment of a separate fund for tuberculosis was 
an unrealistic goal and decided instead to press for 
restoration of the subsidy on tuberculosis compensation. 
In a submission to the Minister the GA argued that, 
since the high volume of payments for tuberculosis 
was a consequence of the Government’s campaign to 
eradicate tuberculosis in dairy herds in the interests
of public health, the Government should subsidise
3payments for tuberculosis claims. Again the Minister 
refused, repeating his old argument that tuberculosis 
eradication was of direct benefit to all primary 
producers and adding that as the incidence of 
tuberculosis was decreasing, the imbalance of benefit
4would soon disappear. However, he agreed to reduce 
the levy, since the credit balance in the compensation 
fund on 30 June 1962 was almost £600,000. Amending
1
Report of Proceedings i960, p . 21 <,
2
Annual Conference minutes, 1961.
3
Report of Proceedings 1962, p.18.
4
Muster, 17 October 1962.
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legislation passed late in 1962 reduced both levies 
from l/6d to l/- per head, and also increased the 
maximum amount of compensation from £36 to £50 per head.
A new twist to the dispute between beef and dairy 
cattle owners came in 1963 when dairying interests 
suggested that since there was a healthy balance in 
the compensation fund the cost of tuberculosis testing 
of cattle should be met from the fund. The GA 
protested and received an assurance from the Minister 
that there would be no departure from existing 
commitments of the fund without consultation with 
industry organisations.^ But soon after when the 
tuberculosis eradication scheme moved into districts 
with a high concentration of beef cattle, the GA 
reversed its policy and supported the request of 
dairying interests. And with a further fall after 
1962 in the number of payments on account of 
tuberculosis, the dispute about the inequity between 
dairying and beef interests disappeared.
investment of the Cattle Compensation Fund
Although farm organisations failed to secure 
renewal of the government subsidy for the cattle 
compensation fund, in 1964 after persistent pressure 
the Government agreed to pay interest of 4 per cent p.a. 
on the credit balance in the fund up to a limit of 
£500,000. The idea came from the GA. In 1962 it first 
suggested that since there was a large credit balance
1
Report of Proceedings 1963» p.20.
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in the fund (£600,000 at 30 June 1962) a large part
should be invested.^ The Minister for Agriculture
refused this request on the grounds that the Cattle
Compensation Act made no provision for such investment,
and reminded the Association that when the fund had
been depleted the Treasury had provided loans from
consolidated revenue (£20,000 in 193 +^? £13? 000 in
1937, and £30,000 from 1938 to 1939)»^ To secure
detailed information on financial aspects of the fund
the Association wrote to the Chief of the Division
3of Animal Industry and on the basis of the information 
received made a further approach to the Minister. On 
l6 January 1963 the acting Minister of Agriculture 
(K.C. Compton) replied that, although it was possible 
to amend the act to provide for investment, this 
would be unwise in view of the continuing tuberculosis
4eradication programme. In characteristic fashion the 
GA persisted, and eventually the Minister for 
Agriculture agreed to discuss the feasibility of the 
suggestion with the Treasury. In July 1964 the 
Minister informed the Association that arrangements 
had been made for £ 300,000 of the credit balance in 
the fund to be regarded as being on fixed deposit for
1
Report of Proceedings 1962, p .19.
2
Annual reports of the Department of Agriculture.
3
Report of Proceedings 1963? p.20.
4
Ibid., p .21.
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12 months at 4 per cent interest«, Once again the 
G A ’s persistence in pressing for a reasonable goal 
paid off.
Other Representations, 1958 to 1965
From the 1958 amendment of the Cattle Compensation 
Act to the defeat of the Labor Government in May 1965? 
the GA sought many other modifications of the scheme. 
Those regarded as being of real importance were sought 
with vigour and persistence. Others, looked upon as 
being less important or less feasible, were often 
pursued to satisfy branches and district councils.
Perhaps the most important matter related to the
rejection of claims because of failure by owners to
give early notification of the disease. From the late
21950s the number of rejected claims rose sharply, and 
most rejections were on the grounds of delayed 
notification. Presumably departmental officers had 
been instructed to adopt a much firmer policy and the 
Department of Agriculture was using the cattle 
compensation scheme as a means to assist in the control 
and eradication of contagious diseases. The GA made 
representations on behalf of many individual members 
whose claims were rejected and sought two different 
amendments to the Act. First, it renewed its request 
for a provision to enable cattle owners to appeal to
1
Report of Proceedings 1964, p.13»
2
See reports of the Department of Agriculture for 
detailed figures.
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an independent tribunal against rejection of claims by 
the Chief of the Division of Animal Industry. Second, 
it suggested that stockowners in rugged country be 
shown greater leniency and that provision be made to 
permit such owners to opt out of the scheme. Both 
requests were refused. The Minister admitted that 
cattle owners in rugged country had just cause for 
complaint, but thought departmental officers treated 
such cases with leniency.
Because of a sudden increase in the number of 
cattle condemned at abattoirs on account of arthritis, 
the GA in 1962 and again in 1963 requested the 
inclusion of arthritis as a compensatable disease under 
the scheme.'*" This was refused on the grounds that 
arthritis was not a serious contagious disease and 
that effective methods of treatment were available.
The Minister also stated that, if compensation was 
payable for arthritis, owners would be encouraged to 
have their cattle destroyed, rather than undertake 
measures of prevention and treatment. After 1963 
the numbers condemned because of arthritis fell and 
the matter lapsed.
The problem of stock sold in other States was 
taken up on a number of occasions with both the 
Minister and the permanent head of the Department 
of Agriculture. The GA presented well documented 
submissions showing that while compensation was not
1
Report of Proceedings 1962, pp.19-20; and Report of 
Proceedings 1963, pp.2 5-6.
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payable on N.S.W. cattle sold in other States and the 
A.C.T., N.S.W. cattle sold in Victoria and South 
Australia were obliged to pay stamp duty to support 
the schemes operating in those States. However, no 
progress on this problem was achieved.
In 1962 on the request of its Tabulam local branch 
the Association took up the question of the power of 
rangers to order a diseased beast from saleyards for 
immediate slaughter without the payment of compensation. 
According to information supplied to the GA, a circular 
which had been issued by the Department of Agriculture 
to its officers stated:
Recently there have been several instances 
where the ranger has detected suspect 
cattle at district saleyards. In these 
cases the ranger has been instructed to 
order such cattle for slaughter without 
compensation.^
The GA sought legal opinion on the question and was
advised that this instruction was invalid since it
exceeded the powers of regulation conferred by the 
2Act. This information was conveyed to members in3the 1963 Report of Proceedings. No further complaints 
were made by GA members. Presumably the Department 
amended its instructions to officers.
1
Report of Proceedings 1963? p .19 •
2
GA file 13966: Cattle Compensation Administration
Act Fund-Powers P.P. Board Rangers.
Report of Proceedings 1963> p .1 9 •
3
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Change in Government, 1965
The defeat of the Renshaw Labor Government in the 
1965 general election was applauded by the GA, and 
meant that after twenty-four years of Labor rule a 
sympathetic government was again in power, The new 
Minister for Agriculture, W.A, Chaffey, was well known 
by the G A . While in opposition, he had often 
consulted the GA on agricultural matters and voiced 
the GA1s viewpoint in parliamentary debates. Once he 
assumed office Chaffey set about promoting greater 
understanding between all farm organisations and his 
department. He arranged meetings with various 
organisations. At one meeting for members of the GA 
Cattle Council, Chaffey and his officers explained 
the main policies of the Department and discussed the 
problem of control of exotic diseases. Films on 
livestock disease control in the United States were 
then shown.^
With the change in government the GA increased 
the tempo of its demands for modification of the cattle 
compensation scheme. A number of new submissions were 
prepared and in November 1965 the Cattle Council 
appointed a sub-committee to examine the cattle 
compensation legislation with a view to seeking major 
amendments. The new Government granted some 
concessions. In 1965 the two levies were reduced from
1
’Report of Proceedings, 1st July to 9th November 
1966’, mimeo document presented to the General Council, 
November 1966.
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l/~ to 6d„ Later the Government agreed to increase
the interest rate on the fund’s deposit with the
Treasury to per cent/ and to provide a slip with
each compensation payment cheque to enable cattle
owners to identify payments for particular claims. But
on other matters the GA’s requests were refused. In
February 1966, after studying the problem of compensation
for cattle sold interstate, Chaffey refused to amend
the legislation to provide compensation payments for 
2such cattle, and the following year refused other
requests. His successor, G.R. Crawford, in 1968 likewise
refused GA requests for an increase in the maximum
compensation payable to $120, and an amendment of the
Act to provide that the owner of stock ordered to be
slaughtered should receive full market value for them
irrespective of whether they were, on slaughter, found
3to be diseased or not.
Review
This chapter gives a different picture of the 
GA’s pressure group activities from that provided in 
the two previous chapters. To secure an accurate 
portrait of any economic pressure group it is necessary 
to look at both crises and periods of calm, at both
1
GA file 13960: Cattle Compensation Act Fund.
2
GA file 13962: Cattle Compensation Fund: Levy on
Interstate Movement.
3 ’Report of Proceedings from 1st January to 20th July, 
1968’, mimeo document presented to the General Council, 
August 1968.
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highly contentious issues and matters that are largely 
non-controversial. By concentrating on the GA' s role 
in the 1965 wool marketing controversy an observer 
could easily conclude that the GA invariably campaigns 
in public, that it holds views widely divergent from 
those of rival organisations, and that it is continually 
involved in inter-industry disputes. This is not the 
case. In largely non-controversial and non-partisan 
issue-areas such as cattle compensation the GA pursues 
its goals quietly and holds views which often differ 
little from those of its rivals. In such areas co­
operation rather than rivalry and public dispute is the 
keynot e.
Cattle compensation clearly falls into the category 
of a largely non-controversial and non-partisan matter. 
There was no need for primary producers to mount a 
public campaign to secure the establishment of a cattle 
compensation scheme since the Government, officers of 
the Department of Agriculture, and public health 
authorities all supported such a scheme in principle.
The only disagreement was on how the scheme should be 
financed, and on the details of its operation. Once 
the scheme was implemented, farm organisations sought 
concessions by direct approaches rather than by making 
threats or mounting public campaigns. The press has 
never shown any real interest in the scheme and some 
amendments to the legislation have passed unnoticed in 
the city dailies. The conflicting interests of beef 
cattle producers and dairyfarmers with regard to the 
scheme’s operation have never resulted in much 
antagonism between the organisations concerned. Cattle
487
compensation has always been regarded by the major 
political parties as a non-party issue. The scheme was 
introduced in 1951 by a Labor Government following an 
election promise made by its leader in 1950» but it was 
treated strictly as a non-party issue. Opposition 
spokesmen supported its introduction, though they 
favoured certain minor amendments. On each of the 
three occasions to 1967 when the Cattle Compensation 
Act was amended, the legislation passed through both 
houses with a minimum of debate and without a single 
division. From 1952 to 1965, the cattle compensation 
scheme was operated by a Labor administration and after 
May 1965 by a Liberal-Country Party government. The 
change in government made little appreciable difference 
to its operation.
In pursuing many of their goals, particularly those 
in issue-areas that are largely non-controversial, farm 
organisations use little real ’pressure'. They request, 
they implore, they make submissions, they produce 
arguments; but they rarely threaten or try to force a 
government to take a certain course of action. This 
case-study well illustrates this point. The GA and 
other organisations made numerous requests about the 
cattle compensation scheme - and each time they 
produced logical arguments in favour of adopting a 
policy or making a modification. They appealed to 
reason, to administrative efficiency, to fair play, 
to the common good. As far as the G A ’s records and 
press reports reveal, no threats were ever made by the 
GA about what would happen if the Government failed to 
respond to some demand concerning the cattle compensation
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scheme, Obviously there were few threats the GA or 
other organisations could make on such a dull matter, 
and no effective sanctions that it could employ. The 
GA could have refused to handle complaints from its 
members concerning the administration of the scheme, 
and so have placed an added burden on the Department 
of Agriculture. (The GA files reveal what a useful 
function the Association performed in acting as a sieve 
for grievances and in explaining the provisions of the 
legislation and regulations to individual cattle 
owners). But the GA could not afford to take action 
which would have damaged its relationship with its 
members and its standing far more than it would have 
inconvenienced the Department of Agriculture. The 
G A ’s submissions to the Government and Department of 
Agriculture on cattle compensation were always 
detailed, well-argued, courteous and couched in the 
language of bureaucrats. Official requests concluded 
with statements such as: ’I commend the above requests
to you for your favourable consideration’. Letters from 
the Chief Executive Officer or General Secretary 
frequently offered to make staff available to discuss 
the matters raised or to arrange for members of the 
G A ’s Cattle Council to be available for consultation 
at the time of their next meeting. Ministers and public 
servants replied to GA requests in the same courteous, 
reasonable way, giving detailed explanations why 
policies could not be modified or concessions made.
Thus, on cattle compensation policy there was little 
real ’pressure’ in its usual sense; rather farm 
organisations and government carried on a dialogue.
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But in this dialogue the Government always held 
the upper hand» The GA with other organisations 
persuaded the Government to adopt the idea of a cattle 
compensation scheme and over the years the GA secured 
modifications and concessions to benefit its members.
But considering the public health value of the scheme, 
and its value as a means of increasing rural 
production, farm organisations did rather poorly. The 
Government gave a mere 20 per cent subsidy on 
tuberculosis cases for the first three years and, 
except for the interest paid on the capital sum in the 
fund, after 1955 the scheme was financed by primary 
producers alone. After 1955 the Government even made a 
small charge on the fund for administrative costs. On 
cattle compensation policy there is no evidence 
whatsoever to suggest that farm organisations dictated 
to the Government.
After the early 1950s the GA largely abandoned 
joint approaches with other organisations on cattle 
compensation matters. This reflected its growing 
disillusionment with the effectiveness of 'peak* 
organisations. But it was also related to the fact that 
the GA showed much greater interest in the scheme’s 
detailed operation and had the staff resources to 
prepare detailed submissions and to establish close, 
personal contacts with officers of the Department of 
Agriculture, On detailed administrative matters, 
like those related to cattle compensation, the GA 
bureaucracy is at its best.
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This case-study shows the persistence of the GA 
in pursuing its objectives. A refusal is seldom 
treated as final. The GA is used to refusals; its 
response to each refusal is to try a different 
strategy, or a new argument, or to concentrate on 
other goals for the time heing.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER l4 
Conclusions
In this study our approach has been based on the 
assumption that the behaviour of a pressure group cannot 
be properly understood or explained without reference 
to the environment in which the group operates and 
with which it interacts. We have seen that economic, 
cultural and political factors have a direct influence 
not only on the way the GA behaves in politics and on 
its effectiveness, but also on its internal
characteristics. Through their influence on its internal 
characteristics, environmental factors also have an 
indirect effect on the GA ’ s behaviour and political 
effectiveness. Environmental factors have provided 
us with an explanation of why the GA differs 
significantly from other farm organisations in its group 
characteristics, behaviour and political effectiveness, 
and with an answer to the question of why the Australian 
wool industry has been divided so long and often so 
bitterly over wool marketing and promotion. Our study 
suggests that this approach may be useful in the study 
of any pressure group, and that with economic pressure 
groups attention should be given to the influence of 
economic factors. From our experience it appears that 
the political behaviour of an economic pressure group 
is closely related to the economic context and climate 
in which the industry (or industries) represented by the 
group operates, and to fluctuations in the incomes of 
members.
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In the case of the GA, economic, cultural and 
political factors are all of major importance. While 
the relative influence of each of these three sets of 
factors on different aspects of the Association’s 
behaviour, political effectiveness and group
characteristics naturally differs, overall it is impossible 
to rank any one of them higher than the other two. It 
would be interesting to know whether the application of 
our model to the analysis of other economic pressure 
groups would yield a similar conclusion. It seems 
possible that there may be some significant differences 
in this respect between farm organisations, business 
groups, and trade unions and professional associations.’*’
One conclusion that emerges from our study is that 
the GA’s political future is inescapably linked to 
economic, cultural and political factors. With its 
large and constant membership, its wealth, its expertise, 
and its position with governments, the GA has no reason 
for concern about its immediate future. But in the 
long-term its future will depend largely on the 
profitability of the industries it claims to represent 
and their continuing importance as major exporters, 
on changing attitudes and values, and on different
1
It is interesting to note that in his study of the 
BMA, Eckstein seems to place more stress on the ’structure 
of the decision-making processes’ than on any of his 
other determinants. In a study of Sohyo, the Japanese 
peak organisation of labour unions, based on Eckstein’s 
model, Willey concludes that of ’the important variables 
which Eckstein posed as determinants, only political 
culture and group characteristics appear to be truly 
significant...’
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political factors such as the party or parties in 
government, the relative importance of Commonwealth 
and State governments, and the relative influence and 
strength of other pressure groups. Obviously no-one 
knows what changes will take place. However, if Gruen’s 
projections for the wool, wheat and meat industries 
prove to be right, woolgrowing will become increasingly 
less profitable in relation to wheatgrowing and meat 
production. If wool prices continue to fall while 
costs increase, many woolgrowers will need a direct 
subsidy or some other form of assistance to continue 
to produce wool. And even with a subsidy, many of them 
may find it more profitable to produce meat and wheat, 
and also barley, maize and irrigation crops, rather 
than wool. Changes of this kind will inevitably 
have important repercussions on the GA.
While some criticisms made of the GA are justified, 
our study shows that others are not. The GA has at 
times been over cautious, and its emphasis on democratic 
procedures has sometimes caused delays in decision­
making. Its policy on public relations has often been 
somewhat confused, and in some issue-areas its resources 
perhaps could have been used to better advantage. On 
the other hand, our analysis has shown that the GA is 
democratic in practice as well as theory; it is not 
solely a veto group and it probably makes more positive 
suggestions to governments than many of its rivals; 
it tries to represent the interests of its members, 
both smaller producers and large landholders; and it is 
not a ’tool’ of the wool firms.
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Moreover, our study suggests that many of the 
common criticisms of economic pressure groups are not 
borne out in the case of the GA. The GA is not 
responsible for the secrecy that often surrounds 
decision-making on agricultural policy. Instead, it 
is just as much opposed to the practice of ’government 
by secrecy’ as many economists and pressure group 
critics, though its opposition springs from different 
(and perhaps more selfish) motives. It would be foolish 
to assert that the GA is not selfish and that it is not 
concerned primarily with advancing the interests of its 
members. But at the same time, it does not ignore 
completely the idea of the public interest, and it is 
no more selfish than^other kind of pressure group or, 
for that matter, any political party or government 
department. To critise economic pressure groups for 
being selfish is to take a very naive view of politics 
and of human behaviour. Our study also leads us to 
question the common assertion that farm organisations 
are exceedingly powerful and that primary producers, 
more than any other section, have manipulated political 
processes for their own advantage. While the GA has 
often influenced official decision-making in many 
different fields, it has never been in the position 
of being able to dictate to governments. Even non- 
Labor governments refuse a large proportion of the 
requests it makes, and frequently governments take 
action which is strongly opposed by the GA. Moreover, 
the successes that the GA has won in politics must be 
attributed to a wide range of other factors as much as 
to ’pressure’ by the GA. In other words, it is
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influential in politics more because many of the 
proposals it makes are considered by governments and 
departments to be economically sound, likely to improve 
administrative efficiency, or useful to build up support 
from the public or sections of it, rather than because 
it commands some kind of coercive power.
Our study also suggests that some of the commonly 
held beliefs about the methods that pressure groups use 
are not based on fact.'*’ We have seen that the GA works 
mainly through bureaucratic channels rather than through 
literal ’lobbying*. While it has a large staff, it 
does not employ any full-time lobbyists to button-hole 
members of parliament, Ministers and senior public 
servants in the corridors of parliamentary and 
administrative buildings. Moreover, as we have seen, 
the GA seeks to achieve its political goals mainly by 
presenting Ministers and departments with detailed and 
carefully prepared proposals, and generally the ’pressure’ 
it uses is the same kind of ’pressure’ that one government 
departments or authority might use to influence another.
1
For example, Crisp (p.135) gives the impression, that 
literal ’lobbying’ is the main method by whii^7groups 
work on governments. He describes the ’growing phalanx 
of resident lobbyists in Canberra’ and the large number 
of ’out-of-town’ men who can be seen ’scurrying about 
the King’s Hall and lobbies of Parliament, the Hotel 
Canberra, and administrative departments, or entertaining 
Ministers, Members and senior public servants more or 
less discreetly’, but does not mention the use of normal 
bureaucratic channels.
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While we would reject the view that public policy 
is determined simply by the pressure on governments 
from groups representing different interests, it is 
clear that pressure groups are important political 
structures. Moreover, they perform many useful 
political functions, We have observed that the GA 
provides graziers with an important means by which 
they can participate actively in politics, with 
machinery for formulating specific and detailed 
proposals, and with a channel of communication to 
official decision-makers. It also functions as an 
ombudsman taking up the specific grievances of 
individual members as they relate to government. Apart 
from its benefits to members, the GA provides Ministers 
and public servants with useful information, advice and 
policy proposals, even if they are one-sided. It 
provides administrative help for departments by acting 
as a sieve for grievances, and by providing suitable 
experienced personnel for appointment to marketing boards 
and official committees. It helps win and organise 
support for those government policies it favours. It 
provides governments with a body able to negotiate on 
behalf of graziers, and with a useful channel to 
communicate information to individual producers. It 
also acts as a watchdog, alerting the public to what is 
going on in government and in rural industries. 
Admittedly, there are some dangers associated with 
pressure groups. Some groups have much greater resources 
than others and some interests are not even organised; 
there is always the danger that groups may not be 
properly representing the interests of their members;
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and too close relations between large groups 
representing a whole industry or section and 
governments may not be in the public interest. However, 
there are already many instituional and cultural 
restraints on pressure groups, and overall their 
usefulness outweighs their evils and dangers. They 
supplement other forms of representation, they provide 
machinery to help in the sifting process involved 
in translating public opinion into policy, they help 
promote consensus as much as they cause disagreement, 
and they contribute to the integration and stability 
of Australian society.
Finally, one of the important and obvious 
conclusions that emerges from this study is that a 
considerable amount of research will be necessary before 
we have an adequate picture of the role that pressure 
groups play in the Australian political system. Little 
is known about the operation of business groups, or of 
the pressure group activities of trade unions and 
professional associations. Except for Kristianson1s 
study of the Returned Services League, we know even 
less about the activities of what are commonly called 
attitude or promotional groups. And until we know more 
about the role of these different kinds of groups, 
there will be little point in attempting any general 
comparison of Australian pressure groups with those in 
other countries.
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APPENDIX
Survey of Farm Organisation Leaders
The postal survey of leaders of the GA, the UFWA 
and the N.S.W, division of the APPU conducted by the 
writer was not part of the original design for the 
study, but was planned and undertaken only after most 
of the data had been collected. Its purpose was to 
secure more detailed and precise information on the 
social and economic backgrounds of leaders. Such 
information was unavailable from other sources, and was 
necessary to test the hypothesis developed by the writer 
from personal impressions and from limited documentary 
material that differences in social and economic 
backgrounds between leaders of the GA and its two main 
rival organisations are considerable.
Postal surveys are somewhat out of favour with 
social scientists today, mainly because of the poor 
response rates often secured.-- Other survey methods 
however, in this case were impracticable. Leaders of 
these three organisations are widely scattered through 
N.S.W. and, since the survey would constitute only a 
small part of the study, it was considered that more 
expensive and time-consuming methods were not warranted.
Kish suggests that with postal surveys more 
satisfactory response rates can be secured if a brief 
simple questionnaire is used, if follow-up letters are 
sent to those who do not return their questionnaires, 
and finally if outstanding non-respondents can be 
interviewed.- Interviewing of outstanding non­
respondents in this case was not possible, but the other 
two suggestions were adopted.
1
Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling, New York, 1965, p.538,
states that with postal surveys the response rate can 
vary from 10 per cent to almost 100 per cent.
2
Ibid., P.539.
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Simple, single-page questionnaires were designed 
and sent to all members of the general councils of the 
GA and the UFWA and to all members of the A P P U 's 
equivalent organ, the Finance and Administration 
Committee, An accompanying letter explained the 
purpose of the survey. Respondents were told that while 
a space for their name was provided on the questionnaire 
form, there was no compulsion to write their name. A 
stamped, addressed envelope was provided. Six weeks 
after the first letters were posted a second letter with 
another copy of the questionnaire form and another 
stamped, addressed envelope was sent to all leaders, 
except those who had replied and who had written their 
names on the questionnaire form. This second letter 
however, stated that if a questionnaire form had already 
been returned the letter should be ignored.
The response rates secured after the first and 
second mailings are shown in the accompanying table.
From the table it is clear that the second mailing was 
well worthwhile. The high response rates made it 
possible to make valid comparisons, particularly between 
leaders of the GA and the UFWA. The President of the 
APPU, who supplied the names and addresses of members of 
his Finance and Administration Committee, explained that 
some members of the Committee could be considered as 
being inactive. This fact probably explains why the 
response rate for the APPU was considerably less than 
that for the other organisations.
Response Rates Secured
No. in 
survey
No . of 
responses 
to first 
mailing
N o . of 
responses 
to second 
mailing
Total
responses
No . *
GA 71 55 8 63 89
UFWA 39 30 4 34 87
APPU 3 6 19 4 23 64
1
At the time of the survey both the GA and the UFWA 
general councils were one short of their nominal 
s trength.
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A copy of the questionnaire used for members of 
the GA is reproduced below. The forms used for the 
other organisations were identical, except for the names 
of organisations and terms such as General Council, or 
Finance and Administration Committee.
-x- * * *
LEADERSHIP IN PRIMARY INDUSTRY SURVEY
The Graziers* Association of N .S.W.
1, Career in the Association
When did you join the Association?
Was (or is) your father a member of the 
Association?
When did you attend your first annual 
conference?
When did you first become a member of 
General Council?
2 . Education
Please tick any of the following institutions you 
at t ended
State or church primary school 
State secondary school 
Private or church secondary school 
University
Agricultural college 
Technical college
Name? ....
Do you hold a university degree or college
diploma? . . . .
(Details ............................ . . . .......... .....)
Any other qualifications? 
3» Age (please tick)
34 and under 35-44 45-44 55-64 65 and over
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4. Experience in other organisations
Have you Had experience as a 
Shire councillor?
Member of a Pastures Protection Board 
Member of a show society committee
(pleas e 
tick)
Are you a member of any of these farm 
organisations? (please tick those to 
which you belong)
UFWA
Primary Producers' Union of N.S.V.
APPU
Clubs? ..............................
5. Economic interests
What is the main commodity that you produce?
How many properties do you own or partly own? .
Total acreage
No. of sheep ........  No. of cattle . . . .
No. of acres of wheat .......................
No. of permanent employees .................
Are you a member of the board of directors of a 
public company? . ......................... .
NAME (optional) ....................................
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
A . OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
Annual reports of the Australian Meat Board, the
Australian Wheat Board and the Australian Wool 
Board.
Annual reports of the Grain Elevators Board of New 
South Wales.
Annual reports of the New South Wales Department of 
Agriculture.
Australian Primary Industry Organisations, Marketing 
Division, Department of Primary Industry, 1967*
Australian Wool Board; Report and Recommendations on 
Wool Marketing Presented to the Australian Wool 
Industry Conference, Canberra, July, 1964.
Australian Wool Board; Report on Wool Marketing, 
Melbourne, 31 October 1967, (four volumes).
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, various volumes.
Commonwealth of Australia: Report of the Committee of
Economic Enquiry, 19^5 •
Commonwealth of Australia; Report of the Wool 
Marketing Committee of Enquiry, I 9 6 2 .
Commonwealth of Australia; Parliamentary Debates.
Historical Background and Evolution of Functions of the 
Department of Primary Industry, Canberra, n.d.
Income Tax for Farmers & Graziers, seventh edition,
1967• (issued under the authority of the 
Commonwealth Treasurer, and the Minister for 
Primary Industry).
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Marketing of Australian Primary Products, Marketing 
Division, Department of Primary Industry, 1965*
New South Wales Parliamentary Debates.
Official Year Book of New South Wales, various editions»
Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
various editions.
Quarterly and annual publications of the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics? Fibres other 
Than Wool, Quarterly Review of Agricultural 
Economics, The Beef Situation, The Wheat Situation, 
The Wool Outlook.
Reports of the Tariff Board.
Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool. Industry, 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, I96I»
Supplement to the Statistical Handbook, of the Sheep and 
Wool. Industry 1 9 6 4 , Bureau of Agricultural 
Economic s , 1 9 6 4 .
Rural Industries 1 9 6 3-6 4 , Bulletin No.2 , Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1966.
The Australian Sheep Industry Survey I96O-6I to 1962-63, 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1965.
The Australian Sheep Industry Survey I963-64, Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, 1 9 67.
The Industrial Arbitration Reports of New South Wales, 
various editions.
The Reserve Price Plan for Wool Marketing, report 
authorised by the AWIC and prepared by the 
Australian Wool Board in conjunction with the 
Executive of AWIC, July 1965*
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B ’ n e w s p a p e r s  a n d  m a g a z i n e s
Country Life and Stock and Station Journal (weekly).
Muster (the official journal of the GA - weekly).
The Australian (daily).
The Australian Financial Review (daily).
The Australian Worker (the official journal of the 
AWU - weekly).
The Bulletin (weekly).
The Canberra Times (daily).
The Land (an independent weekly rural newspaper which 
functions as an organ of the UFWA).
The Sydney Morning Herald (daily - mainly the country 
edition used).
United Farmer (the official journal of the UFWA - 
fortnightly).
Limited use was made of a number of country newspapers.
C • OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GA
At its offices at 56 Young Street, Sydney, the GA 
has an excellent set of well-preserved arid well- 
organised records dating back to the Association’s 
foundation. The following were the most useful for this 
s tudys
1 . Documentary Material 
Membership record files.
Minutes of Council and General Council.
Minutes of the Executive Committee.
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Minutes and records (including verbatim reports of 
debates) of Annual Conferences (1 9 1 8 -I9 6 8 ) and 
special conferences (1925* 1 9 5 6 , I9 6 2 , I9 6 3 and
1965).
Minutes of standing and specialist committees. 
Minutes of local branches and district councils. 
Subject and correspondence files.
2. Publications of the Association 
Annual Report, 1910-17, 1947-56. 
NoS.W. Graziers* Annual, 1918-35* 
The Graziers* Annual, 1936 -6 7/ 6 8 . 
Report of Proceedings , 1957-67*
D , COLLECTIONS OF OTHER RECORDS
1. The FSA (Dixson Library, University of New
England, Armidale).
Minutes of Annual Conferences, 1911-17? 1931-32; 
1945-49; 1953-61.
Minutes of Executive Council and Executive 
C ommittee, 1945-61,
2. The Wheatgrowers' Union of New South Wales and
Wheat and Woolgrowers1 2 Association of New 
South Wales (Dixson Library, University of 
New England, Armidale)
Minutes of Executive Council of Wheatgrowers1 
Union, 1954-57«
Minutes of Executive Council of Wheat and 
Woolgrowers' Association, 1957-60,
506
3. B,A,N„ Cole Papers
Personal collection of papers relating to the FSA 
and wool marketing in the 1930s and ,1940s, 
made available to the author by Mr B.A.N. 
Cole, Molong, New South Wales«
E . MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY OTHER ORGANISATIONS
Many different farm organisations, business groups 
and trade unions supplied the writer with copies of 
their constitutions, annual reports, brochures, and 
newspapers. Many farm organisations kindly supplied 
information on their membership, membership contribution 
rates, and on the staffing of their secretariats. 
Information and material was also supplied by the 
National Farmers' Union in London, by the Canadian 
Federation of Agriculture in Ottawa, by the National 
Farmers' Union in Denver (Colorado), by the National 
Grange in Washington, and by the American Farm Bureau 
Federation in Chicago.
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